Clark v. Nova Scotia (Registrar of Motor Vehicles)

Clark v. Nova Scotia (Registrar of Motor Vehicles) Court Court of Appeal Date 2024-10-24 Citation 2024 NSCA 88 Docket CA 528055 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Bourgeois, Cindy A. (Honourable Justice) (CA); Van den Eynden, Elizabeth (Honourable Justice) (CA); Derrick, Anne S. (Honourable Justice) (CA) Document Type Decision Summary: Judge The Honourable Justice Cindy A. Bourgeois Appeal Heard September 11, 2024, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Facts The appellant was convicted of three driving offences under the Criminal Code over 16 months, leading to the indefinite revocation of his driver's license by the Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles. The revocation was automatic under the Motor Vehicle Act due to multiple impairment-related offences, and the appellant was informed he could not apply for reinstatement for at least 10 years (paras 2-3, 5-8). Procedural History Nova Scotia Supreme Court, 2023 NSSC 428: The application for judicial review was dismissed, as the revocation was an automatic consequence of the Act, not a discretionary decision, and the application was untimely (paras 3, 20-21). Parties' Submissions Appellant: Argued that the Deputy Registrar erred by applying the wrong statutory provision, leading to an indefinite revocation, and claimed the Act allowed for discretion in revocation periods (paras 15-17, 27-28). Respondent (Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles): Contended that the revocation was an automatic result of the Act, not a decision subject to review, and the appellant's application was untimely (paras 18-19). Legal Issues Did the hearing judge err by concluding the matter did not engage a "decision" subject to judicial review? (para 22) Disposition The appeal was dismissed with costs. Reasons Per Bourgeois J.A. (Van den Eynden and Derrick JJ.A. concurring): The Court found that the revocation of the appellant's license was an automatic consequence of the statutory scheme under the Motor Vehicle Act, not a discretionary decision by the Deputy Registrar. The Act's provisions were correctly interpreted, and the appellant's circumstances did not allow for judicial review. The Court also agreed with the hearing judge's interpretation that the Deputy Registrar had no discretion to vary the revocation period. The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent (paras 26-40). Decision Content Nova Scotia Court of Appeal Citation: Clark v. Nova Scotia (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), 2024 NSCA 88 Date: 20241024 Docket: CA 528055 Registry: Halifax Between: Ryan Andrew Clark Appellant v. Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles and the Attorney General of Nova Scotia representing His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of Nova Scotia Respondents Judge: The Honourable Justice Cindy A. Bourgeois Appeal Heard: September 11, 2024, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Facts: The appellant was convicted of three driving offences under the Criminal Code over 16 months, leading to the indefinite revocation of his driver's license by the Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles. The revocation was automatic under the Motor Vehicle Act due to multiple impairment-related offences, and the appellant was informed he could not apply for reinstatement for at least 10 years (paras 2-3, 5-8). Procedural History: Nova Scotia Supreme Court, 2023 NSSC 428: The application for judicial review was dismissed, as the revocation was an automatic consequence of the Act, not a discretionary decision, and the application was untimely (paras 3, 20-21). Parties Submissions: Appellant: Argued that the Deputy Registrar erred by applying the wrong statutory provision, leading to an indefinite revocation, and claimed the Act allowed for discretion in revocation periods (paras 15-17, 27-28). Respondent: (Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles): Contended that the revocation was an automatic result of the Act, not a decision subject to review, and the appellant's application was untimely (paras 18-19). Legal Issues: Did the hearing judge err by concluding the matter did not engage a "decision" subject to judicial review? (para 22) Disposition: The appeal was dismissed with costs. Reasons: Per Bourgeois J.A. (Van den Eynden and Derrick JJ.A. concurring): The Court found that the revocation of the appellant's license was an automatic consequence of the statutory scheme under the Motor Vehicle Act, not a discretionary decision by the Deputy Registrar. The Act's provisions were correctly interpreted, and the appellant's circumstances did not allow for judicial review. The Court also agreed with the hearing judge's interpretation that the Deputy Registrar had no discretion to vary the revocation period. The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent (paras 26-40). This information sheet does not form part of the court’s judgment. Quotes must be from the judgment, not this cover sheet. The full court judgment consists of 41 paragraphs. Nova Scotia Court of Appeal Citation: Clark v. Nova Scotia (Registrar of Motor Vehicles), 2024 NSCA 88 Date: 20241024 Docket: CA 528055 Registry: Halifax Between: Ryan Andrew Clark Appellant v. Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles and the Attorney General of Nova Scotia representing His Majesty the King in Right of the Province of Nova Scotia Respondents Judges: Bourgeois, Van den Eynden and Derrick, JJ.A. Appeal Heard: September 11, 2024, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Held: Appeal dismissed with costs, per reasons for judgment of Bourgeois, J.A.; Van den Eynden and Derrick, JJ.A. concurring Counsel: David G. Coles, K.C. and S. Leanne Flett, for the appellant Alison W. Campbell and Caitlin E. Menczel-O’Neill, for the respondent, Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles Edward A. Gores, K.C., for the respondent, Attorney General of Nova Scotia, not participating Reasons for judgment: [1] The granting, revocation, and re-instatement of driver’s licenses in Nova Scotia is governed by the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 293, as amended (the “Act”). The Act specifies that when individuals are convicted of certain Criminal Code offences, there will be resulting consequences to the status of their driver’s license. [2] Over a period of 16 months the appellant, Ryan Andrew Clark, was convicted of three driving offences under the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46. Following his third conviction, he was advised by the Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles that his driver’s license was indefinitely revoked and has was unable to apply for re-instatement for a minimum period of 10 years. The appellant sought judicial review of the Deputy Registrar’s “decision”. [3] The hearing judge, Justice Pierre L. Muise, dismissed the application for judicial review, finding there was no reviewable “decision”; rather, the revocation of the appellant’s license was an automatic consequence arising from the provisions of the Act. Further, even if there was a reviewable “decision”, Justice Muise found the appellant had failed to seek judicial review in a timely manner. [4] The appellant now appeals to this Court and argues the hearing judge erred in several ways. For the reasons to follow, I am satisfied the hearing judge correctly interpreted the provisions of the Act and properly concluded the revocation of the appellant’s driver’s license did not arise from a discretionary decision, but rather was an automatic result of the statutory scheme. As such, the appellant’s license revocation was not subject to judicial review. I would dismiss the appeal. Background [5] The appellant was convicted of the following offences under the Criminal Code: • On October 6, 2020, driving while impaired (by drugs) contrary to s. 320.14(1)(a). His sentence included a one-year driving prohibition pursuant to s. 320.24; • On July 15, 2021, and while subject to the above-noted driving prohibition, the appellant was charged with driving while disqualified contrary to s. 320.18(1). He pled guilty on February 25, 2022; and • On September 4, 2021, and while still subject to the above-noted driving prohibition, the appellant was charged with operation of a conveyance while prohibited contrary to s. 320.18(1)(a). He pled guilty on February 25, 2022. [6] Following each conviction, the appellant received notice from the Registry of Motor Vehicles that his driver’s license was revoked by virtue of s. 278(1)(b) of the Act. That section provides: Revocation upon conviction 278 (1) Subject to subsections (3) and (4), a person’s driver’s license or privilege of obtaining a driver’s license is revoked upon the person’s conviction, in the Province, for any of the following crimes or offences: . . . (b) an offence against section 220, 221, 320.13, 320.14, 320.15, 320.16, 320.17, 320.18, 333.1 or 335 of the Criminal Code (Canada); . . . (Emphasis added) [7] On or about February 27, 2022, the appellant received two letters from the Registry of Motor Vehicles in relation to his recently entered guilty pleas. The first letter stated: Please be advised on February 25, 2022 your driver’s license was revoked under Section 278 of the Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) due to your Criminal Code conviction under Section 320.18(1) - Driving While Disqualified. You are eligible for reinstatement on February 25, 2025. … [8] The second letter advised: This letter is to inform you that your Driver License is revoked for an indefinite period beginning February 25, 2022. This action has been taken under Section 278 of the Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) because of three impairment related revocations on your driving record within a ten-year period. These revocations are related to the following Criminal Code convictions: Impaired by Drug and/or Alcohol - October 6, 2020 Driving while Disqualified - February 25, 2022 Operated a Conveyance while Prohibited - February 25, 2022 You are eligible for license reinstatement after a minimum of ten (10) years. Contact the Registry of Motor Vehicles at that time to make application. This process does not affect any previous suspensions or revocations. For questions regarding your revocation, please call (902) 424-5587. [9] There is no indication in the record whether the appellant called the Registry of Motor Vehicles about the letters. According to his affidavit evidence filed in the court below he did, however, attend Access Nova Scotia in October, 2022 seeking to have his driver’s license reinstated. At that time, he asserts he was advised he had to wait 10 years to apply for reinstatement. [10] On February 23, 2023, the appellant’s mother wrote to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles on his behalf. In that correspondence, Ms. Clark inquired as to whether there was “an alternative solution to a ten year suspension”. She wrote: . . . Some solutions that have been mentioned as possibilities are: sponsorship by a reliable person, restricted driving hours for example 7 am until 7 pm, probation, reporting to probation officer, community service, an in person interview with Ryan, or anything you may suggest. . . . [11] On March 14, 2023, Daniel Boudreau, the Deputy Registrar of Motor Vehicles replied to Ms. Clark, and advised: I am responding to your letter dated February 23, 2023, regarding the license status of your son, Ryan Clark. Between October 6, 2020, and February 25, 2022, Mr. Clark was convicted of the following Criminal Code convictions: Impaired by Drug and/or Alcohol CC 320.14(1)(A) - October 6, 2020 Driving while Disqualified CC 320.18(1) - February 25, 2022 Operate a conveyance while prohibited CC 320.18(1)(A) - February 25, 2022 As a result of these three impairment related convictions within a ten-year period, Mr. Clark’s driver (sic) license is revoked for an indefinite period, beginning February 25, 2022. This action has been taken under section 278 of the Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) and section 67(5)(ba) of the Motor Vehicle Act. . . . Sections 278 and 67 of the Motor Vehicle Act do not provide any discretion to the Registrar regarding the length of suspension or revocation. Mr. Clark is eligible for license reinstatement after a minimum of ten (10) years. Please contact the Registry of Motor Vehicles at that time to make application. [12] Both referenced sections of the Act were set out in the correspondence to Ms. Clark. Section 278(1)(b) was set out above. Section 67(5)(ba) provides: Refusal to issue and restoration of driver’s license 67 (5) No application for restoration of a driver’s license or the privilege of obtaining a driver’s license shall be made until there has expired from the date of the revocation a period of . . . (ba) one year in the case of a first revocation, three years in the case of a second revocation and indefinitely in the case of a third or subsequent revocation where . . . (ii) the revocation was for a violation of subsection (1) or (4) of section 320.14, subsection (1) of section 320.15 or section 320.18 of the Criminal Code (Canada), if the prohibition referred to in section 320.18 of that Act was occasioned by an impairment-related offence and the offence involves the operation of a motor vehicle; . . . (Emphasis added) [13] Although not specified in the notice or letter provided to the appellant, the minimum revocation period of 10 years has its genesis in s. 67(22)(A) of the Act. It states: 67 (22A) Notwithstanding subsection (19) of this Act and Section 11 of the Summary Proceedings Act, where a driver’s license is revoked indefinitely, no application may be made pursuant to this Section for the restoration of the driver’s license until ten years has elapsed from the date of the revocation or subsequent conviction for an offence involving the operation of the motor vehicle. (Emphasis added) [14] The appellant filed a Notice for Judicial Review on April 6, 2023. He sought to challenge the “decision” contained in the Deputy Registrar’s letter of March 14, 2023. Decision under Appeal [15] The application for judicial review was heard on September 19, 2023. The appellant argued that in determining he was subject to an indefinite revocation, the Deputy Registrar erred in two ways. [16] Firstly, the appellant submitted the Deputy Registrar had erroneously applied s. 67(5)(ba) to his circumstances. He argued that section contemplates a driver having been subject to three “impairment-related” offences – the appellant asserted only one of his convictions was “impairment-related”. He submitted the respondent ought to have applied s. 67(5)(e) which would have resulted in a one year revocation. That section states: 67 (5) No application for restoration of a driver’s license or the privilege of obtaining a driver’s license shall be made until there has expired from the date of the revocation a period of . . . (e) except as provided in subsection (9), one year in the case of a first revocation or two years in the case of a subsequent revocation where . . . (ii) the revocation was for a violation of section 320.18 of the Criminal Code (Canada), if the offence involves the operation of a motor vehicle and the prohibition referred to in that section was in relation to an offence other than an impairment-related offence, or subsection (2) of Section 287 of the Act, . . . (Emphasis added) [17] Secondly, the appellant challenged the Deputy Registrar’s assertion that the Act created an automatic revocation period and afforded no discretion to permit an earlier reinstatement. In advancing this argument, the appellant relied on s. 67(4) of the Act, which indicates: 67 (4) The Department shall not issue a driver’s license to any person whose driver’s license has been revoked under Section 278, or to any person who has been convicted in the Province of any of the offences mentioned in Section 278 until the period of revocation set forth in subsection (5) has elapsed or until any order of prohibition made by a court pursuant to section 320.24 of the Criminal Code (Canada) has expired. (Emphasis added) [18] In the court below, the Deputy Registrar advanced two primary arguments as to why the application for judicial review should be dismissed. Firstly, it submitted the revocation and resulting prohibition against applying for reinstatement before 10 years were not “decisions”, but rather the consequences of an automatic application of the Act. As such, there was no reviewable “decision”. [19] Further, the Deputy Registrar added that even if there was a “decision”, the appellant had been advised on February 27, 2022 of the indeterminate revocation, and he did not seek judicial review until 13 months later, well outside the time requirement set out in Civil Procedure Rule 7.[1] [20] The hearing judge rendered an oral decision on September 21, 2023, with his reasons subsequently published as 2023 NSSC 428. In short, after undertaking a review of the applicable statutory provisions and the suggested interpretation advanced by both parties, the hearing judge agreed with the Deputy Registrar. Notably, the hearing judge concluded that by virtue of ss. 67(5)(ba) and 67(22A), the appellant was subject to an automatic license revocation of at least 10 years. There was no discretionary “decision” made by, or available to, the Deputy Registrar, and accordingly the application was dismissed. [21] In the alternative, the hearing judge found if there was a reviewable decision, the appellant had been aware of his indefinite revocation since February, 2022 but had not brought his application for judicial review until April, 2023. This was well outside the time limitation set out in Civil Procedure Rule 7, and it was not appropriate to provide an extension of time. The hearing judge would have dismissed the application on this alternative basis. Issues [22] Having considered the issues as framed in the Amended Notice of Appeal and by the parties in their submissions to the Court, I am satisfied the appeal can be resolved by addressing the following question: Did the hearing judge err by concluding the matter before him did not engage a “decision” subject to judicial review? [23] Given the analysis to follow in relation to the above question, there is no need to address the time limit for commencing the judicial review issue. Standard of Review [24] In Nova Scotia Health Authority v. Finkle and West, 2024 NSCA 87, Justice Fichaud recently noted: [58] On an appeal from a decision of a judge, the appellate standard is correctness for an issue of law, including an extractable legal issue from a conclusion of mixed fact and law, and palpable and overriding error for a finding of fact or mixed fact and law with no extractable legal issue. Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, paras. 8, 10, 19-36; H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, paras. 65 and 69. [59] The principles governing the court’s authority to conduct judicial review involve issues of law, subject to correctness: J.W. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 20, para. 109, per Côté J., concurring; Khorsand v. Toronto Police Services Board, 2024 ONCA 597, para. 62. [25] The interpretation of legislation is an issue of law, and as such, a standard of correctness applies. Analysis Did the hearing judge err by concluding the matter before him did not engage a “decision” subject to judicial review? [26] As noted earlier, the hearing judge concluded the Act, properly interpreted, gave rise to an automatic revocation of the appellant’s license pursuant to s. 67(5)(ba) for a minimum of 10 years. As such, there was no “decision” to review. [27] The hearing judge relied on several authorities for the proposition that an automatic outcome flowing from the application of statutory provisions is not judicially reviewable (Antigonish/Guysborough Federation of Agriculture v. Antigonish County (Municipality), 2012 NSSC 352, aff. 2013 NSCA 71; Ryan v. Nova Scotia (Registry of Motor Vehicles), 2014 NSSC 91). The appellant does not take issue with this proposition generally; rather, he submits the Deputy Registrar chose to apply the wrong statutory provision to his circumstances, and in doing so, made a “decision” which is subject to review. [28] At the heart of his appeal, the appellant says the Deputy Registrar applied the wrong section of the Act, and the hearing judge erred in law in failing to properly interpret the provisions and recognize the error. Specifically, the appellant submits, as he did in the court below, the Deputy Registrar incorrectly “decided” to apply s. 67(5)(ba) of the Act, instead of s. 67(5)(e). He argues s. 67(5)(ba) would only apply (and give rise to an indefinite revocation) if he had been convicted of three “impairment related offences”. In the appellant’s submission, he was only convicted of one. [29] In support, the appellant points to s. 67(12) which provides the following definition: 67 (12) In this Section, “impairment-related offence” means (a) an offence under section 253, 254 or 255 of the Criminal Code (Canada) committed before those provisions were repealed; or (b) an offence under section 320.14 or 320.15 of the Criminal Code (Canada). (Emphasis added) [30] The appellant is correct that his two convictions pursuant to s. 320.18 of the Criminal Code (driving while prohibited ) are not included in the definition of an “impairment-related offence”. However, his assertion that s. 67(5)(ba) requires three such convictions (and therefore does not apply to him) is incorrect. I will explain. [31] The time an offender must wait before seeking the restoration of their driver’s license depends on the number and types of convictions demonstrated on his record. Different subsections of s. 67 will apply based on the particular factual context. The Deputy Registrar asserts the hearing judge correctly interpreted s. 67(5)(ba) as applying to the appellant’s circumstances. It is helpful to set it out again: 67 (5) No application for restoration of a driver’s license or the privilege of obtaining a driver’s license shall be made until there has expired from the date of the revocation a period of . . . (ba) one year in the case of a first revocation, three years in the case of a second revocation and indefinitely in the case of a third or subsequent revocation where . . . (ii) the revocation was for a violation of subsection (1) or (4) of section 320.14, subsection (1) of section 320.15 or section 320.18 of the Criminal Code (Canada), if the prohibition referred to in section 320.18 of that Act was occasioned by an impairment-related offence and the offence involves the operation of a motor vehicle; . . . (Emphasis added) [32] From the above it is clear that the length of the revocation period is dependent on the number of revocations incurred – indefinitely in the case of three or more. It is also evident that this subsection only applies when there are specific types of revocations – a revocation following a conviction for driving while impaired (s. 320.14) or revocations following a conviction under s. 320.18 (driving while prohibited) when the prohibition that was breached had been ordered due to “an impairment-related offence”. Contrary to the appellant’s assertion, the section does not require three “impairment-related offences” in order to trigger an indefinite license revocation. [33] Here, the appellant had a first revocation due to his s. 320.14 (driving while impaired by drugs) conviction. His other two revocations arose from his convictions for driving while prohibited. The prohibition he twice breached had been ordered or “occasioned by” his conviction for driving under the influence - “an impairment-related offence”. The hearing judge was correct in his interpretation of s. 67(5)(ba) and that the appellant’s history of convictions resulted, by virtue of the legislative scheme, in a mandatory indefinite revocation. [34] Further, the hearing judge was correct in his determination that s. 67(5)(e) would not apply to the appellant. Section 67(5)(e) states: 67 (5) No application for restoration of a driver’s license or the privilege of obtaining a driver’s license shall be made until there has expired from the date of the revocation a period of . . . (e) except as provided in subsection (9), one year in the case of a first revocation or two years in the case of a subsequent revocation where . . . (ii) the revocation was for a violation of section 320.18 of the Criminal Code (Canada), if the offence involves the operation of a motor vehicle and the prohibition referred to in that section was in relation to an offence other than an impairment-related offence, or subsection (2) of Section 287 of the Act, … (Emphasis added) [35] That section clearly confines itself to circumstances where second and subsequent revocations have arisen for s. 320.18 (driving while prohibited) convictions when the prohibition breached had been ordered for an offence other than “an impairment-related offence”. As explained above, that is not the appellant’s circumstances – he was prohibited from driving because of “an impairment-related offence”. The hearing judge was correct when he made this determination. [36] As a final point, I will address the appellant’s assertion the hearing judge failed to correctly interpret s. 67(4) as providing the Deputy Registrar with a discretion to vary from the revocation periods specified in the Act. For ease of reference I set it out again: 67 (4) The Department shall not issue a driver’s license to any person whose driver’s license has been revoked under Section 278, or to any person who has been convicted in the Province of any of the offences mentioned in Section 278 until the period of revocation set forth in subsection (5) has elapsed or until any order of prohibition made by a court pursuant to section 320.24 of the Criminal Code (Canada) has expired. (Emphasis added) [37] As he did in the court below, the appellant places his focus on the use of the word “or” in the above provision. He says its inclusion demonstrates the Legislature’s intention to provide the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (or a Deputy) with a discretion to apply the applicable revocation period arising by virtue of the Act or, to choose to apply the time set out in a prohibition order arising from a criminal conviction. [38] I am satisfied the hearing judge did not err in rejecting the appellant’s proposed interpretation of s. 67(4). I agree with his analysis in that regard, set out in his decision as follows: [76] Mr. Clark argues that, even if the indefinite revocation is mandatory under section 67(5), the Department still maintains discretion under section 67(4), to issue a driver’s license once the driving prohibition imposed by the court pursuant to section 320.24 of the Criminal Code has expired. [77] That argument is based on s. 67(4) stating that the “Department shall not issue a driver’s license to any person whose driver’s license has been revoked under Section 278 … until the period of revocation set forth in subsection (5) has elapsed or [with emphasis on the word “or”] until any order of prohibition made by the court pursuant to section 320.24 of the Criminal Code (Canada) has expired”. [78] This argument ignores the fact that, because of the application of section 67(5), the Department will not be put in a position to decide, whether it should issue a driver’s license to a person whose driver’s license has been revoked under section 278, until the period of ineligibility to apply, as determined under section 67(5), has expired. That is because the offender will not be able to even make an application to have his driver’s license restored. [79] Therefore, the Department could never issue a driver’s license earlier than the time that the period of revocation set forth in subsection (5) has elapsed, even if the driving prohibition made by the court pursuant to section 320.24 had already expired. [80] At the same time, section 320.24(2) of the Criminal Code provides for prohibition periods that are not exactly the same as the periods of revocation provided for in MVA s. 67(5). [81] The potential periods of prohibition under section 320.24(2) are: • for a first offence, 1 to 3 years; • for a second offence, 2 to 10 years; and, • for each subsequent offence, not less than three years with no maximum. [82] Periods of imprisonment are also added to those periods. [83] Under MVA section 67(5)(ba), the durations of revocation are as follows: “one year in the case of a first revocation, three years in the case of a second revocation and indefinitely in the case of a third or subsequent revocation”. [84] Those revocations could all arise from impaired operation or refusal convictions (ie. offences under ss. 320.14 and 320.15 of the Criminal Code). [85] Therefore, there could easily be situations where the prohibition period imposed by the court would exceed the duration of revocation under the MVA. For instance, for a second offence, the driving prohibition could be four years when the duration of revocation would only be three years. Similarly, for a third or subsequent offence, the court-imposed prohibition could be for 11 years, while the period of ineligibility attached to an indefinite revocation would only be for 10 years. [86] Consequently, I agree with the Deputy Registrar, that the portion of s. 67(4) which adds “or until any order of prohibition made by a court pursuant to section 320.24 of the Criminal Code has expired” is there to ensure that a person whose driver’s license has been revoked under section 278 is not issued a driver’s license while still subject to a driving prohibition imposed by a court pursuant to section 320.24 of the Criminal Code. [87] To do so would be contrary to public policy; and, refraining from doing so is in keeping with the public safety objectives of these license revocation-related provisions in the MVA. [88] Prohibiting it ensures that the MVA complements, rather that (sic) contradicts, the Criminal Code. It also respects the fact that, as stated by our Court of Appeal, in R. v. Penney (1995), 142 NSR(2d) 76, at paragraph 16, “any prohibition order under the Code while in force supersedes any order under the Motor Vehicle Act”. (Underlining in original) [39] For the reasons set out above, I am satisfied the revocation of the appellant’s license for a minimum period of 10 years did not result from a “decision” made by the Deputy Registrar. Nor did the Deputy Registrar possess a discretion to vary from the revocation period set out in the Act. [40] The hearing judge was correct in his determination that the circumstances before him did not engage a discretionary “decision” subject to judicial review. Disposition [41] For the reasons outlined above, I would dismiss the appeal. At the hearing before this Court, both parties agreed that costs of $800.00 would be appropriate. As such, I would order the appellant pay costs to the Deputy Registrar in the amount of $800.00, inclusive of disbursements. Bourgeois, J.A. Concurred in: Van den Eynden, J.A. Derrick, J.A. [1] Rule 7.05(1) provides “[a] person may seek judicial review of a decision by filing a notice for judicial review before the earlier of the following: (a) twenty-five days after the day the decision is communicated to the person; (b) six months after the day the decision is made.”