R. v. Kematch

2026 BCSC 265 R. v. Kematch IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: R. v. Kematch, 2026 BCSC 265 Date: 20260116 Docket: 37053 Registry: Vancouver Rex v. Dwight William Kematch Before: The Honourable Justice Kirchner Oral Reasons for Sentence Counsel for the Crown: M. Myhre E. Wilson Counsel for the Accused: J. Heller S. Grewal Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. January 16, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. January 16, 2026 [1] THE COURT: Dwight William Kematch has pled guilty to committing the second degree murder of Alexander Lo. It now falls to me to sentence Mr. Kematch for that offence. Under s. 235(1) of the Criminal Code, second degree murder carries a mandatory life sentence. Under s. 745(c), the minimum period of parole ineligibility for second degree murder is 10 years and the maximum is 25 years. Thus, the task of sentencing Mr. Kematch is focussed on the period of parole ineligibility since the life sentence is mandatory. [2] It is important to remember that a life sentence is a life sentence, and the period of parole ineligibility does not mean a right to parole at the end of that period. It means a right to apply for parole. Therefore, in assessing the period of parole ineligibility we are looking at the earliest opportunity that Mr. Kematch will be able to apply for parole. At that time, it will be his onus to persuade the Parole Board that he ought to be granted parole. [3] I am greatly aided in this case by the fact that the Crown and defence have made a joint submission for a life sentence with no eligibility of parole for 13 years. In R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, the Supreme Court of Canada held that courts should not depart from a joint submission on sentence unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to public interests. The court said at para. 34 that a rejection of a joint submission should generally be confined to circumstances where the submission is: so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed persons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down. [4] I will say at the outset of these reasons that I am satisfied the joint submission represents an appropriate sentence in this case and certainly does not bring the administration of justice into disrepute in the manner contemplated by Anthony‑Cook. In fact, having regard to the cases that the Crown and defence have cited to me for the same offence in somewhat similar circumstances by somewhat similar offenders, I am persuaded that the proposed sentence is an appropriate one that sits well within the sentencing range for similar offenders in similar circumstances for similar offences. Circumstances of the Offence [5] I will briefly describe the circumstances of the offence. Mr. Kematch and Mr. Lo met in or around 2003 on a social networking dating app on which they both had user profiles. They had never met each other in person until the night of this murder. Through text messages, they planned to meet up for sexual activity in March 2023, almost a year before these events, but Mr. Lo had to cancel due to an illness. They reconnected in January 2024, and, on January 27, 2024, they exchanged text messages and agreed to meet at Mr. Kematch's apartment that night for sexual activity. Mr. Kematch was then sharing that apartment with his sister and brother-in-law, both of whom were home that night. [6] Mr. Lo arrived at the apartment just before 1:00 a.m. Mr. Kematch had been drinking and was intoxicated. His sister and brother-in-law were asleep in their bedroom. Mr. Kematch and Mr. Lo immediately went into his bedroom and started to engage in sexual activity. During this initial foreplay, something set Mr. Kematch off and he punched Mr. Lo in the upper back or the neck. He cannot explain why. Mr. Lo then hit Mr. Kematch back. Mr. Kematch then picked up a hammer that was near his bed and struck Mr. Lo repeatedly. Mr. Kematch described Mr. Lo as lying on his back and crying for help, but once he started hitting Mr. Lo Mr. Kematch could not stop. [7] Mr. Kematch's sister and brother-in-law were woken by the sound of somebody yelling, "Stop it!". They went into the hallway from their bedroom where they heard banging coming from Mr. Kematch's room. Mr. Kematch's brother-in-law yelled, "What is going on?" and the two of them heard Mr. Lo yell from the bedroom, "Help me. Stop it. Help me. Help me. Help me." They tried to open the door to the bedroom but it was locked. Mr. Kematch's sister pushed as hard as she could and broke the door open, at which point Mr. Lo ran from the room. He had blood covering his head and his face. He ran into the kitchen where Mr. Kematch ran after him and continued to hit him with the hammer. Mr. Lo fell to the floor. [8] Mr. Kematch's sister went to her bedroom to call 9‑1‑1 while Mr. Kematch's brother-in-law went into the kitchen and managed to wrestle the hammer away from Mr. Kematch. At that point, Mr. Kematch grabbed a chef's knife from the knife block on the counter and continued to attack Mr. Lo using the knife, stabbing him repeatedly in the torso as he lay on the ground screaming. [9] During this time, Mr. Kematch's brother-in-law was screaming at Mr. Kematch, asking, "What are you doing?" and pulling at his shirt. The brother-in-law described Mr. Kematch as "out of it" and "not making sense". The brother-in-law yelled for the sister to call the police, at which point Mr. Kematch stopped stabbing Mr. Lo. He dropped the knife and said, "Please don't call them." [10] The police arrived and arrested Mr. Kematch without incident. They began life‑saving efforts on Mr. Lo but were unsuccessful. Mr. Lo was pronounced dead at 1:43 in the morning. [11] An autopsy on Mr. Lo conducted on February 1, 2024, identified multiple sharp and blunt force injuries to his head, stab wounds to his chest and abdomen, seven of which penetrated his heart, both lungs, liver and spleen. Mr. Lo had multiple blunt force injuries to his head and a seven-centimetre fracture on his skull. He had significant bruising on his forearms and a broken right forearm. This was obviously a very brutal and horrifying attack. Principles of Sentencing for Second-Degree Murder [12] As I said, s. 235 of the Criminal Code imposes a mandatory life sentence for second degree murder. Under s. 745(c) of the Code, a minimum period of parole ineligibility of 10 years is set. Under s. 745.4, the court may increase the period of parole ineligibility from the minimum of 10 years to the maximum of 25 years. In determining whether to do so, the court must consider the character of the offender, the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence. In R. v. Shropshire, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227, the Supreme Court of Canada said, at para. 27: . . . as a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 744 [now s. 745.4] the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end, an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be "unusual", although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded. [13] The British Columbia Court of Appeal has identified two broad groupings of cases where more than 10 years of parole ineligibility is imposed. Cases in the range of 12 to 15 years of parole ineligibility involve some aggravating feature that elevates the case above the base 10‑year period. Cases in the 15 to 20 year range of parole ineligibility tend to involve egregious circumstances of a higher order or moral culpability or dangerousness; R. v. Cerra, 2004 BCCA 594, para. 17. These groupings are not prescriptive but they provide a general guide for sentencing judges. [14] I would observe that, considered on its own, the circumstances of this case sound egregious and of a higher order of moral culpability and dangerousness. However, when considered in the context of the range of sentences and the circumstances described in the authorities that the Crown and defence have provided, it becomes clear that this case does indeed fall in the 12 to 15‑year grouping. [15] In addition to the considerations of s. 745.4, the court is also to consider the general statutory principles of sentencing that apply in all cases, found in ss. 718.2 of the Criminal Code. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society while encouraging rehabilitation, treatment of offenders in appropriate circumstances, and acknowledging the harm done to victims and to the community. The objective is achieved through the imposition of just sanctions, with the purpose of denouncing unlawful conduct and harm to victims of society, deterring the offender and others from committing offences, separating the offender from society where necessary, assisting in the offender's rehabilitation, providing reparations for harm done to a victim or to the community, and to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and acknowledgment of the harm done; s. 718 of the Criminal Code. [16] In Shropshire, mentioned a moment ago, the Supreme Court of Canada held that these general sentencing factors are encompassed in s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code. [17] Retribution also informs sentencing decisions in a case of this nature. Retribution is neither vengeance nor denunciation. It refers to the need for a sentence to "properly reflect the moral blameworthiness of the particular offender." R. v. Grantham, 2022 BCSC 1827, at para. 31. [18] A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's own moral culpability. It must also be consistent with sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances - the so‑called parity principle - although each case must ultimately be considered on its own facts and circumstances. The court must also take into account aggravating and mitigating factors, some of which are prescribed under the Criminal Code. [19] Mr. Kematch is of Cree identity and heritage. I must therefore consider s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code and the case law that has discussed it, such as R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 and R. v. Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13. Section s. 718.2(e) states that the court must take into account all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community. This must be considered for all offenders, with particular attention paid to Indigenous offenders. [20] When the offence is second degree murder, the mandatory life sentence with a minimum 10 years of parole ineligibility means a term of imprisonment is obviously mandatory and thus s. 718.2(e) does little with respect to alternatives to imprisonment in this circumstance. Nevertheless, it is relevant to the question of the appropriate period of parole ineligibility and perhaps other ancillary orders. [21] In Gladue and Ipeelee, the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized that the s. 718.2(e) is a remedial provision that is intended to address the crisis of over-representation of Indigenous peoples in Canadian prisons. In Gladue, the Court commented that overincarceration is a long-standing problem in Canada generally, but, for Indigenous offenders, it has reached a crisis level in numbers grossly disproportionate to the representation of Indigenous peoples in the community. In Gladue, the Supreme Court of Canada directed sentencing judges to consider: (1) the unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing an Indigenous offender before the courts; and (2) the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of their particular Indigenous heritage or connection. [22] The first of these considerations, the unique systemic or background factors, speak to the moral blameworthiness of the offender. It is not necessary for the offender to prove a causal connection between these factors and the commission of the offence, although a link may be important or helpful in finding a fit sentence; R. v. West, 2020 BCSC 352, at para. 42. [23] Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Canada stated in Ipeelee, at paras. 59-60, courts are required to take judicial notice of broad systemic or background factors, including: [60] . . . the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples. ... [24] The systemic and background factors do not excuse or justify criminal conduct, but rather provide necessary context for understanding and evaluating case-specific information in sentencing; R. v. Kehoe, 2023 BCCA 2, at para. 37. [25] Nor do the systemic or background factors, on their own, necessarily justify a different sentence for Indigenous offenders; Ipeelee, at para. 60. Circumstances of the Offender [26] I will talk now briefly about Mr. Kematch's circumstances. [27] Mr. Kematch was born in December 1984 in Vancouver. He is currently 45 years old. His mother was from the Sapotawyak Cree Nation in Manitoba, and his father was of the Mikisew Cree Nation in Alberta. He has five siblings, one of whom, an older brother, died of an overdose at age 38 when Mr. Kematch was 36 or 37. He also has two older half siblings on his father's side. [28] Mr. Kematch began living in foster care at age four, along with two of his siblings. He did not see his parents growing up and only connected with them when he was in his 20s. He learned they were alcohol-dependent and drug users. They were also survivors of the residential school system. [29] While their personal experiences at residential school are unknown, the physical and sexual abuse that children suffered at residential schools was rampant throughout the system and is well-documented in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's report and elsewhere. It is reasonable to infer that their own struggles with addiction and their apparent inability to care for Mr. Kematch and his siblings have roots in that system, as well as the broader impacts of colonialism. [30] In accordance with Ipeelee and other cases, I take judicial notice of those impacts and the legacy of the residential school system, including the intergenerational impact of that on Mr. Kematch. [31] As described in the Gladue report, Mr. Kematch and his siblings suffered mental, physical and sexual abuse while they were in foster care. Mr. Kematch and his siblings were subjected to cruel, abusive, and racist treatment at the hands of their foster parent, which undoubtedly had a profound impact given their particular vulnerability as foster children and given that a foster parent is in a position of trust and authority. This contributed to the struggles and confusion that Mr. Kematch has had throughout his life including with his own sexual identity as the abuse he suffered at the hands of his foster parent was frequently laced with homophobic remarks, including remarks directed specifically at him. [32] I note that much of the information about Mr. Kematch's life in the foster home as stated in the Gladue report was provided by Mr. Kematch's sister, Marie Kematch, who has also provided a very compelling and sincere victim impact statement. In my view, this adds credibility to her statements to the Gladue report writer because her victim impact statement demonstrates she is not an advocate for a particular accommodation in Mr. Kematch's sentence. In fact, she expresses her own fears about Mr. Kematch's potential release from prison in the future. As stated in the Gladue report, she still wants what is best for him. [33] Mr. Kematch also believes he was sexually assaulted while very young at the hands of a Sunday school teacher and he reported other incidents of sexual assault in his youth and teenage years. As an adult, he moved out of the foster home and made efforts to become educated. He worked at various jobs but had an unstable life that was marked by addiction, depression, and other mental illness, as well as insecure housing and difficulties in relationships. He continued to struggle with his sexuality and his sexual identity. [34] In 2005, Mr. Kematch was convicted of theft under $5,000, two counts of killing or injuring an animal, and one count of arson. He was sentenced to two years in jail for the theft and the arson convictions and six months concurrent for the convictions for killing an animal. The circumstances of those offences are described in R. v. Barnes, 2005 BCCA 432, at paras.6-8 and the facts regarding the convictions for killing an animal, in that instance two cats, are particularly chilling and disturbing. The psychological reports that were prepared for sentencing in that case reveal significant mental health issues for Mr. Kematch and that he was having very disturbing thoughts about committing excessively violent acts, inter‑related with sexual violence, including dismemberment, necrophilia and cannibalism. [35] In 2007, Mr. Kematch was placed on a 12‑month recognizance under s. 810.1 of the Criminal Code on the basis that a Provincial Court judge was satisfied there were reasonable grounds to fear that he would commit a serious personal injury offence. That order was based largely on the psychological reports prepared in connection with the earlier offences, as well as Mr. Kematch's behaviour at the time of the order. A further 12‑month order was made in 2008. [36] After Mr. Kematch's release from prison in 2007 he continued to struggle with the same challenges I have described, but he found some stability living with his sister in more recent years. His criminal record shows no offences being committed after 2004 until the offence in this case, and therefore he has lived a criminal-free life until the present murder. Aggravating and Mitigating Factors [37] Next, I will discuss some aggravating and mitigating factors that I will take into account in respect of the present offence. [38] The nature of the offence is itself aggravating. It was a brutal, horrifying, aggressive, and violent assault committed with a hammer and a chef's knife against a person who was much smaller than Mr. Kematch. The attack I have described earlier, which, as I say, resulted in Mr. Lo's death, is truly horrifying. [39] Also aggravating are the circumstances in which it occurred. Mr. Kematch had invited Mr. Lo into his home for what Mr. Lo rightly expected to be a fun and harmless night together of sexual activity. Mr. Kematch's brutal attack came out of nowhere and in a place and in circumstances that could only have come as a terrifying shock to Mr. Lo. Related to this is the aggravating feature of this very brutal murder taking place in the home of Mr. Kematch's sister and brother-in-law while they were there. Their victim impact statements illustrate the very compelling way that this incident has shattered their worlds and it has clearly had, and will have, a profound and lasting impact on them. [40] A further aggravating feature is that Mr. Kematch could have called this attack off. His brother-in-law managed to wrestle the hammer away from him. At that point, Mr. Kematch could have walked away. This could potentially have spared Mr. Lo's life, but Mr. Kematch continued his attack, picking up the knife and stabbing Mr. Lo multiple times. The fact he did not walk away when he had the opportunity to do so is a clear aggravating feature. [41] Further, the evidence of Mr. Kematch's writings and thoughts of grotesque and disturbing sexual violence as I have described earlier has continued up to recent times, around the time of the offence. This is an aggravating factor, at least as it relates to considering the need to separate Mr. Kematch from society and his prospects for rehabilitation. I consider as well the evidence respecting the books that were found in his room and the evidence of his internet searches which suggest a fascination with very serious violence. [42] Finally, the criminal record I have described is an aggravating feature, although, as I have said, Mr. Kematch has been 20 years without committing an offence, which puts the record in context. As I say, the criminal record is relevant more for what it says about the nature of the offence that he was convicted of at the time and what that means for his prospects of rehabilitation now. [43] As to mitigating circumstances, the guilty plea is clearly a mitigating factor. Although there was a preliminary inquiry at which I understand Mr. Kematch's sister and brother-in-law had to testify, his guilty plea did at least spare them the burden of testifying again in a trial in this court. [44] A second mitigating feature is Mr. Kematch's remorse and apology that he articulated in his statement to the court. I took that to be a genuine statement and it suggests that there is a real prospect for Mr. Kematch to take responsibility, which of course is essential if there is to be hope for Mr. Kematch's rehabilitation. Mr. Kematch, in my view your statement that you hope Mr. Lo will be remembered for the person he was and not for how he died shows some profound insights and humanity, and I consider that to be a mitigating factor. [45] Further, the Gladue factors I have discussed earlier, though treated differently under the Criminal Code than ordinary mitigating factors, are certainly very important in this case in assessing Mr. Kematch's moral blameworthiness and explaining in part what has brought him before the court. [46] Further, the fact that Mr. Kematch, as outlined in the Gladue report, has taken to studying in prison, building on his skills, working on his music composition, again shows real elements of humanity and hope for rehabilitation, and that again is a mitigating factor, in my view. Victim Impact [47] I wish to say a word about the victim impact statements. [48] I have already spoken about Marie Kematch's statement. Her husband, Mr. Kematch's brother-in-law, Jordan Smith, also provided a victim impact statement. These are remarkable in a sense, given that they are Mr. Kematch's relatives and their presence at the scene of the murder obviously has a human impact on them that is almost impossible to understand, but clearly very significant. I found Marie Kematch's impact statement especially profound, given that she has experienced the same kind of intergenerational trauma of the impacts of colonialism and residential school that Mr. Kematch has experienced. This makes her brother's betrayal of the trust that she had in him all the more difficult for her to overcome, especially when coupled with the fact that she was a direct witness to the murder. [49] The statement of Lisa Lo, Mr. Lo's mother, is deeply moving and saddening She has lost an adult son who brought her flowers, took her to the movies, and would have spent his life living close to her in a laneway house that she had built behind her own home for the very purpose of having her son live near her. Her statement speaks of the "endless sorrow" this incident has plunged her family into. [50] Though he has not provided a victim impact statement, the family's endless sorrow as described by Ms. Lo undoubtedly extends to Mr. Lo's brother, who attended by video today, who has lost his brother. The loss to the family is unfathomable. [51] Finally, Mr. Hesketh's statement, which he read in court, tells us that Mr. Lo's death is not just a loss to his family and friends but to the entire community. As Mr. Hesketh tells us, this horrible event has taken away "from so many others, someone who has this one of a kind burst of energy, life, that was energetic, enthusiastic, uplifting, fun and friendly". [52] These events and the evidence of what has gone through Mr. Kematch's mind paints a picture of despair for Mr. Kematch, but in my view, as the Crown and defence have argued, there is hope, Mr. Kematch, for your rehabilitation. As I have said, it is commendable that you are working on your education in prison. It is commendable that you are working on your music composition and creativity. These are all things that give this Court hope. [53] I have referred to Marie Kematch's victim impact statement, which, as I have said, is a compelling read. I also took note of what she said in the Gladue report, which passage I will read: Marie believes that Dwight can be helped to address traumas through "counselling, purpose -- giving him a purpose and a drive, a goal". Marie conveyed her love for Dwight, adding, "I still think of him. I still want the best for him." [54] Mr. Kematch, I am going to make an order that you have no contact with Marie while you are in prison, but in view of that statement I have to say you are a very lucky man to have a sister like that. The Suitable Sentence [55] I do not propose to review the cases that have been cited by the Crown and defence, other than to identify them. In R. v. Forster, 2012 BCSC 1682, the offender was given a life sentence with no parole eligibility for 12 years; R. v. Fraser, 2019 BCSC 910, also 12 years; R. v. Sandhu, 2024 BCSC 1388, 13 years; Grantham, 2022 BCSC 1827, 14 years; and R. v. Lagimodiere, 2022 BCSC 425, 14 years. These are all cases with somewhat similar circumstances. The circumstances in Forster where the parole ineligibility period was 12 years, are very close to this case but of course there are always distinguishing features in all these cases. [56] Since this is a joint submission, there is not a great deal of utility in me reviewing the specific circumstances of each of these cases. They clearly support the joint submission being firmly within the range and the appropriate range for the present offence. This is not a case where a joint submission touches on the very edge of the range. It sits firmly within the range and I find it to be a suitable sentence. The Crown also seeks certain ancillary orders that I will also make in a moment. [57] Mr. Kematch, would you please stand. [58] For the reasons I have given, I sentence you to life imprisonment with no eligibility to apply for parole for a period of 13 years. [59] Thank you. You can be seated. Ancillary Orders [60] With respect to the ancillary orders, firstly, with respect to the firearms, pursuant to s. 109(3) of the Criminal Code, Mr. Kematch, you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition and explosive substance for the rest of your life. [61] With respect to DNA, second degree murder is a primary designated offence. Pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code, I make an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of samples of bodily substances from you for the purpose of registration in the DNA National Databank. [62] With respect to contact, the Warrant of Committal shall be endorsed with the following order: Pursuant to s. 743.21(1) of the Criminal Code, you must have no contact of any kind with Lisa Lo, Maria Kematch and Jordan Smith while you are in custody. [63] With respect to the surcharge, pursuant to s. 737(2.1) of the Criminal Code, I am satisfied that because of your precarious financial circumstances due to your incarceration, a surcharge would cause undue hardship and I order that it be waived. [64] With respect to documents to Corrections, pursuant to s. 743.2 of the Criminal Code, these reasons for sentence; the agreed statement of facts, which is Exhibit 1; the background materials for sentencing, which is Exhibit 2; and the victim impact statement, which is Exhibit 3 are to be forwarded to the Correctional Service of Canada. [65] I believe that leaves s. 726.3. So pursuant to s. 726.3 the prosecutor has advised the court that Ms. Lo wishes to receive information regarding the sentence and its administration, and I order that that wish be entered on the record of this proceeding. [66] Anything further? [67] CNSL M. MYHRE: Not from the Crown, Justice, thank you. [68] CNSL J. HELLER: No, thank you. [69] THE COURT: Okay. I wish to thank counsel for your submissions and we will adjourn. Thank you. [70] CNSL M. MYHRE: Thank you, Justice. [71] CNSL J. HELLER: Thank you. "Kirchner J."