R. v. Bedard

R. v. Bedard Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2000-10-27 Docket numbers C27716 Judges Osborne, Coulter Arthur Anthony; Doherty, David H.; Laskin, John Ivan Subject Criminal Decision Content DATE: 20001027 DOCKET: C27716 COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO RE: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Respondent) v. RICHARD MARTIN BEDARD (Appellant) BEFORE: OSBORNE A.C.J.O., DOHERTY and LASKIN JJ.A. COUNSEL: appellant appearing in person Susan Kyle for the respondent HEARD: October 24, 2000 On appeal from the conviction imposed by Mr. Justice Bourke Smith dated June 19, 1997. E N D O R S E M E N T [1] The appellant raised many issues in the extensive material he filed on the appeal. We are concerned only with those issues that could have some bearing on the propriety of his convictions on charges of break and enter and possession of stolen property entered after a trial before Mr. Justice Bourke Smith at which the appellant acted for himself. [2] The appellant argues that he was denied the right to make full answer and defence because he was not allowed to adduce evidence of his medical condition at the time he gave an inculpatory statement to the police. The appellant contends that he is hypoglycaemic and that his condition rendered him incapable of making a voluntary statement. This argument was not one of the several arguments made by the appellant at trial in support of his contention that the statement was inadmissible. [3] The officer taking the statement from the appellant testified that the appellant did not appear to be impaired in any way. Ms. Kyle, counsel for the Crown, also referred us to a portion of the cross-examination of that officer by the appellant in which the appellant took issue with any suggestion that he may have been incoherent during any part of his conversations with the police. [4] Although the appellant did seek to adduce certain medical evidence of his hypoglycaemic condition at trial, it does not appear to us that this evidence was tendered to support a contention that the statements were not voluntary. In any event, nothing produced at trial, or by way of fresh evidence in this court sheds any light on the appellant’s medical condition at the time he gave the inculpatory statement. While the evidence offers some support for the appellant’s contention that he was hypoglycaemic it goes no further and does not suggest that this condition affected his ability to provide a voluntary statement. There is no suggestion, even in the affidavit filed by the appellant on this appeal, that he did not have an operating mind when he made the statement. [5] The appellant also claims that he was denied the opportunity to present medical evidence of his condition at the time of trial and that such evidence could have demonstrated that at the time of his trial he was unable to properly defend himself because his cognitive functions were significantly impaired by his hypoglycaemic condition. Nothing in the transcript of the trial proceedings or the fresh evidence filed by the appellant supports this claim. Perusal of the transcript shows that the appellant was a full participant in the trial. It is also noteworthy that the very experienced trial judge congratulated the appellant on the conduct of his own defence at the end of the trial. [6] At the trial, the appellant challenged the voluntariness of his statements to the police, one of which was videotaped. He renewed those objections on appeal. At trial, the Crown led evidence from the two officers who took the statements. The appellant did not testify and did not call any evidence on the voir dire to determine the admissibility of the statement. He advanced three arguments in support of his claim that the Crown had not shown that the statements were voluntary. The trial judge rejected each submission. In doing so, he made clear findings of fact all of which were fully supported by the evidence. We cannot interfere with those findings. In the light of those findings the admissibility of the statements cannot be successfully challenged. [7] The appellant also submitted that the trial judge was biased. This submission rested on a single remark made by the trial judge during the appellant’s cross-examination of one of the witnesses. There is no merit to this submission. We see nothing improper in the comment made by the trial judge. Nor have we been referred to anything else in his conduct of the trial which would cast any doubt on the trial judge’s impartiality or the fairness with which he conducted the trial. [8] The appeal is dismissed. “C.A. Osborne A.C.J.O.” “Doherty J.A.” “John Laskin J.A.”