VC3-12061

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VC3-12061 VC3-12062 / VC3-12063 / VC3-12064 VC3-12065 / VC3-12066 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Date of decision January 17, 2024 Date de la décision Panel Derek Vermette Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Karen Klouth Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (Principal Appellant), his spouse, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and their children, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (Associate Appellants) are citizens of Chile. The Appellants are appealing a Refugee Protection Division (RPD) decision that denied their claim for refugee protection. [2] The Appellants allege that they fear a man by the name of XXXX XXXX, who they allege is a Mapuche leader with a violent and criminal past, and who has ties to the current government and to Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM), a terrorist organization. The Appellants allege that the Principal Appellant was targeted, with threats later made against the other Appellants, because of the Principal Appellant's past military service and his support of a particular presidential candidate. [3] The RPD accepted the Appellants' allegations with respect to the incidents and threats involving XXXX XXXX and CAM. However, the RPD determined that the Appellants were not entitled to refugee protection as they had failed to rebut the presumption of state protection in Chile. [4] The Appellants submit that the RPD erred in determining that they have state protection in Chile. In addition to their allegation that there is a lack of state protection in Chile, the Appellants have provided documents that they request be admitted as new evidence for this appeal. The Appellants allege that these documents demonstrate that the Principal Appellant's father was recently assaulted, which they argue shows that the agents of harm are still interested in pursuing them. They also allege that the police refused to take the Principal Appellant's father's report, which they submit rebuts the presumption of state protection. [5] It is my decision that the RPD correctly determined the Appellants' claim. The Appellants failed to rebut the presumption of state protection in Chile, and they are therefore not entitled to refugee protection in Canada. DECISION [6] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellants are neither Convention1 refugees nor persons in need of protection. BACKGROUND The Appellants' Allegations [7] The Principal Appellant alleges that in 2018, he joined a political party called the Partido de la Gente (PDG). The Principal Appellant alleges that initially he supported the candidate Franco Parisi, but Parisi did not make it to the second round, so the Appellant supported Jopse Antonio Kast. [8] The Principal Appellant alleges that he began to have problems after his public support of Kast. The Principal Appellant alleges that he was at a meeting, when someone broke into the meeting, loudly shouting insulting comments about the Principal Appellant, his XXXX XXXX and political preference. The shouting man said that the Principal Appellant was an enemy of the true homeland and of the Mapuche tribes (indigenous tribes from Chile and Argentina). The shouting man accused the Principal Appellant of having attacked their tribes, just because of his past XXXX XXXX. The Principal Appellant denies that neither as a XXXX nor as a civilian, has he ever used force or weapons to attack anyone, and further denies that he would ever do so. [9] The Principal Appellant alleges that he later found out that the shouting man was a former leftist militant and Mapuche community member with a past in drug trafficking, who had connections with terrorists from Araucanía, and was known in his area as XXXX XXXX (Indigenous chief). The Principal Appellant alleges that XXXX XXXX had been prosecuted in his youth for terrorist activities in Araucanía. [10] The Principal Appellant alleges that XXXX XXXX made numerous threats against him, and even demanded the Principal Appellant pay money to avoid a price being put on his head. The Principal Appellant alleges that on several occasions he attempted to report the threats to the authorities, but the authorities did not accept his complaints because XXXX XXXX was a Mapuche leader with direct connections to the new leftist government in Chile (President Boric). [11] The Principal Appellant alleges that he inquired about XXXX XXXX, and found out that he has direct connections with the current far-left government, he led the acts of violence in 2019 in Chile, which destabilized the country, and, in addition, he represents the armed wing of the current government. [12] The Principal Appellant alleges that threats were made against the other Appellants, and the claim was that the Principal Appellant was an enemy of their cause. The Principal Appellant alleges that he changed his phone number and the Appellants moved to another community, but they found his contact information and continued the threats. [13] The Appellants left Chile for Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2022, hoping that the threats would end. The Principal Appellant alleges that after four months, the situation in Chile got worse. The Principal Appellant alleges that in July 2022, he received a call from a neighbour in Chile who said that some armed men identifying themselves as members of CAM, after not finding the Appellants at their house, had gone to the neighbours' houses asking for the Appellants' whereabouts and leaving a clear message that the Appellants were making fun of them and that they were looking for the Appellants to settle scores. [14] The Principal Appellant alleges that his brother also told him that he had passed by the Appellants' house and he found some pamphlets that listed the Appellants' names, with a message that said death to the "XXXX," a pejorative term for the XXXX XXXX of Chile. [15] The Appellants decided to seek refugee protection in Canada. The Appellants allege that they require protection from CAM, who has sentenced the Appellants to death for defying their authority, because of their belief that the Principal Appellant's XXXX past could have affected them, for retaliation because the Appellants refused to pay them money, and because the Principal Appellant was a member of a political party opposed to the current government that protects this group and its actions. NEW EVIDENCE [16] For the following reasons, I allow the Appellants' request to admit the following documents as new evidence: a. Statutory Declaration dated November 14, 2023, from the Principal Appellant;2 b. Declaration Letter dated November 5, 2023, with ID Card, from the Principal Appellant's father;3 c. Declaration Letter dated November 4, 2023, with ID Card, from the Principal Appellant's brother;4 d. Medical Report and ultrasound imaging dated XXXX XXXX, 2023, with respect to the Principal Appellant's father;5 and e. Declaration Letter dated November 3, 2023, with ID Card, from the neighbour of the Principal Appellant's father.6 [17] The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)7 anticipates that an appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) will ordinarily be based on the record of the RPD proceeding. [18] According to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, I can only accept new evidence on this appeal that: arose after the RPD decision (the RPD hearing was conducted on June 12, 2023, and the RPD issued its decision on September 25, 2023); was not reasonably available at the time of the RPD decision; or, that the Appellants could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before its decision. [19] I find that the documents meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) in so far as the Appellants could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring the information in the documents to the RPD before its decision. The information in the documents details an assault on the Principal Appellant's father that took place on September 23, 2023. It is not reasonably expected that the Appellants could have gathered all the information about this assault and to have provided it to the RPD before the RPD issued its decision on September 25, 2023. [20] Having met the requirements of subsection 110(4), I find that the information in the documents is new, credible (e.g., the source and the circumstances in which it came into existence) and relevant.8 The information is new in that it details a recent assault on the Principal Appellant's father. The information is credible in terms of the source and circumstances in which it came into existence. The Principal Appellant signed his declaration in front of a commissioner of oaths, the other letters are accompanied with identification establishing the identity of the authors, and the medical report appears to be signed by a doctor and is accompanied with ultrasound images. I accept that the information is relevant to the Appellants' submission that the agents of harm are still interested in the Appellants. ORAL HEARING [21] For the following reasons, I deny the Appellants' request for an oral hearing. [22] The Federal Court has commented that an appeal of an RPD decision to the RAD is intended to be a paper-based appeal, and that holding an oral hearing is an exception where there is new evidence admitted that meets the requirements of section 110(6) of the IRPA.9 [23] I find that the documents admitted as new evidence do not trigger any of the conditions set out in section 110(6) of the IRPA, and therefore do not require an oral hearing. The documents do not raise a serious issue with respect to the Appellants' credibility; are not central to the Appellants' refugee protection claim; and do not justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. ANALYSIS [24] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.10 For the following reasons, I find that the RPD correctly decided that the Appellants failed to rebut the presumption of state protection, and that they are therefore not entitled to refugee protection.11 The test for state protection [25] The Appellants have not argued that the RPD member incorrectly stated the law with respect to the issue of state protection. On my independent assessment, I found that the RPD member correctly summarized the law and the test for state protection.12 [26] It is important to note that the Appellants have the onus to rebut the presumption of state protection by providing relevant, reliable and convincing evidence.13 The Federal Court has held that when analyzing whether the presumption of state protection has been rebutted:14 A claimant might advance testimony of similarly situated individuals unassisted by state protection or the claimant's testimony of past personal incidents in which state protection did not materialize or the claimant's personal experience as proof of a state's inability to protect its citizens. A claimant can also provide country condition documentation to rebut the presumption that a state is capable of protecting its citizens... [27] I have considered these various forms of evidence, which I will discuss below. The country condition evidence does not rebut the presumption of state protection [28] For the following reasons, I disagree with the Appellants' submissions that state protection is unavailable to them because the threats in question "...related to a Mapuche leader with strong connections with the current government and with connections with CAM."15 The Appellants submit that the agents of harm are powerful and have "...immunity with the Chilean's current government..."16 [29] The Appellants argue that they fear XXXX XXXX, a Mapuche leader, and CAM, a political military organization formed by Mapuche people.17 They argue that in the past, the Mapuche have been persecuted by right-wing governments and the military, and that the Principal Appellant has been targeted because of his past military work and his support of a right-wing presidential candidate. [30] The Appellants argue that the RPD ignored that President Boric's leftist government has "... always openly demonstrated support to the Mapuche and has given immunity to CAM and Mapuche leaders."18 [31] I find that the Appellants have failed to provide sufficient evidence that the Boric government has always demonstrated their support to the Mapuche and given immunity to CAM and the Mapuche leaders. [32] The evidence submitted by the Appellants at the RPD hearing indicates that CAM is a "...radical Mapuche group that periodically carries out attacks in the southern Chilean macro-zone."19 The CAM, along with other groups, has been declared "illegal associations of a terrorist nature."20 Rather than the Appellants' characterization of support between the Boric government and the CAM, the evidence indicates that the CAM and the Boric government are in disagreement. For example, CAM has been described as a "radicalized group that opposes the militarization of Araucania implemented by the government of Boric [the president of Chile]."21 [33] I acknowledge that in the RPD Record, there is an article that discusses that President Boric pardoned 12 people convicted of crimes associated with the social outbreak of 2019.22 However, I find that this information is insufficient to support the Appellants' argument that President Boric is always supportive and will give immunity to the agents of harm. For example, there is a lack of evidence of the background and factual circumstances surrounding those people who were pardoned, and whether there is any association to the agents of harm in this case. There is insufficient evidence to support that the pardons in question supports the Appellants' allegation that President Boric wishes to give immunity to the agents of harm on a forward-looking basis. [34] The social outbreak of 2019 seems to have been motivated by numerous issues,23 so I cannot draw a conclusion that President Boric pardoning 12 members who took part in that outbreak means that he supports and wishes to give immunity to the agents of harm in this case. The people who were pardoned might have been advancing other social issues that are unrelated to the issues advanced by the agents of harm. There might be no connection between the people who were pardoned and the agents of harm. [35] The test for state protection is forward-looking, meaning that what must be considered is the state's ability to provide adequate protection when a claimant should return to his or her country.24 The news article about President Boric pardoning 12 people convicted of crimes associated with the social outbreak of 2019, not only fails to address the specific circumstances of those pardoned, but also notes that many people were unhappy that the pardons had been issued. There is a lack of information about how President Boric responded to the negative criticism of the pardons, and therefore a lack of information about whether President Boric would take such actions on a forward-looking basis (assuming that those pardoned are even connected to the agents of harm in this case, which has not been established, as discussed above). [36] The country condition evidence further indicates that President Boric and the agents of harm are not as connected as the Appellants allege. One document in the National Documentation Package (NDP) indicates that President Boric has not addressed the long-standing conflict between the government and certain Mapuche Indigenous activists, and that, "...no government, including the Boric administration so far, has properly addressed core complaints regarding land rights, political representation, and security."25 The same evidence indicates that the conflict between the state and the Mapuche people continued, and that the state of emergency declared by former President Piñera in four southern provinces in 2021, was reinstated by President Boric.26 [37] Another document in the NDP suggests that the government/police and the Mapuche are not aligned, as suggested by the Appellants. The document, which is dated September 13, 2022 (President Boric assumed office on March 11, 2022), states:27 The Committee is concerned about the continuation of the "state of constitutional emergency" and the militarization of the conflict with the Mapuche, which has already led to the death and bodily harm of members of that community. It is also concerned about numerous reports of excessive use of force by Carabineros against members of Mapuche communities, in particular in the context of demonstrations in defence of their rights. The Committee is also concerned about reports that law enforcement officials are not always held accountable for their acts, despite the administrative measures and institutions set up to address such instances (arts. 2 and 4-5). The Principal Appellant's experience of attempting to file police reports does not rebut the presumption of state protection [38] The Principal Appellant testified that he went to the police twice.28 The first time was in his community of XXXX, and the second time was in XXXX XXXX, the community where his brother-in-law lives.29 For the following reasons, I find that the Principal Appellant's experience of attempting to file a police report in XXXX and a police report in XXXX XXXX does not rebut the presumption of state protection. [39] When the Principal Appellant tried to make a complaint with the police in XXXX, the police told him that they could not take his complaint as he had not suffered any physical injuries.30 [40] If the local officer in XXXX refused to take a report because of the lack of physical injuries, then that would have been an instance of a local failure to act, which is insufficient to rebut the presumption of state protection. The Federal Court has held that local failures to provide effective policing do not automatically amount to a lack of state protection; and that it is simply insufficient for an applicant to give up trying merely because of a single bad experience with local police officials.31 [41] The Principal Appellant testified that he went to his brother-in-law's house in XXXX XXXX sometime in January 2022.32 When the Principal Appellant tried to make a complaint with the police in XXXX XXXX, the police officer told him to make a complaint in XXXX because his address was not within the XXXX XXXX community.33 [42] I find that the Appellants have failed to establish that this response from the XXXX XXXX police officer is a failure on the part of the state to provide protection. The Appellants have the onus to rebut the presumption of state protection, and they have not provided me with evidence that a police officer advising a complainant to file a complaint in the community in which they reside is not an appropriate response. [43] The XXXX XXXX police's advice to file in the Principal Appellant's community does not represent a failure by the state to provide protection, but rather seems to represent an appropriate and efficient response to someone attempting to file a complaint in a different community in which that person resides. [44] The Principal Appellant was just staying with his brother-in-law in XXXX XXXX, but there is a lack of evidence that the Principal Appellant resided there. In his history of residential addresses, the Principal Appellant indicated that he resided in XXXX from XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013 to XXXX XXXX XXXX 2022, and that he then arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2022.34 There is no reference to the Appellants residing in XXXX XXXX, where the Principal Appellant testified he only stayed for a short time. Again, on this basis, it is not clear that the police officer was acting inappropriately when he advised the Principal Appellant to file a complaint in XXXX, where he resided. [45] Even if the response by the XXXX XXXX police in advising the Principal Appellant to file a complaint where he resides (i.e., XXXX) was inappropriate, and again, I find that the Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence to establish that such a response was inappropriate, I find that the Federal Court has held that some local failures are not sufficient to demonstrate a lack of state protection.35 Merely showing that Chile's protection is imperfect is insufficient to rebut the presumption of state protection.36 The Principal Appellant did not take all reasonable steps to rebut the presumption of state protection [46] With respect to the phone call threats the Principal Appellant received, the Principal Appellant testified that the police told him that he had to go through another process and had to deal with the telephone company.37 He elaborated that the police told him that he would have to make a request to the telephone company for the recording of the phone calls, if available.38 When asked whether he tried requesting the calls, the Principal Appellant testified, "I looked into that with a friend who works at a company and he told me that that takes months, and I did not have that time."39 [47] I find that the Principal Appellant failed to take all reasonable steps in the circumstances to seek state protection. Specifically, I find that relying upon information from a friend about what it takes to obtain the telephone records requested by the police does not demonstrate that the Principal Appellant took reasonable steps to provide the police with the requested information. [48] There is a lack of information that the Principal Appellant contacted the telephone company to find out directly from the telephone company about the steps involved and how long it might take to obtain the requested records. It was not reasonable for the Principal Appellant to not make efforts to obtain the requested records from the telephone company because of what he was told by a friend, who may or may not have had the requisite knowledge to opine about the matter. In other words, there is a lack of information about the expertise of the Principal Appellant's friend and whether his information about the steps required to obtain the telephone records was reliable or accurate. Therefore, there is a lack of information to support that it was appropriate for the Principal Appellant to rely upon his friend's advice in deciding to refrain from seeking the recordings requested by the police, rather than contacting the telephone company directly. [49] The Federal Court has held that the burden of proof is very high since applicants must demonstrate that they have used all the protection measures available to them in their country, in order to relieve themselves of their burden of proving that they do not have state protection, before claiming asylum in another country.40 [50] In this case, the Appellants did not make efforts to use all the protection measures available to them. The Principal Appellant testified that he did not try reaching out to higher authorities than the police because the only way to access those authorities was through the police.41 The Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence that this is in fact the case. [51] When the RPD member asked the Principal Appellant if he had considered going to the National Institute of Human Rights about the lack of police protection that he was receiving, the Principal Appellant testified, "Sadly, in our country, the human rights offices are left-wing. And they protected a lot of the disturbances and a lot of the issues that happened during the social uprising that happened in 2019."42 The Appellants have not provided sufficient evidence to support this allegation. The Federal Court has held that, "...doubting the effectiveness of state protection without reasonably testing it, or simply asserting a subjective reluctance to engage the state, does not rebut the presumption of state protection..."43 In other words, the Appellants cannot simply rely on their own belief that state protection will not be forthcoming.44 The experiences of the Principal Appellant's brother and father do not rebut the presumption of state protection [52] The Appellants explained that after the Appellants left for Canada, the Principal Appellant's brother passed by their house and found pamphlets that had the Appellants' names on it, along with a message that said death to the "XXXX," which is a pejorative term for XXXX XXXX XXXX of Chile.45 [53] The Principal Appellant testified that his brother who found the pamphlets at their house never went to the police to make a complaint about the pamphlets. The Principal Appellant testified that he instructed his brother not to go to the police because (a) he did not want his brother to get involved, (b) the person who is directly affected must go to the police, and (c) the police would ask his brother about the Appellants' whereabouts, which they do not want to disclose.46 [54] The Principal Appellant's brother did not go to the police to seek protection, and I find that this lack of effort does not support a finding that the police are not able or willing to provide protection to the Appellants. As referenced above, the Federal Court has held that questioning the effectiveness of state protection without really testing it, or merely asserting a subjective reluctance to involve the state, is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of state protection.47 [55] I considered the new evidence tendered by the Appellants for this appeal. The new evidence relates to allegations of an assault upon the Principal Appellant's father. The Appellants allege that the police did not take the report of the Principal Appellant's father, and that their refusal to take the report rebuts the presumption of state protection. [56] The Principal Appellant's father provided a declaration indicating that in the last week of September 2023, he was leaving his apartment building, accompanied by a neighbour. The Principal Appellant's father indicates that two individuals approached him on the street, and asked about the Principal Appellant's whereabouts. The Principal Appellant's father indicates that the men gave an intimidating message for the Principal Appellant, and then knocked him to the ground. [57] The Principal Appellant's father and the neighbour approached a police officer nearby, and they recounted what had happened. The father indicates in his letter that the officer recommended that they file a police report about the incident, and that the police officer also mentioned that, "... without having all the information about the attackers, the process could not be completed."48 [58] For the following reasons, I am not persuaded that this incident involving the Principal Appellant's father rebuts the presumption of state protection. [59] When the Principal Appellant's father and his neighbour approached the police officer on the street, and the officer told them that essentially things were unlikely to progress without information about the identity of the attackers, this did not demonstrate a lack of state protection. Instead, the officer was providing the reasonable advice that it would be difficult for the police to pursue an investigation without the critical information about the alleged attackers. [60] The police officer's response to the Principal Appellant's father does not represent a failure on the part of the police. The Principal Appellant's father's attempt to approach the police, in the context where he was unable to provide identification of those who had assaulted him, does not rebut the presumption of state protection. The officer conveyed a practical reality that the police would be unable to investigate given that the Principal Appellant's father was unable to identify the wrongdoers.49 As the Federal Court has commented:50 Random assaults, such as those suffered by the applicants, where the assailants are unknown to the victim and there are no independent witnesses are also difficult to effectively investigate and protect against. In all such circumstances, even the most effective, well-resourced and highly motivated police forces will have difficulty providing effective protection. This Court should not impose on other states a standard of "effective" protection that police forces in our own country, regrettably, sometimes only aspire to. [61] I appreciate that the neighbour of the Principal Appellant's father expressed regret that the incident remains unpunished because of the lack of information about the identity of the attackers.51 However, it is a practical reality that, "The police must be given adequate tools in order to investigate a crime and information as to the criminals is a key tool."52 Unfortunately, the key tool of information about the attackers was lacking in the case of the Principal Appellant's father's assault such that the police would not have been able to mount a successful investigation, but that does not mean there is a lack of state protection for the Appellants in Chile. CONCLUSION [62] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) Derek Vermette Derek Vermette January 17, 2024 Date 1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status", under the 1951 Convention. 2 Appellants' Record, pp. 15-16. 3 Ibid., pp. 17-22. 4 Ibid., pp. 23-27. 5 Ibid., pp. 28-31. 6 Ibid., pp. 32-36. 7 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. 8 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, [2016] 4 FCR 230; and Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385. 9 Digaf v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1255 at para 25; and Rehman v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 783 at para 44. 10 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 11 Faundez Vargas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1616 at para 19; and Camacho v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2022 FC 1507 at para 29. 12 In Hamam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1656 at paras 31-34, Justice Little provided a recent recent summary of the law with respect to state protection. 13 Hamam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1656 at para 32. 14 Da Costa Soares v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FC 190 at para 29. 15 Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Argument, para 9. 16 Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Argument, para 27. 17 Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Argument, para 29. 18 Appellants' Record, Memorandum of Argument, para 31. 19 RPD Record, Article dated July 6, 2022, from www.infobae.com, entitled, "Five hooded armed men from a radical Mapuche group destroyed three vehicles in a farm in southern Chile," p. 472. 20 RPD Record, Article dated June 1, 2022, from www.latercera.com, entitled, "Chamber of Deputies declares the CAM and three other radical organizations as "illegal associations of a terrorist nature," p. 493. 21 RPD Record, Article dated May 20, 2022, from www.lanacion.com, entitled, "Mapuche conflict in Chile: who is the lonko with ties to Argentina and who called for armed resistance," p. 535. 22 RPD Record, Article dated December 30, 2022, entitled, "Boric pardons 12 convicted of crimes of the social outbreak of 2019," p. 469. 23 For example, at National Documentation Package (NDP) for Chile (July 31, 2023), item 7.2: ?OSAC Country Security Report. Chile. United States. Overseas Security Advisory Council, the document indicates that the protest started after an increase in transit fees: "In October 2019, widespread protests began when a student protesting an increase in public transit fares escalated into widespread violence. In what became known as the Estallido Social (Social Outbreak), protesters occupied and vandalized the city's public transportation system in protests against inequality and the perceived lack of government accountability. The government deployed the army and declared a state of emergency in Santiago. Protests then spread throughout the country, including to the major cities of Concepcion, San Antonio, and Valparaíso and their surrounding regions. More than 30 people died in the violence, with at least 2,500 others injured. Some have accused the national police force (Carabineros) of human rights abuses during and after the unrest." 24 Burai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 966 at para 59. 25 NDP for Chile (July 31, 2023), item 2.3: Chile. World Report 2023: Events of 2022. Human Rights Watch. January 2023. Page 5 (Indigenous Rights) 26 Ibid. See also NDP for Chile (July 31, 2023), item 2.2: ?Chile. Amnesty International Report 2022/23: The State of the World's Human Rights. Amnesty International. March 27, 2023. POL 10/5670/2023. Page 1 (Background): "Northern and southern territories of the country were under a prolonged state of emergency for much of the year due to the migration crisis and conflict between the state and Mapuche people." 27 NDP for Chile (July 31, 2023), item 13.8: ?Concluding observations on the combined twenty-second and twenty-third reports of Chile. United Nations. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. September 13, 2022. CERD/C/CHL/CO/22-23. Page 4, para 20 (Racial discrimination and law enforcement) 28 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 10, lines 17-19. 29 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 10, lines 21-25. 30 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 9, lines 35-46; and p. 11, lines 22-42. 31 Burai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 966 at para 43. See also Zhuravlvev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (T.D.), 2000 CanLII 17128 (FC), [2000] 4 FC 3 at paras 24 and 31: "... A local refusal to provide protection is not a state refusal in the absence of evidence of a broader state policy to not extend state protection to the target group...." 32 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 9, lines 25-31. Note: The transcript refers to the town of "Wim (ph)." I listened to the relevant portion of the audio recording of the hearing and I believe the Principal Appellant says "XXXX." XXXX is listed in the Appellants' residential address history in their forms (e.g., see page 126 of RPD Record). The transcript also indicates that the Principal Appellant indicated that his brother-in-law lived a "four" minute drive away. I listened to the audio recording of the hearing and I believe the interpreter said "forty." This is consistent with what I found on the internet, which indicates that the distance between XXXX and XXXX XXXX, is an approximately "40" minute drive away. 33 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 10, lines 21-30. 34 RPD Record, Record of Submission of Refugee Claim, p. 96. 35 Ruszo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1004 at para 31. 36 Faundez Vargas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1616 at para 18. 37 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 10, lines 44-49. 38 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 11, lines 2-5. 39 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 11, lines 7-10. 40 Faundez Vargas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2023 FC 1616 at para 20. 41 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 12, lines 12-21. 42 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 12, lines 23-30. 43 Ruszo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1004 at para 33. 44 Moya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 315 at para 75. 45 RPD Record, Narrative to Principal Appellant's Basis of Claim form, p. 23, lines 52-53. 46 RPD Hearing Transcript (June 12, 2023) at p. 14, lines 12-29. 47 Ruszo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1004 at para 33. 48 Appellants' Record, Declaration dated November 5, 2023, from Principal Appellant's father, p. 20. 49 Davidova v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 908 at paras 34 and 44; Kallai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 729 at para 20; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huntley, 2010 FC 1175 at paras 194-195; Aguilar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1519 at para 25; and Mejia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1180 at para 12. 50 Smirnov v. Canada (Secretary of State) (T.D.), 1994 CanLII 3545 (FC), [1995] 1 FC 780 at p. 786. 51 Appellants' Record, Declaration dated November 3, 2023, from Principal Appellant's father's neighbour, p. 32-36. 52 Karaseva v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 1997 CanLII 5680 at para 28. See also Riczu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 888 at para 19: "...The police cannot solve crimes where there is little if any evidence to investigate or to respond to." --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VC3-12061 VC3-12062 / VC3-12063 / VC3-12064 VC3-12065 / VC3-12066 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français