Elderkin v. Nova Scotia (Service and Municipal Relations)

Elderkin v. Nova Scotia (Service and Municipal Relations) Court Supreme Court Date 2012-02-09 Citation 2012 NSSC 61 Docket Hfx 347647 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Pickup, Arthur W. D. (Honourable Justice) Document Type Decision Relations Library Sheet - Elderkin v. Nova Scotia (Service and Municipal Relations) - 2012 NSSC 61 - 2012-02-09 - Library Sheet Decision Content SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Elderkin v. Nova Scotia (Service and Municipal Relations), 2012 NSSC 61 Date: 20120209 Docket: Hfx. No. 347647 Registry: Halifax Between: Peter Elderkin, Harold Forsyth, Hal Stirling, Doug Hennigar and Catherine Streatch Applicants v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations) Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice Arthur W.D. Pickup Heard: October 3, 2011, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Counsel: Robert G. Grant, Q.C., and Matthew Pierce Solicitors for the Applicants Alison Campbell and Stephen McGrath Solicitors for the Respondent By the Court: [1] The applicant landowners applied to the Municipality of the County of Kings (the Municipality) for rezoning of an area of about 380 acres in the Coldbrook - Wolfville urban corridor. They proposed a Greenwich Comprehensive Development District (GCDD) which would permit mixed use development of lands currently designated for either agricultural, farm commercial or environmental open space use. The applicants say they are unable to use their properties for farm purposes because of the increasing urbanization of adjacent communities. They say they have experienced declining profits from agricultural use of the properties. [2] The Municipality approved the amendments to the Municipal Development Plan and Land Use By-law by majority vote on February 1, 2011. In accordance with the Municipal Government Act, S.N.S. 1998, c.18 (the Act), the amendments were sent to the Provincial Director of Planning, who determined that they required ministerial approval under s. 208 of the Act on the basis that the amendments may not be reasonably consistent with the statements of provincial interest regarding drinking water protection and the preservation of agricultural land. The Minister of Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations (the Minister) met with the warden and other municipal officials. The Minister then issued a decision on March 23, 2011, advising that he was satisfied that the Municipality would do what was necessary to protect wellfields in the town of Wolfville. He concluded, however, that the amendments should not be approved because the need to remove the land from agricultural use had not been sufficiently demonstrated. [3] The applicants, who are the property owners most affected by the refusal to approve the amendments, seek judicial review of the Minister’s decision to reject the amendments. In addition to challenging the decision on its merits, the applicants claim that the decision-making process employed by the Minister did not accord with the duty of fairness. They allege that notwithstanding past meetings with municipal officials (and with the applicants themselves when he was Minister of Agriculture), the Minister rejected the amendments without giving them an opportunity to respond to his concerns. The applicants also allege that the written reasons for the Minister’s decision were inadequate. Background: [4] In early 2010 the applicants applied to the Municipality for the rezoning of approximately 380 acres of land they own in the Coldbrook - Wolfville urban corridor. These lands were designated for agricultural, farm commercial or environmental open space use. The application was to amend the Municipal Planning Strategy and Land Use By-law to allow for the establishment of a Greenwich Comprehensive Development District (GCDD) which would permit mixed use development on the subject lands. [5] According to the applicants they had two meetings with senior provincial officials to discuss the proposal. In 2009 they met with the Director and Assistant Director of Planning, and in 2010 they met with John MacDonnell, who was then the Minister of Agriculture, and his senior staff. The applicants claim they were encouraged about the prospects of the success of their proposal as a result of these meetings. [6] There was a lengthy planning process carried out by Kings Municipality, including public consultation, an agricultural impact assessment and a servicing feasibility study. Council voted to approve the applicants’ rezoning application on February 1, 2011. Section 2.12 of the amended Municipal Planning Strategy describes the purpose of the Comprehensive Development District: The purpose of the Greenwich Comprehensive Development District (GCDD) is to enable the ongoing growth of the community based upon a land use plan which seeks to enable urban type development in areas where municipal services and urban form can be extended in a rational and cost effective manner. The GCDD will also provide some protection for existing agricultural uses and require the establishment of new agricultural activities within the community on lands with documented high capability agricultural soils. New agricultural uses and practices will be enabled which are environmentally sustainable and commercially viable given the existing and growing constraints created by proximity to non-agricultural uses. [7] The Minister’s March 23, 2011 decision rejecting the amendments indicated that the proposed amendments conflicted with the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land. The Minister wrote: In my opinion, the documents do not adequately support the need to remove the land from agricultural use. You indicated that the Wolfville to Coldbrook corridor was intended for development in the original municipal plan in 1979, but if this were the case, the document wouldn’t need amending now. [8] The applicants filed a Notice for Judicial Review on April 27, 2011 seeking judicial review of the Minister’s decision and, in the alternative, alleging that he breached the duty of procedural fairness. Issues: [9] The issues are as follows: 1. Judicial Review of the Minister’s decision on the merits. a) What is the standard of review applicable to the Minister’s decision? b) Was the Minister’s decision reasonable? 2) Did the Minister breach a duty of fairness owed to the applicants? Analysis: 1. Judicial Review of the Minster’s decision on the merits. a) What is the standard of review applicable to the Minister’s decision? [10] In conducting a judicial review, the first question to be determined is the standard of review to be applied by the court. Since Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SSC 9, there are only two standards of review, correctness and reasonableness. The court described the standard of reasonableness at para. 47: Reasonableness is a deferential standard animated by the principle that underlies the development of the two previous standards of reasonableness: certain questions that come before administrative tribunals do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result. Instead, they may give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions. Tribunals have a margin of appreciation within the range of acceptable and rational solutions. A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision‑making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. [11] The standard of correctness was defined at para. 50: As important as it is that courts have a proper understanding of reasonableness review as a deferential standard, it is also without question that the standard of correctness must be maintained in respect of jurisdictional and some other questions of law. This promotes just decisions and avoids inconsistent and unauthorized application of law. When applying the correctness standard, a reviewing court will not show deference to the decision maker's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the court to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer. From the outset, the court must ask whether the tribunal's decision was correct. [12] The applicable standard of review is determined with reference to several factors set out in Dunsmuir, supra, at para. 64: The analysis must be contextual. As mentioned above, it is dependent on the application of a number of relevant factors, including: (1) the presence or absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by interpretation of enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at issue, and; (4) the expertise of the tribunal. In many cases, it will not be necessary to consider all of the factors, as some of them may be determinative in the application of the reasonableness standard in a specific case. [13] The applicants submit that there are two issues for which standards of review must be determined: a) the level of deference owed by the Minister to the Municipality, that is, the scope of the Minister’s jurisdiction to reject planning documents submitted for his review; and b) whether the Minister erred in his decision to reject the amendments. [14] The applicants submit that the first issue requires a review on the correctness standard. They say it is not clear from the Minister’s decision whether he considered the extent to which he owed deference to the decision of the Municipality. [15] The applicants submit that the scope of the Minister’s discretion is limited by the Municipal Government Act. They say the Minister’s ability to reject planning documents is limited to those circumstances where planning documents are not “reasonably consistent” with statements of provincial interest enacted as regulations under the Act. They say there is no privative clause protecting the Minister’s decision, and that the planning provisions of the Act express an intention to grant primary planning jurisdiction to municipalities, so long as the municipalities comply with statements of provincial interest. [16] The applicants say the level of deference owed by the Minister to the Municipality must be assessed on a correctness standard, as it is a question of law going to the scope of the Minister’s jurisdiction. Such questions, according to the applicant are more directly within the expertise of the courts and as such warrant no deference. [17] The applicants’ position is predicated on s. 190(b) of the Municipal Government Act and is essentially a correct description of one of the purposes of Part 8 (Planning and Development) of the Act as set out at s. 190(b). The applicants, however, do not consider s. 190(a), which indicates that another purpose of Part 8 is “to enable the Province to identify and protect its interest in the use and development of land”. [18] In deciding whether to approve amendments, the Minister was carrying out an independent discretionary policy function under the Act. He was not conducting a judicial review of the Municipality’s planning decision. The suggested correctness standard is inappropriate. Because the Minister is carrying out a discretionary policy function under the Act , his decision is entitled to deference and should be reviewed on a reasonableness standard. [19] The applicants say that the standard of review on the second issue is somewhat dependent on the court’s determination of the first issue (as they have framed it), that is, the level of deference owed by the Minister to the Municipality. They submit that the Minister’s jurisdiction to reject planning documents is limited to circumstances where the planning documents are not reasonably consistent with a statement of provincial interest, and that the “reasonably consistent” threshold requires the Minister to defer to the municipality except in cases of clear conflict. They say this is fundamentally a question of statutory interpretation, that is, to determine whether there is a basis upon which the amendments are not reasonably consistent with the legislation. They say that such a question is a question of law within the particular expertise of the court. They say that the question of whether the Minister stayed within his jurisdiction in overturning the municipal legislation is of sufficient general importance to the legal system that it should warrant review on the correctness standard. As will be seen below, I conclude that the applicants have fundamentally misconstrued the nature of the Minister’s duty as well as the nature of the issue before the court. [20] The respondents say reasonableness is the applicable standard. In discussing the factors that must be considered in the standard of review analysis as stated in Dunsmuir, supra, they say that there is no privative clause and neither is there a right of appeal. As the Municipal Government Act is silent on this issue they say this factor is neutral. [21] The next relevant factor, the “purpose of the decision-maker” is determined by interpreting the enabling legislation. In this case, the Minister is the decision- maker. The legislation requires the Minister, in certain circumstances to approve planning documents (s. 208(3)). As noted earlier, the applicants refer to s. 190(b) of the Municipal Government Act to support their argument that the municipality is owed deference because one of the purposes of Part 8 of the Municipal Government Act is providing the Municipality with primary authority for planning. However, as the respondent points out, the applicants fail to mention the equally important purpose identified in s. 190(a), that being to “enable the Province to identify and protect its interests in the use and development of land.” In connection with this, s. 193 provides that the Governor In Council may adopt or amend a statement of provincial interest on the recommendation of the Minister. [22] The respondent says that the Minister’s purpose as a decision maker is to identify and protect provincial interests in land use and development. This purpose is set out in Schedule B to the Municipal Government Act which contains the statements of provincial interest, which are statements of policy adopted by the provincial government. Statements of provincial interest have the force of regulations pursuant to s. 194(5) of the Act (see N.S. Reg. 101/2001). Schedule B provides, under the heading “implementation”, that the Minister is responsible for interpreting statements of provincial interest: 1. These statements of provincial interest are issued under the Municipal Government Act. The Minister of Housing and Municipal Affairs [now the Minister of Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations], in cooperation with other provincial departments, is responsible for their interpretation. [23] The respondent says the purpose of these provisions is to allow the Minister to identify and protect stated provincial interests when deciding whether to approve planning documents. The respondent argues that the Minister’s decision is entitled to significant deference as he is the person statutorily charged with interpreting the statements of provincial interest. [24] The third factor in the standard of review analysis is the nature of the question at issue. The respondent submits that it is a question of mixed fact and law whether the Minister gave insufficient weight or any weight to the fact that the municipal council had approved the proposed amendments when exercising his discretion to consider whether the Municipality’s proposal was reasonably consistent with the statement of provincial interest regarding agricultural land. As a question of mixed law and fact, the respondent says this factor supports deference. [25] The applicants maintain that the Minister, when considering a statement of provincial interest, is engaged in statutory interpretation. The respondent says the statements of provincial interest, although found in a Schedule to a statute and given the force of regulations, are policy guidelines. The introduction to the statements of provincial interest states that they are “general in nature” and “provide guidance rather than rigid standards”. The respondent submits that this demonstrates that the Minister is exercising discretion and, therefore, the rules of statutory interpretation are not appropriately applied, and deference is required. [26] The final factor in the standard of review of analysis is the expertise of the decision maker. The respondent submits that Ministers of the Crown, because their decisions are based on a public mandate relating to the administration of their department, the determination of matters of public interest and balancing competing public rights, are in fact, experts on public policy. As well, the Minister has the benefit of specialist advice from within the department. [27] Considering the factors set out in Dunsmuir, supra, and the submissions of the parties, I conclude that the deferential standard of reasonableness is appropriate. There was no privative clause to protect the Minister’s decision. The Minister is the designated decision-maker under the Municipal Government Act which requires the Minister, in certain circumstances, to approve planning documents. The Minister is mandated with protecting provincial interests as reflected in the statements of provincial interest. The Minister’s purpose is to identify and protect provincial interests in land use and development. [28] As the Minister is deciding a question of discretion and policy there should be deference. The implementation section of Schedule B states that the Minister is responsible for the interpretation of statements of provincial interest. This indicates a legislative intent that the Minister is entitled to deference in their interpretation. [29] Finally, I am satisfied that ministers of the Crown should be considered experts on public policy within their departments, as argued by the respondent, and that the Minister would have the benefit of specialist advice. As a result this type of ministerial decision is given significant deference. [30] For these reasons I am satisfied that the standard of review of the Minister’s decision should be reasonableness. b) Was the Minister’s Decision reasonable? [31] The Supreme Court of Canada described the concept of reasonableness in the context of a ministerial decision in United States v. Lake, 2008 SCC 23. LeBel J., for the court, said: 41 Reasonableness does not require blind submission to the Minister’s assessment; however, the standard does entail more than one possible conclusion. The reviewing court’s role is not to re-assess the relevant factors and substitute its own view. Rather, the court must determine whether the Minister’s decision falls within a range of reasonable outcomes... [32] The applicants raised two main grounds to suggest that the Minister, as they put it, exceeded his jurisdiction and made an error of law: a) That the Minister erred by not deferring to the Municipality’s interpretation of the statement of provincial interest regarding agricultural land. b) That the Minister erred in determining that the applicants had to demonstrate a need. [33] This is not an appeal. To speak of the Minister “erring” is to mistake the true question, that is, was the Minister’s decision a reasonable one? Did the Minister act reasonably by not deferring to the Municipality’s interpretation of the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land? [34] Not all planning documents are subject to ministerial review. Only those flagged by the Director of Planning pursuant to s. 208(3) of the Municipal Government Act are put before the Minister. Sub-section 208(3) provides: (3) Where the Director determines that the planning documents (a) appear to affect a provincial interest; (b) may not be reasonably consistent with an applicable statement of provincial interest; (c) appear to conflict with the law; or (d) in the case of a subdivision by‑law, may conflict with the provincial subdivision regulations, the planning documents are subject to the Minister's approval. [35] If the Director determines that one of the these provisions apply, the Minister then reviews the planning documents under s. 208(6) and decides whether to approve them. While s. 208(6) does not specify the factors which the Minister must consider when reviewing planning documents, the applicants say it is clear from the planning provisions of the Municipal Government Act that the Minister’s decision is to be governed by whether the planning documents are reasonably consistent with statements of provincial interest. The applicants say that the standard of reasonable consistency strikes the appropriate balance under the Act. The Province is afforded the opportunity to identify overarching planning interests, but municipalities retain the general authority to make planning decisions so long as they are reasonably compliant with the Province’s general interest. [36] The applicants say that the courts have held that municipalities are owed significant deference in their planning decisions. In Midtown Tavern & Grill Ltd. v. Nova Scotia (Utility and Review Board), 2006 NSCA 115, the Court of Appeal made the following remarks about appeals to the Utility and Review Board: 45 Thus in this case, the Board, did not have to apply a pragmatic and functional approach which the developer argues would command a reasonableness simpliciter standard of review. Instead it simply had to follow the clear test set out in the legislation. 46 Thus for the same reason, I reject the opponents' assertion that the Board owed no deference to Council despite the fact that the Board conducted its own full scale hearing. In fact, I believe Council and not the Board to be the primary decision maker when it comes to this type of planning issue. Let me briefly elaborate. 47 Despite the Board's detailed hearing, it must be remembered that members of Council are elected and accountable to the citizens of HRM. As such they exercise discretion and are accordingly entitled to deference. As earlier noted, one purpose of the MGA is to provide municipalities with autonomy when it comes to planning strategies and development. This decision fell within Council's discretion, provided it reasonably reflected the intent of the MPS. As elected officials, their decisions must be respected. This court has said as much on several occasions. For example in Tsimiklis v. Halifax (Regional Municipality), [2003] N.S.J. No. 64, 2003 NSCA 30, Chipman, J.A. observed: 24 A review of the MPS confirms, as one would surmise, that many of the policies are, to use the words of Hallett, J.A. in [Heritage Trust of Nova Scotia v. Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board (1994), 128 N.S.R. (2d) 5 (C.A.)], at para. 100 "inherently in conflict". The Board recognized this in its decision. The MPS recognises a number of competing interests necessarily involved in the creation of a workable planning regime and, of necessity, Council must have considerable latitude in striking a balance among those interests in making a planning decision. ... 64 As I have already pointed out, planning decisions often involve compromises and choices between competing policies which are best made by the elected representatives, so long as they are reasonably consistent with the intent of the MPS. To my mind, read against these policies Council's decision here is reasonably consistent with that intent. 48 So it is not for the Board to impose its interpretation of the MPS. Instead the Board must defer to Council. Thus, this court in Kynock v. Bennett et al. (1994), 131 N.S.R. (2d) 334 (C.A.) observed: 27 ... Clearly the legislature did not intend to confer a de novo jurisdiction on the board when hearing an appeal from a municipal council decision to enter into a development agreement. The board is functioning in a review capacity and is limited by the jurisdiction conferred on it under the Planning Act. [37] The applicants argue that deference to municipal planning decisions is an essential feature of the Municipal Government Act generally, not only with respect to Utility and Review Board appeals. Therefore, they say the Minister was required to accord significant deference to the Municipality’s decision to approve the amendments. Only if these amendments presented a clear conflict with the provisions of a statement of provincial interest could the Minister refuse to approve them, the applicants argue. In this case the applicants say there was no such conflict. [38] The respondent submits that the applicants have exaggerated the importance of s. 190(b) of the Municipal Government Act. If the legislature intended to fetter the Minister’s discretion to the extent suggested by the applicants, it says, clearer language would have been used. An example is s. 251(2) of the Act, which limits the discretion of the Utility and Review Board: (2) The Board shall not allow an appeal unless it determines that the decision of council or the development officer, as the case may be, does not reasonably carry out the intent of the municipal planning strategy or conflicts with the provisions of the land‑use by‑law or the subdivision by‑law. [39] The respondent says there is no such provision requiring the Minister to consider a municipality’s view or its interpretation of statements of provincial interest. To the contrary, s. 208(6) permits the Minister to approve all, or only a part of a planning document, make amendments to the document or refuse to approve it, without any restrictions on the broadly stated authority. [40] The applicant’s argument that the only purpose of the planning sections of the Municipal Government Act is to give municipalities primary planning authority does not take into consideration the first purpose listed in s. 190, namely enabling the Province to identify and protect it interests in the use of land. These provisions show a legislative intent that the Minister, not municipalities, has discretion to interpret the province’s policies in a statement of provincial interest. This discretion given to the Minister does not affect the municipalities’ primary authority for planning within their respective jurisdictions. Statements of provincial interest are provincial in nature, as emphasized in the introduction: Nova Scotia’s land and water resources are fundamental to our physical, social and economic well-being. But they are finite resources and using them in one way can mean the exclusion of other uses forever. Therefore, it is important that decisions about Nova Scotia’s land and water be made carefully. Ill-advised land use can have serious consequences for the physical, economic and social well-being of all Nova Scotians. [41] The Minister must address the interest of the province as a whole. I agree with the respondents that the preservation of agricultural lands can benefit not just the local area where the lands are situate, but the province as a whole. As such, it is proper that the protection of such interests vests in the province, not in individual municipalities whose interests may not align with those of the entire province. [42] The applicants rely on Midtown Tavern, supra, to support their argument that the Minister owes deference to the Municipality’s decision. Midtown Tavern, supra, deals with the deference owed by the Utility and Review Board to a municipal council. In the present case, the Minister was not reviewing the reasonableness of the Municipality’s decision or substituting his view of the appropriate decision, but carrying out his mandate to decide whether the proposed amendments were reasonably consistent with the statements of provincial interest. This was a determination assigned to the Minister under legislation, not a review of the decision made by the municipality. The Minister was not sitting in an appeal capacity or reviewing the reasonableness of the municipality’s decision, but making a discretionary decision on a matter of provincial public policy. In making that decision the Minister did not owe any deference to the Municipality. The fundamental weakness in the applicants’ argument is the assumption that the Minister was, in some form, reviewing the municipal decision on its merits. [43] The Supreme Court of Canada considered the attributes of an unreasonable decision in Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 748. Iacobucci J. said, for the court, at para. 56: ... An unreasonable decision is one that, in the main, is not supported by any reasons that can stand up to a somewhat probing examination. Accordingly, a court reviewing a conclusion on the reasonableness standard must look to see whether any reasons support it... [44] I am satisfied that the Minister was exercising a discretion given to him under s. 190(a) of the Municipal Government Act. The decision reached by the Minister was one of the outcomes provided for in s. 208(6) of the Act. The Minister’s decision is a discretionary policy decision that the legislature intended to be made by the Minister, not the Municipality, and I am satisfied that his conclusion was within the reasonable range of outcomes. His decision not to approve the amendments was one of the available outcomes pursuant to the legislation and on the facts before me. The Minister determined that the amendments as submitted affected the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land. Was it reasonable for the Minister to determine that the applicants had to demonstrate a need? [45] The Minister wrote in his decision that he was “unsatisfied that rezoning this land was required to fulfill a pressing demand for development” and that “the documents do not adequately support the need to remove the land from agricultural use.” The applicants say the Minister’s decision was based on his view that the amendments offended the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land, which includes the following: GOAL To protect agricultural land for the development of a viable and sustainable agriculture and food industry. BASIS The preservation of agricultural land is important to the future of Nova Scotians. Agricultural land is being lost to non-agricultural development. There are land-use conflicts between agricultural and non-agricultural land uses. APPLICATION This statement applies to all active agricultural land and land with agricultural potential in the Province. PROVISIONS 1. Planning documents must identify agricultural lands within the planning area. 2. Planning documents must address the protection of agricultural land. Measures that should be considered include: (a) giving priority to uses such as agricultural, agricultural related and uses which do not eliminate the possibility of using the land for agricultural purposes in the future. Non-agricultural uses should be balanced against the need to preserve agricultural land; (b) limiting the number of lots. Too many lots may encourage non-agricultural development. The minimum size of lots and density of development should be balanced against the need to preserve agricultural land; (c) setting out separation distances between agricultural and new non-agricultural development to reduce land-use conflicts; (d) measures to reduce topsoil removal on lands with the highest agricultural value. 3. Existing land-use patterns, economic conditions and the location and size of agricultural holdings means not all areas can be protected for food production, e.g., when agricultural land is located within an urban area. In these cases, planning documents must address the reasons why agriculture lands cannot be protected for agricultural use. Where possible, non-agricultural development should be directed to the lands with the lowest agricultural value. [46] The applicants say that the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land is designed to ensure that agricultural land is not excessively or haphazardly rezoned, but does not indicate that agricultural land cannot be rezoned except as a final resort. They say the language is general and that planning documents must address the protection of agricultural land, including measures for achieving an appropriate balance between agricultural and non-agricultural uses and the reasons why agricultural land cannot be protected in urban or similar settings. They submit that the Statement of Provincial Interest is intended to ensure that the balancing of agricultural and non-agricultural uses is taken into account by municipalities in their planning decisions, but is not meant to dictate a specific result. They say the Minister misinterpreted the Statement of Provincial Interest and the nature of planning decisions generally. [47] In particular, the applicants say the Minister read into the Statement of Provincial Interest a requirement that the planning documents show an urgent need to remove land from agricultural use. The applicants argue that s. 3 of the Statement of Provincial Interest does not require an immediate need for alternate use. Rather, they submit, an interpretation more compatible with the nature of land use planning is that “cannot be protected” refers to the long term sustainability of the lands, or the long-term needs of the community. They say the Minister demonstrated insufficient deference towards the Municipality’s planning process and committed an error of law. They say the Statement of Provincial Interest expressly contemplates the rezoning of agricultural land in certain circumstances, not limited those to situations of urgency. [48] The applicants say the Minister erred in focussing on only one component of need. They say the Minister’s focus on the absence of a pressing demand for alternative uses is unduly narrow. They submit that the idea that agricultural land cannot be protected in some circumstance has two components: a) that the land may be required for some other use; and b) that the land is no longer viable in its current use. [49] The applicants say the Minister’s decision wrongly focuses on the first component. They say the immediate need for development is only a factor to be considered, and the Minister should have deferred to the Municipality in the balancing of agricultural and non-agricultural uses. They say he did not identify the way in which the amendments were not reasonably consistent with the Statement of Provincial Interest. Instead, he substituted his own judgment as to the need for development. [50] The applicants go on to argue that the Minister applied the wrong test in reviewing the amendments. According to the applicants, had the Minister properly considered the relevant factors and deferred to the Municipality’s planning authority, it would have been clear that he had no jurisdiction to reject the amendments. They say the Minister did not give sufficient consideration to the serious difficulty facing the applicants in sustaining the agricultural operations on their lands. They say that in focussing on whether the amendments were necessary to accommodate a pressing need for development the Minister ignored the necessity of the amendments in a different sense, that of allowing lands to remain economically viable to their owners. Further, they argue, the Statement of Provincial Interest contemplates that in some circumstances preservation of agricultural land will not be feasible, such as in an urban setting. They say the Minister failed to address the urban location of the subject lands in reaching his decision. Nor, they say, did he consider that any proposed development would be subject to supervision by the Municipality by way of a development agreement. [51] The applicants further allege that the Minister appears not to have considered an agricultural impact assessment that was prepared by Morton and Associates. While this report did identify negative results of rezoning, such as the inability to expand nearby farms, and loss of jobs associated with decreased farming, it also identified a number of factors demonstrating the limited value in retaining the lands’ current designation. The applicants say this study served as the framework within which the Municipality considered the rezoning, adding that it took into account the statements of provincial interest. [52] In his decision the Minister said: After our meeting, I was satisfied that the Municipality of Kings County would do everything that was required to protect well fields for the Town of Wolfville. However, I remained unsatisfied that re-zoning this land was required to fulfill a pressing demand for development. In my opinion, the documents do not adequately support the need to remove the land from agricultural use. [53] The respondent indicates that every statement of provincial interest contains a section dealing with goals, basis, application and provisions. Section 3 of the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land states that the planning documents must address the reasons why the land cannot be protected for agricultural use: 3. Existing land-use patterns, economic conditions and the location and size of agricultural holdings means not all areas can be protected for food production, e.g., when agricultural land is located within an urban area. In these cases, planning documents must address the reasons why agriculture lands cannot be protected for agricultural use. Where possible, non-agricultural development should be directed to the lands with the lowest agricultural value. [54] The respondent says that the reasons advanced by the applicants for finding that the Minister “erred” do not actually explain the need for rezoning, but are no more than reasons why the applicants want the land to be rezoned. Evidence showing an actual need is absent from the record in that there is no attempt to show that the existing growth centres within the municipality are at, or near capacity, such that agricultural land is required for development. This is the type of evidence, according to the respondent, that would be expected to demonstrate a need to convert agricultural land to non-agricultural land. [55] The respondent submits that ultimately the court must decide whether the Minister’s interpretation of need is reasonable. [56] As to the applicants’ argument that the Minister failed to recognize the need to defer to the primary planning authority of Kings Municipality, I am not satisfied that the legislation reflects this intent. To the contrary, s. 190(a) of the Municipal Government Act makes clear that the Minister is making a discretionary policy decision as to whether a statement of provincial interest is affected. While I agree the Municipality is given the primary authority for planning within its jurisdiction under s. 190(b), the legislation is clear that it is the Province that identifies and protects its interests in the use and development of land under s. 190(a). There is nothing in the legislation to suggest that the Minister must defer to a municipality in the interpretation of these interests. [57] What the applicants ask is that I substitute my view as to whether the Minister was correct in his decision. In other words, they request that I review the Minister’s decision on a correctness basis. I have already determined that the standard of review is reasonableness, which connotes a degree of deference to the Minister’s decision. [58] I am not satisfied that the Minister’s decision was unreasonable on the basis alleged by the applicants. The Minister was exercising his discretion under the Municipal Government Act. The decision not to allow the amendments was one of the options that the Minister had under s. 208(6) of the Act. The Minister, in his decision, indicated that the documents submitted by the Municipality did not support the need to remove the land from agricultural use. The goal, as stated in the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land, is to “protect agricultural land for the development of a viable and sustainable agriculture and food industry”. It goes on to state that agricultural land is being lost to non-agricultural development and that there are land use conflicts between agricultural and non-agricultural land uses. Moreover, s. 3 states that “planning documents must address the reasons why agricultural land cannot be protected for agricultural use”. I am satisfied that is was within his discretionary authority for the Minister to follow the line of reasoning that he did, and, specifically, to take account of the necessity to remove that land from agricultural use. I see nothing unreasonable in his interpretation. 2. Did the Minister breach a duty of procedural fairness owing to the applicants? [59] The applicants also seek to quash the Minister’s decision on the basis that he contravened the duty of fairness they say was owed to them. It is not necessary to determine a standard of review on this issue. As distinct from judicial review, the “context of procedural fairness goes to the manner in which the Minister went about making his decision, whereas the standard of review is applied to the end product of his deliberations”: CUPE v. Ontario (Minister of Labour), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539, at para. 102. [60] In cases involving allegations of procedural unfairness, the first step is to establish whether the duty of fairness is engaged. In N.N.M. v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services), 2008 NSCA 69, the Court of Appeal stated that the “duty of procedural fairness may be engaged whenever a person’s rights, privileges or interests are affected by an administrative decision ...” (para. 41). The respondent concedes that the duty of fairness is engaged in this case, as the Minister’s decision had an impact on the applicants’ lands. The issue is whether that duty was breached. The applicants allege that the Minister breached the duty of fairness by acting contrary to their legitimate expectations and by providing inadequate reasons for his decision. [61] The scope of the duty of fairness will vary depending on the facts of each case. Brown and Evans state, in Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, at pp. 7 -72: Due to the diversity of administrative action, these requirements can vary, running from the full panoply of procedures commonly associated with judicial proceedings, to the right simply to be notified and to express one’s views in whatever mode may seem appropriate. Despite the diversity of content, however, it is possible to identify a common core to the participatory rights that the duty of fairness requires. Its principal purpose is to provide a meaningful opportunity for those interested to bring evidence and arguments that are relevant to the decision to be made to the attention of the decision-maker, and correlatively, to ensure that the decision-maker fairly and impartially considers them. [62] In Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, the Supreme Court of Canada listed five factors to guide the analysis of the duty of fairness: (1) the nature of the decision being made and the process followed in making it; (2) the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates; (3) the importance of the decision to the individual or individuals affected; (4) the legitimate expectations of the person challenging the decision; and (5) the choices of procedure made by the agency itself. [63] The respondent says an analysis of the Baker factors suggests a low level of procedural protection, with only one factor suggesting a higher level of procedural protection. [64] Regarding the nature of the decision, the respondent says the decision of the Minister was a discretionary policy decision and there is nothing in the Municipal Government Act that requires a hearing or even additional submissions beyond the “planning documents” themselves. This is not a decision like that found in the judicial model, suggesting a lower level of procedural fairness. [65] The second Baker factor is the nature of the statutory scheme and the terms of the statute pursuant to which the body operates. There is neither a right of appeal nor a privative clause in the Municipal Government Act. Moreover, the respondent says, the statute does not contemplate the involvement of any parties, other than the municipality which submits the planning documents. The statute does not provide a mechanism for a third party to become involved, suggesting a lower level of procedural protection. [66] The third factor is the importance of the decision to the individuals affected. The respondent acknowledges that the Minister’s decision is of importance to the applicants since it concerns the use that can be made of their property. This suggests that greater procedural protections may be in order. [67] The fourth Baker factor is the existence of any legitimate expectations. The applicants say the duty of fairness was heightened by a series of meetings between themselves and provincial officials. In June 2009, the applicants met with the Director and Assistant Director of Planning. In August, 2010 they met with the Minister, in his capacity (at that time) as Minister of Agriculture. Senior officials of the Department of Agriculture were also present at that meeting. [68] The applicants say they were encouraged in both meetings as to the prospects of the proposed amendments. Did these meetings raise legitimate expectations in the applicants such as to require the Minister to meet with and/or consult with these individuals prior to the issuance of his decision? [69] The doctrine of legitimate expectations is explained in Baker, supra, at para. 26: ... If the claimant has a legitimate expectation that a certain procedure will be followed, this procedure will be required by the duty of fairness:... Similarly, if a claimant has a legitimate expectation that a certain result will be reached in his or her case, fairness may require more extensive procedural rights than would otherwise be accorded:... Nevertheless, the doctrine of legitimate expectations cannot lead to substantive rights outside the procedural domain. This doctrine, as applied in Canada, is based on the principle that the "circumstances" affecting procedural fairness take into account the promises or regular practices of administrative decision‑makers, and that it will generally be unfair for them to act in contravention of representations as to procedure, or to backtrack on substantive promises without according significant procedural rights. [70] While the applicants acknowledge that the Minister was not bound to approve the amendments by an expression of encouragement at these meetings, they maintain that the effect of the meetings was to create legitimate expectations that if the Minister later had concerns about the amendments he would advise them. [71] In respect of the June 2009 meeting and the August 2010 meeting, it appears from the statutory declaration of the applicant, Peter Elderkin, that he attended both meetings and, as a result, formed the impression that the planning staff had no concerns with the amendments. He states in his affidavit that his subjective impression was that the Minister and his staff supported the proposed amendments (para. 16). [72] The authors of Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada provide the following discussion of legitimate expectations at ¶7.1710: The distinguishing characteristic of a legitimate expectation is that it arises from some conduct of the decision-maker, or some other relevant actor. Thus a legitimate expectation may result from an official practice or assurance that certain procedures will be followed as part of the decision-making process, or that a positive decision can be anticipated .... Of course, the practice or conduct said to give rise to the reasonable expectation must be clear, unambiguous and unqualified. [73] The respondent denies that legitimate expectations arose in these circumstances and submits that the conduct, giving rise to any expectation the applicants had, was not “clear, unambiguous and unqualified”. The respondent says that even if Mr. Elderkin’s impression of ministerial and staff support established an expectation, this would have been questioned by the applicants when they learned that the Director of Planning (who Mr. Elderkin said had no concern) found that the amendments may conflict with the statements of provincial interest. The respondent says that such conduct is not “clear, unambiguous and unqualified”. I agree that the staff actions clearly contradicted Mr. Elderkin’s impression of support for the proposal. [74] The respondent also emphasizes that when the applicants met with Minister MacDonell in August 2010 he was not Minister of Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Affairs, but Minister of Agriculture. Although he later became the Minister of Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations (on January 11, 2011), he was not the relevant decision maker at the time of the meeting. It is not clear how anything he could say as Minister of Agriculture could give rise to a reasonable expectation of a particular outcome from the Minister of Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations. [75] The applicants argue that the Minister had a duty to consult them for the above reasons and say that this duty to consult was heightened by the volume of the material received by the Minister from the general public in the course of his review, most of which was in opposition to the proposed amendments. They say that the Minister’s failure to consult with them is a breach of the duty of fairness. [76] I am satisfied that the Municipal Government Act does not require the Minister to consult with the public before making a decision. There is no evidence that the legislature intended the Minister to conduct a consultative process before making a discretionary policy decision. Pursuant to s. 208(6), if an amendment is refused, written reasons for the decision must be given to the clerk of the municipality. The Municipality’s submission of the documents triggered the Minister’s actions and the Municipality was given an opportunity to respond to the Minister’s concerns. In fact, representatives of the Municipality met with the Minister prior to his decision. The Minister’s decision indicates that after meeting with municipal officials, he no longer had a concern over the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Drinking Water and was only concerned with the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Lands. [77] I am not satisfied that the Minister breached the duty of fairness by acting contrary to any legitimate expectations of the applicants. In particular, the fact that the Minister did not invite or receive further submissions from these individuals did not violate the duty of fairness. The Minister met with representatives of the submitting party, the Municipality, and, after receiving their submissions, the Minister directed his written decision to the clerk of the Municipality as required by the Act. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that the applicants had a legitimate expectation of any particular procedure from the Minister. [78] Finally, the fifth Baker factor is the choice of procedure made by the decision maker. The applicants’ position is that the Minister’s duty of fairness included an obligation to seek input from them during the review process, to advise them of his views as to why the amendments were problematic and to provide them with an opportunity to respond. They rely upon the following provisions of the Municipal Government Act to support their argument: (a) Sub-section 190(c), which establishes that one of the basic purposes of the planning and development provisions is to “establish a consultative process to ensure the right of the public to have access to information and to participate in the formulation of planning strategies and by-laws, including the right to be notified and heard before decisions are made pursuant to this Part”; and (b) The Minister’s obligation under s. 208(6) to provide written reasons, which in the applicants’ submission implies a duty to consider the views of all interested persons in formulating those reasons. [79] The respondent says that apart from stating that the Minister must furnish written reasons, the Municipal Government Act is silent as to the procedures that the Minister must use in his decision-making process. They say that this signals a legislative intent that the Minister must have discretion as to which procedure to follow, suggesting a lower level of procedural protection. [80] Part VIII of the Municipal Government Act, S.N.S.1998, c 18, accords to the Province the power to “identify and protect its interests in the use and development of land”: s. 190(a). Municipalities are granted “the primary authority for planning within their respective jurisdictions,” and may adopt municipal planning strategies and land-use bylaws that are “consistent with the interests and regulations of the Province”: s. 190(b). There shall be a “consultative process to ensure the right of the public to have access to information and to participate in the formulation of planning strategies and by-laws, including the right to be notified and heard before decisions are made pursuant to this Part”: s. 190(c). Public consultation relates to “the formulation of planning strategies and by-laws,” at the municipal level, suggesting that the right to be “notified and heard” is limited to decisions at the municipal level where planning strategies and by-laws are formulated. [81] This interpretation is supported by other provisions requiring public consultation at the municipal level: for instance, a municipally-established planning advisory committee or area advisory committee is required to include members of the public: ss. 200(3), 201(2). Meetings of such a committee are presumptively open to the public: s. 203(1). Councils are authorized to adopt “public participation programs” in relation to preparing planning documents: s. 204. Public hearings are necessary before a council can adopt planning documents: ss. 205-206. [82] The implication of the provisions requiring public consultation and involvement at the municipal level is that a ministerial decision as to whether to approve municipal planning documents does not trigger any right to public consultation or involvement. I am satisfied that approval of planning documents by the Minister is a matter between the Minister and the municipal council. [83] Support for the proposition that the public stands at arms length from a ministerial decision can be found in the definition of “aggrieved person” as, inter alia, “an individual who bona fide believes the decision of the council will adversely affect the value, or reasonable enjoyment, or the person’s property¼”: s. 191(a) (emphasis added). Once again, the municipal decision is specified, not the ministerial decision. The definition of “planning documents” is limited to municipal planning strategies and land-use by-laws, or amendments thereto, as well as subdivision by-laws: s. 191(n). Provincial documents, such as statements of provincial interest, are not within these categories. [84] There is no suggestion that a statement of provincial interest – a document “necessary to protect the provincial interest in the use and development of land” (s. 193) – is subject to public consultation. In formulating a statement, the Minister is required to “seek the view of councils affected by the proposed statement,” but not to seek the views of the public: s. 194(1). (The Minister is, however, required to give notice of the adoption of a statement in a local newspaper: s. 195). [85] At this stage, it is important to note that it was the Municipality that submitted the amendments to the Minister and it was municipal officials who met with the Minister prior to him issuing his decision. It is also noteworthy that under s. 208(6), the Minister’s written reasons are to be provided to the clerk of the municipality. As for s. 190(c), it primarily deals with municipal planning processes and ensures the right of the public to participate in the formulation of planning strategies and by-laws at the municipal level. It is less clear that there is any right of public participation at the level of ministerial decision-making. [86] I am satisfied there is a relatively low level of procedural protection in these circumstances. [87] I am not satisfied that the Minister breached the duty of fairness by acting contrary to the applicants’ legitimate expectations. As I have said, there is no suggestion that a statement of provincial interest is subject to public consultation. Did the Minister breach a duty of fairness by providing inadequate reasons? [88] The applicants also allege that their right to procedural fairness was breached by inadequacies in the reasons provided by the Minister. [89] Brown and Evans, supra, set out the general principles regarding the adequacy of reasons at ¶12.5310: Where reasons are required by law, a decision-maker must give reasons that not only do not contain a misstatement of the law or other legal error, but are adequate. For example, they must be “sufficiently clear, precise and intelligible” to enable the individual to know why the tribunal decided as it did. That is, the reasons must set out the chain of reasoning and the findings of fact on which the decision is based in such a way as to serve the purposes for which the reasons requirement was imposed. Thus, courts have assessed the adequacy of the reasons by asking whether the losing party was able to understand why the case was lost and to assess whether there were grounds to challenge the decision, whether the reasons enabled the reviewing body to test the validity of the decision or to show curial deference, and whether the reasons made it clear that the party’s representations were considered, whether relevant criteria were considered, and whether due weight was given to the important individual interests affected by the decision. However, in view of the several purposes served by a requirement of reasons and the range of decision-makers subject to the duty, it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a more specific test of “adequacy”. It will almost always depend upon the context. Nevertheless, the courts have offered some general guidance. For example, it is often been said that it is insufficient for decision-makers merely to state their conclusions, or to recite simply that they have considered the parties’ representations ... [Emphasis in original] [90] The applicants submit that the Minister’s reasons are largely a recitation of his conclusion. They say he failed to address the findings of the agricultural impact assessment and failed to deal with the provisions of the Municipal Planning Strategy and the amendments as a whole. They say he ignored the fact that the Municipal Planning Strategy, is by its nature, an evolving document. The Minister stated that the amendments “do not adequately support the need to remove the land from agricultural use” but, according to the applicants, he did not address the fact that the amendments provide only a controlled mechanism for future development by way of development agreement, rather than the immediate development of farm land. Moreover, they say, the Minister did not explain how his opinion on this point meant that the amendments were not reasonably consistent with the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land. In summary, the applicants say the Minister’s reasons do not make clear the relevant criteria that were considered and whether due weight was given to the important individual interests affected by the decision. [91] The respondent says the Minister was not required to provide a decision similar to that given by a court or the Utility and Review Board, in which every piece of evidence and representation is individually addressed. Rather, different standards apply to different types of decision- makers. In this case, the decision was a Minister’s discretionary policy decision and a judicial standard is not required for adequate reasons. [92] The respondent submits that the Minister did more than simply state his conclusions. He also provided brief reasons for those conclusions. There were two potential issues identified by the Director of Planning: whether the amendments were reasonably consistent with the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Drinking Water, and whether they were reasonably consistent with the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Agricultural Land. The Minister’s decision was contained in a letter to the municipality dated March 23, 2011: Thank you for taking the time to meet with me last Friday, and for your letter of March 22. These Municipal Planning Strategy and Land Use Bylaw amendments were adopted by Municipal Council on February 1, 2011. The amendments, as submitted, have been found to conflict with the Statements of Provincial Interest regarding drinking water protection and the preservation of agriculture land. As such, it was referred to me for ministerial review. After our meeting, I was satisfied that the Municipality of Kings County would do everything that was required to protect well fields for the Town of Wolfville. However, I remained unsatisfied that re-zoning this land was required to fulfill a pressing demand for development. In my opinion, the documents do not adequately support the need to remove the land from agricultural use. You indicated that the Wolfville Coldbrook corridor was intended for development in the original municipal plan in 1979, but if this was the case, the documents wouldn’t need amending now. For these reasons I am not able to approve the amendments. I acknowledge, and I did consider, the interests of the owners of these lands. This was not an easy decision. I also acknowledge and appreciate the work that has been done by you and your Council. My decision today is no way takes away from the dedication and commitment to the public interest in Kings County that I know you all share. (Record, Tab 1) [93] The Minister met with municipal officials in March 2011 before issuing his decision. The Director of Planning advised the Municipality that the Minister wished to give them an opportunity to respond to a number of issues that were raised during the staff review. The fact that this meeting took place explains the brevity of the reasons, since the municipal officials would have already heard the Minister’s concerns during the meeting. While the decision is brief and it would have been preferable for fuller reasons to have been given, it does not follow that it is inadequate. The Minister clearly sets out his conclusion on both issues and states the reasons for the conclusions. The reasons as written must be considered in the context of what the Minister was deciding at the time and for whom. In this regard, it is of some value to consider the legislative scheme. The requirement for written reasons is imposed by s. 208(6), which provides: (6) Within sixty days after the date of a written notice that planning documents are subject to the approval of the Minister, the Minister shall (a) approve all or part of the documents; (b) approve the documents with amendments; or (c) refuse to approve the documents, and return to the clerk two copies of the planning documents as approved, amended or refused with written reasons for the decision. [94] I am satisfied that the process of review by the Director and, where necessary, the Minister, is a matter between the municipal council and the Province. There is no direct public involvement in that process, as there is in the process of formulating planning documents at the municipal level. The Minister’s reasons are directed to the clerk of the municipality. [95] In Baker, supra, the majority held, per L’Heureux-Dube J, that concerns about the imposition on administrative decision-makers of requirements for “archival” reasons (that is reasons of a kind that might be expected from a court) could “be accommodated by ensuring that any reasons requirement under the duty of fairness leaves sufficient flexibility to decision-makers by accepting various types of written explanations for the decision as sufficient” (para. 40). The duty of fairness in relation to the sufficiency of reasons must recognize “the day-to-day realities of administrative agencies and the many ways in which the values underlying the principles of procedural fairness can be assured” (para. 44). [96] Guy Régimbald makes the following remarks in his book Canadian Administrative Law (Markham: LexisNexis, 2008), at pp. 279 - 280: There do not appear to be any specific criteria for the evaluation of the sufficiency of reasons. Much will depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the decision, the interest of the affected individual, the powers of the decision maker, and the purpose sought to be achieved by the imposition of a duty to give reasons. The reasons must be, according to the Supreme Court [in Northwestern Utilities Ltd v Edmonton (City), [1979] 1 SCR 684], “proper, adequate and intelligible, and must enable the person concerned to assess whether he has grounds of appeal”. While the reasons may be brief and need not canvass every argument, the decision maker must address plausible issues of law raised and relevant factual findings. Moreover, they must explain why important evidence was rejected, and include an explanation of findings of credibility. On the other hand, reasons need not be given on every minor point raised in the proceedings. Adequate reasons will allow the individual to know why, how or on what evidence the decision maker has reached its decision. The reasons must be clear as to exactly what the agency has decided. They should include the reasons relating to every question argued, relate to the facts and law relied upon to make the determination, and the reasoning on which the conclusions rest. Finally, it must be detailed enough to permit parties to understand why they lost their case and allow an assessment as to whether the decision should be appealed. [97] The Minister’s reasons were provided in the context of ongoing discussions with municipal officials. Provided the reasons were adequate to allow the municipal council to know why the amendments were not approved they would meet that criteria. I am satisfied, in this instance, that they have. The Minister’s responsibility was to interpret and apply the statements of provincial interest to the proposed amendments submitted by the Municipality. [98] The statutory direction to provide reasons to the municipal clerk is consistent with the view that the Act considers the approval of planning documents to be a matter between the Minister and the municipality. Pursuant to the Act, the only parties to the Minister’s decision are the Minister and the municipal council. [99] I am not convinced that the Minister’s reasons are insufficient, looked at in context. The reasons were owed to the municipal council, not the applicants. Baker, supra, makes it clear that flexibility is required in determining whether reasons are sufficient. This was a Minister’s discretionary decision being delivered to a municipal council as required by statute after meeting with municipal officials, and after the Director of Planning had advised the municipality of the issues arising during the staff review. The Minister’s decision provides brief reasons for his decision as it relates to each of the points that had been brought to the attention of the municipality. [100] For all of these reasons I am not satisfied that the reasons as argued by the applicants are insufficient. Remedies: [101] The application is dismissed. Costs to the respondent in the amount of $2,000. Pickup J.