R. v. Hurley
The conviction for possession of a loaded restricted weapon was set aside because the trial judge's finding that the appellant knew the gun was loaded was tainted by a misapprehension of the in-court demonstration and a failure to address the appellant's contrary testimony; the court substituted a conviction for...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- C44785
- Parties
- Respondent: Her Majesty the Queen; Appellant: Sheldon Hurley
- Court
- Court of Appeal for Ontario
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 31 October 2006
- Procedural Posture
- Criminal Appeal From Conviction and Sentence / Court of Appeal Decision on Appeal From Trial Conviction and Sentence
- Outcome
- Appeal allowed in part: conviction for possession of a loaded restricted weapon set aside and replaced with conviction for possession of a restricted weapon; duplicate conviction stayed under Kienapple; sentence reduced to time served.
- Legal Topics
- S.11(b) Reasonable Delay, Possession of a Restricted Loaded Weapon, Possession of Weapon for Dangerous Purpose, Kienapple Doctrine, Sentence Reduction/time Served
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
Her Majesty the Queen
Respondent
Sheldon Hurley
Appellant
Procedural Posture
Criminal Appeal From Conviction and Sentence / Court of Appeal Decision on Appeal From Trial Conviction and Sentence
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether there was an unreasonable delay contrary to s.11(b) of the Charter
- 2 Whether the trial judge misapprehended evidence when finding the appellant knew the gun was loaded
- 3 Whether an express finding of dangerous purpose was required to sustain a conviction for possession for a dangerous purpose
Ratio Decidendi
The conviction for possession of a loaded restricted weapon was set aside because the trial judge's finding that the appellant knew the gun was loaded was tainted by a misapprehension of the in-court demonstration and a failure to address the appellant's contrary testimony; the court substituted a conviction for possession of a restricted weapon, applied Kienapple to stay the duplicate count, and reduced the sentence to time served rather than imposing a consecutive term.
Court Disposition
Appeal allowed in part: conviction for possession of a loaded restricted weapon set aside and replaced with conviction for possession of a restricted weapon; duplicate conviction stayed under Kienapple; sentence reduced to time served.
Orders
- Set aside conviction on count seven for possession of a loaded restricted weapon
- Substitute conviction for possession of a restricted weapon
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
R. v. Hurley Collection Decisions of the Court of Appeal Date 2006-10-31 Docket numbers C44785 Judges Laskin, John Ivan; Moldaver, Michael James; Juriansz, Russell G. Subject Criminal Decision Content DATE: 20061031 DOCKET: C44785 COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO RE: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN (Respondent) v. SHELDON HURLEY (Appellant) BEFORE: LASKIN, MOLDAVER and JURIANSZ JJ.A. COUNSEL: Michael Dineen for the appellant Joseph Perfetto for the respondent HEARD & RELEASED ORALLY: October 19, 2006 On appeal from conviction entered November 7, 2005, and the sentence imposed on January 10, 2006, by Justice Donna G. Hackett of the Ontario Court of Justice. ENDORSEMENT [1] The appellant made three submissions on his appeal against his convictions and he also appealed his sentence. A. The Conviction Appeal [2] The appellant first submitted that the trial judge erred in failing to find a violation of ss. 11(b) of the Charter. We did not call on the Crown to answer this submission. This was a borderline case in which we deferred to the trial judge’s conclusion that the delay was not unreasonable. [3] Second, the appellant submitted that the trial judge’s finding that he knew that the gun was loaded was tainted by a misapprehension of evidence and a failure to take account of material evidence. We agree with this submission. [4] The trial judge’s finding rested on two planks: the in-court demonstration and the appellant’s answer to a question on cross-examination. On the first plank, the Crown acknowledges that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence. The in-court demonstration did not make it obvious that one could tell the gun was loaded from mere observation. [5] On the second plank, the trial judge failed to advert to a key portion of the appellant’s evidence where he said that he did not know the gun was loaded. Admittedly, several of the Crown’s questions on cross-examination did elicit answers from which one could infer the appellant’s knowledge. In no instance, however, did the Crown ask the simple question “did you know the gun was loaded?” In the face of the appellant’s contrary evidence that he did not know the gun was loaded, we do not think that the second plank of the trial judge’s finding is supportable. [6] For these reasons, the conviction for possession of a restricted loaded weapon must be set aside. [7] Third, the appellant submitted that his conviction for possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose cannot stand because the trial judge did not make an express finding of a dangerous purpose. We disagree. [8] The appellant was carrying a restricted weapon. The trial judge found that he did not take possession of the gun out of panic or for self defence. Instead she found that he was prepared to use it. Implicitly, this must have been for a dangerous purpose. [9] Therefore, on the conviction appeal, the conviction on count seven, possession of a loaded restricted weapon, must be set aside. In its place, we substitute a conviction for possession of a restricted weapon. However, in the light of the conviction on count six, possession of a restricted weapon in a motor vehicle, we apply Kienapple to count seven and stay this conviction. B. The Sentence Appeal [10] The appellant received a twenty-one month sentence. He has already served just over nine months. At this point, we do not think that it is in the interests of justice to impose a consecutive sentence for the weapon dangerous conviction. Accordingly, we allow the appeal against sentence and reduce the appellant’s sentence to time served. “J.I. Laskin J.A.” “M. Moldaver J.A.” “R. Juriansz J.A.”