Chavali v. The Law Society of Upper Canada

Chavali v. The Law Society of Upper Canada Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2007-06-28 Neutral citation 2007 ONCA 482 Docket numbers C45918, C46164 Judges Doherty, David H.; Gillese, Eileen E.; MacFarland, Jean Louise Subject Civil Decision Content CITATION: Chavali v. The Law Society of Upper Canada, 2007 ONCA 482 DATE: 20070628 DOCKET: C45918-C46164 COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO DOHERTY, GILLESE and MACFARLAND JJ.A. BETWEEN: REDDY RAJAGOPAL CHAVALI, REDDY KRISHNAVENI CHAVALI, REDDY VENKATASUBBARAMI CHAVALI, SADANA CORPORATION LTD., VAHINI HOLDINGS LTD., MERU HOLDINGS LTD., 715048 ONTARIO LTD., 715040 ONTARIO LTD., KSHAMA CORPORATION, LYON LAURIER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, NIKOLAUS WOLF, and LYON LAURIER PLACE DEVELOPMENTS LTD. Applicants, Moving Parties (Appellants other than Nikolaus Wolf) and THE LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, LAWYERS’ PROFESSIONAL INDEMNITY COMPANY, NELLIGAN/POWER, GEORGE GATY, ROYAL TRUST CORPORATION OF CANADA, PEAT MARWICK THORNE INC., SAMUEL TALBERT and COLETTE TALBERT Respondents AND BETWEEN: REDDY KRISHNAVENI CHAVALI, REDDY RAJAGOPAL CHAVALI Appellants/Applicants (Moving Parties) and THE CORPORATION OF THE VILLAGE OF ROCKCLIFFE PARK (THE CITY OF OTTAWA) Respondents J. Perry Borden and Gerald Heinrichs for the appellants, Chavali A. O’Brien for the respondents Stuart Huxley for the respondents, City of Ottawa Heard and orally released: June 22, 2007 On appeal from the order of Justice I.V.B. Nordheimer of the Superior Court of Justice dated July 31, 2006. ENDORSEMENT [1] The order of Nordheimer J. dated May 24, 2006 stands and has not been appealed. That order established a pre-screening process whereby the appellants were obliged to bring an ex parte motion to obtain leave to bring an application under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act. This screening order was made in the exercise of the Superior Court’s inherent power to control its own process and was made in an effort to prevent the appellants, who have been found to be vexatious litigants, from abusing the leave power set up in s. 140(3). [2] Pursuant to the May order of Nordheimer J., the appellants brought two motions before Nordheimer J. requesting leave to bring an application under s. 140(3). Nordheimer J. dismissed both motions on the same terms. He indicated in his order that the motion brought pursuant to s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act was “hereby dismissed”. [3] Section 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act provides that: No appeal lies from a refusal to grant relief to the applicant. [4] Section 140(4)(e), by its clear and unambiguous terms, precludes any appeal from a refusal to grant leave under s. 140(3) of the Act. We cannot read any qualifying language into the clear language of s. 140(4)(e). Furthermore, to read any qualification into that provision would be, in our view, to render the provision virtually ineffective. [5] Section 140(4)(e) precludes an appeal from a refusal to grant leave under s. 140(3). That is exactly what Nordheimer J. did in the two orders which the appellants purport to appeal in these proceedings. [6] There is no merit to the constitutional challenge to parts of s. 140. Neither counsel pursued those arguments in their oral submissions. [7] The appeals are quashed. [8] Costs to the respondents in the amount of $1,500, inclusive of disbursements and GST. “Doherty J.A.” “E.E. Gillese J.A.” “J. MacFarland J.A.”