Black v. Nova Scotia (Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing)

Black v. Nova Scotia (Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing) Court Supreme Court Date 2025-10-09 Citation 2025 NSSC 321 Docket Hfx No. 540740 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Gabriel, D. Timothy (Honourable Justice) (SC) Document Type Decision Decision Content SUPREME COURT OF Nova Scotia Citation: Black v. Nova Scotia (Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing), 2025 NSSC 321 Date: 20251009 Docket: Hfx No. 540740 Registry: Halifax Between: Shannon Black Applicant v. Provincial Director of Planning of the Nova Scotia Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice D. Timothy Gabriel Heard: July 2, 2025, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Final Written Submissions: August 1, 2025 Counsel: Shannon Black, self-represented Applicant Benjamin Perryman, for the Applicant (only with respect to the issue of standing) Alison Campbell, for the Respondent By the Court: [1] The Applicant, Shannon Black, brings this application for Judicial Review. She is a practicing lawyer in the Province of Ontario, and also the owner of real property located in the Village of Chester (“Chester”), in the Municipality of the District of Chester (“MODC”). [2] Ms. Black takes the position that the Respondent’s decision, which was to the effect that certain planning documents submitted by MODC Council (“Council”) were not subject to the Ministerial approval regime outlined in s. 208 of the Municipal Government Act (“MGA”), was unreasonable. [3] The Applicant was represented by counsel, Benjamin Perryman, only for the purpose of making submissions with respect to the issue of her standing to bring this application. Otherwise, she self-represented. Factual Background [4] Ms. Black’s real property consists of three rental units, two residential and one commercial. She is a part-time resident of Chester, staying a portion of each year in one of the two residential units, depending on which one is not occupied (at the time) by a long-term tenant (Applicant’s Affidavit, para. 3). [5] She asserts: 4. The property is located in the commercial core of the Village of Chester. Many property owners in the immediate vicinity report reliance on cisterns and rain catchment and/or commercial water delivery at points of the year or throughout the year. Attached as Exhibit “B” is a CBC article from 2016 with commentary from business owners on water scarcity issues. 5. Also included in Exhibit “B” are excerpts from “Chester Business District Water Supply – Feasibility Study” by SNC-Lavalin, commissioned by the MODC in 2014. According to researchers, the study stemmed from recognition by the MODC that “a number of residents and business owners in the business district of Chester are faced with high costs of providing patrons, employees, and residents due to low water yields in individual supplies”. 6. My property on Duke Street is on the eastern border of the “Proposed Service Area” marked on the Preliminary Map included in the excerpt from the 2014 “Feasibility Study” at Exhibit “B”. [6] She continues: 11. Last fall, I started researching cisterns. I anticipate that increased development in and around Chester will increase the likelihood of a future well water supply interruption on my property. In the short-term, a cistern may only be required for the summer and fall months, and therefore could be stored outdoors. However, I am concerned about the feasibility and expense of mid-to-long-term, year-round reliance on a commercial water supply or installation of a rain water catchment. My preference would be a municipal water utility and water system. 12. The Well Construction Regulations set out mandatory distances from sources of contamination for new well construction, including sewers and outer boundaries of public roads. Excerpts from these regulations are attached as Exhibit “C”. On my property, the lot size, the location of existing structures and the recent discovery of a concealed, unsuccessful well drilled by the previous owners, all limit the likelihood that a new well is an option. I believe that a municipal water utility would offer the most reliable potable water supply for my property. 13. For these reasons, the removal of protection from the watershed of the intended and only identified potable water source in the MODC in order to open the area up for development impacts me directly, as a resident and property owner. 14. The Provincial Director of Planning’s determination that the MODC amendment to the Municipal Planning Strategy removing protection from the Spectacle Lake watershed did not affect and did not need to be reasonably consistent with the Statement of Provincial Interest on Drinking Water, is therefore a matter of personal interest to me. 15. Apart from my personal, direct interest in this issue, the private well water supply of the Village of Chester and other water-stressed communities in the MODC is not reliable and, in many cases, is unsafe. - Resident Water Survey, Municipality of Chester, Coastal Action, 2020, Record, Tab 6, page 25 16. The safety and wellbeing of the wider community is of great concern to me. Many other residents voiced similar concerns at various Council meeting in September and October and at the public hearing on October 10, 2024. (Applicant’s Affidavit) [7] The statistics noted in the above paragraphs are referenced in documents to be found in the Record (Tab 6), and in the Applicant’s Affidavit, Exhibit G (pp. 50-52). No objection was taken by the Respondent to the Court’s reception of this information in this manner. [8] There has never been a water supply utility to service the residents of Chester. Currently, the residents rely on on-site services, such as private wells and cisterns, which may be augmented by water delivery during dry spells. [9] Approximately three kilometers north of the village lies Spectacle Lake. A “Planning Matters Report” (Record, Tab 6, p. 65) notes that the lake was first identified as a potential source for a future municipal water supply as early as the 1960s. [10] In the 1990’s, the MODC Council applied a “Protected Watershed Zone” designation to an area which it felt comprised the watershed for Spectacle Lake (Supplemental Record, Tab 3, pp. 34-35). Among other things, the imposition of this zone limited development in the affected area so as to protect it while the potential of Spectacle Lake to serve as a source of municipal drinking water continued to be explored (Supplemental Record, Tab 3, p. 35). [11] On June 27, 2024 Council passed a motion which directed staff to prepare a report on the potential rezoning of Spectacle Lake. That report was delivered to the Municipal Planning Advisory Committee Meeting on August 21, 2024. This meeting is described in the following manner: …There was a lengthy debate and discussion around the reliability of the report and the comments from Public Works, which stated that the lake [Spectacle Lake] is not and would not be a viable Municipal water source. Some members of the Committee wished to receive more detail, up to and including a report prepared by an outside qualified professional to determine the viability of Spectacle Lake. (Supplemental Record, Tab 3, p. 40). [12] The Supplemental Record also references a public meeting which took place on October 10, 2024 (Tab 3, pp. 20-22). It refers to letters written by residents of the Municipality to Council on the topic (Tab 3, pp. 24-33). [13] On October 17, 2024, Council passed this motion: 2024 – 473 MOVED by Deputy Warden Shatford, SECONDED by Councillor Assaff that Council approve an amendment to the Municipal Planning Strategy and Land Use By-Law to rezone the Protected Watershed Zone around Spectacle Lake to Mixed Use Zone (south of Highway 103) and General Basic Zone (north of Highway 103). DISCUSSION It was noted that Council can make a motion asking for report as soon as possible to where the Lakeside Zone should be applied. SIX IN FAVOUR. ONE OPPOSED. MOTION CARRIED. (Record, Tab 8, p. 100) [14] On October 23, 2024, in an effort to comply with s. 208 of the MGA (which legislation will be discussed more fulsomely later in these reasons), the Municipal Senior Planner sent the plans and the documents associated with the motion to the Respondent, the Provincial Director of Planning (to whom I will refer as either “the Director” or “the Respondent”). Delivery of the package, however, was delayed due to a Canada Post strike. When this was realized, the Senior Planner once again sent the package, this time by courier. That package was received by the Director’s office on December 5, 2024 (Supplemental Record, Tabs 2 & 4; Record, Tab 7). There was a “twist” to this, however, which will be discussed shortly. [15] In the meantime, the Applicant had written to the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing, MLA John Lohr, on October 29, 2024. In her correspondence, she expressed a number of concerns, including her view that the decision by Council to remove the protected watershed zoning from Spectacle Lake was not reasonably consistent with the Statement of Provincial Interest Regarding Drinking Water (“SPI”), that it was arrived at in a manner contrary to the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act, as well as her interpretation of the results of research performed over the years. Therein, among other things, she stated, “the water from Spectacle Lake can be treated, and measures can be taken to maintain a volume adequate to serve at least 2000 residents of the Village of Chester”. [16] The Applicant went on to point out: This is a divisive issue with significant consequences for the public interest in safe drinking water for the Village of Chester, and for the private interests of property owners who have expressed a wide range of development interests. Building a family home and possibly homes for immediate relatives, using the land for recreational uses such as a campground or a golf course, and a multi-unit residential subdivision along the lakefront portion of one lot owned by a developer, all were mentioned. It seems the Statement of Provincial Interest on Drinking Water was intended for just this sort of planning deliberation. (Record, Tab 6, pp. 12-13) [17] The Minister’s response to the Applicant was dated December 17, 2024. The relevant portions of that response are set out below: The Municipality of the District of Chester has the legal mandate to make decisions regarding land use planning and zoning within its jurisdiction. This authority includes the ability to assess and respond to local needs, priorities and the realities of water supply options available to the community. The intention behind the Statement of Provincial Interest (SPI) on Drinking Water, expressed in the Municipal Government Act, is to protect the quality drinking water within Municipal Water Supply Watersheds. This is defined as a water supply area for a current municipal drinking water system. Amendments to a Municipal Planning Strategy are required to be provided to the Department of Municipal Affairs for review by the Director of Planning to confirm reasonable consistency with the SPI before coming into force. [emphasis added] (Record, Tab 4) [18] The SPI to which the Minister had referred is one of a number of such Statements. They are attached as Schedule B to the MGA and have been reproduced by the Applicant in her Authorities, at Tab 2 thereof. The Statements cumulatively deal with drinking water, flood risk areas, agricultural land, infrastructure and housing. [19] In the definition section of the SPI’s, “Municipal Water Supply Watershed” is defined as “an area encompassing a surface watershed or recharge area, or a portion of it, serving as a water supply area for a municipal water system”. [20] Returning to the transmission of the plans and associated documents to the Director, there was a further complicating factor. Council did send three copies of the correct motion (to the Director) which rezoned the Protected Watershed Zone around Spectacle Lake to “Mixed Use Zone” (south of Highway 103) and “General Basic Zone” (north of Highway 103). However, it also inadvertently sent (in the same package) a photocopy of a motion that had not been passed by the Council. Counsel for the Respondent acknowledges that this is what happened and refers to the latter as “the Mistaken Motion”. This Mistaken Motion (facially) refers to a rezoning of the same area to “Lakeside Zone” (Respondent’s Brief, paras. 23-24, Supplemental Record, Tab 13, Record, Tab 9). [21] Counsel for the Respondent says: It is evident from the Director’s decision that she apprehended the Mistaken Motion was not the correct document submitted by Council as her decision letter refers to the correct motion which rezoned the Spectacle Lake area to “Mixed Use” and “General Basin [sic]” zones. Record, Tab 1 (Respondent’s Brief, para. 25) [22] The Applicant takes a different view: …When the Director exercised her delegated authority, she was reviewing a proposal that was not legally passed by the MODC. This is a fatal flaw. To whatever extent the Director considered or relied on the application of Lakeside Zone in reaching her Decision – or the External Reviewer in forming his opinion – their determinations were based on a fundamental misapprehension of the matter under review… (Applicant’s Brief, paras. 121–122). [23] Departmental staff in the Director’s office reviewed the application and prepared a summary brief of the document for the Director’s consideration. This was entitled “Director’s Review of Planning Documents Review Summary” (Record, Tab 2). Integral to preparation of the summary was input from an external reviewer from the Department of Environment and Climate Change. This is the “external reviewer” referenced by the Applicant in the above excerpt from her brief. [24] On December 20, 2024, the Director signed an acknowledgement indicating that her review under s. 208 of the MGA had been completed, and that the planning documents did not fall within any of the categories requiring Ministerial approval under s. 208(3) of the MGA. It is this decision to which the Applicant takes exception. She contends that Ministerial approval was required in the circumstances and asks this Court to set aside the Director’s decision and “remit it back for redetermination” (Applicant’s Brief, para. 148). Issues [25] There are four issues raised in this judicial review. They follow: A. Does the Applicant have private interest standing to bring this application? B. Does the Applicant have public interest standing to bring this application? C. What, if any, significance is there to the fact that the Mistaken Motion was included in the package which was sent to the Director’s office? D. Has the Director’s decision, that Council’s planning documents were not subject to the ministerial approval regime (under s. 208 of the MGA) been shown to have been unreasonable? Analysis A. Does the Applicant have private interest standing to bring this application? [26] The legal principles to be applied in the determination of this question are straightforward, and the parties, for the most part, have cited the same authorities. Predictably, they differ as to the conclusion at which the Court should arrive after the application of these principles. [27] It is convenient to begin with Canadian Elevator Industry Education Program v. Nova Scotia (Elevators and Lifts), 2016 NSCA 80. Therein, our Court of Appeal distilled the authorities and confirmed that there are four factors to be considered when private interest standing is being deliberated. These four factors relate to the statutory purposes of the legislation in question, the subject matter of the proceeding, the Applicant’s interest in the subject; and the effect that the decision might have on the interest (Canadian Elevator, para. 42). [28] I will first consider the significance of each criterion, including a summary of the positions taken by the parties in relation to them. I will then conclude my analysis of this issue by considering them cumulatively within the specific context of this case. (i) The statutory purposes of the MGA (a) Parties’ positions [29] The Applicant’s argument is predicated upon her assertion that “[t]he Municipal Government Act, the Statements of Provincial Interest regulations, and related Implementation Guidelines for Statements of Provincial Interest ensure ‘safe and viable communities’ [per s. 9A(c), MGA] by recognizing that ‘water resources are fundamental to our physical, social and economic well-being’ [per Introduction, Statements of Provincial Interest, Schedule B, MGA]” (Applicant’s Brief, para. 40). She argues that this is more than just a hypothetical concern, due to the number of reported dry wells in the MODC, and she references the indications in the documents comprising the Record and Supplemental record, and her own firsthand information (as recounted in her Affidavit) to support her assertion that the number of reported dry wells in her district of the MODC has recently doubled (Applicant’s Brief, para. 42). [30] The Respondent, for its part, argues that the Applicant has taken a much too narrow view of the purpose of the of the MGA and Statements of Provincial Interest, and has focused only on statements regarding the importance of the availability of drinking water to society (Respondent’s Brief, para. 33). (b) Analysis [31] The MGA itself provides: Purpose of Act 2 The purpose of this Act is to (a) give broad authority to councils, including broad authority to pass by-laws, and to respect their right to govern municipalities in whatever ways the councils consider appropriate within the jurisdiction given to them; (b) enhance the ability of councils to respond to present and future issues in their municipalities; and (c) recognize the purposes of a municipality set out in Section 9A. 1998, c. 18, s. 2; 2019, c. 19, s. 1. [32] As is apparent from the above, s. 2(c) incorporates by reference the provisions of s. 9A which adds: Purposes of a municipality 9A The purposes of a municipality are to (a) provide good government; (b) provide services, facilities and other things that, in the opinion of the council, are necessary or desirable for all or part of the municipality; and (c) develop and maintain safe and viable communities. 2019, c. 19, s. 2. [33] Due to the issues raised in this proceeding, the above referenced portions of the legislation must also be read in tandem with Part VIII of the MGA, which specifically deals with planning and development. The purpose behind the provisions which deal with planning and development are described as follows: Purpose of Part 190 The purpose of this Part is to (a) enable the Province to identify and protect its interests in the use and development of land; (b) enable municipalities to assume the primary authority for planning within their respective jurisdictions, consistent with their urban or rural character, through the adoption of municipal planning strategies and land-use by-laws consistent with interests and regulations of the Province; (ba) ensure that every municipality develops and adopts one or more municipal planning strategies to govern planning throughout the municipality and fulfill the minimum planning requirements; (c) establish a consultative process to ensure the right of the public to have access to information and to participate in the formulation of planning strategies and by-laws, including the right to be notified and heard before decisions are made pursuant to this Part; and (d) provide for the fair, reasonable and efficient administration of this Part. 1998, c. 18, s. 190; 2018, c. 39, s. 1. [emphasis added] [34] Clearly, s. 190 represents an attempt on the part of the Legislature to balance Provincial and Municipal interests in development and planning matters. Municipal Councils are provided with authority over planning, subject to the Province’s ability to identify and regulate provincial interests. These “provincial interests” are generally outlined in the SPI’s, to which earlier reference has been made. [35] Some of this was explored in Elderkin v. Nova Scotia (Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relations), 2013 NSCA 79, a decision to which both parties have referred. In Elderkin, the Court of Appeal had occasion to consider s. 190 of the MGA within the context of the other statutory purposes expressed in the legislation: [34] The wording of s. 190 (a) and (b) demonstrates that the Legislature intended that the “primary authority” given to the municipalities would not be without limits. Instead, the Act expressly states that municipal planning decisions have to accord with provincial interests. As a result of how the Legislature described the proper roles of the municipalities and the Province, the Province retains an overarching authority to protect provincial interests. [emphasis added] [36] The Respondent argues that: Contrary to the Applicant’s position that the statutory purpose is to recognize the importance of access to drinking water, the Director states that the purpose of the statute, and the planning section in particular, is to bestow primary authority on the municipalities while providing the Province with an overarching authority to intervene in limited circumstances clearly expressed in the statute. … (Respondent’s Brief, para. 38) [37] While the above may oversimplify the Applicant’s argument somewhat, I conclude that it is nonetheless correct for the Respondent to observe that the legislation is aimed at addressing and balancing a myriad of municipal interests, of which drinking water, although exceedingly important, is only one. At the same time, Municipal “primacy” has been tempered in a manner so that Provincial interests will not be threatened. Thus, the MGA is directed primarily toward cloaking municipalities with the mantle of “primary authority” to plan within their jurisdictions, provided that such planning activities are consistent with Provincial interests. (ii) Subject matter of the proceeding (a) Parties’ positions [38] The Applicant argues: 43. Demonstrating her private interest in the water security issues and well-being of the wider community, the Applicant describes in her affidavit the water quality and water scarcity issues that affect the private well water supply in the Municipality of the District of Chester, citing the MODC’s research, with which she is familiar. 44. As set out in paras. 15-18 of the Statement of Facts, the issue of water security in the Village of Chester is long-standing; the number of dry wells reported is increasing; MODC efforts to locate an alternate potable water supply to Spectacle Lake have all failed. [39] She continues: 46. Her immediate neighbours rely on alternate water collection and supplemental water supply while the Applicant’s property draws water from a private well owned by a neighbour. 47. The Applicant is a landlord, renting to long-term tenants, and a water supply interruption at her property would also affect them. Water certain shortages in the MODC effect residence directly, as each has a private interest in a safe, stable water supply yet they also affect the well-being, security and potential for growth of communities as a whole. (Applicant’s Brief) [40] Earlier, the Applicant had characterized the decision under review as one concerning “the availability of surface and groundwater as a source of drinking water in the future, both for the Applicant and the broader community” (Applicant’s Brief, para. 41). [41] The Director contends that this characterization is flawed (Respondent’s Brief, para. 39). Rather, as her counsel put it: 41. The issue before the Director is narrow: Do the planning documents meet any of the criteria that would require they be approved by the Minister? It is evident from the arguments made by the Applicant on the reasonableness decision that she interprets the Director as conducting a much more wide-ranging review than what the MGA actually requires or permits. (Respondent’s Brief) (b) Analysis [42] The Respondent’s decision was made under the auspices of s. 208 of the MGA, the relevant provisions of which read as follows: Requirement for review by Director 208 (1) Planning documents are subject to review by the Director. (2) The clerk shall submit four certified copies of the planning documents to the Director. (3) Where the Director determines that the planning documents (a) appear to affect a provincial interest; (b) may not be reasonably consistent with an applicable statement of provincial interest; (c) appear to conflict with the law; (ca) in the case of a municipal planning strategy, may fail to fulfill the minimum planning requirements; or (d) in the case of a subdivision by-law, may conflict with the provincial subdivision regulations, the planning documents are subject to the Minister’s approval. (4) Within thirty days after receiving the planning documents, the Director shall (a) return two copies of the planning documents to the clerk, with a written notice affixed stating that they are not subject to the approval of the Minister; or (b) provide written notice to the clerk that the planning documents are subject to the approval of the Minister and include the reasons why they are so subject. (5) Compliance with the procedural requirements for the adoption or amendment of planning documents is not subject to the review of the Director or the Minister. (6) Within sixty days after the date of a written notice that planning documents are subject to the approval of the Minister, the Minister shall (a) approve all or part of the documents; (b) approve the documents with amendments; or (c) refuse to approve the documents, and return to the clerk two copies of the planning documents as approved, amended or refused with written reasons for the decision. [emphasis added] [43] I begin with the observation that the words “planning documents” are used in ss. 208(1) and 208(3)(b). It therefore seems clear that it is the “planning documents” themselves, rather than any ancillary or background documents which may accompany them, that are potentially subject to Ministerial review. [44] It is also clear that the situation is not one in which the Director must pass judgement on the wisdom of the Municipality’s decision. Indeed, in Elderkin, which (unlike this case) was a matter in which the Director had referred a Municipality’s decision to the Minister for review, the Court of Appeal pointed out: [36] The Minister’s role as set out in s. 208(6) of the Act is important. That provision simply requires him to approve all or part of the planning documents, approve the documents with amendments, or refuse to approve the documents. Nothing in s. 208(6) obliges him to defer to Council’s decision or any part of it. Furthermore, the Minister is not hearing an appeal from Council’s decision. Nor is he conducting a judicial review of that decision. His task is to examine the planning documents anew, having regard to the SPI. His review necessarily involves considerations of complex policy issues and an overall weighing of policy considerations, which may include matters in addition to or different from those a municipality considers and weighs. [emphasis added] [45] In this case, the Director is (obviously) not the Minister. Their roles are different. That of the former is much more circumscribed than the Minister’s (above described) role. It is simply to determine whether the Municipality’s By-Law has triggered s. 208(3), thus requiring the Minister’s approval. The Applicant has argued that it did, because s. 208(3)(b) is implicated. [46] Therefore, the Respondent’s characterization of the subject matter of the proceeding is closer to the mark. It is consistent with the manner in which the final issue (Issue D) has been framed, which will be considered later in these reasons. (iii) Applicant’s interest in the subject; and (iv) The effect that the decision might have on that interest [47] These are the final two criteria which are involved in an analysis of the first issue. It is convenient to deal with them together. [48] In Canadian Elevator, Bryson, J.A. pointed out that: [13] The rules and application of standing differ depending on whether one is seeking private or public interest standing, because the interests engaged differ. Vindicating private rights is the interest of the former. The latter is a matter of maintaining the rule of law as a general principle, regardless of whether a private right or interest is involved. As Chief Justice Laskin, speaking for the majority, said in Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138, at p. 145: [ . . . ] it would be strange and, indeed, alarming, if there was no way in which a question of alleged excess of legislative power, a matter traditionally within the scope of the judicial process, could be made the subject of adjudication. [49] Next, in Borowski v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575, the Court explained: [4] I start with the proposition that, as a general rule, it is not open to a person simply because he is a citizen and a taxpayer or is either the one or the other to invoke the jurisdiction of a competent court to obtain a ruling on the interpretation or application of legislation, or on its validity, when that person either is not directly affected by the legislation or is not threatened by sanctions for an alleged violation of the legislation. Mere distaste has never been a ground upon which to seek the assistance of a court. Unless the legislation itself provides for a challenge to its meaning or application or validity by any citizen or taxpayer, the prevailing policy is that a challenger must show some special interest in the operation of the legislation beyond the general interest that is common to all members of the relevant society. This is especially true of the criminal law. For example, however passionately a person may believe that it is wrong to provide for compulsory breathalyzer tests or wrong to make mere possession of marihuana an offence against the criminal law, the courts are not open to such a believer, not himself or herself charged or even threatened with a charge, to seek a declaration against the enforcement of such criminal laws. [emphasis added] [50] In Rudderham v. Scotian Materials Ltd., 2017 NSSC 330, this Court dealt with an application for judicial review (by a local resident) of an Officer’s approval of an asphalt and concrete operation on property owned by the respondent. [51] Therein, the female applicant had expressed a belief that the respondent’s quarry, plus the mobile asphalt and concrete operation being proposed, would create a nuisance, adversely affect the value of her home, and the quality of her well water. In particular, she adverted to the fact that it would increase the amount of dust, smoke, soot, noise, traffic, and runoff into streams and lakes. [52] The relevant statutory scheme, incorporated in the HRM Charter, envisioned a bilateral process for appeals. Brothers, J., concluded that “the legislature did not intend an aggrieved person to have a right of appeal from an approval of a [Development Officer]” (Rudderham, para. 54, emphasis added). She therefore went on to determine whether the applicant had established a basis upon which to assert private interest standing to challenge the decision. [53] In doing so, the Court concluded that the concerns expressed by the applicants were conjectural in nature: [83] While Ms. Rudderham says these issues collectively raise concern because of the fact her home is located approximately 1800 metres from the proposed quarry and mobile ACP, she admits in her affidavit that she has no clear idea of where the facilities are going to be located on the Subject Lands. On cross-examination, Ms. Rudderham was shown Exhibit 4, a depiction of the proposed ACP. This document purports to show the 2 km radius from the proposed ACP. Ms. Rudderham was asked to mark the location of her home with a green marker. Her home is outside the 2 km radius of the ACP. [84] Mr. Isenor’s affidavit mirrors Ms. Rudderham’s affidavit in reviewing the proceedings to date. In addition, para. 23, and paras. 25-31, of Mr. Isenor’s affidavit are virtually identical to paras. 23-31 of Mr. Rudderham’s affidavit. The only difference is the proximity of Mr. Isenor’s home to the ACP. Mr. Isenor states that his home is approximately 1500 metres from the proposed quarry and the ACP. He too has no clear idea and no information as to where the ACP is going to be constructed. His evidence is conjecture and bald assertions. On cross-examination, Mr. Isenor was shown Exhibit 4, the satellite view of the ACP. He was asked to mark his home with a blue pen. In doing so, his home too is outside the 2 km radius of the ACP. [85] The affidavits of Ms. Rudderham and Mr. Isenor are rife with conjecture and do not offer any clear, admissible evidence of detriment or impact to the applicants legal or property interests. They have not satisfied the burden of proving a private interest. There is no special or sufficient interest demonstrated. [86] Given the evidence provided by the applicants, the principles articulated in the caselaw and even when applying a contextual, generous approach and not considering the merits or the strength of the case, the applicants fail to demonstrate or establish private interest standing. [87] There is no evidence before me that the decision of the DO will have any impact on the applicants. The applicants rely on their alleged proximity to the proposed mobile ACP and their speculation that as a result of its operation their property and person will be affected. However, there is nothing provided for the court’s consideration, aside from mere speculation and bald assertions. There is no expert evidence to show that a mobile ACP with the character of the one at issue will create any of the issues speculated by the applicants. [88] In making these comments, I acknowledge the authorities and the trends of the courts to be more generous in finding private interest standing to those who challenge decisions of public authorities. However, a relationship between the applicants and the challenged action must have some nexus as opposed to be contingent worry or even less, conjecture. [emphasis added] [54] As the Court went on to point out: [91] While the applicants may have an interest, in the general sense, about the speculative environmental concerns, this falls short of “interest” in the legal sense (Shiell v. Amok Ltd., supra). There is no evidence before the court, short of bald assertions, that demonstrate any impact on the applicants use and enjoyment of their property. Mere proximity to the Subject Lands does not meet the test for standing (Brison Re 2006 NSUARB 113). [55] In the end result, the applicants were denied private interest standing on the basis that they were “interested observers” (para. 94), and nothing more. [56] By way of contrast, in cases such as Brighton v. Nova Scotia (Agriculture and Fisheries), 2002 NSSC 160, and Specter v. Nova Scotia (Fisheries and Aquaculture), 2011 NSSC 333, the applicable legislation (the Fisheries and Coastal Resources Act) did permit an avenue of appeal with respect to ministerial decisions, if they were “aggrieved persons” as defined in the statute. [57] In Brighton, MacDonald, A.C.J. (as he then was) observed: [7] Because the Appellants filed no documentation to show that they have been directly prejudiced by this decision, the Respondent Crown suggests that they do not meet the threshold of “aggrieved persons” so as to have standing to prosecute this Appeal. I reject this submission. One need look no further than to the voluminous record to quickly realize that the Appellants were most interested in the outcome of this application and directly involved in the process. In fact the Minister saw fit to write many of them personally when his decision was announced (Volume IV, Tab 449). Given the scope of the FCRA generally and the circumstances surrounding this process in particular, the Appellants meet the standard contemplated under s. 119. They have standing to process this Appeal. [58] In Specter, which involved the same legislation, LeBlanc, J. (as he then was) pointed out that: [59] “Public interest groups and individual advocates have usually been denied standing to challenge administrative action that raises environmental concerns, for lack of an identifiable special interest of their own” (Donald JM Brown Y John M Evans, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Canada, loose-leaf (Toronto: Canvasback, 2010) _4.3443. For example, in Friends of Public Gardens v. Halifax (City) (1985), 68 NSR (2d) 433, 13 Admin LR 272 (SCTD), the applicant was denied standing to challenge the City of Halifax’s decision not to designate certain properties near the Halifax Public Gardens as “heritage property”. [59] When discussing adjacent property owners, he noted: [60] However, adjacent landowners have been granted standing to challenge the issuance of permits or government decisions governing land use. In Oakland/Indian Point Residents Assn. v. Seaview Properties Ltd., 2008 NSSC 209, the Court allowed the applicant standing to challenge a subdivision plan and development permits, noting that some of the members of the applicant association were adjacent landowners to the proposed condo development at issue. In Lord Nelson Hotel Ltd. v. Halifax (City) (1972), 4 NSR (2d) 753, 33 DLR (3d) 98 (CA) [Lord Nelson Hotel], the Court of Appeal found that an adjacent landowner had standing to challenge the City of Halifax’s re-zoning of neighbouring property. [61] In my view, how the test for standing is phrased is largely irrelevant. It does not matter whether a statute uses the phrase, “person aggrieved”, “person directly affected”, or “direct and personal interest”. What matters is the interpretation that is given to these phrases. This necessarily involves a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis of the applicable legislation. Involved in this interpretation is the concern of courts that an overly broad interpretation will allow mere “busybodies” to flood the courts with litigation challenging public decisions. [62] The key question to ask is whether a potential applicant has an economic, commercial, legal, or personal interest in a decision that is sufficiently delineated from the concerns of the general public so as to make them a “person aggrieved”. [63] The interests of adjacent property owners may fall into any of these categories. What may set adjacent property owners apart from other potential applicants is that their proximity to the place affected by a decision makes them sufficiently different from other potential applicants. [emphasis added] [60] And further: [71] In this case, the decision at issue authorized the movement of an industrial food production facility – an aquaculture fish farm – to within approximately 240 metres of an adjacent coastal landowner. The owner of the fish farm admits that water clouding in the vicinity can occur, as well as increased algae and slime in the intertidal zone. [72] One of the purposes of the Act is to “foster community involvement in the management of coastal resources”. The value of the appellants’ property may be impacted by this decision. The appellants’ use of the intertidal zone immediately adjacent to their property may also be impacted by this decision. This potential impact will affect the appellants in ways that are significantly different from the general public. In my view, these appellants are at least as affected as the appellants in Brighton, if not more so. As such, the appellants are “persons aggrieved” within the meaning of the Act, and they should be granted standing. [73] I reject Kelly Cove’s submission that the Minister’s decision should be parsed, and the appellants granted standing only with respect to Site 0602. Kelly Cove made a single amendment application to the Minister. The Minister made a single decision with respect to this application that affected three different sites. [74] An attack of ultra vires would apply to all of the licenses and not just Site 0602. There may be evidence at the hearing that the appellants’ interests were affected by other sites. At this time, it would not be appropriate to limit the appellants’ appeal to only the amendment of Site 0602. [emphasis added] [61] I note that the earlier cited decision in Rudderham does not support the proposition that proximity is of no moment when an application for private standing is advanced. Rather (as we have seen), that case turned on the fact that the anticipated effects of the development cited by the Applicants amounted to “contingent worry or … conjecture” (para. 88). Obviously, the decision in each case must reflect its own factual matrix. [62] As cases like Specter demonstrate, in an appropriate context, proximity may have a great deal to say when the issue of private standing is considered. In fact, as Ann Smith, J. put it in Lynn v. Nova Scotia (Lands and Forestry), 2020 NSSC 307: [92] A review of these decisions demonstrates that there is a body of case law in Nova Scotia supporting the view that a neighbouring or proximate landowner to a property in respect of which an administrative decision has been made will have standing to advance a justiciable complaint. In some cases there is specific statutory language within which standing can be considered (e.g. “aggrieved”), but this is not a prerequisite of standing, particularly where the complaining party is seeking judicial review. Where the decision relates to private property in which neighbouring or proximate property owners have a direct or genuine interest, in my view there is a strong basis to find that standing exists. As LeBlanc J. said in Specter, the question is “whether a potential applicant has an economic, commercial, legal, or personal interest in a decision that is sufficiently delineated from the concerns of the general public so as to make them a ‘person aggrieved’.” [93] In my view a similar analysis can be applied to determine whether a person has standing as an applicant for judicial review purposes. [emphasis added] [63] In Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1986] 2 S.C.R. 607, the respondent contended that he was a resident of Manitoba and a person in need within the meaning of the Canada Assistance Plan (“the Plan”). He alleged that his sole support was the social allowance he received under the Manitoba Socia Allowances Act, and that for a period of forty-six months an amount was deducted from his monthly social allowance in payment of a debt owing by him to the Crown for overpayment of allowance. Prior to receiving social allowance, he had been in receipt of municipal assistance, which by The Municipal Act of Manitoba was made a debt owing by the respondent to the municipality. The respondent argued that the continued payments by Canada (to Manitoba) of contributions under the Plan were illegal and in particular, were contrary to the statutory authority conferred by s. 7(1) of the Plan, because they contribute to the cost of a provincial system of assistance to persons in need which is in breach, in several respects, of the conditions and undertakings to which such payments are made subject to s. 7(1). [64] He further argued that s. 20(3) of The Social Allowances Act, which authorized the deduction from a social allowance payment of an amount to repay an overpayment of allowance, was contrary to the provincial undertaking to provide assistance to any person in need in an amount or manner that takes into account his basic requirements because such deduction has the effect of reducing the amount of a social allowance payment below the cost of basic requirements. [65] Finally, he argued that s. 444 of The Municipal Act, which makes the cost of any municipal assistance to a person in need a debt owing to the municipality, was in breach of the provincial undertaking to provide assistance to a person in need; and further, that the authority conferred on municipalities by s. 11(5)(b) of The Social Allowances Act to fix the amount of assistance required to meet the cost of basic requirements was contrary to the indication in the Plan that such authority shall be exercised by the provincial authority designated in the agreement made pursuant to the Plan. [66] The respondent sought a declaration that the federal cost-sharing payments were illegal, and an injunction to stop them as long as the provincial system of assistance to persons in need fails to comply with the conditions and undertakings imposed by the Plan. [67] On a motion to strike by the appellants (under Federal Court Rule 419(1)) the respondent’s statement of claim was struck in the Trial Division of the Federal Court on the grounds that the respondent lacked the requisite standing to bring his action and the statement of claim did not disclose a reasonable cause of action. A majority of the Federal Court of Appeal allowed the appeal from this order and restored the respondent’s statement of claim. The Minister appealed, and the issues before the Supreme Court of Canada were simply whether the respondent should be recognized as having standing to bring his action, and if he had the requisite standing, whether the statement of claim made out a cause of action. [68] In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the respondent was not entitled to private interest standing (although he was subsequently awarded public interest standing). In arriving at this conclusion, the Court stated: [26] There is no doubt that the respondent has a direct, personal interest in the alleged provincial non-compliance with the conditions and undertakings imposed by the plan. A declaration that the federal cost-sharing payments are illegal would necessarily involve a finding that the province had failed to comply with the conditions and undertakings imposed by the plan, but this would not affect the validity of the provincial legislative provisions about which complaint is made: cf. Re Lofstrom and Murphy (1971), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 120 (Sask. C.A.); see also LeBlanc v. Transcona, [1974] S.C.R. 1261, at 1268, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 484, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 549 [Man.], per Spence J. It cannot be asserted for a certainty that the province would feel compelled by such a finding to change the offending legislative provisions. The effect on provincial action of a declaration that the federal payments are illegal and even an injunction to stop them is also necessarily a matter of speculation. For a somewhat analogous relationship between the prejudice suffered and the action attacked that was held to be too speculative for standing, see Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 48 L. Ed. 2d 450, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). Although I have experienced some difficulty on this question, I am on balance of the view that the relationship between the prejudice allegedly caused to the respondent by the provincial non-compliance with the conditions and undertakings imposed by the plan and the alleged illegality of the federal payments is too indirect, remote or speculative to be a sufficient causative relationship for standing under the general rule. The respondent must therefore, in my opinion, rely for standing on what is essentially a public interest in the legality of the federal cost-sharing payments, albeit that of a particular class of the public defined by the plan as persons in need. It is accordingly necessary to consider whether the respondent should be recognized as having standing, as a matter of judicial discretion, by application of the principle or approach reflected in the decisions of this court in Thorson, McNeil and Borowski. [emphasis added] Conclusion on Private Interest Standing [69] I adopt a contextual approach to this issue. I do not confine my analysis to legal rights and obligations. I remind myself that an analysis of the apparent merit of the argument being advanced by the Applicant (although relevant, at least to some degree, to a claim of public interest standing) does not enter into a “private interest” analysis (Canadian Elevator, para. 37). [70] In the case at bar, I have concluded, like the Court in Rudderham and Finlay, that the Applicant has not demonstrated the basis for a grant of private interest standing. [71] First, her apprehension of personal or private harm is not sufficiently distinct. There is very little, if anything, which differentiates her from the entirety of the residents of Chester. Virtually all have the same interest in the availability of potable drinking water. [72] Second, I certainly acknowledge that diminishing water levels and dry wells do indeed appear to be a problem, based upon the exhibits attached to the Applicant’s Affidavit. Moreover, there is no doubt that the question of the possible use of Spectacle Lake as a potential future source of water for the Municipality has been bruited by various iterations of Council over the years since the 1960’s. But the report and commentary delivered to the Planning Advisory Committee on August 21, 2024 by Public Works stated that Spectacle Lake “is not and would not be a viable Municipal water source” (Supplemental Record, Tab 3, p. 40). [73] Third, the fact remains that Chester does not currently, and never has had, a municipal water utility. Spectacle Lake is not, and never has been, used to supply drinking water to any part of the Municipality. I therefore find myself in agreement with counsel for the Respondent when she says, “the redesignation and rezoning of the Spectacle Lake area does not impact any supply that the Applicant has thus far enjoyed on her property” (Respondent’s Brief, para. 53). [74] Fourth, the purpose of the MGA, as earlier observed, is multifaceted. It is not confined to reinforcing the importance of drinking water. Even a cursory review of ss. 2, 9A, and 190 would underscore the fact that although primary authority has been provided to the municipalities, the Province retains a superseding ability to intervene in circumstances expressed in the Act. It is the balancing of these respective interests which the legislation addresses. This transcends the one issue (drinking water) which is of concern to the Applicant. [75] Fifth, not only is the Applicant’s concern speculative, it is also contingent. Any value that Spectacle Lake might possess to ameliorate the potential for a shortage of potable water in the future would be contingent upon, and presuppose, that Public Works got it wrong when it advised the Planning Advisory Committee that Spectacle Lake “is not and would not be a viable Municipal water source”. It would be further contingent upon, and presuppose, that the Municipality would also be prepared to invest in the appropriate infrastructure in support of a water utility. This is something it has never done in the past. [76] For all of these reasons, I conclude that the Applicant does not have private interest standing to seek judicial review of the Respondent’s decision. B. Does the Applicant have public interest standing to bring this application? [77] It is important to bear in mind that “public interest standing” serves a different purpose to that of private interest standing. This difference was said (in Canadian Elevator) to consist of the fact that the former is concerned with “maintaining the rule of law as a general principal”, whereas the latter aims to vindicate private rights (para. 13). [78] Both parties have referenced Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 (“Downtown Eastside”). Therein, the three criteria required for public interest standing were identified by Cromwell, J.: [2] In exercising their discretion with respect to standing, the courts weigh three factors in light of these underlying purposes and of the particular circumstances. The courts consider whether the case raises a serious justiciable issue, whether the party bringing the action has a real stake or a genuine interest in its outcome and whether, having regard to a number of factors, the proposed suit is a reasonable and effective means to bring the case to court: Canadian Council of Churches v. R., [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.), at p. 253. The courts exercise this discretion to grant or refuse standing in a “liberal and generous manner” (p. 253). [emphasis added] [79] Later, he explained: [35] From the beginning of our modern public interest standing jurisprudence, the question of standing has been viewed as one to be resolved through the wise exercise of judicial discretion. As Laskin J. put it in Thorson, public interest standing "is a matter particularly appropriate for the exercise of judicial discretion, relating as it does to the effectiveness of process" (p. 161); see also pp. 147, 161 and 163; MacNeil v. Nova Scotia (Board of Censors) (1975), [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.), at pp. 269 and 271; Borowski, at p. 593; Finlay, at pp. 631-32 and 635. The decision to grant or refuse standing involves the careful exercise of judicial discretion through the weighing of the three factors (serious justiciable issue, the nature of the plaintiff's interest, and other reasonable and effective means). Cory J. emphasized this point in Canadian Council of Churches where he noted that the factors to be considered in exercising this discretion should not be treated as technical requirements and that the principles governing the exercise of this discretion should be interpreted in a liberal and generous manner (pp. 256 and 253). [36] It follows from this that the three factors should not be viewed as items on a checklist or as technical requirements. Instead, the factors should be seen as interrelated considerations to be weighed cumulatively, not individually, and in light of their purposes. [emphasis added] [80] Cromwell, J. went on to discuss what is meant by “serious justiciable issue”: [42] To constitute a “serious issue”, the question raised must be a “substantial constitutional issue” (McNeil, at p. 268) or an “important one” (Borowski, at p. 589). The claim must be “far from frivolous” (Finlay, at p. 633), although courts should not examine the merits of the case in other than a preliminary manner. For example, in Hy and Zel's, Major J. applied the standard of whether the claim was so unlikely to succeed that its result would be seen as a “foregone conclusion” (p. 690). He reached this position in spite of the fact that the Court had seven years earlier decided that the same Act was constitutional: R. v. Videoflicks Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 (S.C.C.). Major J. held that he was "prepared to assume that the numerous amendments have sufficiently altered the Act in the seven years since Edwards Books so that the Act’s validity is no longer a foregone conclusion" (Hy and Zel's, at p. 690). In Canadian Council of Churches, the Court had many reservations about the nature of the proposed action, but in the end accepted that “some aspects of the statement of claim could be said to raise a serious issue as to the validity of the legislation” (p. 254). Once it becomes clear that the statement of claim reveals at least one serious issue, it will usually not be necessary to minutely examine every pleaded claim for the purpose of the standing question. [emphasis added] [81] These comments were also considered in Canadian Elevator: [52] Justice Cromwell explained that "serious justiciable issue" addressed two related concerns: the appropriateness of judicial resolution of the matter (as opposed to legislative or executive action), and proper use of judicial resources (overburdening the courts with marginal or redundant suits) (¶¶ 39-41). [53] The Supreme Court did not endorse assessment of the merits of the claim when deciding whether a serious justiciable issue was raised, (¶ 41). Nevertheless, it may be difficult in practice to ignore the merits altogether if maintaining the "rule of law" underwrites public interest standing, as AXA says and Downtown Eastside implies (¶ 31). Certainly, consideration of the merits is how the Ontario and Manitoba Courts of Appeal resolved this factor in Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 40 O.R. (3d) 489 (Ont. C.A.), ¶ 87 and Rowell v. Manitoba, 2006 MBCA 14 (Man. C.A.), ¶ 50, respectively. [emphasis added] [82] In Ecology Action Centre v. Nova Scotia (Environment and Climate Change), 2023 NSCA 12, the Court of Appeal provided guidance as to the manner in which this Court is to go about weighing the Downtown Eastside factors. Fichaud, J.A., after having surveyed the authorities, concluded at para. 67 that: • The judge at first instance must assess and cumulatively weigh the factors “in light of the underlying purposes of limiting standing” and “in a flexible and generous manner that best serves those underlying purposes”. As the chambers judge in Downtown Eastside did not do so, “these three concerns identified by the chambers judge were not entitled to the decisive weight which he gave them”. Downtown Eastside, paras. 20 and 72. See also paras. 21, 23, 26-30, 42, 52-53, 56, 60, 67 and 76 for the application of that standard. • The denial of public interest standing by the tribunal at first instance was overturned because the tribunal did not apply the required “flexible, discretionary approach”, which Chief Justice McLachlin, for the majority, described as follows: The whole point is for the court to use its discretion, where appropriate, to allow more plaintiffs through the door. Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukacs, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 6, paras. 16 and 18. • The judge at first instance must weigh the factors “in light of the underlying purposes of limiting standing … applied in a flexible and generous manner that best serves those underlying purposes” [following Downtown Eastside], and also in light of “the purposes that justify granting standing” [Chief Justice Wagner’s italics]. As the chambers judge had not done so, “it was not open to the chambers judge to afford these concerns the decisive weight he did.” Council of Canadians with Disabilities, paras. 28-30 and 87. See also paras. 37-40, 48-50, 59, 79, 82-83, 85, 88-94 and 96-97 for the application of that standard. [emphasis added] [83] I will proceed to consider and cumulatively weigh the constituent elements of public interest standing in the manner described above. (i) Serious justiciable issue [84] In British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Council of Canadians with Disabilities, 2022 SCC 27, the Court expanded upon the purposes which underlie these factors: [29] In Downtown Eastside, this Court explained that each factor is to be “weighed ... in light of the underlying purposes of limiting standing and applied in a flexible and generous manner that best serves those underlying purposes” (para. 20). These purposes are threefold: (i) efficiently allocating scarce judicial resources and screening out "busybody" litigants; (ii) ensuring that courts have the benefit of the contending points of view of those most directly affected by the issues; and (iii) ensuring that courts play their proper role within our democratic system of government (para. 1). [30] Courts must also consider the purposes that justify granting [Chief Justice Wagner’s italics] standing in their analyses (Downtown Eastside, at paras. 20, 23, 36, 39-43, 49-50 and 76). These purposes are twofold: (i) giving effect to the principle of legality and (ii) ensuring access to the courts, or more broadly, access to justice (paras. 20, 39-43 and 49). The goal, in every case, is to strike a meaningful balance between the purposes that favour granting standing and those that favour limiting it (para. 23). [31] Downtown Eastside remains the governing authority. Courts should strive to balance all of the purposes in light of the circumstances and in the “wise application of judicial discretion” (para. 21). It follows that they should not, as a general rule, attach “particular weight” to any one purpose, including legality and access to justice. Legality and access to justice are important — indeed, they played a pivotal role in the development of public interest standing — but they are two of many concerns that inform the Downtown Eastside analysis. [emphasis added] [85] As I consider the purposes to be served by the Downtown Eastside criteria, as enunciated above, they are, unsurprisingly, interrelated. This is one reason why the criteria cannot be considered and weighed individually, in isolation. [86] The Applicant contends that she raises a serious or important issue, one with a clear connection to the public interest: water security in a time of perceived shortages (Applicant’s Brief, para. 56 et seq). [87] The Respondent concedes that the issue is a justiciable one, but argues that it is not a “constitutional”, “serious” or “important” one as contemplated by the extant case law. (ii) Applicant has a genuine interest in the issue [88] The Applicant’s continuing interest in Chester’s water supply (both present and future) appears, on the basis of her Affidavit materials, to have been earnest and unflagging, ever since she became aware last year that Spectacle Lake Watershed might be re-zoned. The Respondent concedes that this is so (Respondent’s Brief, para. 63). (iii) Is judicial review a reasonable, effective way to bring these issues before the Court? [89] To return once again to Downtown Eastside, the Court elaborated upon this criterion, and the factors that are to be considered in tandem with it: [51] It may be helpful to give some examples of the types of interrelated matters that courts may find useful to take into account when assessing the third discretionary factor. This list, of course, is not exhaustive but illustrative. • The court should consider the plaintiff's capacity to bring forward a claim. In doing so, it should examine amongst other things, the plaintiff's resources, expertise and whether the issue will be presented in a sufficiently concrete and well-developed factual setting. • The court should consider whether the case is of public interest in the sense that it transcends the interests of those most directly affected by the challenged law or action. Courts should take into account that one of the ideas which animates public interest litigation is that it may provide access to justice for disadvantaged persons in society whose legal rights are affected. Of course, this should not be equated with a licence to grant standing to whoever decides to set themselves up as the representative of the poor or marginalized. • The court should turn its mind to whether there are realistic alternative means which would favour a more efficient and effective use of judicial resources and would present a context more suitable for adversarial determination. Courts should take a practical and pragmatic approach. The existence of other potential plaintiffs, particularly those who would have standing as of right, is relevant, but the practical prospects of their bringing the matter to court at all or by equally or more reasonable and effective means should be considered in light of the practical realities, not theoretical possibilities. Where there are other actual plaintiffs in the sense that other proceedings in relation to the matter are under way, the court should assess from a practical perspective what, if anything, is to be gained by having parallel proceedings and whether the other proceedings will resolve the issues in an equally or more reasonable and effective manner. In doing so, the court should consider not only the particular legal issues or issues raised, but whether the plaintiff brings any particularly useful or distinctive perspective to the resolution of those issues. As, for example, in McNeil, even where there may be persons with a more direct interest in the issue, the plaintiff may have a distinctive and important interest different from them and this may support granting discretionary standing. • The potential impact of the proceedings on the rights of others who are equally or more directly affected should be taken into account. Indeed, courts should pay special attention where private and public interests may come into conflict. As was noted in Danson v. Ontario (Attorney General), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1086 (S.C.C.), at p. 1093, the court should consider, for example, whether "the failure of a diffuse challenge could prejudice subsequent challenges to the impugned rules by parties with specific and factually established complaints". The converse is also true. If those with a more direct and personal stake in the matter have deliberately refrained from suing, this may argue against exercising discretion in favour of standing. [emphasis added] Conclusion on Public Interest Standing [90] I observe that the Applicant is a lawyer, one who ably argued her position in this application. She has demonstrated the capacity to capably present the issue to the Court. As noted, she also has a genuine interest in Spectacle Lake and the present and future water supply of Chester. [91] With that said, it is clear when her submissions are considered holistically, that what she is concerned with, in substance, is not the refusal of the Director to refer the by-law in question to the Minister for review. What really troubles her is what she contends is the unreasonableness of Council’s decision to rezone the area, as well as the procedure adopted by Council as they went about it. It is this with which she takes issue. [92] Some non-exhaustive examples, drawn from her brief, follow: Ignoring or apprehending the evidence 127. The section of the Review Summary addressing impact on the SPI Regarding Drinking Water states: The Protected Watershed Zone was assigned as a place-holder, because, in an earlier time, the Municipality determined that Spectacle Lake may provide water to supply a municipal water utility. Subsequent professional studies commissioned by new councils determined that the supply was inadequate, and Spectacle Lake is not a legitimate source for a municipal drinking water supply and utility. Residents in the Municipality derive water from on-site services. Based on the results of studies, and due to growing development pressure, the Council voted to remove the former zone and create a new zone that permits development. 128. The determination that “Spectacle Lake is not a legitimate source for a municipal drinking water supply and utility” is flawed for several reasons, including: a. The professional studies commissioned by the MODC supported use of Spectacle Lake as a potable water supple; b. The Public Works Email was neither scientific or accurate; c. Residents in the Municipality experience frequent and severe water shortages; d. “Growing development pressure” was not the stated basis for Council’s decision; e. There was no identified alternate supply. Professional studies supported use as a water supply 129. The Review Summary references “subsequent professional studies commissioned by new councils [determining] that the supply was inadequate, and Spectacle Lake is not a legitimate source for a municipal drinking water supply and utility”. The record does not include any study that support this statement. 130. None of the professional studies commissioned by councils contradicted the 2011 Hydrological Assessment finding that Spectacle Lake could provide a treatable, adequate supply of water to the residents and businesses in the anticipated service area of a municipal water system supplying the Village of Chester. 131. The Planning Matters Report proposing removal of the Protected Watershed zoning confirms this – referring to the professional studies commissioned by councils as “keeping the concept alive”. 132. The MODC Council’s confidence in the suitability of Spectacle Lake as a potential drinking water supply led to the purchase of several properties within the Protected Watershed Zone over the years. 133. The only “recent information” contradicting the professional studies was the Public Works Email of May 2024. [footnotes removed, emphasis added] [93] The Applicant expands upon these points: 137. The Review Summary introduces a new rationale for the rezoning. It states, “Based on the results of studies, and due to growing development pressure, the Council voted to remove the former zone and create a new zone that permits development.” 138. There is no reference to “growing development pressure” as a justification for removing Protected Watershed zoning from Spectacle Lake in the materials in the MODC’s amendment package. 139. The policy analysis section of the Senior Planner’s Planning Matters Report states several times that the proposed rezoning of the Spectacle Lake watershed is not related to any development proposal. The consideration the Senior Planner gives to development relates only to “burdensome limits” on “development potential when no prospect of a Municipal water source exists.” [footnotes removed, emphasis added] [94] With respect, her ultimate objective is clear: 56. Subsequent to Council’s decision removing watershed protection from Spectacle Lake, I wrote to the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing on October 29, 2024 (the “Letter”). In the Letter, I stated that the applicability of the Provincial Statement of Interest on Drinking Water had been raised before Council, as well as the Guidebook Implementing the “Statements of Provincial Interest”, relevant portions of which are attached as Exhibit “O”. I argued that the definition of “municipal water supply watershed” contained in the Statements of Provincial Interest did apply in light of 3.1 APPLICATION, in the Guidebook, which states, “All existing surface watershed areas (watersheds) and Groundwater recharge areas (recharge areas), and those identified as future sources of drinking water for municipally owned or operated water utilities, are subject to the SPI”. I asked that the adopted amendments removing Protected Watershed zoning from Spectacle Lake be rejected. - Letter to the Minister, October 29, 2024, Record, Tab 6 (Applicant’s Affidavit) [emphasis added] [95] One of the functions served by a discretionary grant of public interest standing is to provide an opportunity to individuals to bring matters important to the public interest before the Court, where an alternative efficacious method of doing so might not otherwise be available. [96] Even when considering the issue in a liberal and generous manner, as I must, I cannot fail to observe that the Applicant already has a much more direct means by which she may challenge the reasonableness of Council’s action in passing the by-law at issue herein, as well as the procedure which it adopted to do so. She may apply to judicially review it, and/or quash it. The MGA, s. 189, provides for this very contingency: Procedure for quashing by-law 189 (1) A person may, by notice of motion which shall be served at least seven days before the day on which the motion is to be made, apply to a judge of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia to quash a by-law, order, policy or resolution of the council of a municipality, in whole or in part, for illegality. (2) No by-law may be quashed for a matter of form only or for a procedural irregularity. (3) The judge may quash the by-law, order, policy or resolution, in whole or in part, and may, according to the result of the application, award costs for or against the municipality and determine the scale of the costs. (4) No application shall be entertained pursuant to this Section to quash a by-law, order, policy or resolution, in whole or in part, unless the application is made within three months of the publication of the by-law or the making of the order, policy or resolution, as the case may be. 1998, c. 18, s. 189 [97] I must consider, among the other relevant factors, whether the present application is a reasonable and effective manner of advancing the Applicant’s case before the Courts, particularly in light of the other alternatives that are available. The present application is so indirect and oblique, that it barely addresses, if at all, the Applicant’s real concern. [98] This is particularly so where, as here, the Applicant has acknowledged (during oral argument) that she has already applied (in a separate proceeding) to this Court for judicial review and to quash the by-law. The Respondent, in that instance, is the Municipality of the District of Chester. [99] This is not a situation like the one encountered in the recent decision of Canadian Constitution Foundation v. Minister of Natural Resources (Nova Scotia), 2025 NSSC 298 (“CCF”), where a grant of public interest standing to the CCF meant that two separate (yet important) viewpoints might be brought to bear on a topic, thereby providing assistance to the Court. In that case, the background facts were as follows: [5] On August 15, 2025, counsel for the Canadian Constitutional Foundation (“CCF”), a nationally registered charity, filed a Notice of Judicial Review seeking review of the Proclamation for allegedly exceeding the authority conferred by the Act, alleged failure of the decision maker to consider the proportional impact of Charter rights and values, and alleged vagueness and overbreadth. CCF also filed a Notice of Motion for Public Interest Standing. On August 18, 2025, as Chambers Judge, I granted a request from CCF to abridge the time periods set out in the Civil Procedure Rules and scheduled the Motion for Directions required by Rule 7 and the Motion for Public Interest Standing for August 26, 2025. Also on August 18, 2025, the respondent filed a Notice of Participation and an Undertaking to Seek Directions Regarding the Production of the Record (Rule 7.09(1)(c)) on August 18, 2025. [6] CCF does not have private interest standing to pursue this judicial review. The issue for determination on this motion is whether the CCF should be granted leave to proceed with public interest standing. The respondent opposes the motion for leave. [7] Also of note is that after the CCF filed its Notice of Judicial Review, a Notice of Judicial Review was filed on August 20, 2025 (Hfx No. 546181) by Jeffrey Evely, a resident of Nova Scotia who received a summary offence ticket for allegedly breaching the Proclamation, alleges that the Proclamation is unreasonable, ultra vires, and unreasonably limits his rights under s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”). The court directed that the Motion for Directions would be heard at the same time as the CCF Motion for Directions. Mr. Evely did not participate in the motion for Public Interest Standing except to state that he did not oppose it. [100] In CCF, Norton, J. concluded: [33] With respect to whether there are alternative means, the respondent notes that a judicial review has been filed by Mr. Evely, who has been issued a summary offence ticket for acting contrary to the Proclamation. The circumstances of this directly affected individual will provide valuable factual context within which the Court can consider the issues that is absent in this proceeding. The involvement of an affected individual can reasonably be expected to present a more suitable alternative means of reviewing the Proclamation. … … [35] In Frontline Nurses, Justice Mosely found that the application by CCF was a reasonable and effective means to bring the issues before the court because they have the capacity to present evidence and argument required to assist the court in reaching a determination of the issues, which upholds the principle of legality (para. 187). He stated, at para. 188: [188] The participation of individuals with direct standing, i.e., Cornell and Gircys, is not a bar to granting public interest standing. Nor would it serve, in my view, as a reasonable and effective means of bringing the issues before the Court to limit the proceedings to the two private litigants. While, as stated in DESW at para 37, a party with standing as of right is to be preferred all other relevant considerations being equal, that is not the case here. Neither the evidence submitted nor the arguments advanced by the private litigants would have been sufficient to deal with the issues in these proceedings. The CCLA and CCF brought organized and effective submissions to the issues before the Court. Moreover, this case transcends the interests of those most directly affected by the Proclamation and related measures: DESW at para 51. [36] That same reasoning applies in this case. [emphasis added] [101] There has been no attempt by the Applicant to consolidate her two applications. More importantly, unlike CCF, in this case, two separate applications, brought by the same individual, only one of which directly addresses the substance of the Applicant’s real concern, does not reflect an efficient use of scarce judicial resources. [102] A grant of public interest standing to the Applicant in this application, would, in my view, be tantamount to the encouragement of a multiplicity of proceedings by the same individual, directed toward the same objective. One (the judicial review) is a much more direct means of going about it. This application is merely tangential to her objective. [103] In sum, I have cumulatively considered, balanced, and weighed the factors identified in Downtown Eastside, in light of the purposes that they are intended to fulfill. I have done so in “a flexible and generous manner that best serves those underlying purposes” (Council of Canadians with Disabilities, para. 29). I have nonetheless concluded, for the reasons set out above, that the Applicant’s request for public interest standing must be denied. [104] The above is sufficient to dispose of this application. I will, however, go on to consider the final two issues in the event that I have erred on the issue of standing. C. What, if any, significance is there to the fact that the Mistaken Motion was included in the package which was sent to the Director’s office? [105] As noted earlier, the Applicant considers the inclusion of a photocopy of a by-law which was not passed by Council, with the three original or “wet” copies of the correct by-law, in the package which was sent to the provincial Director of Planning (pursuant to s. 208 of the MGA) to be a “fatal flaw” in the process. She says that it is one which undermines the Director’s decision, which was to the effect that the amendments to the Municipal Planning Strategy and Land Use by-law adopted by Council of the Municipality of Chester on October 17, 2024 did not require Ministerial approval pursuant to s. 208(3) of the MGA. [106] Recall that the “package” containing the approved by-law amendment was dispatched by mail to the Director shortly after Council had approved it. It later came to the attention of the Municipality that the Director had not received it because of an ongoing mail strike. A second package, this one containing three original copies of the correct motion, and one copy of the Mistaken Motion (as noted above) was then delivered to the Director, whose office received it on December 5, 2024 (Record, Tab 3). [107] On December 20, 2024, the Director approved the amendments to the document. Both the approval and the covering letter are reproduced below: (Record, Tab 1, personal contact information redacted) [108] Prior to the package reaching the Director’s desk, a document entitled “Director’s Review of Planning Documents Review Summary” (“the Review Summary”) was prepared for the Director by the external reviewer (also discussed earlier) and by Graham Fisher in the Director's office. This document, and the email exchange between Messrs. Fisher and Cummings which preceded it, are also reproduced below: (Record, Tab 2) (Record, Tab 3, email addresses redacted) [109] As can be seen, the “Proposal” portion of the Review Summary prepared by Mr. Fisher makes reference to the substance of the proper motion, as well as that of the Mistaken Motion or by-law which was not passed by Council. It was reviewed by Greg Cummings, the external reviewer, on December 18, 2024 and his response (Record, Tab 3) was incorporated into Mr. Fisher’s review in the final paragraph “external reviewer results”, before it was forwarded to the Minister. [110] Several things are apparent. First, while Mr. Fisher does make reference to the substance of the Mistaken Motion in his review summary, there is no evidence that the Director herself laboured under any misconception as to what it was that she was tasked with. [111] Additionally, while the enclosures with the covering letter sent to her by Council contained three originals of the correct motion and a photocopy of the incorrect one, the letter itself referenced only the correct motion (Record, Tab 7). [112] Third, the letter with these enclosures were not all that was forwarded. The Public Hearing Report (Tab 12), the Agenda for the public hearing, the MPS&LUB (map) Amendments, and some letters received by Council from the public also accompanied the letter (Supplementary Record, Tab 3). These latter items were directed toward the correct motion, the one which Council had actually approved. [113] Fourth, the “Re” line to the Director’s covering letter of December 20, 2024, enclosing the approval refers only to the correct motion: Amendments to the MPS and LUB to rezone Protected Watershed Zone around Spectacle Lake to Mixed Use (south of Highway 103) and General Basin Zone (north of Highway 103). [114] Fifth, included in the Record (Tab 6) was a lengthy letter written by the Applicant herself dated October 29, 2024, to the Minister. This letter recounted, in copious detail, the relevant history of Spectacle Lake, the fact that it had, at times in the past, been considered as a possible water source for the village and environs, together with explanatory documents such as “Resident Water Survey Municipality of Chester, 2020”, a copy of the “Spectacle Lake hydrological assessment” and a copy of the “Municipal Planning Strategy, the Municipality of Chester”. [115] At page 8 of the Applicant’s letter, we find: On October 17, 2024, despite an alternative drinking water source for the Village of Chester not having been yet identified, Council voted to remove the Protected Watershed zoning for Spectacle Lake. My respectful submission is that, in light of the above, the Protected Watershed Zone around Spectacle Lake does fall within the definition of a Municipal Water Supply Watershed and that the adopted amendments re-zoning the watershed to Mixed Use and General Basics are not reasonably consistent with the Statement of Provincial Interest on Drinking Water. (Record, Tab 6, p. 17) [116] This is all contained in the Record and/or Supplementary Record. The decision-maker (in this case the Director) is presumed to have read and familiarized herself with the documents comprising these volumes. There is nothing before me to suggest that she failed to do so. By virtue of these documents, and the many others comprising the Record and Supplementary Record, the Director would have been well aware of what was properly in front of her, and (to repeat) there is no evidence that she was misled by the inadvertent inclusion of a one-page photocopy showing the Mistaken Motion in the otherwise proper package which was sent to her. [117] Finally, as we look at the response which the Minister provided to the Applicant, as well as the email chain between Graham Fisher and external reviewer Gregory Cummings in advance of the completion of the Review Summary, and the Director’s letter of December 20, 2024 approving the rezoning by-law, it is clear that the reason for the Director’s decision was the determination that Spectacle Lake did not fall within “any of the categories requiring approval by the Minister of Municipal Affairs listed in Subsection 208(3) [of the MGA]” (Record, Tab 1). [118] This would have been the case whether the Director was faced with approving one by-law, or many of them. If they pertained to Spectacle Lake, it is clear that the Director considered that they did not require Ministerial approval. [119] With respect, there is no evidence that the Director’s decision was impacted in any way by the inclusion of a one page photocopy containing the Mistaken Motion, in the circumstances. D. Has the Director’s decision that Council’s planning documents were not subject to the ministerial approval regime (under s. 208 of the MGA) been shown to have been unreasonable? [120] The Applicant cites two reasons why she considers the Director’s decision to have been unreasonable. [121] First, she says that the Director applied a legal requirement that does not exist, one which stipulated that the SPI did not apply to Spectacle Lake because that lake had never been officially designated as protected under the Nova Scotia Environment Act. [122] Second, she says that the Director misinterpreted the definition of “Municipal Water Supply Watershed” contained in the SPI. [123] Before dealing with these contentions directly, it is helpful to reflect upon the applicability of the “reasonableness” standard, and also what the word means in a context such as this. (i) When is a “reasonableness” standard of review applied and of what does it consist of? [124] A reasonableness review is conducted under the auspices of the framework set out in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Vavilov, [2019] 4 SCR 653. Therein, the majority stated: [83] It follows that the focus of reasonableness review must be on the decision actually made by the decision maker, including both the decision maker’s reasoning process and the outcome. The role of courts in these circumstances is to review, and they are, at least as a general rule, to refrain from deciding the issue themselves. Accordingly, a court applying the reasonableness standard does not ask what decision it would have made in place of that of the administrative decision maker, attempt to ascertain the “range” of possible conclusions that would have been open to the decision maker, conduct a de novo analysis or seek to determine the “correct” solution to the problem. The Federal Court of Appeal noted in Delios v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FCA 117, 472 N.R. 171, that, “as reviewing judges, we do not make our own yardstick and then use that yardstick to measure what the administrator did”: para. 28; see also Ryan, at paras. 50-51. Instead, the reviewing court must consider only whether the decision made by the administrative decision maker - including both the rationale for the decision and the outcome to which it led - was unreasonable. [84] As explained above, where the administrative decision maker has provided written reasons, those reasons are the means by which the decision maker communicates the rationale for its decision. A principled approach to reasonableness review is one which puts those reasons first. A reviewing court must begin its inquiry into the reasonableness of a decision by examining the reasons provided with “respectful attention” and seeking to understand the reasoning process followed by the decision maker to arrive at its conclusion: see Dunsmuir, at para. 48, quoting D. Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy”, in M. Taggart, ed., The Province of Administrative Law (1997), 279, at p. 286. [85] Developing an understanding of the reasoning that led to the administrative decision enables a reviewing court to assess whether the decision as a whole is reasonable. As we will explain in greater detail below, a reasonable decision is one that is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker. The reasonableness standard requires that a reviewing court defer to such a decision. [emphasis added] [125] Further on, in Vavilov, the Court prescribed a reasonableness review in the absence of constitutional questions, general questions of law of central importance to the legal system as a whole, and/or questions regarding the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies and/or legislated standards of review and statutory appeal mechanisms (see paras. 53-66). [126] Obviously, none of these exceptions is applicable here. The parties have tacitly conceded this, since they have only dealt with the reasonableness standard of review in their submissions. This was appropriate. [127] In applying the (presumptive) reasonableness standard, I am mindful of the Court’s cautions in Vavilov, which include: [68] Reasonableness review does not give administrative decision makers free rein in interpreting their enabling statutes, and therefore does not give them licence to enlarge their powers beyond what the legislature intended. Instead, it confirms that the governing statutory scheme will always operate as a constraint on administrative decision makers and as a limit on their authority. Even where the reasonableness standard is applied in reviewing a decision maker's interpretation of its authority, precise or narrow statutory language will necessarily limit the number of reasonable interpretations open to the decision maker — perhaps limiting it one. Conversely, where the legislature has afforded a decision maker broad powers in general terms — and has provided no right of appeal to a court — the legislature's intention that the decision maker have greater leeway in interpreting its enabling statute should be given effect. Without seeking to import the U.S. jurisprudence on this issue wholesale, we find that the following comments of the Supreme Court of the United States in Arlington, at p. 307, are apt: The fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by establishing an arbitrary and undefinable category of agency decision-making that is accorded no deference, but by taking seriously, and applying rigorously, in all cases, statutory limits on agencies' authority. Where [the legislature] has established a clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where [the legislature] has established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the ambiguity will fairly allow. But in rigorously applying the latter rule, a court need not pause to puzzle over whether the interpretive question presented is “jurisdictional” .... [128] And later on: [75] We pause to note that our colleagues’ approach to reasonableness review is not fundamentally dissimilar to ours. Our colleagues emphasize that reviewing courts should respect administrative decision makers and their specialized expertise, should not ask how they themselves would have resolved an issue and should focus on whether the applicant has demonstrated that the decision is unreasonable: paras. 288, 289 and 291. We agree. As we have stated above, at para. 13, reasonableness review finds its starting point in judicial restraint and respects the distinct role of administrative decision makers. Moreover, as explained below, reasonableness review considers all relevant circumstances in order to determine whether the applicant has met their onus. [emphasis added] [129] Moreover, although Vavilov dealt with a situation in which reasons for the administrative decisions at issue were required and given (para. 78), it is also true that: … as a matter of procedural fairness, reasons are not required for all administrative decisions. The duty of procedural fairness in administrative law is “eminently variable”, inherently flexible and context-specific … (Vavilov, para. 77) (ii) Application to the case at bar (a) The Applicant contends that the Director imposed a legal requirement that does not exist [130] The Applicant cites the Review Summary (Record, Tab 2) as the basis for her contentions in this regard. But, as has been considered in relation to the previous issue, this was a document prepared, not by the Director, but by a member of her staff, Mr. Fisher. [131] Specifically, the Applicant takes issue with this portion of the Review Summary (Record, Tab 2) prepared by Mr. Fisher: Drinking Water: No anticipated impact. Although the lands were formerly zoned as “protected watershed,” Spectacle Lake was never officially designated as under the NS Environment Act and is not used as a municipal drinking water supply… Subsequent professional studies commissioned by new councils determined that the supply was inadequate, and Spectacle Lake is not a legitimate source for a municipal drinking water supply and utility. [emphasis added] [132] However, part of the Director’s decision required that she determine (in addition to the requirements of s. 208(3)(b)) whether the planning document “appears to affect a provincial interest” (s. 208(3)(a)). [133] Mention of the above noted fact in the Review Summary prepared by Mr. Fisher appears to merely advise the Respondent that there is no Environment Act designation for her to take into consideration. [134] Finally (and once again), the Director’s letter of December 20, 2024, which explains her decision to approve the by-law, is clearly predicated upon the fact that the amendment to rezone the Protected Watershed zone around Spectacle Lake’s mixed use zone did “not fall within any of the categories requiring approval by the Minister …” (Record, Tab 1). [135] In other words, the Respondent’s decision was based entirely upon the criteria, which are set out in s. 208(3) of the MGA. (b) The Applicant contends that the Director’s interpretation of the definition of “Municipal Supply Watershed” in the SPI was unreasonable [136] As I approach this question, I am mindful of the guidance provided by the Supreme Court of Canada. I therefore do so by examining the “statutory text in its entire context and in its grammatical and ordinary sense, in harmony with the statute’s scheme and objects (Michel v. Graydon, 2020 SCC 24, at para. 21). [137] This is nuanced in the case of an administrative interpretation of legislation. As Ruth Sullivan has pointed out in her text, The Construction of Statutes, 7th ed, Lexus Nexus Canada Inc., 2022, at p. 676: [2] Reasons to rely on administrative interpretation Administrative interpretation is of interest to interpreters in so far as it offers persuasive opinions about the purpose or meaning of legislation. It is not surprising that those responsible for the administration of legislation on a day-to-day basis would develop an expertise or perspective that lends authority to their opinion. Judges who sit in courts tend to be generalists. Although they may be experts in statutory interpretation, they are not necessarily experts in the interpretation of any one statute. Often they have only limited, non-systematic contact with particular enactments and at the appellate level they may be remote from the factual context in which the legislation operates. By contrast, administrative interpreters often are specialists. Because of their focus on a limited body of legislation, they are likely to be fully conversant with the scheme of “their” Act and regulations and with the factual context in which this legislation operates. They may have been participants in the planning and drafting of the legislation. If the legislation is complex or technical in character, they may have a specialized knowledge exceeding the capacity of most courts. Administrative interpreters who handle many claims or cases also are well placed to understand the conflicts and hard interpretive issues arising under their legislation. This experience may enhance their sensitivity to the range of interests, concerns and policies that the legislature sought to accommodate in enacting the legislation. It may also foster a clear appreciation of the implications of different possible outcomes. Another reason to rely on administrative interpretation is that it invites reliance by those who are affected by a legislative scheme. Once a particular interpretation has been published in a guideline or embodied in a settled practice, it is likely to be relied on by members of the public in arranging their affairs. In these circumstances, rejecting the interpretation may create confusion, hardship, or a sense of unfairness. Although this sort of reliance does not give rise to estoppel, in choosing between competing interpretations the courts may legitimately prefer an established administrative interpretation over one that is likely to take the public by surprise. [footnote removed, emphasis added] [138] Recall that the MGA cites five instances in which planning documents are subject to review by the Minister. They are spelled out in s. 208(3) which, for ease of reference, is repeated below: (3) Where the Director determines that the planning documents (a) appear to affect a provincial interest; (b) may not be reasonably consistent with an applicable statement of provincial interest; (c) appear to conflict with the law; (ca) in the case of a municipal planning strategy, may fail to fulfill the minimum planning requirements; or (d) in the case of a subdivision by-law, may conflict with the provincial subdivision regulations, the planning documents are subject to the Minister’s approval. [139] The Applicant has confined her argument on this issue to a contention that the Director’s decision (that Ministerial approval of the impugned by-law was not required) was based upon an unreasonable determination of s. 208(3)(b). In turn (the argument continues) this was the result of an unreasonable interpretation of the definition of “Municipal Water Supply Watershed” found in the definitions section of the Statements of Provincial Interest. [140] Of note is that the Drinking Water SPI says, “[t]his statement applies to all municipal water supply watersheds in the Province including surface watersheds and groundwater recharge areas” (also reproduced in Applicant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 2, p. 14). [141] This next requires a consideration of the definition of “Municipal Water Supply Watershed”, which, it will be further recalled, is expressed thus: “Municipal Water Supply Watershed means an area encompassing a surface watershed or recharge area, or a portion of it, serving as a water supply area for a municipal water system” ((also reproduced in Applicant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 2, p. 13 [emphasis added]). [142] Within this context, the Applicant argues that the Director’s interpretation was too narrow when she considered that the above definition encompassed only “watersheds” or “recharge” areas currently “serving as a water supply area for a municipal water supply system”. The text itself (the argument continues) must remain “the anchor of interpretive exercise” (Applicant’s Brief, para. 93). [143] Ms. Black elaborates on this: 95. The Director did not explain, with reasons, why the narrow interpretation adopted was preferred, contrary to the Supreme Court’s stipulation in Vavilov that: [120] Where the meaning of a statutory provision is disputed in administrative proceedings, the decision maker must demonstrate in its reasons that it was alive to these essential elements. 96. In Salmonid Association of Easter Newfoundland v. Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2020 NLSC 34, the applications judge found that the Minister’s failure to explain his reasons for adoption of one of two valid by opposite readings meant he had failed to demonstrate that he was “alive to the essential elements of statutory interpretation.” In addition, the interpretation of the legislation he adopted was not harmonious with the text, context or purpose of the legislation or the interpretive rules that the authorities mandate for use in reading environmental legislation. 97. The Court of Appeal of Newfoundland and Labrador, affirming the lower court’s ruling in Northern Harvest Smolt Ltd. v. Salmonid Association of Eastern Newfoundland, 2021 NLCA 26, cited the caution set out in Vavilov (para 121) that an administrative decision-maker “cannot adopt an interpretation it knows to be inferior – albeit plausible – merely because the interpretation in question appears to be available and is expedient. The decision-maker’s responsibility is to discern meaning and legislative intent, not to ‘reverse-engineer’ a desired outcome”. 98. The Director’s failure to satisfy this mandatory requirement renders the Decision unreasonable. 99. Contextually, the enabling statutory scheme makes clear that a narrow interpretation would be contrary to provincial interests in land and water resources. The SPI convey an expectation that decision-makers will be thoughtful and apply expansive interpretation that takes into consideration local circumstances. 100. Specifically, the SPI provides: As the statements are general in nature, they provide guidance rather than rigid standards. They reflect the diversity found in the Province and do not take into account all local situations. They must be applied with common sense. Thoughtful, innovative and creative application is encouraged. [footnotes removed] (Applicant’s Brief) [144] Her argument culminates with the following: 114. These textual, contextual and purposive considerations strongly support a broader interpretation of “Municipal Water Supply Watershed” that includes planned future use of a water source as a relevant consideration. 115. On judicial review of an administrative decision-maker’s statutory interpretation: “…[T]he key question is whether the omitted aspect of the analysis causes the reviewing court to lose confidence in the outcome reached by the decision maker. 116. In this case, the Director provided no analysis capable of review, which impugns confidence in their interpretation. [footnotes removed, emphasis added] (Applicant’s Brief) [145] With respect, the Court’s role in these circumstances is not to apply a standard of “correctness” to the Director’s decision. Nor is it to determine whether it agrees with the particular interpretation adopted. Its role is to determine whether the Director’s decision and/or interpretation has been shown to have been an unreasonable one. This is a deferential standard. [146] Moreover, with respect, the interpretation offered by the Applicant not only strains, but appears to stretch the meaning of the words “serving as a water supply” beyond recognition. It transcends the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words “serving”. I agree with the Respondent that to give credence to the Applicant’s argument on this point would be to construe the definition as though “serving” meant “available to serve”, “available for use”, “may serve” or “might serve” (Respondent’s Brief, para. 81). [147] I do acknowledge that the SPI provides: As the statements are general in nature, they provide guidance rather than rigid standards. They reflect on the diversity found in the Province and do not take into account local situations. They must be applied with common sense. Thoughtful, innovative and creative application is encouraged. (Introduction, Statements of Provincial Interest, Schedule B, MGA, Applicant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 2, p. 13) [148] However, if the word “serving” were to be interpreted as “available to serve”, or “may serve” (at some point in future) almost every body of fresh water within reasonable proximity to a Municipality would be encompassed within the definition in the SPI. [149] Moreover, the argument appears to ignore the final portion of the definition “serving as a water supply area for a municipal water system” (emphasis added). To repeat (once again) Chester does not, and never has had, a municipal water supply system. To expand the meaning of “Municipal Water Supply Watershed” broadly enough to include a body of water (Spectacle Lake) that has never served as a municipal water source, in support of a “municipal water system” which does not currently exist, and may never exist, would, in my view, take the text into an area not remotely contemplated by its present structure. [150] The Applicant has referenced administrative interpretative guidelines created by staff at the Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing. The thrust of her argument in this respect is captured by the following: 101. To facilitate consistent applications of these general statements in the SPI, the province adopted Implementation Guidelines for Statements of Provincial Interest (“the Implementation Guidelines”) as authorized by s. 7 of the regulations. 102. The Service Nova Scotia and Municipal Relation’s Implementation Guidelines (January 2006), included in the Respondent’s Supplemental Record, refer to future use of water sources as an important factor in the decision-making process: All surface watershed areas (watersheds) and groundwater recharge areas (recharge areas) which are the existing or identified future source of drinking water for municipally owned/operated water utilities are subject to this Statement. Additional future sources of municipal drinking water, once identified, will automatically be subject to this Statement. [emphasis added, bolding in original] 103. The Guidebook on Implementing the “Statements of Provincial Interest” (“the Guidebook”), published by the Department of Municipal Affairs and Housing in 2020, provides similar guidance: 3.0 DRINKING WATER 3.1 APPLICATION All existing surface watershed areas (watersheds) and Groundwater recharge areas (recharge areas), and those identified as future sources of drinking water for municipally owned or operated water utilities, are subject to this SPI. 104. The Director did not explain why she was ignoring the future considerations articulated in the implementation guidelines when interpreting the SPI. [footnotes removed, emphasis added] (Applicant’s Brief) [151] Spectacle Lake is neither an existing nor “identified future source for municipally owned/operated water utilities”. Both the Public Works Report (referenced in the Supplemental Record, Tab 3, p. 40), and the non-existent water utility for MODC bear testament to this. [152] Even if (somehow) the guidelines themselves could arguably be interpreted broadly enough to encompass Spectacle Lake, the administrative guidelines which the Applicant has referenced (Applicant’s Brief, paras. 101-103) come from the Guidebook on Implementing the “Statements of Provincial Interest” (Applicant’s Book of Authorities, Tab 3, p. 25) and Service Nova Scotia’s Implementation Guidelines (January, 2006). I do not read anything in either which suggests that the purpose of these productions is to do anything other than to offer assistance to users in meeting minimum standards. It is not suggested or intended that these Guidelines would have the force of law such as, for example, Regulations passed pursuant to an empowering statute. [153] I do acknowledge that the use of extrinsic aids such as these Guidelines may be of assistance to a Court if it were engaged in the interpretation of an otherwise ambiguous portion of the statute. However, as discussed earlier, and with respect, the definition of “Municipal Water Supply Watershed” under consideration in the case at bar admits of no ambiguity: In so far as the language of a statute is precise and unambiguous, it determines the content of the law. Statutory language that is vague, abstract, ambiguous or otherwise unclear confers discretion on the interpreter. Interpretive guidelines take away or narrow that discretion – in so far as their own language is clear. (Ruth Sullivan, 6th edition, p. 706) [154] I have not been persuaded that the Director’s decision was unreasonable. Her reasons, although sparse, when read in conjunction with the Record, are more than sufficient to demonstrate the basis for her decision and that, in particular, the manner in which she construed the definition of Municipal Water Supply Watershed, was an eminently reasonable one. Conclusion [155] The Application is dismissed. The parties will attempt to agree on the issue of costs. I will receive written submissions within 30 days if they cannot. Gabriel, J.