Jugovits Estate (Re)

2026 BCSC 269 Jugovits Estate (Re) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Jugovits Estate (Re), 2026 BCSC 269 Date: 20260220 Docket: S257126 Registry: Vancouver In the Matter of the Estate of Laszlo Jugovits, Deceased - and - Docket: P240602 Registry: Vancouver In the Matter of the Estate of Laszlo Jugovits, Deceased Before: The Honourable Justice Hoffman Reasons for Judgment Counsel for Erika Inacio: G.T. Buchanan Counsel for the Estate of Laszlo Jugovits, Deceased and Laszlo Jugovits Jr.: M.T. Cleary Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. January 15-16, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. February 20, 2026 Table of Contents I. Overview.. 3 II. Factual Background.. 4 III. Issues. 5 IV. Suitability. 6 V. Alleged Revocation.. 6 1. Applicable Legal Framework. 6 2. Who Bears the Burden of Proof to Establish Capacity?. 10 3. Can Laszlo Jr. Establish that the Deceased Revoked the Will?. 13 a. Alleged Destruction. 13 i. Evidence that the Original Will was Intact After the Deceased's Death. 14 ii. Conclusion on the Destruction of the Will 16 b. Evidence of the Deceased's Intention to Revoke. 17 i. Medical Declaration of Incapacity. 17 ii. Transcript of Conversation Immediately Preceding the Alleged Destruction. 17 iii. Conversation between Deceased and Laszlo Jr. on November 8, 2023. 19 iv. Conversation between the Deceased and Ilona on October 26, 2023 20 v. Conclusion on the Deceased Intention to Revoke. 21 VI. Disposition.. 22 I. Overview [1] This matter involves the validity of the last will of Laszlo Jugovitz dated May 26, 2021 (the "Will"). Laszlo Jugovitz (the "deceased") died on November 22, 2023, at the age of 89. In the two competing petitions before me, the petitioners are respectively, the deceased's only biological son, Laszlo Jugovitz Jr. and the stepdaughter of the deceased, Erika Inacio, who is named the executor in the Will. Ms. Iancio has three sisters Judith Schur, Ilona Smith, and Erzsebet McLeod. [2] For clarity and readability, I will be referring to these individuals by their first names, and I intend no disrespect in doing so. [3] Laszlo Jr. alleges that a month prior to his death, he witnessed the deceased destroy the Will. Laszlo Jr. submits that the evidence establishes that the deceased destroyed the Will with the intention of revoking it and, as a result, died intestate. As the only surviving descendant of the deceased, Laszlo Jr. takes the position that the entire estate should pass to him under s. 23(2)(a) of the Wills, Estates and Succession Act, S.B.C. 2009, c. 13 [WESA]. [4] It is not disputed that the deceased was suffering from Alzheimer's disease at the time of his death. [5] Erika disputes that the deceased destroyed the Will and, because the original has not been located, seeks to have a copy of it probated. Even if it could be established that the deceased destroyed the Will, Erika says that the evidence is overwhelming that the deceased was suffering from severe dementia and therefore, did not have the requisite capacity to revoke the Will. [6] The alleged revocation is the main issue in these petitions. Aside from the allegation that the deceased destroyed the Will with the intent to revoke it, Laszlo Jr. takes no other issue with the form or execution of the Will or the deceased's testamentary capacity when it was made. [7] Although there are many factual disputes in the affidavit evidence filed by the parties in this matter, both parties take the position that it is appropriate for the court to resolve this petition summarily on the basis of the affidavit evidence. Both petitioners submit that the evidence provided is sufficient for the court to make the required findings of fact. [8] Based on my review of the evidence before me and for the reasons I will explain below, I find that it is appropriate to resolve this matter on the basis of the affidavits filed and conclude the evidence fails to establish that the deceased destroyed the Will. If I am wrong and the deceased did destroy the Will, I find that he did not have the requisite testamentary capacity to revoke it. II. Factual Background [9] The deceased began living with Julianna Adorjan and her four daughters, Erika, Judith, Ilona, and Erzsebet in 1967. The deceased did not legally adopt Julianna's daughters, but the evidence of the daughters is that they considered the deceased to be their father, and they are described as his stepdaughters in the Will at issue and in various other legal documents signed by the deceased prior to his death. [10] The deceased and Ms. Adorjan were together for 42 years until Ms. Adorjan passed away in September 2009. She left the entirety of her estate to the deceased. She and the deceased were joint tenants of their home on 140th St. in Surrey, which is now the primary asset of the deceased's estate. The home has a 2025 assessed value of $1,311,700 and is free of any financial charges. [11] For a number of years prior to the death of the deceased, Laszlo Jr. resided with the deceased in the 140th St. home. Since the deceased's death, Laszlo Jr. has continued to reside there. [12] On November 1, 2018, the deceased appointed Ilona and Erika to act as joint representatives under the Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 405, giving them authority to make health care decisions and manage his financial affairs in the event that he became incapable of making decisions. [13] On May 17, 2021, the deceased gave Power of Attorney to Erika and appointed Ilona to act as his alternate attorney. [14] On May 26, 2021, with the assistance of his counsel, Edith Szilagyi, the deceased signed the Will which was witnessed by Ms. Szilagyi and Gavin Thornton. The Will provides for the following cash gifts: a) $25,000 to his stepdaughter, Erika; b) $50,000 to his stepdaughter, Ilona; c) $100,000 to his stepdaughter, Erzsebet; d) $100,000 to his stepdaughter, Judith. [15] Under the terms of the Will, Laszlo Jr. is to receive the residue of the estate. [16] It is reasonable to infer from the evidence before me that there is significant animosity and distrust between Laszlo Jr. and at least some of his four stepsisters predating the deceased's death. Some of the stepsisters allege that Laszlo Jr. mistreated the deceased. The extent of distrust is further demonstrated by the unusual practice with recording conversations. Both petitioners have included in their affidavits transcriptions of conversations between family members from both before and after the deceased's death in circumstances where it is unclear that all participants in those conversations were aware that they were being recorded. III. Issues [17] The issues before me are: a) whether this is matter suitable to be determined by way of summary trial, and if so, b) the original of the Will was destroyed by the deceased with the intention of revoking it. IV. Suitability [18] Both parties in these competing petitions submit that, notwithstanding conflicts in the affidavit evidence and disputed issues of fact, a summary trial is a proportional and just procedure to resolve this dispute in a timely way consistent with the object of the Supreme Court Rules, R. 1-3. The starting point is that a petition is to be heard on the basis of affidavit evidence, and the existence of disputed issues of fact is not a bar to proceeding summarily: Cepuran v. Carlton, 2022 BCCA 76 at para. 158. [19] I agree that the modest amount involved and the relatively straightforward factual and legal issues at play make it appropriate for me to resolve this matter on the affidavit evidence presented by the parties. I am satisfied that I can make the required findings of fact based on the record before me. Much of the disputed affidavit evidence is simply not relevant to the key issues before me which are to be decided, in large part, on the testamentary capacity of the deceased. V. Alleged Revocation [20] I turn now to an assessment of the alleged revocation. 1. Applicable Legal Framework [21] Section 55(1) of WESA sets out how a will, other than an electronic will, may be revoked. The section relied upon by Laszlo Jr. is s. 55(1)(c): 55(1) A will other than an electronic will or a part of a will other than an electronic will is revoked only in one or more of the following circumstances: (c) by the will-maker, or a person in the presence of the will-maker and by the will-maker's direction, burning, tearing or destroying all or part of the will in some manner with the intention of revoking all or part of it; (2) A will is not revoked in whole or in part by presuming an intention to revoke it because of a change in circumstances. [22] Breaking down s. 55(1)(c), two elements are required: (1) the will must be physically burned, torn, or destroyed; and (2) the will maker must have undertaken the destruction with the intention to revoke the will. [23] At common law, where there is evidence to prove that a deceased had the original will in their possession before their death and the will cannot be located after their death, it is presumed that the deceased destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it. This is referred to as the presumption of revocation. The rationale underlying this presumption is the logical inference that people of ordinary prudence will place into safekeeping important documents such as a will. Therefore, the inability to locate a will after death supports the presumption that the testator intentionally destroyed the will: Galloway Estate (Re), 2023 BCSC 1204 at paras. 45-46, citing Morton v. Christian, 2014 BCSC 1303. [24] Practically speaking, this means that the burden of proof will generally lie on the party denying that the will was revoked to demonstrate that the will was merely lost: Polischuk Estate v. Perry, 2014 BCSC 1089 at para. 66. [25] However, like most legal presumptions, the presumption of revocation is rebuttable. It can be displaced by evidence demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that the will was lost or otherwise misplaced: Galloway at para. 48-50. [26] The presumption of revocation will also cease to operate if the testator becomes mentally incapable sometime after the will was executed because it can no longer be presumed that the testator had the capacity to revoke it. As a result, in circumstances where there is evidence casting doubt on the testator's mental capacity, the burden of proof shifts to the party alleging revocation to prove that when the testator revoked the will, he or she had the requisite mental capacity to do so: Polischuk Estate at para. 66. [27] The test to be applied in determining testamentary capacity dates back to the 19th century. The Ontario Court of Appeal provided a modern restatement of this test in Re Schwartz, 10 D.L.R. (3d) 15 at 32, 1970 CanLII 32 (O.N.C.A.), which continues to be applied in this province: see Laszlo v. Lawton, 2013 BCSC 305 at para.188: The testator must be sufficiently clear in his understanding and memory to know, on his own, and in a general way (1) the nature and extent of his property, (2) the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty and (3) the testamentary provisions he is making; and he must, moreover, be capable of (4) appreciating these factors in relation to each other, and (5) forming an orderly desire as to the disposition of his property ... [28] This test is a factual one to be determined on the basis of all factual circumstances before the court: Laszlo at para. 197. The testator being diagnosed with dementia is one relevant circumstance, but it is not, standing alone, determinative of the question of capacity. This is because testamentary capacity is a legal, rather than a medical, concept: James v. Field, 2001 BCCA 267 at para. 41. Accordingly, medical evidence is only one factor to consider. The evidence of lay witnesses is also important. It is open to the court to reject a medical diagnosis where there is other evidence suggesting that the testator had more or less capacity than suggested by a medical professional: Laszlo at para. 199. [29] The court must also be cautious about presuming capacity when a testator provides rational responses to routine or familiar questions. Rather, testamentary capacity must be assessed with specific reference to the task that the testator is performing, either making a will, in cases involving the validity of a will, or in this case, revoking a will. Applying the principles from the Laszlo decision, I must be satisfied that at the time of revocation, the deceased was capable of having a reasonable understanding of the implications for his estate and his beneficiaries if he were to revoke his will: Laszlo at paras. 194-197. [30] At the same time, proving testamentary capacity is not overly onerous, and proof of cognitive deterioration, standing alone, may not be sufficient to establish a lack of testamentary capacity even where the testator is unable to manage other aspects of their life: Underhill Estate (Re), 2025 BCSC 1722 at para. 83. It is recognized that many people may make wills late in life when they are already suffering from significant cognitive deterioration, and this fact alone should not make it impossible for such individuals to express their intentions in a will: Waibel Estate (Re), 2023 BCSC 322 at para. 19. [31] Laszlo Jr. relies on the decision of Nassim v. Healey, 2022 BCSC 402, to demonstrate that a diagnosis of dementia is not determinative of testamentary capacity. The issue in Nassim was whether a will-maker had the requisite capacity to make a will and, therefore, engaged the doctrine of suspicious circumstances. Justice Brongers held that the fact that the testator made the will after he was diagnosed by two medical doctors as having dementia and being incapable of managing his finances was a suspicious circumstance which shifted the burden to the party seeking to rely upon the will. In finding that this suspicious circumstance was dispelled and that the testator had the requisite capacity despite his dementia diagnosis, Justice Brongers described the evidence of two lawyers who assessed the testator's capacity as follows: [57] Having reviewed the joint application record, I am of the view that the best evidence of Ramses' testamentary capacity at the time the Will was made is that provided by Ms. Britnell and Ms. Janzen. As was submitted by counsel for Margaret, they are both experienced and knowledgeable wills and estates lawyers, who were well aware of the Banks v. Goodfellow test for testamentary capacity. Furthermore, Ms. Britnell had met Ramses on several occasions, was aware of the Nassim family dynamics, and was alive to the possibility of a challenge to the Will and the potential for allegations of impaired capacity. Neither Ms. Britnell nor Ms. Janzen had concerns about Ramses' capacity in respect of the Will. They felt that Ramses understood the nature and effect of making a will, the extent of his property, the claims to which he ought to give effect, and that he was operating free of any delusions. [32] Laszlo Jr. submits that a lesser standard of capacity is required to revoke a will than to make a will because revocation is a far less mentally taxing task involving only one decision, namely that the testator does not wish to have a will. No authority is cited to support this proposition. Erika relies on the decision of Goold Estate (Re), 2016 ABQB 303 at para. 56, where it was held that at the time that a will is destroyed, it must be voluntary, and the testator must be of the same state of competence as when a valid will is created. [33] I am not prepared to conclude that as a matter of law, a lesser standard of testamentary capacity is required to revoke a will rather than make it. The test of testamentary capacity as set out in Re Schwartz is already calibrated to consider the nature of the testamentary provisions being contemplated which include the revocation of a will. In addition to an appreciation of the provisions being revoked, the testator must still have an appreciation of the nature and value of his or her estate, and those who would be considered its natural recipients. Taking all this into account, the testator must have been able to arrive at an orderly decision that he or she preferred to have their estate disposed of without the benefit of a will and in accordance with the intestate provisions of WESA. 2. Who Bears the Burden of Proof to Establish Capacity? [34] Before resolving the factual disputes of whether the Will was revoked by the deceased, and if so, whether he had the requisite capacity to do so, it is important to first establish who has the onus to prove revocation in the circumstances before the court. In other words, is Laszlo Jr. entitled to rely on the presumption of revocation or do the circumstances of this case call for the presumption to be rebutted? [35] The unique facts of this case raise a question about whether the presumption can even operate when there is an eyewitness to the destruction of the Will. Most commonly, the presumption arises when the Will is unable to be located. However, as the remains of either the allegedly torn or the original Will have not been found, I find that, but for the questions regarding the deceased's mental capacity, the presumption could operate in this case. [36] In any event, whether the presumption can operate turns on the evidence of the deceased's mental capacity at the time the Will was allegedly revoked. It is not disputed between the parties that the deceased was suffering from Alzheimer's in the years proceeding his death. Erika filed an affidavit alleging that the deceased had expressed various concerns about the treatment he was receiving from Laszlo Jr., including that he had cut off power to the deceased's stove sometime in 2022. In response, Laszlo Jr. admitted doing so but as a safety precaution as he was concerned that the deceased could have a serious accident because of his progressive dementia. Laszlo Jr. also offered the deceased's dementia as a response to allegations of mistreatment and hearsay statements by the deceased that Laszlo Jr. was hiding things from him, deposing that from what Laszlo Jr. "observed as a lay person, my father was suffering from progressive dementia." [37] I also have before me the medical records of the deceased's admission and stay at Surrey Memorial Hospital. He was admitted on September 22, 2023, due to a persistent wound that was failing to heal. It is apparent from the records that part of the reason he was admitted to hospital was due to a breakdown in the relationship between home health care workers, the deceased, and Laszlo Jr. The deceased's past medical history is noted to include behavioural and psychological symptoms of dementia and decreased strength in his hands. The deceased was reported to have claw hands and to have been bed-bound at home. [38] On October 19, 2023, the deceased was assessed by Dr. Choong, a psychiatrist. The deceased told Dr. Choong that he was in hospital due to his hands as he was no longer able to grip onto things. He reported that he was unable to stand up. Despite this, later in the assessment, the deceased told the doctor that he was able to use his mobility scooter for shopping and that he could cook for himself at home. The deceased was reported to be vague about the supports that this son was providing for him at home aside from giving him a "high level of freedom". Although he was aware that he was in hospital, he was unaware of the year and could not explain why he had been in the hospital for so long. Dr. Choong described the deceased as requiring total care and a ceiling lift to get him out of bed. Dr. Choong had seen the deceased the year prior and noted that compared to his previous assessment, the deceased was not as articulate as before and frequently required repetition to improve his comprehension. Although Dr. Choong described him as animated and enthusiastic about "his freedom", he also noted that there was "poverty of thought content" and that he was "quite perseverative about 'freedom'". Dr. Choong opined that the deceased's dementia had progressed since the previous assessment and that he remained lacking capacity to direct his care or make health care decisions. Dr. Choong did not report any difficulties communicating with the deceased in English. [39] On October 26, 2023, Dr. Choong prepared a letter to confirm that the deceased was "lacking capacity with respect to directing his care, making health care decisions, and managing his personal finances due to major neurocognitive disorder resulting in cognitive impairment". [40] In a later assessment on November 21, 2023, Dr. Nyugen reported having difficulty gathering a history from the deceased due to his limited English and the fact that he was only able to vocalize as a whisper. The deceased had developed pneumonia two days previously. He died the following day. [41] Ilona deposes that after the deceased was admitted to Surrey Memorial, he called her on several occasions, wanting her to arrange for him to go home. She told the deceased he was capable and could manage his own care decisions. This was before she became aware of Dr. Choong's assessment that he was no longer capable. I place more weight on Dr. Choong's medical assessment than Ilona's view of the deceased's capacity. [42] With respect to the deceased's ability to understand English, Ilona deposes that the deceased came to Canada in the mid-1950s and that he worked as a drywall finisher and could communicate in English, spoke with tradespeople without difficulty, and conducted daily tasks, such as banking and shopping in English. Laszlo Jr. does not dispute this evidence. However, I infer from the degree to which his son and other affiants, such as Ilona and Joseph Mandur, spoke to the deceased in Hungarian that the deceased was most comfortable communicating in his mother tongue. [43] I find that there is ample evidence casting doubt on the deceased mental capacity in and around October 2022 when the Will was alleged to have been revoked. The evidence establishes that the deceased was suffering from progressive dementia and his treating physicians were of the opinion that he was unable to make decisions respecting his care and his finances. In light of this evidence, the presumption of revocation does not apply in this case. 3. Can Laszlo Jr. Establish that the Deceased Revoked the Will? [44] Without the benefit of the presumption of revocation, the burden lies on Laszlo Jr. to establish on a balance of probabilities both that the Will was revoked and that the deceased had sufficient capacity to intentionally do so. I will first address the evidence relating to the alleged destruction of the Will before turning to address the evidence regarding the intention and capacity of the deceased. a. Alleged Destruction [45] The only evidence that the Will was destroyed comes from Laszlo Jr. who gives evidence that he witnessed the deceased tear up the Will on either October 22 or October 25, 2023, outside Surrey Memorial Hospital. In his first affidavit in these proceedings, Laszlo Jr. deposes that he was together with Brenda Otte, on October 22, 2023, when the deceased was having a telephone discussion with his counsel, Edith Szilagyi, partially in Hungarian and partially in English. Laszlo Jr. recorded this conversation, and a certified translation is attached to his affidavit dated February 20, 2024. Laszlo Jr. describes that after his father hung up the phone, he "angrily tore up his will". Laszlo Jr. also deposes that the torn Will appeared to be the same document that Erika served on him in connection with her application for probate. [46] In his most recent affidavit, sworn January 7, 2026, Laszlo Jr. deposes that the conversation with Ms. Szilagyi took place on October 25, 2023, and that, on the previous day, the deceased asked him to bring to the hospital a folder of papers from their home which was stored in a hidden drawer in a cupboard in the deceased's part of the house. Laszlo Jr. further deposes that after this conversation ended, the deceased stated, in Hungarian, words to the effect that "I will handle this" and tore pages of the original Will almost in two. He then stated in English, "I want to change my will." When they returned to the deceased's hospital room, at the request of the deceased, Laszlo Jr. put the torn Will in the bottom drawer of the bedside table. When Laszlo Jr. returned to visit his father on October 26, 2023, Ilona and her niece Jessica Gould were visiting. After they left, Laszlo Jr. opened the bottom drawer of the bedside table to get some wet wipes. In doing so, he did not see the torn Will he had previously placed there. [47] The relationship of Brenda Otte to the deceased and Laszlo Jr. is not set out in her affidavit. Laszlo Jr. describes her as a friend in a subsequent affidavit. Ms. Otte's evidence is that she was present on October 25, 2023, when the deceased was having a telephone discussion with Ms. Szilagyi. Ms. Otte does not speak Hungarian and, therefore, states that she did not understand a lot of the conversation. She observed the deceased to be quite agitated during the call. After the call ended, she observed the deceased take some unidentified papers and rip them up. She then heard the deceased state that he wanted to "change his will". Whether that was stated in English or Hungarian is not specified in her affidavit, but I presume it was in English because Ms. Otte could understand it. i. Evidence that the Original Will was Intact After the Deceased's Death [48] Despite the eyewitness' accounts of the deceased's destruction of what was at least observed by Laszlo Jr. to have been the Will, there is evidence from at least two other witnesses that Laszlo Jr. had the original Will in his possession following the deceased's death. [49] Jessica Gould is Erzsebet's daughter. Ms. Gould deposes that on January 14, 2024, Laszlo Jr. came to her home to tell her that he had located the deceased's original Will. Her evidence is that Laszlo Jr. had some papers with him that he identified as the original Will and a copy of the power of attorney. Ms. Gould recorded their conversation in two parts and attaches her transcription of them to her affidavit. Laszlo Jr. did not object to the portions of the transcript that record the words actually spoken and does not dispute that he spoke the words attributed to him in the transcript. Laszlo Jr. objects to the admissibility of visual observations made by Ms. Gould that she included in the transcript. According to the transcript, Ms. Gould asks Laszlo, "is that the will or the power of attorney that you have?" Laszlo responds, "that's the power of attorney, this is the will." Later, in the context of an exchange about who is obligated to keep the original of a will, Ms. Gould asked "does the one you have say true original." Laszlo Jr. responds, "Uh huh, it's written in ink" and then later clarifies, "it is signed in ink." When Ms. Gould asks to see what Laszlo Jr. identified as "the will", Laszlo Jr. refuses and assures her that he will keep it safe. In her affidavit, Ms. Gould gives evidence that Laszlo Jr. pointed out that the document he identified as "the will" did not have the word "copy" marked on it and that he also showed her the signature page to point out that the names were written in blue ink. [50] Erzsebet deposes that when she came home on January 14, 2024, Laszlo Jr. was waiting for her. She describes having a close relationship with Laszlo Jr., seeing him twice per week. She deposes that Laszlo Jr. placed the Will in front of her on the dining room table. She observed that it clearly read "Last Will and Testament" and there was nothing marking it as a copy. Erzsebet picked up the Will to read it, but Laszlo Jr. took it out of her hands and told her that she was not allowed to tell anyone what she saw. [51] In response to this evidence, Laszlo Jr. deposes that the documents that he had with him on January 14, 2024, were a copy of a representation agreement made by the deceased in 2018 and that it could not have been the original Will because he witnessed his father tear up the original. This is despite his admission at the hearing before me that he spoke the words recorded in the transcript of his conversation with Ms. Gould. In submissions, his counsel proffered the explanation that Laszlo Jr. is unsophisticated in legal matters and was likely confused as to the nature of the documents in his possession. Counsel further submits that when one examines the transcript closely, it sounds as though Laszlo Jr. is describing a power of attorney agreement. I disagree. Laszlo Jr. clearly described for Ms. Gould having two documents, both a will and a power of attorney. Further, for someone who is fluent and literate in English, it does not take a great deal of sophistication to differentiate between the Will which has the bolded title "Last Will and Testament" on the face page and the Power of Attorney document which is titled in bold "Power of Attorney". I have no evidence before me that Laszlo Jr. is unable to read English. [52] A certified copy of the Will was sent to all of the siblings on January 16, 2024, two days after Laszlo Jr. is alleged to have an original. This eliminates the possibility that the will Laszlo Jr. had with him on January 14, 2024 was the copy Erika, as executor, is seeking to probate. ii. Conclusion on the Destruction of the Will [53] I am not satisfied that Laszlo Jr. has met his onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the deceased destroyed the original Will. The only evidence that the papers allegedly torn by the deceased were the original Will comes from Laszlo Jr. who is not a disinterested party in this matter. The affidavit evidence before me demonstrates a clear animus between Laszlo Jr. and his stepsisters, and the transcripts of the conversations in which he was involved support a finding that he was anxious to ensure that he could remain living in the deceased's house. The doctrine of suspicious circumstances applies to the making of a will rather than its revocation and, accordingly, is not directly applicable in this case. However, this doctrine often arises where an interested beneficiary is instrumental in the preparation of the will in question: Laszlo at para. 207. In my view, suspicions are equally raised where a beneficiary who stands to individually benefit from the testator dying without a will is a witness to or directly involved in the revocation of a will. [54] In any event, Laszlo Jr. cannot satisfy his onus to prove destruction because he has failed to provide a persuasive basis upon which to discount the evidence of Ms. Gould and Erzsebet, including his own statements that he does not disavow, that he had a copy of the original Will in his possession when he met with them after the deceased's death. As set out above, I am not persuaded that Laszlo Jr. was confused as to the nature of these documents they discussed during that visit. Nor is it plausible that he would tell Ms. Gould and Erzsebet that he had the original Will if he had witnessed his father destroy the Will, even if he was confused as to the nature of the documents he had with him. His affidavits are emphatic leaving no room for confusion that he observed the Will being torn by the deceased, which undermines his explanation that he may have misunderstood the documents he had with him on January 14, 2024. All this causes me to doubt the credibility of his account that he witnessed the deceased destroy the Will. Further, the medical evidence that the deceased was unable to get out of bed without the assistance of two people and a ceiling lift, had a condition referred to "claw hands", and loss of strength such that he was unable to grip things raises serious doubt in my mind that the deceased would be physically capable of tearing documents. b. Evidence of the Deceased's Intention to Revoke [55] In the event that I have erred in concluding that the deceased did not destroy the original Will, I turn now to the evidence addressing whether the deceased had the requisite mental capacity to form the intention to revoke the Will. i. Medical Declaration of Incapacity [56] As set out above, the medical evidence before me establishes that by October 19, 2023, the deceased's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Choong, was of the view that he lacked the mental capacity to make his own care decisions. On October 26, 2023, Dr. Choong certified in a letter that the deceased was also incapable of making financial decisions. [57] However, consistent with the case authorities reviewed above, the inquiry into the deceased's capacity does not end there. I must have regard to all of the relevant evidence and observations of the deceased's capacity. Laszlo Jr. submitted that when one adds up the evidence regarding the actions of the deceased, it clearly amounts to an intention to revoke the Will and supports the conclusion that he understood the consequences of doing so. ii. Transcript of Conversation Immediately Preceding the Alleged Destruction [58] Laszlo Jr. submits that in the conversation the deceased had with his lawyer, Ms. Szilagyi, just prior to declaring that he wished to change the Will, the deceased gave meaningful instructions regarding his intentions. In my view, the transcript of this conversation sheds little light on whether the deceased intended to revoke the Will. Based on the transcript and Laszlo Jr.'s evidence that he recorded the conversation once it got heated, I find that this transcript does not contain the entirety of the conversation. Furthermore, many portions of the transcript are noted to be inaudible. Early in the conversation, the deceased states in Hungarian that: Deceased: "I was tricked. They took, I had the last will and testament written, then Ica took me there, and they said, I signed that letter, and her husband, that this attorney, how it is called? Laszlo Jr.: Power of attorney. Deceased: Power of attorney, and I did not sign it like that. I thought I signed the last will and testament. There was no English, nobody. [59] After a long exchange in English exclusively between Laszlo Jr. and Ms. Szilagyi, Laszlo Jr. asks the deceased in Hungarian, "Do you want anyone as power of attorney", and the deceased responds "not now" and confirms that he "wants it cancelled." [60] Aside from its incompleteness, there are several aspects of the available portions of the conversation which raise questions about the extent to which it can be used in assessing the deceased's intention and capacity to revoke the Will. First, the deceased says little during the conversation that is dominated by Laszlo Jr., who aggressively questions Ms. Szilagyi in English about the circumstances under which the power of attorney was signed and how he can get a copy because his father wants it revoked. Secondly, Ms. Szilagyi expresses concerns that what Laszlo Jr. represents as the deceased's wishes is not consistent with an earlier conversation she had with the deceased. Thirdly, Ms. Szilagyi states that the fact that the deceased could not remember what he signed is a "big problem". Finally, the only time in the call that the deceased volunteered information unprompted is when Laszlo Jr. attempts to end the conversation. The deceased says something in Hungarian that was not entirely audible but is transcribed as "[inaudible] not my daughters. The children's mother was known to Hungary, but they grew up [inaudible] worked and I helped them out." Laszlo Jr. then interjects to say "Okay, dad, we have to tell what happened to another lawyer." The limited participation of the deceased in this call, along with the interjection of Laszlo Jr., leaves me little basis upon which to assess whether the deceased had both the independent intention and the mental capacity to revoke the Will. [61] In fact, the call raises more questions about the deceased's capacity and the possibility of undue influence over him by Laszlo Jr. than it answers. One thing that is clear from the transcript is that Laszlo Jr. was very intent on getting a copy of the power of attorney. So much so that at one point, he threatens to report Ms. Szilagyi for not fulfilling her professional duties to the deceased. At a different point in the call, Ms. Szilagyi raised the possibility that the deceased was afraid of Laszlo Jr. iii. Conversation between Deceased and Laszlo Jr. on November 8, 2023 [62] In submitting that the deceased had the requisite capacity to revoke the Will, Laszlo Jr. also relies on a transcription from a conversation he had and recorded with the deceased on November 8, 2023. Again, it is likely that this transcript records only a portion of the conversation that Laszlo Jr. had with the deceased that day. At the outset of the transcript, Laszlo Jr. notes that the conversation is being recorded in order to fulfil the deceased's wishes. Laszlo Jr. asks what the deceased wants. In response, the deceased states that he wants the house transferred in Laszlo Jr.'s name and to take his money out of the bank so that "Eri" cannot touch it. After indicating that he will take the necessary steps to fulfill the deceased's wishes immediately, Laszlo Jr. then asks the deceased a series of questions seemingly to assess his awareness. The deceased was unable to identify what day it was but could state his age, that he was at Memorial Hospital, and was able to recite a series of numbers when asked what his phone number was. The deceased was able to say that he had one child and four stepchildren. Laszlo Jr. then asks the deceased if he wants to come home. The deceased responds, "Oh, yes. That is why you should take the house. It is comfortable at home, hungry." [63] In my view, although the deceased provides a clear direction that he wants the house put into his son's name, the transcript again provides me little comfort that this direction was the product of an independent and rational testamentary consideration by the deceased. The medical records show that the deceased was highly concerned about his freedom, and evidence from his stepdaughters indicates that he was anxious to leave the hospital and go back home. Indeed, the deceased told Laszlo Jr. that he wanted Laszlo Jr. to own the house so he could go home. This is different from saying that he wanted his son to have the house after his death. As to the questions put to the deceased to demonstrate his capacity, these are the type of routine and familiar questions identified in Laszlo that the court should be wary to rely upon in establishing capacity. [64] Accordingly, there is little I can rely upon in this transcript to support a finding that the deceased had testamentary capacity to revoke the Will. iv. Conversation between the Deceased and Ilona on October 26, 2023 [65] On October 26, 2023, Ilona had a conversation with the deceased in Hungarian that she recorded and then transcribed and translated into English herself. Laszlo Jr. objects to the admissibility of this translation on the basis that having been both translated and transcribed by an interested party, it does not meet the minimal standards of translated evidence admissible in civil proceedings. Translations must be impartial, objective, and unbiased: R v. Tran, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951, 1994 CanLII 56. This standard is equally applicable in civil proceedings: Luu v. Wang, 2011 BCSC 1201 at para. 10; Tran at para. 73. [66] The only portion of this transcript that is relied upon by Ilona is an exchange that took place in the context of Ilona saying that Laszlo Jr. was seeking power of attorney over the deceased's affairs. The deceased recounted at his own prompting that Judith and Erzsebet would get $100,000, Ilona would get $50,000, and Erika would get $15,000. At this point, Ilona interjected to say that she thinks that Erika was to get $25,000. Erika submits that this statement, which gives no indication that the deceased was resiling from the division of his estate that he recounted, is inconsistent with an intention to revoke the Will. [67] At the hearing, Laszlo Jr. withdrew his objection to this limited portion of the transcript. Laszlo Jr. submits that this exchange demonstrates that the deceased possessed the requisite capacity because had expressed an appreciation for the extent of his estate, who might benefit from its disposition, and what he wanted to do with his estate. Laszlo Jr. submits that the deceased was under no obligation to disclose to Ilona that he had revoked the Will. v. Conclusion on the Deceased Intention to Revoke [68] Having reviewed the whole of the affidavit evidence before me, I am not satisfied that there is sufficient independent and reliable evidence before me to establish on a balance of probabilities that the deceased had the requisite testamentary capacity on October 22 or 25, 2023, when he was alleged to have revoked the Will. This includes the diagnosis of dementia and the finding that the deceased lacked the capacity to make health care and financial decisions. Despite this diagnosis, there is some evidence that the deceased understood the nature and extent of his estate as related in his October 26, 2023, conversation with Ilona. However, the transcripts of conversations involving the deceased relied upon by Laszlo Jr. do not contain sufficient evidence to allow me to conclude that, despite his dementia, the deceased had arrived at a considered appreciation that he wished to revoke the testamentary gifts he had provided to his stepdaughters in the Will. [69] This case is distinguishable from Nassim where the court had the benefit of an assessment from two lawyers with an in-depth knowledge of the requirements of testamentary capacity who had met with the testator. Such evidence is entirely lacking in this case. I have no evidence from a lawyer who carefully and objectively questioned the deceased to determine his testamentary wishes that would allow me to depart from the medical conclusions drawn that he lacked capacity to make financial decisions. Instead, I have fragmentary conversations in which the deceased is asked by an interested party what his wishes are in the context of an enthusiastically expressed desire on the part of the deceased to leave the hospital and return to his home. Accordingly, Laszlo Jr. has failed to satisfy me that if the deceased destroyed the Will, he did so with the requisite testamentary capacity to revoke it. VI. Disposition [70] I declare that the force and validity of the copy of the Will is approved in solemn form. [71] The proffered copy of the Will is to be admitted into probate. [72] As the successful party in these proceedings, Erika as executor of the Will is presumptively entitled to recover her costs from the estate as she had a valid basis to seek to probate a copy of the Will. If the parties are unable to arrive at an agreement on costs, the parties should seek leave to make further written submissions before me. Any such request should be forwarded to Supreme Court Scheduling within 30 days of the release of this judgment. "Hoffman J."