Sikora v. Deputy Director Community Safety Unit

2025 BCSC 57 Sikora v. Deputy Director Community Safety Unit

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Sikora v. Deputy Director Community Safety Unit, 2025 BCSC 57 Date: 20250115 Docket: S244193 Registry: Vancouver In the Matter of the Judicial Review Procedure Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 241 Between: Michelle Vrinder Sikora, Douglas Peter Sikora, and S&M Medicinal Sweet Shoppe Ltd. Petitioners And Deputy Director Community Safety Unit Respondent Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Wilkinson Reasons for Judgment Appearing on their own behalf: M.V. Sikora D.P. Sikora Appearing as agent for the petitioner S&M Sweet Shoppe Ltd: M.V. Sikora Counsel for the Respondent: K. Fast R. Danay Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. November 6-7, 2024 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. January 15, 2025 [1] The petitioner brings a petition for judicial review of two decisions by the Deputy Director of the Community Safety Unit ("CSU") under the Cannabis Control and Licensing Act, SBC 2018, c. 29 (the "CCLA"). [2] In the decisions, the Deputy Director refused an application for the return of cannabis that had been seized from the petitioners' store and vehicle, and issued the Petitioner S&M Medicinal Sweet Shoppe Ltd. (the "Corporate Petitioner") an administrative monetary penalty in the amount of $105,873.86. [3] For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the petition. Preliminary issue [4] The petitioner named the BC Community Safety

Unit, Ministry for Public Health and Safety, Meghan Oberg, and Deputy Attorney General Ministry of Justice as respondents in this proceeding. The proper party to be named as respondent is the Deputy Director Community Safety Unit and I make the order removing the named respondents, adding the Deputy Director, and amending the style of cause accordingly. [5] I also note that the Corporate Petitioner is not properly named. I order that style of cause is amended to include the corporate designation "Ltd." in the name of the Corporate Petitioner. Background The inspections and seizure [6] The Corporate Petitioner is a corporation duly registered in British Columbia. It was dissolved for failure to file annual reports on July 24, 2023. [7] Michelle Sikora and Douglas Sikora (collectively, the "Personal Petitioners"), are the sole directors of the Corporate Petitioner. [8] Between January 8 and 9, 2019, CSU was advised by the RCMP that cannabis was being sold at the Corporate Petitioner's storefront located at 706 Gibsons Way, Gibsons, British Columbia (the "Premises"). [9] CSU officers confirmed with the Liquor and Cannabis Regulation Branch of the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General that there was no provincial licence to sell cannabis at the Premises. [10] On June 19, 2019, CSU Officers visited the Premises for the purposes of conducting an inspection under s. 89 of

the CCLA and providing education to the owners of the Premises on potential enforcement actions, including the seizure of illegal cannabis and the imposition of monetary penalties (the "Education Inspection"). Providing education to retailers was a practice of the CSU, given the relatively new provincial regulatory scheme created after federal legislative changes. [11] During the Education Inspection, CSU Officers observed a sandwich board sign outside the Premises and exterior signage displaying cannabis leaves and indicating that the store was a "dispensary". They also observed a sign that stated: "We grow it. We make it. We bake it"; and other signage indicating that all the cannabis used in the store's "edibles and topicals" was grown by Ms. Sikora and all edibles were made by Mr. Sikora. [12] During the Education Inspection, CSU Officers observed and photographed cannabis that was openly displayed for sale in the Premises' sales room in various forms, including loose cannabis and edibles that looked like foil wrapped candies, gummy worms, gummy bears, sour fizzes, lollipops, and baked goods. [13] Following the Education Inspection, the Premises continued to operate as a cannabis store offering cannabis for medical purposes. [14] On February 18, 2020, CSU Officers returned to the Premises to conduct a further inspection under s. 89 of the CCLA (the "Enforcement

Inspection"). On this occasion, CSU officers observed, photographed and seized cannabis that was stored in the back room and freezer in the Premises, and in a vehicle owned by the Petitioner Michelle Sikora, which was parked immediately beside the store. [15] During the Enforcement Inspection, CSU officers took photographs of large display boards in the sales room listing various types of cannabis, including: tinctures, edibles (with labels such as "Lollipots cbd+ thc", "Chocolates cbd + thc - singles = ½ joint + lasts 6-8 hours", "Gummies - singles - dbls - triples"); and "smokables" (with labels such as "Econo, Premium, Organic, Hash, Rosin, High Guys distillates"). There was also a price list for cannabis in various forms, cannabis product lists, an ATM, and a cash register. [16] CSU Officers seized cannabis from the Premises (the "Seized Cannabis") and collected other evidence. Administrative Proceedings before the Deputy Director of the CSU [17] On March 18, 2020, the Petitioner Michelle Sikora applied pursuant to s. 105 of the CCLA for the return of the Seized Cannabis. In her application, she asserted that: a) The Premises is a "medicinal dispensary" which was seeking to "fill the void" left by the federal government, who, in her submission, was not providing safe and reliable access to cannabis for medical patients; b) Both she and the Petitioner Doug Sikora were

medical cannabis patients with licences to grow cannabis; c) The CSU searched her personal vehicle during the Enforcement Inspection without a search warrant, which violated her rights under s. 8 of the Charter; and d) The seizure of the cannabis violated the s. 7 Charter rights of the "medical patients" to whom they were going to be sold. [18] On February 9, 2021, Ms. Sikora's s. 105 application was denied by the Deputy Director. In so doing, the Deputy Director found that: a) Ms. Sikora had not provided any evidence that either she or Mr. Sikora possessed the seized cannabis in accordance with a valid licence or permit; b) The federal Cannabis Regulations do not permit the operation of storefronts; c) The federal Cannabis Regulations do not permit patients who have been authorized to possess cannabis for medical purposes to sell cannabis to others; and d) While the Deputy Director lacked the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies, Ms. Sikora's Charter arguments could be considered as part of a "Charter values" analysis. She found those arguments, however, to be without merit. [19] On December 15, 2021, the Petitioners were each issued a Notice of Administrative Penalty ("NAMP"), proposing to impose penalties of $118,919.10 on each of the Petitioners for contravening s. 15 of the CCLA. [20] The NAMP advised the Petitioners that they could either admit to the contravention and

accept an administrative monetary penalty of $59,459.55 (i.e. the retail value of the Seized Cannabis) or opt to have a hearing to challenge the NAMP. [21] On January 18, 2022, the Petitioners opted to challenge the NAMP by submitting applications for an administrative hearing. The evidence differs as to whether the petitioners requested an oral hearing. Even if an oral hearing were held, no cross examination is permitted under s. 97 of the CCLA. [22] On February 4, 2022, the CSU provided disclosure to the Petitioners and advised that the deadline for the filing of evidence and submissions was March 11, 2022. On February 8, 2022, the CSU informed the Petitioners that the hearing would commence by way of written review, which is the default process. [23] On March 15, 2022, the CSU received a letter from Ms. Sikora, enclosing a USB drive with submissions. Ms. Sikora provided further submissions on April 4, 7, June 10, 11, 21 and December 9, 2022. [24] In their submissions, the Petitioners advanced many of the same arguments that the Deputy Director had rejected in response to Ms. Sikora's application for the return of the Seized Cannabis (e.g. that the Premises was operating as a "medical dispensary" and that CSU had violated ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter). [25] The Petitioners also argued that the Director ought not to issue a monetary penalty due to an unacceptable delay in the

administrative process, which they argued, violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter and their right under s. 7 of the Charter to be free from "state interference with psychological integrity". [26] On January 13, 2023, the CSU provided the Petitioners with a supplementary disclosure package containing evidence that the Petitioners had continued to contravene the CCLA by unlawfully selling cannabis. The CSU also advised the Petitioners of recent amendments to the CCLA which provided that constitutional issues are outside the Director's jurisdiction, and invited the Petitioners to make any submissions that they might wish to make in that regard. [27] Ms. Sikora provided submissions objecting to the inclusion of the supplementary disclosure package and the applicability of the CCLA amendments on January 13 and 18, 2023. [28] On June 8, 2023, the Deputy Director decided to impose an administrative monetary penalty on the Corporate Petitioner only, in the amount of $105,873.86. [29] In her reasons, the Deputy Director: a) Reviewed the evidence before her and found that the Seized Cannabis was unlawfully in the Petitioners' possession for the purposes of sale; b) Found that imposing an administrative monetary penalty on the Corporate Petitioner would advance the purposes underlying the CCLA; c) Rejected the Petitioners' arguments to the

effect that the Enforcement Inspection was an unreasonable search and seizure and that there had been an unacceptable delay in the administrative process and that CSU had thereby violated ss. 7, 8 and 11(b) of the Charter; d) Decided to impose the monetary penalty only on the Corporate Petitioner, though she expressly left for another day the question of whether the Personal Petitioners should be held personally liable for the Corporate Petitioner's monetary penalty under s. 94(9) of the CCLA; and e) Concluded that the retail value of the Seized Cannabis was $52,936.98, which resulted in a monetary penalty of $105,873.86 under the provisions of the CCLA. [30] Also on June 8, 2023, the Deputy Director issued a Compliance Order requiring the Corporate Petitioner to pay the penalty. [31] On December 15, 2023, after conducting a separate hearing in writing on the issue, the Deputy Director determined that the Personal Petitioners were personally liable for the Compliance Order pursuant to s. 94(9) of the CCLA as directors and officers of the Corporate Petitioner. [32] On January 19, 2024, the Personal Petitioners applied for reconsideration of the s. 94(9) determination. [33] On May 17, 2024, the Director advised that the application for reconsideration could not be accepted as the Petitioners had only asserted that the underlying decision was tainted by errors of law, but did not

actually identify any such errors or provide any supporting argument to substantiate them as was required by s. 95(f)(c) of the CCLA. The Petition for Judicial Review [34] On June 27, 2024, the petition for judicial review was filed. In it, the Petitioners seek orders that the administrative monetary penalty at issue be "retracted" and that they be compensated for the loss of the Seized Cannabis. [35] The petitioners challenge the Deputy Director's February 9, 2021, decision denying the application for a return of (or compensation for the destruction of) the Seized Cannabis pursuant to s. 105 of the CCLA and the Deputy Director's June 8, 2023, Decision to impose an administrative monetary penalty of $105,873.86 on the Corporate Petitioner as well as the personal liability decision of December 15, 2023. [36] The petitioners argue that the CSU violated their rights under ss. 7 and 8 of the Charter due to the amount of time taken by the Deputy Director to complete the administrative hearing, the fact that Ms. Sikora was not allowed an oral hearing, and the fact that the CSU unreasonably searched the non-public room of the Premises and Ms. Sikora's personal vehicle on February 18, 2020 without a warrant. Statutory Framework The Regulation of Cannabis in Canada [37] The federal Cannabis Act, S.C. 2018, c. 16 and Cannabis Regulations, SOR/2018-144 establish a legal and regulatory

framework for the distribution and sale of cannabis in Canada. [38] Under this scheme, the federal government retains responsibility for the regulation of medical cannabis, whereas provincial governments are responsible for regulating the distribution and sale of recreational cannabis, subject to minimum federal standards set by Canada: Vancouver (City) v. Weeds Glass & Gifts Ltd., 2019 BCCA 190 ("Weeds Glass") at para.

33. The Regulation of Medical Cannabis [39] Under the federal Cannabis Act and Cannabis Regulations, patients who wish to access cannabis for medical purposes must obtain a medical document from a healthcare professional, which sets out an authorized daily amount (in grams of dried cannabis per day) that they may lawfully possess: Harris v. Canada, 2019 FC 553 at paras. 7 and 9-11 (overturned on other grounds at 2020 FCA 124). [40] Under this scheme, patients may lawfully obtain cannabis in one of three ways: a) Purchase cannabis from a producer that has been licensed by Health Canada, which is then shipped to them by mail; b) Register with Health Canada to grow cannabis themselves at a designated location; or c) Register with Health Canada to designate someone to grow it on their behalf. [41] The federal medical access program does not permit cannabis to be sold by licensed producers to patients at brick-and-mortar storefront locations: R. v. Ferkul, 2019 ONCJ 893 at paras. 2-3; R v. Howell, 2020 ABQB 385; R. v. Chartrand, 2020 NSPC 26; and R. v. Enns, 2019 NSSC 323. The petitioners in oral submissions stated that, while they generally follow the requirements for the provision of medical cannabis under the federal scheme, they have no intention of applying for licencing under the federal scheme because it does not allow them to distribute through their retail store. The

Regulation of Recreational Cannabis in British Columbia [42] The CCLA establishes the regulatory regime for the possession, sale, supply and production of recreational cannabis in British Columbia. Unlike the federal Cannabis Act and Cannabis Regulations, the CCLA does not purport to regulate cannabis for medical purposes: CCLA, s. 13.1. The petitioners submit that is why they also do not seek licensing under the provincial scheme. Their goal is to provide cannabis to those who require it for medical purposes. They fully acknowledge that medical cannabis is distributed at much higher THC doses than provincially regulated recreational cannabis in order to provide therapeutic results. They do not want to be retailers of recreational cannabis. [43] The CCLA prohibits individuals from selling cannabis (or possessing it for the purposes of sale) unless they have a federal or provincial licence to do so: CCLA, s.

15. It also establishes a licensing scheme for private non­medical cannabis retailers as well as a comprehensive compliance and enforcement regime: CCLA, Parts 4 and 6. [44] The CSU, which is part of the Policing and Security Branch of the Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, is responsible for compliance and enforcement under the CCLA. [45] The Director of the CSU, who is appointed by the Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General, has the authority under s. 89 of the CCLA to search for and seize cannabis from non-residential premises without a warrant where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the sale, supply, production or storage of cannabis has occurred or is occurring. [46] If cannabis is seized following a search, the owner of the cannabis may apply to have it returned to them (or be compensated, if the seized cannabis has been destroyed) on the basis that it was possessed lawfully: CCLA, s. 105. [47] Under s. 94 of the CCLA, the Director has the discretion to impose a monetary penalty on a person who unlawfully sells cannabis (or unlawfully possesses it for the purposes of sale). The monetary penalty is set at twice the retail value of the cannabis at issue: CCLA, s. 94(2)(a). [48] If, however, the Director proposes to exercise their discretion to impose a penalty and the person waives their right to a hearing and admits to the contravention,

the penalty that the person must pay is equal to the retail value of the cannabis at issue: CCLA, s. 94(2)(b). [49] Hearings before the Director under s. 94 of the CCLA are governed by the CSU's Administrative Monetary Penalty Policy. Under that policy, the administrative hearings are, by default, held by way of written submissions unless the Director determines an oral hearing is necessary (either on their own initiative or upon application). [50] Section 95 of the CCLA provides for the reconsideration of a Director's decision to impose an administrative monetary penalty. Reconsideration can be based on: (1) new evidence; (2) an asserted breach of procedural fairness; (3) an asserted error of law other than a constitutional question; or (4) any ground "prescribed" in a regulation. The Standard of Review [51] It is agreed that the standard of review that applies to the Deputy Director's finding regarding the petitioners' s. 7 Charter right to life, liberty and security of the person is the correctness standard. [52] By contrast, the deferential reasonableness standard applies to the review of the Deputy Director's conclusion that any impact on the petitioners' s. 8 Charter privacy rights that was caused by the search and seizure of cannabis from their store and vehicle was outweighed by the CCLA's statutory objectives. [53] In Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.

Vavilov, 2019 SCC 65, the Supreme Court of Canada established a rebuttable presumption that the standard of reasonableness applies in judicial review proceedings, subject to certain exceptions. One such exception is when a constitutional question is raised, where the rule of law requires courts to apply the standard of correctness: Vavilov at para. 53. [54] In challenging the impugned decisions, the Petitioners assert that their rights under ss. 7-8 of the Charter have been violated. In particular, they argue in the petition that: a) "the CSU has violated the Sikora's [sic] section 7 Charter Right for the unfair process with -respect to (i) the amount of time the hearing as taken; and (ii) the fact that not once in the 3 years since the warrantless search has Michelle Sikora a self represented litigant been allowed to speak directly with the ADM;" and b) "the CSU has violated the Sikora's section 8 Charter Right with respect to the warrant less search of their business and unattended vehicle on February 18, 2020". [55] The petitioners advanced these same arguments in the decisions under review. While the Deputy Director found that she lacked jurisdiction to directly consider constitutional questions or grant constitutional remedies, she nevertheless found that she was obliged by Dore v. Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12 and Loyola High School v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2015 SCC

12 to consider those arguments as part of a "Charter values" proportionality analysis. [56] The Dore/Loyola framework has two steps. The first is to determine "whether the decision engages the Charter by limiting its protections." If so, the second step is to determine "whether, in assessing the impact of the relevant Charter protection and given the nature of the decision and the statutory and factual contexts, the decision reflects a proportionate balancing of the Charter-protections at play": Loyola, at para 39. [57] The Deputy Director applied the Dore/Loyola test and rejected the Petitioners' constitutional arguments. In so doing, the Deputy Director concluded that: a) The amount of time that it took to render the administrative monetary penalty decision did not violate the petitioners' rights under s. 7 of the Charter as, among other reasons, they had provided no evidence (other than a bare assertion) that the delay at issue had caused them psychological harm; and b) The petitioners had a significantly diminished reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to their store and vehicle under the circumstances (e.g. they were engaged in the commercial sale of a highly regulated product and the search was authorized by s. 89 of the CCLA). The Deputy Director further concluded that if she ordered a return of the cannabis under s. 105 of the CCLA or refused to impose a

monetary penalty on the petitioners under s. 94 due to the impact on the petitioners' reasonable expectation of privacy, that would undermine the CCLA's objectives of deterring illegal cannabis sales, protecting children and youth and reducing the illegal market. [58] The appropriate standard of review for the first prong of the Dore/Loyola test (i.e. determining whether a Charter protection was engaged) is correctness: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation v. Ferrier, 2019 ONCA 1025 at paras. 34-35 and York Region District School Board v. Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario, 2024 SCC 22 at para.

63. When applying the correctness standard, a reviewing court will not show deference to the decision-maker's reasoning; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question: Vavilov at para. 54. [59] By contrast, the standard of review for the second question (i.e. the balancing of the Charter protection against the applicable statutory objectives) is reasonableness: Ferrier at para.

34. A reasonable decision in this regard is one that "is based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and that is justified in relation to the facts and law that constrain the decision maker": Vavilov at para. 85. [60] Alleged flaws or shortcomings in a decision-maker's reasoning must be "more than merely superficial or peripheral" to the merits of the decision. A reviewing court must be satisfied that such shortcomings or flaws are "sufficiently central or significant" to render the decision unreasonable: Vavilov at para. 100. [61] While the reviewing court must consider whether there were other reasonable possibilities open to the administrative decision-maker to give greater effect to Charter protections, this does not mean that the decision-maker was obligated to choose the option that would have limited the Charter protection the least: Law Society of British Columbia v. Trinity Western University, 2018 SCC 32 at para.

81. The question for the reviewing court is always whether the decision falls within a range of reasonable outcomes: Doré at para. 57; Loyola at para. 41, citing RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 at para. 160. [62] The legal and factual constraints that bear on a particular administrative decision maker include: (a) the governing statutory scheme; (b) other statutory or common law; (c) principles of statutory interpretation; (d) the evidence that was before the decision maker; (e) the submissions of the parties; (f) past practices and past decisions of the decision maker; and (g) the potential impact of the decision on the individual to whom it applies: Vavilov, at para: 106. Did the Deputy Director correctly find that s. 7 of the Charter was not breached? [63] Section 7 of the Charter provides that "everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." [64] To establish a violation of s. 7 of the Charter, the petitioners must prove that: (a) the impugned law or state action deprives them of the right to life, liberty or security of the person; and (b) any such deprivation does not accord with the principles of fundamental justice: Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5 at para. 55 and Canada (Attorney General) v.

Bedford, 2013 SCC 72 at para. 57. [65] To satisfy the first criterion, the claimant must establish a "sufficient causal connection" beyond speculation between the impugned government action or law and the limit on life, liberty or security of the person: Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 (CanLII), [2000] 2 SCR 307 at para. 60. [66] The decisions of the Deputy Director do not involve any arrest, detention, possibility of imprisonment, or genuine penal consequences. Therefore, there are no s. 7 liberty interests implicated: Weisdorf v. The City of Toronto, 2019 ONSC 692 at paras. 45-56, aff'd 2020 ONCA 401 at para. 11. [67] The proceedings before the Deputy Director concerned the petitioners' request for the return of the seized cannabis (or compensation for its destruction) and potential liability to pay a monetary penalty. These are purely economic interests that are not protected by s. 7: Siemans v. Manitoba, 2003 SCC 3 at paras. 45-46; Leroux v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2012 BCCA 63 at paras. 49-52. As such, there also is no legal basis for the petitioners to assert that s. 7 of the Charter afforded any of them the right to an oral hearing. The same would be true at common law: Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817 at paras. 33-34; He v. Vancouver (City), 2019 BCSC 2246 at para. 88; and Downing v. Strata

Plan VR2356, 2023 BCCA 100. [68] It is possible for a claimant to establish that an unreasonable delay in an administrative proceeding deprived them of their right to security of the person contrary to s. 7 of the Charter. In order to do so, a claimant would have to prove, among other factors, the existence of any serious or profound effects that they claim to have suffered and that those effects were in fact caused by the delay. The "evidentiary and causal threshold" that a claimant must overcome in this regard is "high": Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44 at paras. 57, 59-60, 81, 83; Seklani v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2020 FC 778 at para. 43; and Law Society of Saskatchewan v. Abrametz, 2022 SCC 29. [69] Other than a bare assertion of psychological harm to Mr. and Ms. Sikora, the petitioners offered no other evidence in this regard. The Deputy Director rejected the petitioners' Charter delay argument due to a lack of evidence. [70] In the circumstances and on the record of proceedings, the Deputy Director correctly concluded that the Petitioners' rights under s. 7 of the Charter were not engaged. The Deputy Director was also correct in concluding that the amount of time that it took her to conclude the decision-making process to find the Corporate Petitioner liable to pay an administrative monetary penalty did not

engage the petitioners' right to psychological integrity under s. 7 of the Charter. [71] While the Supreme Court of Canada has found that economic interests may engage the protection of security of the person, the standard is one where the impugned economic rights of the claimants are fundamental to human survival: Irwin Toy and Gosselin. The claimants have not pleaded any facts indicating that the monetary penalties imposed or closure of their business rose to the level of impacting their fundamental ability to survive, nor have they otherwise pleaded any form of economic hardship flowing from the Director's administrative actions. The only claim they have pleaded in support of establishing a breach of their security interest is the bare assertion of psychological harm, as noted above, which does not meet the required evidentiary standard Did the Deputy Director proportionately balance the petitioners' reasonable expectation of privacy against the statutory objectives? [72] Section 8 of the Charter guarantees that "[e]veryone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure." This right is engaged where the state conducts a search or seizure that unreasonably interferes with an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy: Goodwin v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 2015 SCC 46 at para. 48. [73] The respondent submits that any reasonable

expectation of privacy that the petitioners had in the store and vehicle that were searched by CSU was diminished given that the petitioners were engaged in the commercial activity of selling a highly regulated product. Reasonable expectations of privacy are necessarily diminished where an individual is engaged in a highly regulated, commercial activity (especially when that activity involves a motor vehicle): Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research, Restrictive Trade Practices Commission), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 at 507 and R. v. Nolet, 2010 SCC 24 at para. 31. [74] The Deputy Director in her reasons noted that the search and seizure at issue here was explicitly authorized by s. 89 of the CCLA, which gives the Director the authority to search for and to seize cannabis from non-residential premises without a warrant where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the sale, supply, production or storage of cannabis has occurred or is occurring. "Premises" are defined in the CCLA as including a "conveyance" such as a motor vehicle: CCLA, s.

87. The cannabis is not required to be in plain view in order to form reasonable grounds. [75] The petitioners referred me to decisions involving prosecution of drug possession and trafficking offences which considered the constitutionality of the federal regulation of medical cannabis, including R. v. Seema, 2022 SKKB 232. They are not helpful in deciding this matter. The constitutionality of s. 89 of the CCLA has not been challenged in these proceedings and thus the provision itself must be deemed to be reasonable. [76] This Court has held that the statutory purposes underlying the CCLA include prioritizing the health and safety of British Columbians, protecting children and youth, reducing crime in the illegal market and supporting economic development opportunities in our province: BC1178980 v British Columbia, 2023 BCSC 1641. The Deputy Director considered these purposes in her decision. [77] While the Deputy Director acknowledged that the petitioners had a privacy interest in their store and vehicle, she concluded that that interest did not outweigh the applicable statutory objectives insofar as the return of the cannabis or the issuance of an administrative monetary penalty was concerned. To this effect, she noted that there was exterior store signage advertising cannabis products for sale. Inside were further indications of cannabis being on offer. Mr. Sikora was

observed making trips back and forth from the vehicle to the store carrying items from the vehicle into the store. One of the CSU officers also observed glass jars that appeared to contain dried cannabis through the tinted hatchback window. The vehicle photos indicate that real possibility that such an observation could have been made. These were jars which the officer recognized as being similar to jars observed in the back of the store. [78] Based on the foregoing facts, I find it is reasonable for the CSU officers to have found that the back room of the store and the vehicle were associated with commercial activity. [79] The Deputy Director found that it would not be a proportionate balancing between the petitioners' rights under s. 8 of the Charter and the CCLA's underlying objectives if the Deputy Director ordered the return of the Seized Cannabis (or compensation) under s. 105 of the CCLA or declined to issue a monetary penalty under s.

94. This is not unreasonable. Conclusion [80] In light of the above, the petition is dismissed. [81] I appreciate that the petitioners operated their business with the intent to benefit persons managing symptoms from a variety of medical conditions. They operated on a retail basis as an alternative to the federal scheme which requires medical cannabis to be obtained from a limited number of providers who must deliver their product by mail. However, given the presumed constitutionality of the legislative scheme, it is not open to the petitioners to offer an alternative and at the same time be compliant with the law. Costs [82] As usual in these circumstances, the respondent did not seek its costs and no costs are ordered. "Wilkinson J."