Larue v. Larue

Larue v. Larue Court Supreme Court Date 2001-06-08 Citation 2001 NSSF 23 Docket 1201-53871, SFHD 0182 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Campbell, Douglas C. (Honourable Justice) (NSSF) Document Type Decision Decision Content Your browser's JavaScipt is disabled. Please download the PDF via the PDF icon. 1201-53871/SFHD 0182 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA (FAMILY DIVISION) Cite as: Larue v. Larue, 2001 NSSF 23 BETWEEN: PETER ANDREW LARUE -PETITIONER AND SHELLEY ANN LARUE -RESPONDENT D E C I S I O N HEARD BEFORE: THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE DOUGLAS C. CAMPBELL DATE HEARD: DECEMBER 6 & 11, 2000 DECISION: JUNE 8, 2001 COUNSEL: W. MICHAEL COOKE, Q.C. COUNSEL FOR PETER LARUE LOLA GILMER, COUNSEL FOR SHELLEY LARUE 1 In this proceeding for divorce, the unresolved issues are the division of matrimonial assets (more particularly matrimonial debts) and the question of quantity and duration of spousal support. There are no children. Having determined that there is no possibility of reconciliation between the parties, I am satisfied that all jurisdictional and procedural requirements have been met and hereby grant the divorce based on the ground of permanent breakdown of the marriage as evidenced by the fact that the parties have been separated for a period in excess of one year preceding the determination of the divorce. BACKGROUND FACTS: The parties met in 1989 and lived together for approximately one year before they were married on November 10, 1990. The wife prior to this relationship, had a grade 11 education and worked in a number of low paying jobs such as a counter server at MacDonald=s Restaurant. She had been assisted by having the opportunity to reside with relatives from time to time. She was never truly self-sufficient. The husband had begun a naval career in the military and spent time at sea. Apart from a posting of approximately one year in British Columbia, the couple lived in th Nova Scotia. The separation occurred on August 19 , 1997 after approximately seven years of marriage and eight years of cohabitation. Pursuant to an order of the Family Court issued on February 26, 1998, the husband pays spousal support to the wife in the amount of $600.00 per month. At the time of the hearing, Mr. Larue was 31 years of age and Ms. Larue was 32 years of age. MATRIMONIAL ASSETS AND DEBTS: The parties have agreed that the husband=s pension benefit and entitlement to severance pay which have accrued from October 23, 1989 to August 19, 1997 shall be divided equally. An order so dividing the pension therefore will be granted so as to allow an application to the Minister pursuant to the Pension Benefits Division Act to give effect to that equal division in accordance with the terms of that statute. I would recommend that counsel for Ms. Larue draft that order and that it be separate from the corollary relief judgement, although referred to in it. There shall be a provision in the corollary relief judgement that in the event that Mr. Larue shall receive severance pay, so called, after his release from the military, he shall be required to pay to Ms. Larue an amount equal to 50 percent of the product calculated by multiplying the severance pay by a fraction, the numerator of which is the number of weeks between October 23, 1989 and August 19, 1997 and the denominator of which is the number of weeks between Mr. Larue=s commencement of service for which severance pay is awarded and the date of his release from the military. Both time periods shall be rounded downward to the nearest week. 2 Beyond the pension and the possibility of severance pay, the balance of the couple=s assets would be exceeded by the value of the debts. The matrimonial home was sold and after the pay out of the mortgage, closing costs and other debts, there is the sum of $865.14 being held in trust pending this decision. The parties did not have agreement as to the value of the car and the household furnishings, but I am satisfied on the evidence that the car loan exceeds the value of both by several thousand dollars. In the latter months of the marriage, an RRSP had been purchased with borrowed money in order to earn a tax refund for the husband designed to assist with the parties= difficult finances. The refund was used for family purposes including the purchase of dining room and living room furniture along with an upgrading of the parties= computer. When Mr. Larue could no longer service the RRSP loan, the bank seized it and held back the required remittance to Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (ACCRA@) and applied most, if not all, of the balance to the bank debt. This event in turn had the effect of creating a tax liability for Mr. Larue because the actual tax payable exceeded the amount remitted by the bank to CCRA. After accounting for this tax debt, this asset represents a net negative value of a few thousand dollars assumed by Mr. Larue. There were other debts including a Visa bill and amounts borrowed to renovate the home to make it ready for sale. Accordingly, the parties= consolidation loan increased in amount over time. Certain house contents such as fridge, stove, washer, dryer and freezer were sold by Mr. Larue without Ms. Larue=s permission and the money was applied for family purposes including debt reduction. The treatment of debts (which for simplicity I shall refer to as Amatrimonial debts@ even though that term is not defined in the Matrimonial Property Act) by this court in the course of dividing matrimonial assets between spouses has historically taken one of two forms which I will define as: 1. The net matrimonial asset division approach; and 2. The gross matrimonial asset approach. The net matrimonial asset approach is seen in the vast majority of cases either decided by the courts or approved on an uncontested basis after having been so negotiated by counsel. This approach involves a determination whether the debts are matrimonial debts in which event they are subtracted from the total matrimonial assets to calculate net matrimonial assets. The appropriate percentage division (presumptively 50% but sometimes a different percentage reflecting section 13 factors) is made in respect of that net valuation. The gross matrimonial assets approach focuses on the assets themselves and makes an appropriate division (presumptively 50%) of those assets. In parentheses, I might add that when there are secured debts such as mortgages on a matrimonial home or a chattel-mortgage on a car or when a house has already been sold and the mortgage paid out, it is typical to see those debts netted against the assets and only the balance of the debts set apart from assets. This 3 inconsistency of the treatment of secured debts compared to others is in and of itself a reason to question the validity of this approach. Under this theory, it is suggested that debts need not be the subject of a presumptive equal division but can be dealt with by assigning them to one spouse without regard to the sharing principles of the Act. This unprincipled approach to debts derives from the fact that Amatrimonial debts@ are not expressly stated in the Act to be part of the division. Section 13(b) of the Act is said to be the basis of that method. These two options were considered by Justice Williams in Grant v. Grant, 2001 N.S.S.F. 13. He analyzed the utility of the net matrimonial asset approach at pages 23 through 27of the unreported version. I agree with his analysis. I agree with Justice Williams that these two methods of dealing with debts really represent a valuation issue. The legislature did not attempt to define methods of value but rather has left the court with discretion to do so. For reasons that will be outlined below, it is my view that the only method which produces a consistent and sound approach to valuation of matrimonial assets is the net valuation approach. To use gross asset values is to foster inconsistency and an unprincipled, haphazard approach to allocating the separated couple=s net worth. In the present case, the net matrimonial asset value is negative. The residual debt, after selling the matrimonial home and paying certain debts (subject to a small amount held in trust above noted), has been left with Mr. Larue. Given the disparity in the parties= incomes, he is the only spouse who has a practical ability to deal with those debts. Ms. Larue has no ability to fund or finance the equalization payment that would arise from Mr. Larue taking responsibility for those debts, assuming as I do that it is Anet value@ that is ordinarily to be equalized. The question of how the court should deal with matrimonial debts is relevant to three separate positions taken by Ms. Larue, all of which I reject. 1. She argues that Mr. Larue should not, having sold certain chattels, be permitted to apply their proceeds to matrimonial debts. She argues that, using the gross matrimonial assets approach, her right to half of the value of those matrimonial assets is presumed but her responsibility to share in the debts ( by applying the proceeds to the debts) is not only something which is not presumed but something that the court should resist doing. 2. Relying on the same theory, she requests that the balance of the house proceeds ($865.14) should be divided equally rather than to be applied to the residual net matrimonial debts. 3. Ms. Larue argues that the inequality of the parties= respective net worths brought about by Mr. Larue remaining responsible for the balance of the net matrimonial debts can be properly ignored since debts are not presumptively shared. Counsel for Ms. Larue cites the cases of Davey v. Davey, (1994), 133 N.S.R. (2d) 202 (SC), which cites Arthur v. Arthur (1985), 67 N.S.R. (2d) 323(SC) and Dunn v. Dunn (1995), 14 th R.F.L. (4 ) 50 (NS) for this approach. There are a number of other cases which follow that approach which were not cited to me. 4 These cases tend to be ones in which the couple is to some degree insolvent because the debts of the couple exceed or at least approach the value of the assets; usually in circumstances where one party has no practical ability to take responsibility for that portion of the matrimonial debts which would allow for an equal division of overall net matrimonial worth. The end result in those decided cases for those couples who are insolvent or almost insolvent is a very common sense solution to a difficult problem. I would agree entirely with the result in those cases. However, I would reject the gross matrimonial assets approach used there and come to the same result using the net matrimonial asset approach, for a number of reasons which I will now discuss. It is important to recall that prior to the passage of various provincial statutes in Canada dealing with the division of matrimonial property at marriage breakdown, courts had no direct jurisdiction to deal with assets and debts. The courts followed the rather awkward and homemade remedy of ordering lump sum maintenance in an amount to reflect the appropriate asset allocation. Judgement was entered for that lump sum which could be satisfied by the owning spouse transferring certain assets (often subject to the assumption of applicable debts) to the other spouse. For example, this method was used to induce the transfer between spouses of a matrimonial home, subject to the mortgage or the family car subject to a car loan. If other debt allocation was needed, this non-statute mandated method was particularly awkward. This legislative gap could only be remedied by the passage of matrimonial property statutes by the provinces since the constitutional authority was provincial. There was no inherent jurisdiction by which the courts could divide assets and debts. Since 1980 when the Matrimonial Property Act first existed in Nova Scotia, the court has been authorized to deal with assets directly by assigning joint or individually owned assets to a spouse. The issue therefore is: how has that legislation changed, if at all, the court=s previous lack of authority to deal with matrimonial debts? The Gross Assets Approach: There are various reasons to reject the gross assets approach which in turn requires a section 13(b) approach to unequally allocate or divide matrimonial debts and to accept instead the net matrimonial asset approach. Section 12 of the Act creates a presumption of equal division of Amatrimonial assets@ while section 13 authorizes an unequal division of those assets if an equal division would be unfair or unconscionable. Neither section confirms whether matrimonial assets should be valued net of matrimonial debts or on a gross basis. For all cases, it must be one or the other and I would conclude that Amatrimonial assets@ is intended to refer to the value of those assets, net of matrimonial debts. To appreciate the rationale for this approach, it is important to recall the steps created by the Act which include classifying the assets and I suggest debts (as between matrimonial and non -matrimonial types), valuing them, physically allocating them, and deciding upon a percentage division (presumptively 50%). The last step is to calculate a transfer payment (usually an equalization payment) due from one spouse to the other. 5 Accordingly, the real question is whether the so-called equalization payment should be an amount which equalizes the assets themselves or the net worth of those matrimonial assets. It would not be argued that it should be other than net value in the case of a typical mortgaged home or a chattel-mortgaged vehicle. It would seem inconsistent and illogical to treat unsecured debts differently from secured debts. Most couples have debts including unsecured debts. For those couples who have debts and who separate, it is usually impractical to assign debts equally. The physical allocation of the debt is usually done by reference to some practical factor such as connecting the debt to the asset which it financed or leaving the debt with the party in whose name it was borrowed or who was best able to carry the debt. After deciding upon a practical allocation (as between the spouses) of both matrimonial assets and debts, the transfer payment (typically an equalization payment) is then calculated so as to implement the desired percentage (usually 50%) of the net value of the matrimonial assets. The following are among the reasons for favoring this net valuation approach to dividing matrimonial assets: 1. The legislature could not be taken to have intended a presumptive equal division of gross assets. What is of value and therefore of importance to the parties is their respective net worths after the division is effected. It would be most unfair in most cases to allow one spouse to share equally in the gross value of the asset and not to share in the debts from which it or the parties lifestyle was financed. 2. To adopt the gross valuation approach is to say that the vast majority of cases heard by our court since 1980 have followed the wrong approach since it is the net worth that the court has focused on (except in those cases usually involving insolvency, mentioned above). Where the court has ordered an equalization of the net value, there will always have been an unequal division of matrimonial assets, valued at gross, except in those rare cases where the debts have been assigned exactly equally. To adopt the gross value approach therefore is to suggest that unequal divisions of the assets themselves are the norm and equal divisions are the exception. This is the opposite of what was intended and expressed by the legislature. 3. Section 13(b) of the Act does not authorize the unequal allocation or division of debts; it allows for the unequal division of assets to take into account the circumstances of the debt history. This subsection does not authorize the court to assign joint debts to one spouse or to transfer debt responsibility from one spouse to the other. It merely authorizes the assets to be divided unequally. If, in doing so, the court was restricted to the gross value of the assets, there would be no authority to deal with the debts directly. 4. The Matrimonial Property Act was introduced for the purposes of giving the court the authority to deal with the capital side of a marriage - an authority which it did not previously have. Unless the concept of the net valuation approach is adopted as the intention of the legislature, what would follow from the gross assets 6 approach is that the court in respect of debts is in the same position as it was prior to 1980; that is it would have no authority to deal with debts at all. The only approach which gives effect to the legislature=s true intention is that matrimonial assets are to be divided net of debts. 5. The scheme of the Matrimonial Property Act was to provide for an orderly, principled approach to a division of the spoils of the marriage by providing for a presumption of equal division subject to enumerated section 13 exceptions when fairness dictates. The gross assets approach would allow the assets themselves to be dealt with in a Aprincipled@ way (which would often not make sense because of the debts) and then leave the debts to be dealt with haphazardly from case to case. It is desirable that both assets and debts be dealt with by relying on the same principles and then, when fairness demands, to provide for an unequal division of net worth taking into account the history of the debts acquisition in accordance with section 13(b) of the Act. 6. For many years following the passage of the Act in 1980, negotiation and litigation in these matters were approached by reference to the net values. Since a relatively few cases usually involving insolvency have been decided using a gross value approach to some but not always all of the matrimonial assets, there has been an alarming increase in litigants who approach the court with healthy net worths and modest debts asserting that the law is that assets must be divided in accordance with the presumption of equality and that debts can be divided in some other fashion or even ignored. This is one such case. That interpretation of the law in Nova Scotia is an undesirable development of the jurisprudence. The net valuation approach yields a consistent, fair and equitable result both in the cases of solvent and insolvent couples whose debts are either secured or unsecured. It might be asked what then is the purpose of section 13(b) if the debts are already accounted for by netting them against assets. The answer to this question strengthens the assertion that a net value approach is to be preferred. Section 13 of the Matrimonial Property Act authorizes the court to make an unequal division of matrimonial assets: A...where the court is satisfied that the division of matrimonial assets in equal shares would be unfair or unconscionable taking into account...: (b) the amount of the debts and the liabilities of each spouse and the circumstances in which they were incurred;@ By concluding that Amatrimonial assets@ as that term is used in that subsection must be valued net of their debts, the parties are left with the starting point that their assets, net of debts, would be divided equally. They will thereby be left with equal net worths. This will be done in the vast majority of cases. Section 13(b) sets up two rationales for departing from that norm based on debt position in appropriate cases: 7 1. The first is to consider the amount of the debts of each spouse. If one spouse was to be allocated an amount of debt that would impair his or her ability to fund or finance the equalization payment or if the size of the debt to be allocated to one spouse could not practically be carried, a transfer payment which would create an unequal division of net worths could be ordered or reassignment of the debts to that spouse could be directed, thereby creating an unequal division of net worths. 2. The second factor enumerated is the Acircumstances@ in which the debts were incurred. The following is a non-exhaustive list of circumstances which could, in an appropriate case, give rise to an unequal division of the net value of matrimonial assets: (A) The incurring of a debt without offsetting asset value in a situation where the other spouse would have no practical ability to carry the debt or the consequent equalization payment upon separation (such is the case at bar); (B) The incurring of debt, directly or indirectly, by one spouse by the inappropriate use of family assets or incomes (such as unsuccessful gambling activities); (C) Extreme cases of undisclosed or unilaterally incurred debts unless the other spouse carelessly remained uninformed or failed without justification to assertively object. It would have been preferrable if the legislature had expressed itself more clearly by directing in section 12 of the Act that the reference to matrimonial assets means matrimonial assets valued net of the matrimonial debts. It similarly would have been preferrable for the legislature to define matrimonial debts. It is my view, however, that the legislation does permit the interpretation which I have adopted. The legislature was entirely silent as to the valuation of assets. Although technically the word Aassets@ would not normally imply Anet assets@, it is not uncommon for such a meaning to be intended in ordinary usage. In my view, it is difficult to argue against the policy of a valuation approach which focuses on equalizing net matrimonial assets with appropriate enumerated exceptions. Debt circumstances can and should be relied upon as an exception to the rule when those circumstances justify something other than equality of net matrimonial assets. Common sense demands that the words Amatrimonial assets@ as used in section 12 of the Matrimonial Property Act be interpreted as referring to the Anet@ matrimonial assets of the couple. This interpretation has the additional benefit of clarifying that the court has authority to allocate (as between the spouses and without impact on the creditors) the debts whether they may be jointly or separately owed. The words in section 12 relevant to this point are: A...to have the matrimonial assets divided in equal shares notwithstanding the ownership of these assets, and the court may order such a division.@ If Amatrimonial assets@ refers to their value net of debts, it follows that the court has authority (which it did not have prior to 1980) to allocate debts as well as assets. Unless the authority to 8 allocate debts is so found, I would be forced to conclude that there is no such authority since it did not exist prior to 1980 and since section 13(b) provides no such authority. That would be most unfortunate. I agree with Justice Williams= summary in Grant, supra, of the judge made definition of Amatrimonial debt@ which includes but is not limited to debt incurred for the benefit of the family unit, during the marriage, for ordinary household family matters reasonably incurred and, if incurred after separation, necessary for basic living expenses or to preserve matrimonial assets. The debt must be capable of legal enforcement. To that definition I would add the obvious comment that debts which are incurred for the purpose of acquiring a non-matrimonial asset or for non-family purposes would not be matrimonial in nature. In summary, matrimonial debts should be identified and subtracted from matrimonial assets as part of the valuation exercise in considering a Section 12 presumption of equal division. It is that net value which should be divided equally by ordering an equalization payment to be made. Then and only then are the exceptions in Section 13 of the Act, to be considered one of which is subsection 13(b). Couples rarely accumulate assets alone. Their joint venture usually produces net worth, being the excess of assets over debt and it is that net worth which should be shared. THE CASE AT BAR In the subject case, the parties= debts exceeded their assets substantially. After liquidating the equity in the matrimonial home there remains $865.14 in a trust account held by the solicitor. Given the conclusion that I will make below, it is not necessary for me to precisely measure the extent of the net negative matrimonial worth. The value of the consolidation loan has changed over time and the precise value of the CCRA debt is unclear. Suffice it to say that Ms. Larue is in no position to assume responsibility for any portion of the net matrimonial debt. Her income is very low as is her borrowing capacity if any. I conclude that an equal division of net matrimonial assets would be unfair and indeed unconscionable from the point of view of Ms. Larue. I therefore direct that all of the matrimonial debts shall remain the responsibility of the petitioner, Mr. Larue. It is unfortunate that this leaves him with a negative net worth of several thousand dollars. Regarding the sale of matrimonial chattels by Mr. Larue, it occurs to me that the allocation of those proceeds toward the insolvency was a reasonable thing to do. While Ms. Larue would have preferred to have some of those chattels for her own use, she admitted in cross examination that she could not have put most of them to use (for example, major appliances were already available to her in her rented accommodation). The other items were insignificant in value. The unfortunate exercise faced by this couple was to liquidate their assets to minimize their net residual debt position all of which would have to be taken on by Mr. Larue. It would be inconsistent for the court to look upon the matrimonial home proceeds in a light different from the proceeds of the chattels. The exercise was one of liquidating in order 9 to pay debts to minimize Mr. Larue=s ultimate responsibility for debts. If there had been sufficient proceeds to pay out all of the matrimonial debt an equal division of any remaining proceeds would have been obvious. Because there was a substantial debt load and a complete allocation of it to Mr. Larue, the house proceeds should go to him. He is then still left with a negative net worth. The overall unequal division of net matrimonial assets will arise in Ms. Larue=s favor by relieving her of responsibility for an equalization payment which would have otherwise been necessary to equalize the matrimonial assets, net of debt. In summary, this allocation of assets and debts is founded on the assumption that an overall equal division of net matrimonial assets would be unfair to Ms. Larue by virtue of section 13(b). The circumstances by which the debts were incurred were that Mr. Larue was the main breadwinner in the family. Ms. Larue did not have the capacity to take on initial or ongoing responsibility for those debts. Their amount is excessive relative to the parties= assets. They have been netted against the assets in this marriage to the extent that assets could be liquidated. Mr. Larue has the greater ability to pay those remaining debts. All of those circumstances demand an unequal division of net matrimonial assets in Ms. Larue=s favor by assigning the residual debt to Mr. Larue and relieving Ms. Larue from any further obligation as between the spouses. SPOUSAL SUPPORT: After the parties= separation, an order under the Family Maintenance Act dated the 26th day of February, 1998 provided for spousal support in the amount of $600.00. Ms. Larue seeks a continued order while Mr. Larue asks for an immediate termination. According to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Bracklow v. Bracklow, (1999) 44 RFL (4th) 1there are three rationales for spousal support: 1. Compensatory support. 2. Non-compensatory support. 3. Contractual support. AIn summary the statues and the case law suggest three conceptual bases for entitlement to spousal support: (1) compensatory, (2) contractual, and (3) non-compensatory. Marriage, as this court held in Moge (at p. 870), is a Ajoint endeavor,@ a socio-economic partnership. That is the starting position. Support agreements are important (although not necessarily decisive), and so is the idea that spouses should be compensated on marriage breakdown for losses and hardships caused by the marriage. Indeed, a review of the cases suggests that in most circumstances now serves as the main reason for support. However, contract and compensation are not the only sources of a support obligation. The obligation may alternatively arise out of the marriage relationship itself. Where a spouse achieves economic self-sufficiency on the basis of her own efforts, or on an award of 10 compensatory support, the obligation founded on the marriage relationship itself lies dormant. But where need is established that is not met on a compensatory or contractual basis, the fundamental marital obligation may play a vital role. Absent negating factors it is available, in appropriate circumstances, to provide just support. (Bracklow v. Bracklow (1999), S.C.R. 420 per McLaughlin, C.J.C. at para.49.). Compensatory support: This rationale is founded on the theory that the role assumed in the marriage by the claimant spouse caused that spouse to incur an economic disadvantage which should be remedied by compensation in the form of support. I would reject this basis for support in this case. The marriage was childless. The wife was not required to give up a career or job prospects to support the husband=s career moves geographically or otherwise. To the contrary, she after finishing her non-vocational schooling prior to the marriage, had not achieved and had no concrete prospect of achieving self-sufficiency on her own. The marriage was an economic advantage to her because of Mr. Larue=s larger earnings potential generated from pre-marital circumstance. There was nothing about Ms. Larue=s role in the marriage or its affect on her personal economic prospects that would give rise to a claim for compensation in this short to medium term marriage. Contractual support: Contractual support, in my view, is best understood as a form of compensatory support arising from the contract of the marriage itself, the implied terms of which dictate that support should be paid in consideration for the value added to the payor spouse=s lifestyle by the efforts of the claimant spouse. Such a claim is very difficult to maintain in a marriage where the claimant has no child care responsibilities which are greater than those of the other except when the contract lasts for a significant period during which the circumstances entitle the claimant spouse to rely on the implied promise of support. In the present case, as the parties faced greater financial deficits each year, the husband urged his wife to improve herself by way of training or job promotion. I find that she could have done more in the absence of child care duties to promote her financial development. Her claim on this basis fails. Non-compensatory support: Counsel for Ms. Larue points to the fact that her client=s income is below a reasonable level of self-sufficiency and is expected for the current year to be under $12,000.00 if she obtains full time hours and less if she does not. She argues on that basis that Ms. Larue must be considered to be dependant on her husband. I have no doubt that she depends on him financially but it does not follow that she is dependent in the legal sense of that term. 11 With respect, the existence of a less than self-sufficient income does not necessarily mean that one spouse is dependant on the other. It can mean that the claimant spouse has not met his or her obligation for self-support. In my opinion, he or she must meet that obligation before he or she can claim non-compensatory support. At the time of the existing Family Maintenance Act order, Ms. Larue had, in my opinion, met that test. There had been a period, during cohabitation, when the parties were attempting to start a family. Her income was considered secondary. Childbirth would not have necessarily interfered (except for maternity leave time frame) with a continuation of that type of work. After that plan had failed and the marriage eventually broke down and a period of time had passed so that Ms. Larue could recover from the break-up and move on with her own self-sufficiency, she should have taken steps to achieve that goal. Instead, after almost 4 years of being responsible for herself and without being placed by the marriage in jeopardy of that accomplishment, she is in no worse financial position by virtue of the marriage or its breakdown, and has not achieved self-sufficiency as she should have done. In the long run, she is no less responsible for her own financial well-being now than she was at the beginning of the marriage. However, in the short-run, she was and is entitled to support based on a reliance on the continuance of the short to medium term financial arrangement that had existed for this eight year relationship. Duration of spousal support is a quantum issue according to the decision in Bracklow v. Bracklow, supra. It must relate within reason to the post-separation adjustment period for the particular couple. The ratio of relationship years to support years will vary from case to case. In this case, I recognize that the wife has not, prior to this decision, appeared to acknowledge her duty to make changes to her career plan and I consider that it would be reasonable to give her an opportunity to do so. Such opportunity should be sufficient in length to have a reasonable opportunity for success. Mr. Larue has paid support pursuant to court order for two years and ten months as of the trial date. Support at the same rate for a further year is a reasonable time frame for the goal of self-sufficiency to be expected to be reached. It is also a time frame after which Mr. Larue=s obligation should come to an end. Therefore, I will order that the support of $600.00 per month shall continue to and including the 15th day of December, 2001 after which her entitlement shall terminate absolutely. Considering the impecuniosity of the wife, there shall be no costs to either party. Douglas C. Campbell, J. DCC/wak