Nova Scotia (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) v. Burnell

Nova Scotia (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) v. Burnell Court Court of Appeal Date 2010-03-17 Citation 2010 NSCA 22 Docket CA 315841 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Bateman, Nancy J. (Honourable Justice) (CA); Beveridge, Duncan R. (Honourable Justice) (CA); MacDonald, J. Michael (Honourable Chief Justice) (CA) Document Type Decision Decision Content NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL Citation: Nova Scotia (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) v. Burnell, 2010 NSCA 22 Date: 20100317 Docket: CA 315841 Registry: Halifax Between: The Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the Province of Nova Scotia Appellant v. Charles Burnell Respondent Judges: MacDonald, C.J.N.S., Bateman and Beveridge, JJ.A. Appeal Heard: March 17, 2010, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Written Judgment: March 19, 2010 Held: Appeal is dismissed per oral reasons for judgment of MacDonald, C.J.N.S.; Bateman and Beveridge, JJ.A. concurring. Appeal costs awarded to the respondent of $750 inclusive of disbursements. Counsel: Sheldon Choo and Stephen McGrath, for the appellant Matthew J. D. Moir and Theresa M. Graham, Articled Clerk, for the respondent Reasons for judgment (Orally): [1] We are of the unanimous view that the appeal should be dismissed for reasons that I will now read into the record. [2] Approximately 20 years ago, the respondent, Mr. Charles Burnell, as a result of alcohol related convictions, lost his privilege of obtaining a driver’s license. He subsequently changed his name and secured a driver’s license without first having applied to have this privilege reinstated. [3] When this was discovered in 2008, the Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles notified the respondent that this license was revoked, writing that it ...is now under revocation due to the merge of the driving records. This action is due to the Criminal Conviction under the Mason identity and the Registrar’s authority to act under Section 278 of the Motor Vehicle Act. [4] The respondent applied to quash this decision on the basis that the Registrar had no jurisdiction to revoke this license pursuant to s. 278 of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 293. The judge accepted this argument, concluding in part, [4] The letter at Tab 15 of the Record refers to s. 278 generally, but it is clear to me from reading that, if the Registrar was revoking, as the letter says she was, she must have been acting pursuant to s. 278(1). Therefore, in my view, s. 278(2) is not applicable and the decision that is under review is a decision made under s. 278(1). She continues: [10] In my view, the correct interpretation of s. 278 did not give the Registrar authority to revoke the license under the circumstances here. The revocation was not done when the conviction records were received and that is what the section requires. [5] Before us, the Registrar submits that the judge fell into error by relying on s-s. 278(1) as opposed to s-s. 278(2). Subsection 278(1) provides for revocation upon the Registrar being notified of a conviction. Subsection 278(2), as relied upon by the Registrar provides: Notwithstanding subsection (1) but subject to subsections (3) and (4), when a person is convicted of any of the crimes or offences mentioned in subsection (1), the driver’s license or the privilege of obtaining a driver’s license is thereupon and hereby revoked and shall remain revoked. [6] In other words, the Registrar says that by operation of law, s-s. 278(2) revokes the license and the privilege of obtaining a license. Either revocation, says the Registrar, prevents an individual from obtaining a license without first fulfilling the prerequisites detailed by the Act and the Regulations. [7] However, in the unique circumstances of this case, we are not persuaded that the motions judge erred in her interpretation of the relevant legislative provisions. [8] We are comforted in this conclusion by s. 279 of the Act which, on the facts of this case, would empower the Registrar to immediately suspend the respondent’s license, which then may be subject to reconsideration (following a hearing to which the respondent may be entitled). [9] We would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent of $750, inclusive of disbursements. MacDonald, C.J.N.S. Concurring: Bateman, J.A. Beveridge, J.A.