R v Allen

R v Allen Court Supreme Court Date 2026-05-08 Citation 2026 NSSC 152 Docket Hfx, No. 548534 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Brothers, Christa M. (Honourable Justice) Document Type Decision Decision Content SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: R v Allen, 2026 NSSC 152 Date: 20260508 Docket: Hfx, No. 548534 Registry: Halifax Between: Sadie Allen v His Majesty the King DECISION – Summary Conviction Appeal Judge: The Honourable Justice Christa M. Brothers Heard: January 29, 2026, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Decision: May 8, 2026 Additional Written Submissions: February 11, 2026 - Respondent’s Factum - Supplemental February 24, 2026 - Appellant’s Factum - Supplemental Counsel: Craig Allen, assisting the Appellant Josh Judah, for the Crown By the Court: [1] On June 6, 2025, at or about 1:50 am, the Appellant, Sadie (hereinafter Sean) Allen, was charged with: Did unlawfully commit the offence of driving a motor vehicle while license or privilege of obtaining license suspended contrary to Section 287(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act. [2] On September 11, 2024, the Appellant’s license was suspended pursuant to ss. 231(1) and 341 of the Criminal Code until August 18, 2025. [3] The trial of this matter took place on October 22, 2025, before Justice of the Peace (JP) Debbie Bowes. The Appellant was represented by counsel at trial. The Crown called one witness in the matter, Constable Katrinardottir. Constable Katrinardottir has been an officer with the HRP since 2019. The Appellant was convicted of the s. 287(2) offence and a total penalty of $1,272.50 was imposed. This is an appeal from both conviction and sentence. [4] While the Appellant was represented by counsel at trial, he asked his father to assist in advancing his arguments on appeal. Despite the thoughtful, respectful and diligent advocacy advanced by Mr. Allen, I cannot conclude that JP Bowes’ conclusions invite appellate intervention. Background [5] On June 6, 2025, the date of the alleged offence, Constable Katrinardottir was on patrol in Halifax. Constable Katrinardottir was called to a scene located on Sackville Street, just before Argyle Street, where she observed that a vehicle had struck a parked vehicle. The parked vehicle spun 90 degrees, while the vehicle that struck it became stuck on the curb. When she arrived, the occupants of the vehicle had already been detained. [6] During the trial, the Crown entered into a voluntariness voir dire with regards to statements the Appellant made to Constable Katrinardottir during transport to the police station. The evidence called at the voir dire was that at the time of the statement, Constable Katrinardottir was in a police uniform, and she had identified herself as a constable. After Constable Katrinardottir read a breath demand and identified herself, the Appellant indicated that he wished to speak to a lawyer. A call with Legal Aid was facilitated and he was then escorted into the breath room. [7] At the time, the Appellant was charged with driving while impaired. JP Bowes concluded that the statement was made voluntarily and admitted the statement at trial. [8] The following was the trial evidence given by Constable Katrinardottir: (a) That they (the Appellant) had not wanted to drive the vehicle. The individual that originally was driving the vehicle had asked the Appellant to drive, as they were best friends. That’s the reason why they (the Appellant) did it, just to “try to get it [the car] unstuck”. (b) Constable Katrinardottir was also told: (i) “The other individual went out of the car and tried to push the vehicle at the same time.” [9] Constable Katrinardottir identified the Appellant as the individual who made the utterances to her, which she recorded in her report. Constable Katrinardottir indicated that while the Appellant said that they did not want to drive, they did so after the other driver, who was their best friend, asked them to do so and they felt compelled to do so. [10] The Crown also submitted a Certificate under seal pursuant to Section 286 of the Motor Vehicle Act certifying that the Appellant’s license was suspended on the date of the offence. [11] On cross-examination, Constable Katrinardottir confirmed that she did not witness the accident or see anyone getting out of the vehicle because she arrived on the scene after the individuals involved had been arrested. [12] Constable Katrinardottir indicated that her first interaction with the Appellant was to read him the breath demand and facilitate a call to Legal Aid. The Appellant’s call to Legal Aid was only in relation to the impaired operation charge, and Constable Katrinardottir did not know if the Appellant was aware of the suspended license ticket at the time. She agreed that it would have been difficult for the Appellant to obtain legal advice about the suspended license ticket in the circumstances. [13] The Defence admitted that at the time in question, the Appellant did not have a valid license. They did not admit, however, that the Appellant drove a motor vehicle on a public highway. [14] Defence counsel argued that the Appellant’s admission was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because the Crown led no evidence to establish that a vehicle which is stuck on a curb and not driveable meets the statutory definition of a “motor vehicle”. [15] In concluding that the Crown had met its burden, JP Bowes stated as follows: She said as a result of the interactions with Mr. Allen at that time the voir dire was had on this matter, that there was a voluntary statement already ruled given by the Accused, namely that he had not wanted to drive, implying that he had, but that he was asked by the other occupant, and that he felt compelled to drive because they were best friends. As a result of the evidence, Mr. Allen was charged under the Motor Vehicle Act, 287(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act. And those – because this is not a Criminal Code matter, it’s a motor vehicle offence, there was no rights given, if you will, to call Legal Aid with respect to this matter or call a lawyer in general, and he was charged with 287(2) simply on his own admission, being the driver of the vehicle, and the fact that he was not licenced at the time of the offence. So, based on those two things, and based on the statement that was made, as I already indicated that I found that was voluntarily at the time, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Allen was the driver of a vehicle and that Mr. Allen was not licensed at that time. So, a guilty finding will be entered with respect to that matter, as I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that those two things, that there was an admission that he was the driver. There was no suggestion why he would make that admission, say, “I was the driver” if he wasn’t, particularly when that admission went further as to why he was actually driving at that case. So, there was a ring of truth and believability, if you will, with the explanation given. [Decision Transcript, pages 31-32] Grounds of Appeal and Appellant’s Arguments [16] The following are the grounds of appeal outlined in the Notice of Appeal filed on November 7, 2025: 1. Absence of Sufficient Evidence to Corroborate the Offence The learned Justice of the Peace erred in law and in fact by finding the Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt when the only evidence linking the Appellant to the act of “driving” was a single, unreliable, and vague admission, with no independent evidence of the act itself of driving a motor vehicle at the time and place alleged. 2. Failure to Adequately Analyze and Assess the Weight of the Admission The learned Justice of the Peace erred in law by failing to conduct a proper and rigorous analysis of the weight to be assigned to the alleged admission, despite significant, objective concerns that severely diminished its probative value. These concerns include, but are not limited to: • Circumstances of Compulsion/Coercion: The admission may have been made under duress or pressure (e.g., to shield a third party, Hali Sierra Jobe Eshouzadeh). • Impairment and Stress: The Appellant was allegedly under the influence of alcohol and was involved in a late-night, scary incident, which would impair judgment and the reliability of any statement, especially considering the Appellant’s diagnoses of PTSD, BiPolar disorder, and a mental disability from a brain injury. • Lack of Legal Context/Counsel: An admission to a legal definition (“driving”) made without the benefit of a right to counsel being provided or exercised should be given severely limited weight. The Appellant may have misunderstood the legal meaning of “driving” or “operating” a motor vehicle. 3. Failure to Disprove an Innocent Interpretation of the Admission The learned Justice of the Peace erred in applying the standard of proof by failing to consider or disprove a reasonable and innocent interpretation of the Appellant’s admission. The Crown failed to negate plausible alternative explanations, such as the Appellant: • Siting in the driver’s seat without “operating” the vehicle in the legal sense. • Admitting to driving on a different occasion entirely. • Feeling compelled to admit to the offense when no driving had occurred. 4. Absence of Evidence Regarding the Timing of the Alleged Driving The learned Justice of the Peace erred in fact by finding the essential element of timing proven. There was no clear evidence to establish when the alleged driving occurred, meaning the Crown failed to prove that the offense took place at the time and in the manner alleged in the charge. 5. Failure to Prove the Vehicle was a “Motor Vehicle" The learned Justice of the Peace erred in law by convicting the Appellant when the Crown failed to lead any evidence whatsoever that the vehicle allegedly driven was, in fact, a “motor vehicle” as defined by the relevant statute, which is an essential element of the offense that the Crown bore the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt. 6. Impropriety of Conviction Based Soley on Uncorroborated Admission The conviction, based solely on a single, unreliable admission without any corroborating evidence, leads to a perverse and unreasonable conclusion that constitutes a miscarriage of justice. This establishes a dangerous precedent where a person could be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt merely by walking up to an officer and making an uncorroborated admission to a legal definition of an offence, which is contrary to the fundamental principles of criminal justice and the requirement for independent proof of the actus reus. 7. Failure by the crown to prove that the admission of driving was made voluntarily: The learned Justice of the Peace erred in law by ruling the admission was made Voluntarily, without any evidence proving so. The Crown did not prove that the Appellant knew what they were saying when they made the statement. [17] The Appellant restated the grounds of appeal at page 5 of his factum as follows: 1. Unreasonable Verdict (Identity): Did the Trial Judge err by convicting on the basis of a single, uncorroborated admission regarding identity without independent evidence of the actus reus? 2. Burden of Proof (“Ring of Truth”): Did the Trial Judge err in law by misapplying the burden of proof when she relied on a “ring of truth” analysis, implicitly shifting the burden to the Appellant to explain why a false admission would be made? 3. Charter s. 10(b) & Voluntariness: Did the Trial Judge err by finding the statement voluntary and admissible despite the failure to re-warn the Appellant of their rights upon a change in jeopardy? 4. Issue 4: Voluntariness of Alleged Admission: Did the Justice of Peace err in law by finding the admission was made Voluntarily by an ‘operating mind’. 5. Elements of the Offence: Did the Trial Judge err by failing to require proof that the vehicle was a “motor vehicle” under the Act or of the timing of the ‘Alleged Driving’. [18] No grounds were ever advanced concerning the sentence imposed by JP Bowes. [19] It is uncontested that the Appellant did not have a license at the time he was charged with impaired driving and the Motor Vehicle Act offence. The Appellant argues that there was not enough evidence at trial to prove that he was the driver of the vehicle. The Appellant notes that the Constable did not witness the accident and could not testify as to who was driving at the time of the accident or who may gotten into the driver’s seat after. [20] The Appellant also challenges the finding of voluntariness of the utterance he made to the Constable, arguing that there was no proof that the Appellant had an operating mind when he made the confession. The Appellant argues that in weighing the statement, the JP did not know or failed to consider that alcohol was involved, that the Appellant was on medications for mental health conditions, that the Appellant had mental cognition issues, and that he was suffering from PTSD. [21] The Appellant’s father raised additional information concerning his son’s circumstances during the appeal hearing. This information was offered without a motion for fresh evidence but Mr. Judah, on behalf of the Crown, did not object. The Appellant’s father indicated that prior to this incident, his son had been at the Garron Centre, a mental health placement at the IWK, for three months. He also mentioned that the Appellant has some form of brain injury and is on disability. [22] When asked why these issues were not brought up at trial by Appellant’s counsel, the Appellant indicated that given the Crown’s burden and the duty of the JP, he had no reason to think this information was required. [23] The Appellant further argues that because he had been in an accident that evening and was not provided with medical attention at the scene, there was no evidence to support the determination that he had an operating mind. The Appellant also argues that he was in shock, scared of the police, and may have feared his friend. [24] Again, this was additional information that was provided at the appeal, through the Appellant’s father. The Appellant acknowledged that there was no oppression or trickery involved with regards to the provision of the statement. [25] At the end of the appeal hearing, on January 29, 2026, the Appellant was given time to consider whether he wanted to provide the video of the incident to Crown counsel. The Appellant indicated he had a video of the incident which was part of the Crown disclosure in relation to the impaired charges but not held by the Crown in the Motor Vehicle Act matter. The Crown offered to review the video and to agree to the appeal if it showed the Appellant was not a “driver”. [26] On February 18, 2026, the Appellant advised that he had decided not to disclose the video and wished to go ahead with the appeal as presented in court. In the interim, the Crown was asked to furnish the court with additional authorities dealing with the care and control of a vehicle. That supplemental factum was filed on February 11, 2026. The Appellant was provided an opportunity to file a response, which he did on February 24, 2026. Neither party wished to make further oral submissions. [27] I will now deal with the grounds of appeal. Standard of Review [28] The standard of review on a summary conviction appeal was set forth in Wilmot v. Ulnooweg Development Group Inc., 2007 NSCA 49: [24] Deciding the appropriate standard of review depends on how one characterizes the particular question that is under scrutiny. [25] An appeal is not a second trial. Our powers at the appellate level are constrained. On questions of law the judge must be right. Such questions are tested on a standard of correctness. Matters of fact, or inferences drawn from facts are owed a high degree of deference and will not be disturbed unless they resulted from palpable and overriding error. Matters said to be mixed questions of fact and law are also tested using the palpable and overriding error standard, unless the mistake can be easily linked to a particular and extricable legal principle, which will then attract a correctness standard. Where, however, the legal principle is not readily extricable, the question of mixed law and fact will be reviewable on the standard of palpable and overriding error. See for example Housen v. Nikolaisen et al, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235; H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R 401, [2005] S.C.J. No. 24; Campbell-MacIsaac v. Deveaux and Lombard, [2004] N.S.J. No. 250, 2004 NSCA 87; McPhee v. Gwynne-Timothy [2005] N.S.J. No. 170, 2005 NSCA 80; Flynn v. Halifax (Regional Municipality) [2005] N.S.J. No. 175, 2005 NSCA 81; and Secunda Marine Services Ltd. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, [2006] N.S.J. No. 266, 2006 NSCA 82. [29] While issues regarding burden of proof, the legal requirements for a voluntary confession, and issues surrounding whether the Charter was complied with are questions of law which are reviewed based on correctness, findings of fact are reviewable for palpable and overriding error. [30] Housen v. Nikolaisen et al., 2002 SCC 33, provides that the standard of correctness applies to questions of law. The court stated: 8 On a pure question of law, the basic rule with respect to the review of a trial judge’s findings is that an appellate court is free to replace the opinion of the trial judge with its own. Thus, the standard of review on a question of law is that of correctness: Kerans, supra at p. 90. [31] Furthermore, in R. v. Nickerson, 1999 NSCA 168, Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) described the applicable standard of review on a summary conviction appeal at para. 6: The scope of review of the trial court’s findings of fact by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court is the same as on appeal against conviction to the Court of Appeal in indictable offences: see sections 822(1) and 686(1)(a)(i) and R. v. Gillis (1981), 60 C.C.C. (2d) 169 (N.S.S.C.A.D.) per Jones, J.A. at p. 176. Absent an error of law or a miscarriage of justice, the test to be applied by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court is whether the findings of the trial judge are unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Burns, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 656 (S.C.C.) at 657, the appeal court is entitled to review the evidence at trial, re-examine and reweigh it, but only for the purpose of determining whether it is reasonably capable of supporting the trial judge’s conclusions. If it is, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court is not entitled to substitute its view of the evidence for that of the trial judge. In short, a summary conviction appeal on the record is an appeal; it is neither a simple review to determine whether there was some evidence to support the trial judge’s conclusions nor a new trial on the transcript. [32] Sitting as a summary conviction appeal court, I can review the evidence to determine if it is reasonably capable of supporting the JP’s conclusion. [33] With regards to credibility of witnesses, such a determination is a finding of fact entitled to deference unless a palpable and overriding error can be shown. Issue 1 – Failure to Prove Identify and Corroboration [34] While the Appellant argued that identity was not proven at trial and that corroboration was necessary in relation to the admitted utterances, I cannot conclude that either ground is sustainable. The Appellant was identified by Constable Katrinardottir during the trial while the Constable was giving evidence. This was an in-court identification. There was no argument as to identity before JP Bowes and no suggestion that the in-court identification was not reliable. [35] The Appellant also argues “that it is unsafe to convict on an admission alone without evidence that the crime was actually committed.” In R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, the convictions were based on an admission from the accused. There are many more cases where an accused’s admission has been considered proof beyond a reasonable doubt to support a conviction. Here, we have an admitted utterance as evidence before the lower court that the act of driving was attempted and that the Appellant’s license was suspended at the time. There has been nothing placed before this court to suggest that this was a palpable and overriding error for the JP to rely on or that it was an error of law to rely on this evidence. Issue 2 – Burden of Proof / Ring of Truth [36] It seems the Appellant is arguing that JP Bowes did not apply the burden of proof correctly and that her analysis was flawed as a result. However, in reviewing the decision, I found no indication that the JP misapplied or misplaced the burden when she reached a conclusion that was certainly within her purview to reach based on the evidence. In rendering her decision, JP Bowes explained her reasoning and provided justifications for her findings of fact. [37] On appeal, the Appellant argues that other than being an accurate statement, another inference to be drawn from the admission was that the Appellant was taking the blame to help his friend and that he was not being truthful when he said he was driving. However, there is no other reasonable interference that can be drawn in the circumstances from the utterances made to Constable Katrinardottir. This is not a case where the evidence was solely or primarily circumstantial. If that were the case, before convicting the Appellant, JP Bowes would have had to have been satisfied “not only that those circumstances were inconsistent with his having committed the act, that they must also be satisfied that the facts were such as to be inconsistent with any other rational conclusion that the prisoner was the guilty person” (R. v. Hodge (1838), 168 E.R.1136). [38] In R. v. Villaroman, 2016 SCC 33, the Supreme Court suggested that the word “reasonable” be used to describe the potential inferences, rather than “rational”, as used in Hodge, supra. [39] Furthermore, in assessing circumstantial evidence, inferences consistent with innocence do not have to arise from proven fact (R. v. Villaroman, supra). To do otherwise would place an obligation on the accused to prove facts and would be contrary to the rule that whether there is a reasonable doubt is assessed by considering all of the evidence. [40] Therefore, if there is a reasonable inference other than guilt, the Crown’s evidence does not meet the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, here the accused’s conviction is not based on circumstantial evidence but on the accused’s own admission. Consequently, this application of the law is not relevant. Issue 3 – Voluntariness and Charter Rights [41] There was no Charter argument raised before JP Bowes, even though the Appellant was represented by counsel. The Appellant attempts on appeal to raise an issue of not being provided with a right to counsel upon admitting to driving. The argument is that the Appellant may have misunderstood the legal meaning of driving or operating a vehicle and should have been provided the right to counsel. In R. v. Josine, 2024 NSSC 242, the court concluded that when an appellant did not raise a Charter argument in the court below it was not appropriate to raise such an argument on appeal. [42] In addition, the Motor Vehicle Act offence of driving while suspended is a lesser included offence to that of impaired driving under the Criminal Code. The Appellant was provided with an opportunity to exercise his right to counsel for the impaired driving charge. In the circumstances, this was appropriate and there was no failure to provide right to counsel. [43] The terms “driver”, “motor vehicle” and “operator” are defined in s. 2 of the Motor Vehicle Act as follows: 2 In this Act … (1) “driver” means a person driving or in charge of a vehicle and includes the operator of a motor vehicle. … (ad) “motor vehicle” means a vehicle, as herein defined, which is propelled or driven otherwise than by muscular power and does not include a bicycle, personal transporter or an electric kick-scooter; … (aj) “operator” means a person driving a motor vehicle on the highway or who has the care or control of the motor vehicle on a highway whether in motion or not. [44] The definition of a “driver” includes the operator of a motor vehicle. The “operator” means a person who has the care or control of a motor vehicle on a highway whether in motion or not. [45] In R. v. Martin, 2009 ONCJ 673, the suspended driver was behind the wheel in an inoperable car that was being towed. The court found as follows: 42. The fact Mr. Martin could brake and steer the motor vehicle is sufficient according to case law to prove he was in fact driving that day. R. v. Flemming would also lead the court to believe the fact that the Chevrolet he was operating that day, even though the motor was in the passenger seat, is to be considered a motor vehicle within the accepted meaning of the word. [46] Here, the Appellant was in the driver’s seat behind the wheel of a vehicle that was up on a curb while his friend was attempting to push it off the curb. The fact that he was in the motor vehicle behind the wheel and was a suspended driver is sufficient to support the conviction. This also was a finding of fact by JP Bowes which I have no basis to overturn. [47] In R. v. Martin, supra, the accused was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle being towed and the vehicle’s engine had been removed and was on the passenger seat. Despite this, the accused was found to be driving as he was in control of a vehicle even though the motored power came from a towing vehicle. By being in the vehicle, the Appellant, like the accused in R. v. Martin, supra, would have had access to the steering wheel and brakes. The following definition in R. v. Martin, supra is of assistance: 14 Driver in the Dictionary of Canadian Law, Third Edition (Thomson/Carswell) is defined as “a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle towed or pushed by another vehicle. (2) It includes a person who has the care or control of a motor vehicle whether it is in motion or not. … (5) The occupant of a vehicle seated immediately behind the steering control system.” 15 The same dictionary defines “driver or operator” as “a person who drives or is in actual physical control of a vehicle.” … 25 Mr. Lee puts forward the leading case defining motor vehicle as R. v. Saunders, [1967] 3 C.C.C. 278 (S.C.C.) in which the defendant’s car was in a ditch and could not move until extricated by a tow truck. The Supreme Court was asked to consider if an automobile, which cannot be set in motion under its own power by reason of existing conditions, is still considered a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Criminal Code. 26 The Criminal Code definition of a motor vehicle at the time included a vehicle that is drawn, propelled or driven by any means other than muscular power which is quite similar to the existing definition under the Highway Traffic Act. The Supreme Court ruled the Criminal Code definition of motor vehicle “is in plain and ordinary language. It contemplates a kind of vehicle, not its actual operability or functioning.” 27 In R. v. Flemming, [1980] N.S.J. No. 129 (N.S. Co. Ct.) Justice O’Hearn agreed Nova Scotia’s Motor Vehicle Act definition and the Criminal Code definition of motor vehicle were so close that the reasoning in R. v. Saunders should be applicable to the case at hand. In Flemming, the defendant’s brother was driving a Ford, using chains to tow an inoperable 1967 Humber sedan. The defendant was in the driver’s seat of the Humber, braking and steering as it was being towed The sedan’s engine was inoperable. [48] Given the evidence before JP Bowes, the admissions and the testimony, the Appellant was in the driver’s seat and obviously had control of steering and brakes, despite the vehicle being on a curb. The Appellant’s conduct qualifies as driving as held in the case authorities and there is no basis for appellate intervention in relation to this issue. Issue 4 – Voluntary Admission [49] JP Bowes was provided evidence from Constable Katrinardottir concerning the voluntariness of the Appellant’s statement. After hearing direct and cross examination as well as submissions from both counsel, the court concluded that the Crown had met its burden by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary. [50] The Appellant raised several issues at the conclusion of the voir dire including, but not limited to, whether he was provided bathroom facilities, food or beverages. The trial judge reiterated that the Crown had to prove voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt. The speculative arguments about depriving the Appellant of a washroom, food, or beverages were not supported by the evidence. Having found no palpable or overriding error by the lower court judge, I defer to the finding of voluntariness made by JP Bowes. [51] Constable Katrinardottir confirmed that there were no threats or promises made to the Appellant and furthermore: Q. Prior to and during your interactions with that individual, did they make any requests? A. No. [52] This succinctly dealt with any issues about whether the Appellant wished to use the bathroom or wanted food or drink. [53] Furthermore, Constable Katrinardottir testified that: Q. And during your interactions with that individual, did you have any concerns with regards to their capacity. A. No. [54] Her interactions consisted of providing the Appellant with the breath demand, advising him of his right to counsel, and advising him of the charges against him. She did not ask him any further questions. [55] The suggestion by the Appellant is that in this short verbal interaction with the Appellant, the Constable could not have properly assessed whether he had an operating mind or the capacity to make an admission voluntarily. However, it was well within JP Bowes’ purview to accept the evidence that the Constable had no concern about the Appellant’s capacity at the time. While JP Bowes’ interactions with Appellant’s counsel and the questions and discussions back and forth may have left the Appellant with the impression that the burden was being placed on the Defence, this interpretation is not supported by the totality of the trial transcript or the decision. JP Bowes did not rely on the absence of evidence to convict. [56] Furthermore, Constable Katrinardottir provided evidence that she had no concern about the Appellant’s capacity to provide the statement when he did. While the statement was given at 3:00 am, after there had been an accident, the Constable did not notice anything of concern in relation to his capacity during her interaction with him. Again, it was open to JP Bowes to either accept all, some, or none of that evidence. As the trier of fact, she accepted that evidence and I am to defer to that, unless there is an error of law or a palpable and overriding error was made. [57] Some of what the Appellant has argued is not borne out in the evidence. The Appellant argues at paragraph 17 of his factum: [17] Despite the obvious physical shock of a violent accident and the late hour, and the Appellant having been intoxicated, the Crown offered only a bare assertion by Cst. Katrinardottir that she had “no concerns” regarding capacity Transcript, p. 35, line 3-6 The Trial Judge failed to scrutinize this assertion against the reality of the situation. A young person, shaken by a significant motor vehicle accident and detained in the middle of the night, not offered medical attention, and the shock of being charged at all, given the car was allegedly crashed by a different person, is in a state of vulnerability. The Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Appellant, in this specific context, had an operating mind capable of making a truly voluntary choice to speak. [58] There was no evidence before JP Bowes of physical shock, a “violent” accident, or intoxication that would bear on the Appellant’s capacity to make a voluntary statement. Nor was there evidence that the Appellant was “shaken” by the accident, that it was a “significant accident”, or that the Appellant was in a “state of vulnerability”. [59] In relation to the voluntariness of the Appellant’s utterance to Constable Katrinardottir, the role of this court is not to retry the case or overturn findings of fact. The decision should not be set aside unless the lower court wrongly assessed the evidence, failed to consider relevant circumstances, or failed to apply legal principles correctly. [60] As set out in R. v. Ewert, [1992] 3 SCR 161, a reviewing court’s disagreement with the lower court’s decision on what weight to be given various pieces of evidence is not grounds to set aside a voluntariness finding. There was no evidence before JP Bowes of the kind of oppressive circumstances which would result in the utterance being involuntary (see for example, R. v. Hoilett (1999), 136 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont CA), or R. v. Owen (1983), 4 C.C.C. (3d) 538 (NSCA)). [61] The evidence before JP Bowes was that the Appellant was not mistreated. He was not offered any inducements and there was no oppression. With regards to the existence of an operating mind, there was no evidence before the court to suggest that his capacity was such that he could not decide whether to speak to the police or not. There is nothing in the record that raised a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness. JP Bowes’ decision that the Crown had met its burden to prove the voluntariness of the statement beyond a reasonable doubt was not based on an error of law. Issue 5 – Failure to Prove Essential Elements [62] The Appellant argues that the Crown failed to prove that the vehicle in question was an actual “motor vehicle” as defined under the Motor Vehicle Act. Section 2(a)(d) of the Motor Vehicle Act defines motor vehicle as “a vehicle, as herein defined, propelled or driven otherwise then by muscular power and does not include a bicycle, personal transporter or an electric kick scooter”. [63] In this case, the Constable testified to her observation of the accident scene and where the two vehicles involved came to rest. She also provided the license plate number of the vehicle in question. There was no issue raised before the lower court that there was anything other than a motor vehicle involved. Furthermore, s. 2(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act defines a driver as “a person driving or in charge of a vehicle and includes the operator of a motor vehicle”. [64] While Constable Katrinardottir could not recall how she ascertained the identity of the Appellant at the scene and whether it was through a piece of identification, she identified the Appellant in the courtroom. [65] Prior to the utterances made by the Appellant, he had been read a breath demand and was assisted in making a call to Legal Aid in relation to the impaired driving investigation. [66] While the Appellant argues that Constable Katrinardottir, as the sole witness for the Crown, admitted that she did not recall how the Appellant was identified, there is no question that Constable Katrinardottir identified the Appellant as the individual at the scene and did so while testifying. [67] Further, contrary to the arguments of the Appellant, there is also no legal requirement that an admission by an accused be corroborated before an accused is convicted. There is no burden on the Appellant to prove anything at any time in this case. JP Bowes’ statement that there was “no suggestion why he would make that admission” was not an example of the lower court reversing the burden, as she continued to be clear that the burden of proof was on the Crown throughout. There is no question that the burden remained on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that any statement made by the Appellant was made voluntarily. That is, that the Appellant was not overborne by inducements or oppressions and did not lack an operating mind. While the evidence of Constable Katrinardottir was not lengthy, she certainly spoke to the issues that the Crown had to address. It was after Constable Katrinardottir, an officer in uniform, identified herself that she read a breath demand to the Appellant who then indicated a desire to speak to a lawyer. That call was facilitated and the Appellant spoke to Legal Aid. Legal advice was provided to the Appellant. It was only after that that he was escorted into the breath room. [68] The Appellant also argues that the timing of the alleged driving of the motor vehicle was not proven by the Crown. The Summary Offence Information that was filed indicated the event occurred at approximately 1:50 am, and the Constable testified that she arrived on the scene shortly after the accident and talked about being at the police station with the Appellant. There is no basis to overturn the conviction because the Constable could not pinpoint the exact time this occurred. The Constable was able to say that it happened on June 6, 2025, within a short window in that early morning. The Appellant in his supplemental factum relied on R. v. Milne, 2012 ONSC 5779, on this issue. That case is in relation to the Crown’s burden on a charge of impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle over 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood contrary to sections 253(1)(a) and (b). In that case, the court was considering the Crown’s burden to “show during the critical period of the two hours leading to the taking of the first sample, that the vehicle was operable”. This is a different charge with different elements, and the case has little bearing on the matter before me. Conclusion [69] Having considered all the Appellant’s arguments and the legal authorities, and having applied the standard of review, I find there is no basis for this court’s intervention in relation to the conviction or sentence. The appeal from conviction and sentence is dismissed. Brothers, J.