Markle v. Toronto (City)
The Court held the pension fund (including actuarial surplus) is held on trust for beneficiaries; the City did not reserve a clear power of revocation in the plan or by statute; an amending power does not permit revocation; By-law 186's retroactive recovery was a partial revocation and its prospective mandatory charge unlawfully fettered trustees' discretion, therefore By-law 186 is unlawful and the appeal is dismissed.
- Citation
- C38157
- Parties
- Applicant/respondent: John Markle; Applicant/respondent: Michel Jory; Applicant/respondent: Wes Rowe; Applicant/respondent: Jack Walford; Applicant/respondent: Michael Walker; Respondent/appellant: City of Toronto; Respondent/appellant: CIBC Mellon Global Securities Services Company
- Court
- Court of Appeal for Ontario
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 3 February 2003
- Procedural Posture
- Civil / Appeal to Court of Appeal
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed; application judge's decision affirmed.
- Legal Topics
- Revocation of Trust, Amendment of Pension by Law, Administrative Expenses, Breach of Trust, Fettering Trustees' Discretion, Retroactive Amendment
- Source Language
- English
Case Brief
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
John Markle
Applicant/respondent
Michel Jory
Applicant/respondent
Wes Rowe
Applicant/respondent
Jack Walford
Applicant/respondent
Michael Walker
Applicant/respondent
City of Toronto
Respondent/appellant
CIBC Mellon Global Securities Services Company
Respondent/appellant
Procedural Posture
Civil / Appeal to Court of Appeal
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the pension fund is held in trust for employees
- 2 Whether the City has a power of revocation over the trust
- 3 Whether By-law 186 constitutes a partial revocation and breach of trust (including retroactive recovery)
Ratio Decidendi
The Court held the pension fund (including actuarial surplus) is held on trust for beneficiaries; the City did not reserve a clear power of revocation in the plan or by statute; an amending power does not permit revocation; By-law 186's retroactive recovery was a partial revocation and its prospective mandatory charge unlawfully fettered trustees' discretion, therefore By-law 186 is unlawful and the appeal is dismissed.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed; application judge's decision affirmed.
Orders
- Appeal dismissed
- By-law 186-2001 declared unlawful to the extent it requires recovery of internal administrative costs from the Fund and to the extent applied retroactively to January 1, 1999
Full Case Text
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