Munjaral v. Brar

2026 BCSC 767 Munjaral v. Brar IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Munjaral v. Brar, 2026 BCSC 767 Date: 20260429 Docket: S255764 Registry: New Westminster Between: Sunil Munjaral Plaintiff And Manprit Brar Defendant - and - Docket: S255763 Registry: New Westminster Between: Sunil Munjaral Plaintiff And Iqbal Dhesi Defendant Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Sukstorf Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Plaintiff in both actions: S. Singh Counsel for the Defendants in both actions: K. Zimmer Place and Dates of Hearing: New Westminster, B.C. January 28 and 29, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: New Westminster, B.C. April 29, 2026 Table of Contents I. Background.. 3 II. Facts. 4 III. History of the Proceedings. 9 IV. Issues. 10 V. Legal Framework.. 11 1. Exclusive Arbitral Jurisdiction. 11 2. The Two-Step Weber Analysis. 13 3. Application to Tort and Defamation Claims. 14 4. The Limits of Weber: Independent Causes of Action. 14 5. Defamation in the Employment Context 15 6. Synthesis of the Governing Principles. 16 7. Striking Claims for Abuse of Process. 17 8. Leave to Amend. 18 9. Summary Judgment and Dismissal 18 VI. Positions of the Parties. 18 A. Position of the Defendants. 18 B. Position of the Plaintiff 19 VII. Analysis of Issues. 20 A. Issue 1: Jurisdiction. 20 1. The Essential Character of the Dispute. 20 2. Whether the Dispute Falls Within the Collective Agreement 25 3. Conclusion on Jurisdiction. 28 B. Issue 2: Striking the Claim.. 29 C. Issue 3: Leave to Amend. 30 VIII. Disposition.. 30 IX. Costs. 31 I. Background [1] These are two applications brought by the defendants, Manprit Brar and Iqbal Dhesi, to strike separate civil actions commenced by the plaintiff, Sunil Munjaral, against each of them pursuant to Rule 9-5(1) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, B.C. Reg. 168/2009, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 9-6. The applications were heard together as they raise identical issues and arise from the same underlying facts. [2] The claims stem from the termination of the plaintiff's employment as a Licensed Practical Nurse ("LPN") Supervisor with the Fraser Health Authority in December 2022, following a workplace investigation into allegations of serious misconduct that led to his dismissal. The defendants both worked for the Fraser Health Authority and participated in that investigation in accordance with workplace policies and their obligations as employees. Specifically, both defendants provided information concerning their interactions with the plaintiff. Prior to these proceedings, the defendants did not know each other. [3] The plaintiff initially framed his claims as arising from allegedly defamatory statements made by the defendants during the workplace investigation that led to his dismissal. In his amended notice of civil claim, however, he expands the allegations to include statements allegedly made to third parties outside the investigative process, including individuals described as members of his personal or professional circle. [4] The defendants apply to dismiss the actions at a preliminary stage. They submit that, properly characterized, the claims arise from the employment relationship and fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration under the applicable collective agreement. In the alternative, they argue that the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action. [5] The plaintiff maintains that his claims sound in tort for defamation and concern the personal conduct of the defendants, thereby falling within this court's jurisdiction. [6] In his submissions, the plaintiff no longer seeks relief in respect of statements made during the workplace investigation. The distinction between the two categories of alleged statements is central to the analysis. Statements made within a workplace investigation engage the labour relations regime and may raise issues of privilege. By contrast, the plaintiff frames alleged oral statements made to third parties as giving rise to an independent defamation claim. [7] The amended pleading does not clearly distinguish between these categories or articulate distinct legal bases or relief as between them. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's position in submissions, the pleadings continue to advance the allegations as part of a single course of conduct. In these circumstances, both categories of alleged statements form part of the necessary factual matrix against which the plaintiff's claim must be assessed. II. Facts [8] At the material time, the plaintiff was employed by the Fraser Health Authority as an LPN Supervisor. He was a member of the Nurses' Bargaining Association. [9] The plaintiff's employment was governed by the Provincial Collective Agreement between the Nurses' Bargaining Association and the Health Employers Association of British Columbia ("Collective Agreement"). [10] The Collective Agreement provides a comprehensive dispute resolution mechanism. Indeed, Article 9 sets out a grievance procedure and requires that any difference concerning the interpretation, application, operation, or alleged violation of the Collective Agreement be addressed through it. Article 10.01 provides for final and binding arbitration. Further, Article 15.04 provides that employer termination is expressly subject to the processes set out in Articles 9 and 10. [11] Pursuant to Article 31.02 of the Collective Agreement, the employer is required to maintain and provide a Respectful Workplace Policy that recognizes employees' right to a workplace free from bullying and harassment. That provision further contemplates that complaints of such conduct are to be made in accordance with the employer's Respectful Workplace Policy, which must set out the procedures for reporting, responding to, and investigating those complaints. [12] In accordance with the Collective Agreement, Fraser Health has implemented a Respectful Workplace Policy. The policy governs the reporting, investigation, and resolution of workplace complaints and specifically establishes a structured investigative process--including the interviewing of complainants and witnesses and the review of relevant communications--and applies broadly to workplace related conduct, including interactions arising from workplace relationships and communications such as telephone and electronic messaging. [13] In this way, the Respectful Workplace Policy is not merely an internal guideline, but rather forms part of the employment regime established by the Collective Agreement, governing both the reporting of workplace misconduct and the employer's investigation and disciplinary response. [14] The defendants were also employees of Fraser Health. Ms. Brar was employed as a Community Health Worker, and Ms. Dhesi as a Licensed Practical Nurse. While Ms. Brar's employment was governed by a different collective agreement, the evidence establishes that all parties were subject to the same workplace policies, including Fraser Health's Respectful Workplace Policy. [15] During their employment, both defendants had professional interactions with the plaintiff. Ms. Brar worked directly with him during assigned shifts, providing care to patients in the community. While the plaintiff asserts that he did not work directly with Ms. Dhesi, that does not alter the relevant context. All parties were employees of the same employer and subject to the same workplace policies. The allegations giving rise to the investigation arose within that employment setting and were addressed through a formal workplace process in which both defendants were required to participate. [16] In March 2022, Ms. Brar worked night shifts with the plaintiff in his capacity as the LPN Supervisor. In that role, they attended to patients together at various homes, facilities, and hospitals in the community. During this period, Ms. Brar alleged that the plaintiff had engaged in conduct she believed constituted sexual and personal harassment toward her. In her affidavit, she states that she felt unsafe working with him and was hesitant to come forward. As a result, she declined shifts in which he was scheduled to act as the night shift supervisor. [17] After repeatedly declining such shifts, Ms. Brar attests that the White Rock LPN Supervisor, Mirasol Parulan, urged her to disclose the reasons why she was refusing to work some night shifts and why she was asking who would be working as the LPN Supervisor before accepting a night shift. In response to the queries she received from Ms. Parulan, Ms. Brar said she disclosed her concerns about working with the plaintiff during a private and confidential meeting with her. During that meeting, she described what had happened during her night shifts in March 2022. She was urged to discuss her concerns with the Team Leader of Home Support, Ranbir Rai. She then attended a follow-up meeting with both individuals, during which she was questioned further. Later meeting requests sought more information. At one of those meetings, Ms. Brar grew increasingly uncomfortable and left without sharing her experiences working with the plaintiff with those in attendance. [18] In late 2022, Harpreet Chhina from Fraser Health's Human Resource Department became involved. She received the allegations and conducted an investigation pursuant to both the Collective Agreement and Respectful Workplace Policy. [19] During the course of the investigation, Ms. Chhina became aware of communications and videos on the plaintiff's Fraser Health cellphone and email account that caused her to have concerns that the plaintiff was also engaged in personal harassment of Ms. Dhesi, who was also employed by Fraser Health as a casual LPN at the time. Fraser Health, therefore, requested that Ms. Dhesi attend an interview as part of its investigation into the plaintiff. [20] As part of the investigation, both defendants were required by their employer to participate and to provide information concerning their interactions with the plaintiff. Their participation occurred within Fraser Health's internal investigation process and in accordance with their obligations as employees, including responding to questions and providing information to human resources personnel and others responsible for investigating workplace complaints. [21] The investigation involved interviews conducted by Fraser Health personnel and the review of communications and other materials. The information provided by employees, including the defendants, formed part of the evidentiary record considered by the employer. [22] The plaintiff was advised of the allegations made against him during the investigative process and given an opportunity to respond. [23] Following the investigation, Fraser Health concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in misconduct, including harassment of co-workers, breaches of confidentiality, and other violations of workplace policies. By letter dated December 22, 2022, the plaintiff's employment was terminated for cause. [24] In submissions, the plaintiff clarified that he does not seek relief in respect of the employer's decision to terminate his employment or the statements made during the workplace investigation. However, the amended notices of civil claim continue to allege that the defendants' statements were a primary factor in his dismissal. Those allegations underpin his claim for damages, including lost income and reputational harm. Accordingly, although the investigation-related statements are not advanced as independent bases for relief, they remain part of the factual matrix insofar as they are relied upon to establish the cause and consequences of his loss of employment. [25] With respect to those alleged statements made outside the investigation, the amended notices of civil claim contain limited, largely unparticularized allegations. However, in response to a demand for particulars, the plaintiff asserts, in the case of Ms. Brar, that she told two co-workers, Mandip Dhami and Aman Bains, that he had sexually harassed her and forcefully grabbed her wrist. Both individuals are said to have been employees of Fraser Health. [26] Ms. Brar denies making such statements. She deposes that she was uncomfortable discussing the matter and that any description she provided of her interactions with the plaintiff was confined to characterizing his conduct as unprofessional. [27] There is no affidavit evidence from Ms. Bains at all. As for Ms. Dhami, her affidavit does not support the plaintiff's allegations. Her evidence indicates that it was Ms. Dhami--not Ms. Brar--who, during a night shift while they were working together, raised a concern about a co-worker having been sexually harassed. At that time, Ms. Brar did not disclose that she was the individual involved. [28] While there is some divergence in their accounts of what followed, Ms. Dhami states that she later learned from another source that Ms. Brar was the person affected. After Ms. Dhami learned that it was Ms. Brar who had been allegedly sexually harassed, she contacted Ms. Brar directly to ask why she had not said so at the time she raised it. Ms. Brar, for her part, explains that she did not know Ms. Dhami well and was uncomfortable discussing the incident. Ms. Dhami's affidavit is consistent with that explanation, confirming that Ms. Brar ultimately acknowledged she was the individual involved and explained her reluctance to talk about it. [29] Importantly, even read generously, Ms. Dhami's affidavit contains no evidence approaching the plaintiff's allegation that Ms. Brar made the specific statements pleaded. Both the alleged communications and the denial form part of the factual matrix relevant to the jurisdictional analysis. [30] With respect to Ms. Dhesi, the plaintiff alleges that she made statements to Ambreen Muzaffar, another Fraser Health employee, to the effect that the plaintiff "took girls to the hotel" and that she believed he may have "mixed something into a girl's drink with malicious intent." Ms. Dhesi denies making these statements. While the plaintiff relies on Ms. Muzaffar as a recipient of the alleged statements, emails between Ms. Muzaffar and Ms. Dhesi's counsel (which were appended to Ms. Dhesi's affidavit) indicate a reluctance to become involved in the dispute and provide no particulars even remotely consistent with the allegations advanced in the pleadings. [31] It is not alleged that the defendants acted together or in concert. Indeed, the evidence before the Court is that they did not know each other and did not communicate with one another regarding the plaintiff. III. History of the Proceedings [32] In October 2024, the plaintiff commenced two separate actions: one against Ms. Brar and one against Ms. Dhesi. In the original notices of civil claim, the claims were framed squarely in relation to the statements the defendants made during the workplace investigation and its consequences. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants made defamatory statements to Fraser Health's Human Resources Department during that investigation. He further alleged that those statements constituted a primary basis for the termination of his employment and the resulting financial losses he claims to have suffered. [33] In February 2025, the plaintiff filed amended notices of civil claim in both actions. While maintaining the same underlying factual narrative, the amended pleadings recast the claims as arising from alleged defamatory statements made by the defendants both within the workplace investigation and, more broadly, to individuals outside that process. [34] Based on the plaintiff's submissions, the plaintiff now focuses on statements said to have been made outside the workplace investigation to other individuals within the plaintiff's professional circle. Despite this, the amended notices of civil claim do not distinguish between, or sever, those statements from those made within the investigation, nor do they differentiate the relief sought. Rather, all of the alleged statements--whether made within or outside the investigation--are advanced as part of a single course of conduct said to have resulted in the same harm, including the loss of employment. In addition, the alleged external statements are not meaningfully particularized by reference to the specific words used, the recipients, or the circumstances of publication. [35] At paras. 12 and 13 of the Brar Amended Notice of Civil Claim and paras. 15 and 16 of the Dhesi Amended Notice of Civil Claim, the plaintiff alleges that the impugned statements were widely disseminated among his peers, professional circles, and the broader community, causing significant harm to his reputation, personal and professional relationships, and emotional well-being. He further pleads that those same statements constituted a primary basis for the termination of his employment with the Fraser Health Authority, resulting in substantial financial losses. [36] On April 9, 2025, a case planning conference was held before Associate Judge Hughes in both actions. It was ordered that the defendants' dismissal applications be heard together and determined before any further steps were taken in the litigation. IV. Issues [37] These applications raise the following issues: [38] First, whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims. This requires the Court to determine whether, notwithstanding that the claims are framed in tort, their essential character arises from the employment relationship and the workplace investigation that led to the plaintiff's termination. [39] Second, in light of that conclusion, whether the proceeding should be struck pursuant to Rule 9-5 or dismissed pursuant to Rule 9-6. [40] Finally, if any portion of the claims is found to be deficient, whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend. V. Legal Framework [41] As referenced above, the plaintiff's claim, as advanced in the amended notices of civil claim, engages two categories of alleged statements. While those categories are said to arise in different contexts, both must be assessed having regard to the full factual matrix, including the employment relationship and the Collective Agreement governing the plaintiff. [42] In light of the fact that the underlying issue is the plaintiff's termination of employment under the Collective Agreement, the analysis proceeds by first determining whether the claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration under the governing principles in Weber v. Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 929, 1995 CanLII 108, and its progeny. If so, the Court must decline jurisdiction and consider whether to strike the proceeding as an abuse of process. 1. Exclusive Arbitral Jurisdiction [43] As a general rule, superior courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims in contract and tort. However, a well-established exception arises where the essential character of a dispute is grounded in the interpretation, application, administration, or alleged violation of a collective agreement. Where the essential character of the dispute, viewed in its factual matrix, arises from the employment relationship and falls within the ambit of a collective agreement, the courts are precluded from adjudicating it: Weber at paras. 52, 67. In a unionized workplace, allegations of misconduct, the reporting of those allegations, and the employer's investigation and disciplinary response are all matters that engage the application and operation of a collective agreement. [44] In British Columbia, this framework is reinforced by the Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 244. More specifically, s. 84(2) of the Labour Relations Code requires that every collective agreement provide for the final and binding resolution of "all disputes" between the parties respecting the interpretation, application, operation, or alleged violation of the agreement. The breadth of that language is significant. It extends beyond disputes concerning the formal act of dismissal or discipline to include disputes arising from the processes and conduct that inform and give rise to those decisions. [45] Further, where a collective agreement does not contain a mandatory arbitration clause for resolving disputes, s. 84(3)(b) deems it to contain one. [46] Section 89 of the Labour Relations Code confers broad remedial authority on an arbitrator to provide a "final and conclusive settlement" of disputes arising under a collective agreement. That authority is expressly stated to be "without limitation" and includes the power to award monetary compensation for injury or loss, reinstate an employee, rescind or vary discipline, and substitute measures that are just and equitable in the circumstances. It also empowers the arbitrator to grant procedural relief and, where necessary, to interpret and apply statutes regulating the employment relationship to resolve the dispute. [47] This remedial framework is sufficiently expansive to address not only dismissal or discipline but also the consequences arising from workplace disputes, including financial loss resulting from termination. In this way, the statutory regime provides a complete and effective remedy for disputes arising from the employment relationship, even where those disputes are framed in terms of reputational harm or alleged wrongdoing by co-workers. [48] That said, the Labour Relations Code and related jurisprudence do not confer universal jurisdiction on labour arbitrators. The scope of arbitral jurisdiction depends on both the nature of the dispute and the terms of the applicable collective agreement. Jurisdiction will only rest exclusively with labour arbitrators in disputes whose essential character arises from the employment relationship and is inextricably linked to a collective agreement. In some circumstances, jurisdiction may be concurrent or lie with another tribunal: Goudie v. Ottawa (City), 2003 SCC 14 at paras. 24-26; Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Canadian Pacific System Federation v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 495, 1996 CanLII 215. [49] The determination of jurisdiction is a practical and fact-driven inquiry. The court must identify the true nature of the dispute and assess whether it is rooted in the employment relationship and the rights and obligations established by the applicable collective agreement. The question is whether, viewed in its essential character, the claim arises from the employment relationship and the administration of the collective agreement. If so, exclusive arbitral jurisdiction is engaged. 2. The Two-Step Weber Analysis [50] In Stuart v. Hugh, 2009 BCCA 127, the British Columbia Court of Appeal adopted the two-step Weber analysis. In Stuart, the main issue was whether the defamation claim brought by Mr. Stuart against the Surrey School Board and Richard Hugh ought to proceed in court or be resolved through the grievance arbitration process under the collective agreement governing Mr. Stuart's employment. The chambers judge initially dismissed the defamation action, finding that the collective agreement applied and the court lacked jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal overturned the chambers judge's dismissal, finding an absence of any meaningful connection between the impugned statements and a process governed by the collective agreement. [51] In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeal adopted the two-part test set out in Weber at para. 51 and restated by Regina Police Assn. Inc. v. Regina (City) Board of Police Commissioners, 2000 SCC 14 at para. 25., to determine whether the defamation dispute fell within the scope of the collective agreement: a) determine the essential character of the dispute based on the factual context, not just how the legal issues are framed; and b) examine the provisions of the collective agreement to see if it contemplates resolving such disputes, either explicitly or implicitly. (See Stuart at para. 37.) [52] Based on the specific facts in Stuart, the Court concluded that the essential character of the defamation dispute did not arise under the collective agreement, despite the close connection to Mr. Stuart's employment and the chambers judge's initial finding that it was covered: at paras. 44-46. 3. Application to Tort and Defamation Claims [53] Weber makes clear that the existence of a tort claim does not, in itself, confer jurisdiction on the courts. Claims in tort, including those for wrongful dismissal, conspiracy, and damage to reputation, may fall within arbitral jurisdiction where their essential character is grounded in the employment relationship and arises from the collective agreement: at para. 53. [54] This principle has been consistently applied in British Columbia. Indeed, in Masjoody v. Trotignon, 2022 BCCA 135, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of a civil action in defamation and conspiracy on the basis that the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour arbitration regime. Applying the Weber framework, the Court emphasized that the inquiry turns on the essential character of the dispute, assessed in light of the factual matrix rather than the legal labels attached to the claim. Further, the Court concluded that, notwithstanding the tort framing of the claims, including defamation, the dispute was overwhelmingly and inextricably bound up with the plaintiff's employment as the impugned statements arose from workplace complaints and communications within the employment context. As such, they fell within the exclusive arbitral regime. 4. The Limits of Weber: Independent Causes of Action [55] The jurisprudence also confirms that not all claims involving co-workers are captured by the labour regime. In Hall v. Puchniak, 107 Man. R. (2d) 93, 1995 CanLII 11029 (Man. C.A.), the Court held that a defamation claim against a co-worker may proceed notwithstanding a collective agreement where the alleged wrong is independent of the employment contract and not remediable through arbitration. In Hall, the plaintiff's supervisor issued a written reprimand containing allegedly defamatory statements that was circulated to other employees. Although the underlying disciplinary dispute was resolved through arbitration, the Court held that the defamation claim could proceed because it arose from a distinct publication that caused reputational harm, for which the arbitral process could provide no remedy. [56] However, the principle in Hall does not displace Weber. The question remains whether the claim, in its essential character, arises from the employment relationship. If it does, the fact that a different remedy is sought will not, on its own, confer jurisdiction on the court. 5. Defamation in the Employment Context [57] The authorities also recognize that defamation claims require a more nuanced analysis. Not all defamatory statements arising in or around the workplace fall within arbitral jurisdiction. [58] In Phillips v. Harrison, 2000 MBCA 150, the Manitoba Court of Appeal identified a useful framework for determining when allegedly defamatory statements are properly characterized as workplace disputes. Defamation will generally fall within the labour regime where: 1) the statements concern the employee's character or capacity as an employee; 2) the statements are made by a person with a workplace duty or role to communicate such concerns; and 3) the statements are made to persons who would reasonably be expected to receive workplace-related information. (See Phillips at para. 71. ) [59] Where these factors are present, the dispute is likely to be characterized as a workplace dispute governed by a collective agreement, even if framed as defamation. [60] Conversely, where the statements relate to purely personal matters, are made outside any workplace duty, or are communicated to individuals outside the workplace context, the dispute may fall outside the ambit of the collective agreement and remain within the jurisdiction of the courts. [61] However, it is important to note that the second Phillips factor does not render the application of the Weber principle dependent on the identity of the defendant. The fact that a claim is brought against individual co-workers, rather than the employer, does not, without more, confer jurisdiction on the court. [62] Phillips has been applied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal several times, including in Masjoody, where the Court held: [36] In my view, the Phillips framework is a useful, but not exclusive, means of examining whether defamatory statements are subject to mandatory dispute resolution procedures within collective agreements. The broader Weber framework continues to govern. If the Phillips framework indicates that defamatory statements are work‑related, the essential character of the dispute concerns subject matter that is covered by the collective agreement. If it does not, it is necessary, in my view, for the court to dig deeper to determine if the defamatory statements nevertheless arise out of the interpretation, application, administration or violation of the collective agreement. 6. Synthesis of the Governing Principles [63] The governing principles may be summarized as follows: a) the court must look to the essential character of the dispute, not its legal form; b) where that dispute is inextricably bound up with the employment relationship and a collective agreement, jurisdiction lies exclusively with labour arbitration; c) this includes claims framed in tort, such as defamation, where they arise from workplace duties, relationships, or processes; d) however, defamation claims may proceed in court where they are truly independent of the employment relationship, including where they concern personal matters or communications outside any workplace function; and e) the analysis is fact-specific, requiring close attention to: i. the nature of the statements; ii. the capacity in which they were made; iii. the audience; and iv. their connection to workplace. 7. Striking Claims for Abuse of Process [64] The defendants rely on Rule 9-5(1)(d), which permits the court to strike a pleading where it constitutes an abuse of process. [65] The doctrine of abuse of process is flexible and engages the court's inherent jurisdiction to prevent misuse of its procedure in a manner that would be manifestly unfair or would otherwise bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., 2013 SCC 26 at para. 40, citing Enterprises Inc. v. Coles, 51 O.R. (3d) 481 at paras. 55-56, 2000 CanLII 8514 (O.N.C.A.), aff'd 2002 SCC 63. [66] Proceedings may constitute an abuse of process where they are duplicative, seek to relitigate matters properly addressed in another forum, or otherwise undermine the integrity, consistency, and finality of the adjudicative process: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63 at para. 37. [67] An order striking a claim on this basis will only be made in the clearest of cases: A.M. v. Dr. F, 2021 BCSC 32 at para. 63; Strata Plan KAS 1691 v. City of Kamloops, 2004 BCSC 1231 at para. 20. 8. Leave to Amend [68] Where a claim is struck, the Court retains discretion to grant leave to amend. Determining whether to grant leave to amend requires consideration of the degree to which the pleadings are deficient, the extent to which the deficiencies may be addressed by an obvious or straightforward amendment, the apparent merit of the claim, and prejudice by dismissal of the claim: Jones v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 2018 BCCA 381 at para. 53. Leave should not be granted where the defect is not capable of being cured, including where the claim is barred as a matter of jurisdiction: see, for example, Carruthers v. Comox Valley School District No. 71, 2025 BCSC 2137 at para. 75. 9. Summary Judgment and Dismissal [69] In the alternative, the defendants rely on Rule 9-6(5)(a), which permits the court to summarily dismiss a claim where it is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial. [70] Establishing that there is no triable issue is a high bar. Indeed, to meet this test, the party seeking dismissal must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the other party is bound to lose: Lyons v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2025 BCCA 22 at para. 2. VI. Positions of the Parties A. Position of the Defendants [71] The defendants submit that, notwithstanding the manner in which the claims are framed, the substance of the dispute arises from the plaintiff's employment and the workplace investigation that led to his termination. [72] They rely on the principles in Weber and subsequent appellate authorities, including Masjoody, to argue that: a) the essential character of the dispute concerns workplace conduct, reporting, and discipline; b) the claims are therefore inextricably bound up with the employment relationship and fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration; and c) this Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate them. [73] In the alternative, the defendants submit that the pleadings disclose no reasonable cause of action and should be struck pursuant to Rule 9-5. They argue that the alleged external statements are not pleaded with sufficient particularity to establish a claim in defamation and do not constitute independent or severable causes of action. [74] They further submit that there is no genuine issue for trial as the material facts are not in dispute and the claim cannot succeed as a matter of law. They therefore submit that the claim should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 9-6(5). B. Position of the Plaintiff [75] The plaintiff submits that the essential character of the dispute is not grounded in the interpretation, application, or administration of the Collective Agreement, but rather in the alleged making of false and defamatory statements by the defendants. [76] He argues that the impugned statements were made in a personal capacity and, in particular, that certain statements were made to individuals who were not involved in the workplace investigation and were not subject to any employment-related duty. On that basis, he contends that those communications fall outside the scope of the labour relations regime and remain within the jurisdiction of this Court. [77] The plaintiff further submits that, although the underlying events occurred in a workplace setting and included an investigation, the claim he advances is not a "workplace problem" governed by the Collective Agreement, but rather a "problem at the workplace." In his submission, the impugned statements made by the defendants to individuals outside the investigation constitute personal communications made outside any employment duty and therefore give rise to an independent tort claim properly within the jurisdiction of this Court. [78] Finally, the plaintiff submits that the claim seeks to vindicate a personal interest in reputation, which is independent of the Collective Agreement and not remediable through the grievance process. VII. Analysis of Issues [79] The applications raise a threshold issue that must be resolved at the outset, as it is determinative of both actions. The Court must decide whether the plaintiff's claims, although framed in tort against individual co-employees, are in their essential character disputes arising from the employment relationship and the workplace investigation that led to his termination. If so, the claims fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration pursuant to the governing Collective Agreement and the principles articulated in Weber and this Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate them. If not, the Court must then consider whether the pleadings disclose a viable cause of action or should be struck under Rule 9-5 or, alternatively, dismissed under Rule 9-6. A. Issue 1: Jurisdiction 1. The Essential Character of the Dispute [80] In determining the threshold issue, the Court must first determine the essential character of the dispute, having regard to the nature of the allegations and the context in which they arise. Although the plaintiff now seeks to rely primarily on statements said to have been made outside the workplace investigation, those alleged communications must be assessed in the context of the broader factual matrix, including the workplace allegations, the ensuing investigation, and the termination that followed. [81] The plaintiff amended his pleadings to assert that certain statements were made outside the context of the investigation in an effort to characterize those communications as independent tortious conduct. However, the issue is not whether such a distinction can be articulated in the pleadings, but whether it meaningfully alters the essential character of the dispute. [82] The plaintiff alleges that the defendants made false statements about him that caused reputational harm and were a primary cause of his termination and his inability to secure subsequent employment in his profession. Those allegations arise from workplace interactions between the parties and include statements said to have been made outside the investigative process that led to his termination. [83] The plaintiff also relies on the personal nature of his relationship with the defendants in support of his position that certain statements fall outside the employment context. At the same time, he pleads that the impugned statements allegedly made outside the investigation were a primary cause of his termination and resulting losses, including lost income. [84] The plaintiff relies on Stuart in support of his submission that the claim reflects a "problem in the workplace" rather than a "workplace problem." In that case, the impugned statements were made by a vice-principal to law enforcement in response to a public disturbance involving potentially criminal conduct on school property. The statements were made in the course of assisting police and would have attracted the same response regardless of the employment relationship: at para. 44. [85] That reasoning does not assist the plaintiff. Here, the alleged statements arise directly from workplace allegations of misconduct, the reporting of those concerns, and the employer's investigation and disciplinary response conducted pursuant to policies incorporated into the Collective Agreement. In these circumstances, the impugned statements are not independent of the employment relationship but rather form part of the same factual matrix governed by the Collective Agreement. [86] More specifically, the fact that the allegations may imply criminal conduct, as in Stuart, does not, without more, transform a workplace dispute into a purely personal one. Nor were the statements here made to law enforcement or any external authority; rather, they remained within the workplace context. [87] The plaintiff also argues that the allegations arose from an ongoing interpersonal conflict with Ms. Dhesi. This characterization does not alter the analysis, as the alleged communications arise from workplace interactions and relate directly to allegations of workplace misconduct. [88] As a matter of principle, defamatory statements made outside any workplace duty and independent of the employment relationship may, in appropriate circumstances, fall outside the scope of a collective agreement. [89] This case is closely analogous to Masjoody, in which the Court of Appeal held that claims framed in defamation were, in substance, grounded in a workplace dispute and fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitral regime: at paras. 42-47. As in that case, the impugned statements here arose from a workplace investigation, were communicated within the employment context, and are said to have resulted in reputational and employment-related harm. [90] In Masjoody, the Court also considered a defamation claim arising from a co-worker complaint and related internal communications within a university setting. Although the plaintiff characterized aspects of the dispute as personal in nature, the Court held that the essential character of the claim was inextricably bound up with his employment, including allegations of workplace harassment, the employer's response, and the consequences for his employment. The Court emphasized that personal elements within a dispute do not alter its characterization where, viewed in its entirety, the claim arises from workplace conduct and its consequences. The same reasoning applies here. [91] The plaintiff pleads that Ms. Brar told two co-workers, Ms. Dhami and Ms. Bains, that he had sexually harassed her and forcefully grabbed her wrist, and that she further disseminated allegations of specific misconduct to colleagues, supervisors, and others within his professional circle. [92] The plaintiff also alleges that Ms. Dhesi made a statement to Ms. Muzaffar between December 2022 and January 2023, which he characterizes as a "character assassination," asserting that he "took girls to hotels" and surreptitiously placed substances in their drinks. [93] While the plaintiff identifies certain recipients--such as named co-workers and Ms. Muzaffar--and provides a general description of the alleged statements, the particulars remain limited. The pleadings do not consistently set out the specific words used, the circumstances in which the statements were made, or the extent of their dissemination. The affidavit evidence similarly does not meaningfully fill these gaps. [94] While the strength or weakness of the evidence is not determinative at this stage, the absence of particularized allegations and supporting material informs the Court's ability to characterize the nature of the alleged communications. [95] In these circumstances, the plaintiff cannot, by isolating particular communications or relying on the identity of their recipients, transform the essential character of the dispute. The authorities relied upon by the plaintiff, including Mendoza v. Hernandez, 53 B.C.L.R. (3d) 177, 1998 CanLII 4797 (B.C.S.C.), and Phillips, do not assist him. Those cases recognize that statements made outside the scope of employment duties may, in some circumstances, ground independent claims. However, they do not alter the governing principle that jurisdiction turns on the essential character of the dispute. [96] The plaintiff relies on Mendoza to argue that certain statements made to third parties fall outside the Collective Agreement. However, that case is distinguishable. In Mendoza, the impugned statement concerned a personal characteristic unrelated to the plaintiff's role as an employee and was not made in furtherance of any workplace function. By contrast, the alleged statements in this case are grounded in allegations of workplace misconduct and arise from the same factual matrix as the investigation and termination. They relate directly to the plaintiff's interactions with co-workers and his fitness for employment. Viewed in their essential character, they are inextricably bound up with the employment relationship and do not constitute the kind of independent, personal dispute contemplated in Mendoza. [97] Further, I note that Mendoza has received negative treatment by this Court. Indeed, in Westmoreland v. Gorman, 2003 BCSC 447, the Court found that the approach in Mendoza was not aligned with the principles set out in Weber: at para. 32. [98] Additionally, the seriousness of the allegations, including the possibility that they may imply criminal conduct, does not alter the essential character of the dispute when they arise in the context of workplace interactions and are addressed through workplace processes. [99] Based on the pleadings and the evidence, to the extent the alleged communications occurred, they appear to have arisen within a workplace context and to have been made to persons within the workplace who could reasonably be connected to the subject matter of the alleged concerns. For example, the interaction between Ms. Brar and Ms. Dhami occurred during a night shift as part of their work. On the evidence, it was Ms. Dhami who raised the concern and sought information, with Ms. Brar providing limited confirmation only after the fact. [100] It is also relevant that if the impugned comments were made, they were directed at other co-workers in the same workplace. This supports the conclusion that the communications were not gratuitous or purely personal but were functionally connected to the management of workplace risk and, therefore, to the employment relationship. [101] In any event, the absence of clear particulars in the pleadings regarding what exactly was said and the circumstances of the alleged communication underscores the difficulty in characterizing this aspect of the claim as an independent, stand-alone wrong. [102] While the plaintiff characterizes certain communications as occurring outside the workplace, the pleadings and evidence do not support that distinction. At most, they can be said to have occurred outside the formal investigative process. That distinction does not alter the essential character of the dispute. Viewed in substance, the claim arises from workplace complaints, the ensuing investigation, and the employer's disciplinary response. [103] The alleged external communications are not separate but are rather factually and functionally intertwined with that same matrix. In substance, the alleged external statements reflect the same underlying allegations of workplace misconduct being discussed among employees outside the formal investigative process, rather than separate or independent publications. [104] Nothing in these reasons should be taken as foreclosing the possibility that a properly pleaded claim based solely on independent external communications, unconnected to the workplace investigation or its consequences, could fall outside the arbitral regime. However, even accepting the plaintiff's argument at its highest, that is not the case here. As a whole, I find that the pleadings in this dispute remain rooted in the workplace investigation and its consequences. It is therefore necessary to consider whether the dispute, so characterized, falls within the scope of the Collective Agreement. 2. Whether the Dispute Falls Within the Collective Agreement [105] The second step in the Weber analysis requires the Court to consider whether the dispute, as characterized, falls within the ambit of the Collective Agreement, either expressly or by necessary implication. [106] Because the jurisdictional issue arises from the plaintiff's claims and the consequences of his termination, the primary focus is the Collective Agreement governing his employment. While the defendants were employed under different collective agreements, the record establishes that all parties were subject to the same employer policies governing workplace conduct, including the Respectful Workplace Policy, which is expressly contemplated by and incorporated into the applicable collective agreements. [107] As set out above, the statutory framework and the Collective Agreement together establish a comprehensive regime governing workplace disputes. Consistent with that statutory mandate, the Collective Agreement provides a mandatory grievance and arbitration process for disputes arising out of the employment relationship. Indeed, Article 9.01 provides that any "difference concerning the interpretation, application, operation or any alleged violation" of the Collective Agreement must be resolved through that process, culminating in a final and binding arbitral decision, as provided for in Article 10.01. [108] The Collective Agreement also addresses workplace conduct and the reporting of concerns through incorporated employer policies. In particular, the Respectful Workplace Policy establishes a structured regime that requires employees to report workplace concerns and obligates the employer to investigate allegations of misconduct. That process includes gathering information from employees, interviewing witnesses, and assessing workplace interactions to determine whether discipline is warranted. [109] As discussed above, s. 84(2) of the Labour Relations Code requires that all disputes respecting the interpretation, application, operation, or alleged violation of a collective agreement be resolved through a final and binding arbitration process. That language has been interpreted broadly to encompass not only the ultimate decision to dismiss or discipline, but also the underlying circumstances giving rise to that decision, including workplace complaints, investigations, and related communications between employees. [110] Unlike in Hall, where the claim arose from a discrete act of publication--namely, a written reprimand circulated within the workplace giving rise to an independent claim for reputational harm--the alleged communications in this case arise from co-workers reporting concerns about the plaintiff's conduct and participating in an employer-driven process addressing those concerns. Even where some statements are said to have been made outside the formal investigation, they are alleged to have been communicated to other employees within the workplace and in the context of those same concerns. They do not constitute stand-alone, independent publications, but rather form part of a continuum of workplace communications that are functionally connected to the investigation, the assessment of workplace conduct, and the resulting disciplinary decision. As such, they are not properly characterized as distinct and independent publications for the purposes of the jurisdictional analysis. [111] The reporting and discussion of workplace concerns are integral to the employer's ability to investigate and manage workplace conduct and fall within the scope of obligations and processes governed by the Collective Agreement. The absence of a formal reporting duty to a particular recipient does not, in itself, remove such communications from the scope of the employment relationship where they arise from workplace concerns and are reasonably connected to the employer's ability to investigate and address those concerns. [112] While the plaintiff relies on Phillips for the framework for assessing whether defamatory statements are work-related, it is noted that the case arose in a materially different context. As noted by the Court, there was no collective agreement in force and no provision for final and binding third-party adjudication of disputes. The analysis was therefore undertaken in the absence of an exclusive arbitral regime of the kind engaged by s. 84 of the Labour Relations Code. While the framework described in Phillips may assist in analyzing the nature of particular communications, it does not displace the broader inquiry mandated by Weber, which governs in the present case. [113] In that sense, the alleged communications remain functionally connected to the employment relationship and the employer's processes for addressing workplace misconduct. They arise from, and are functionally connected to, the employment relationship and the employer's processes for addressing workplace misconduct. Whether made during the formal investigation or in the course of workplace interactions related to those concerns, they remain rooted in the same factual matrix and, by necessary implication, are governed by the Collective Agreement. [114] Further, as explained above, s. 89 of the Labour Relations Code provides a broad and flexible range of remedies, including the authority to award monetary compensation for injury or loss and to address the consequences of discipline or termination. While an arbitrator does not adjudicate tort claims, the remedial powers conferred by the statute are sufficiently expansive to provide meaningful relief for the losses alleged by the plaintiff, including financial loss arising from the termination of his employment. [115] The absence of identical remedies does not confer jurisdiction where the arbitral process provides a meaningful avenue to address the underlying dispute and its consequences. The remedial scheme under the Labour Relations Code and the Collective Agreement is sufficiently broad to address the harm alleged by the plaintiff, including the consequences flowing from the investigation and the termination of his employment. In these circumstances, there is no meaningful remedial gap and therefore no basis to conclude that recourse to the courts is required. [116] I find that the matters in dispute are integrally connected to the employment relationship and fall squarely within the scope of the Collective Agreement and the statutory regime. Unlike the framework considered in Phillips, the present framework provides for binding third-party adjudication and a full remedial process through arbitration. Accordingly, the grievance and arbitration regime has exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute. 3. Conclusion on Jurisdiction [117] While it is theoretically possible for statements made outside the workplace context to give rise to independent claims, that is not how the present claim is framed. [118] On the pleadings as they stand, the plaintiff's claims are inextricably bound up with the workplace investigation and the consequences that followed, including his termination. [119] Viewed in its essential character, the dispute arises from the employment relationship and concerns matters governed, at least implicitly, by the Collective Agreement, including the reporting of workplace concerns, the investigation of employee conduct, and the imposition of discipline. These are matters that fall within the scope of the grievance and arbitration process mandated by s. 84 of the Labour Relations Code and the dispute resolution provisions of the Collective Agreement. [120] Accordingly, the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labour arbitration regime, and this Court lacks jurisdiction over the claims as pleaded. B. Issue 2: Striking the Claim [121] In light of my conclusion on jurisdiction, the next issue is not whether the plaintiff's claim is viable, but whether it is properly brought in this forum. [122] Where a dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of a statutory dispute resolution regime, the commencement of parallel proceedings in this Court seeking to reframe the same dispute constitutes an improper use of the Court's process. It risks undermining the integrity, consistency, and finality of that statutory regime. [123] In this case, the plaintiff's claim seeks to litigate, in the guise of a defamation action, matters arising from a workplace investigation and its consequences. As set out above, those matters fall squarely within the scope of the Collective Agreement and the mandatory grievance and arbitration process. Permitting this action to proceed would allow the plaintiff to circumvent that regime by recasting it as a fundamentally workplace dispute. [124] In these circumstances, the proceeding constitutes an abuse of process within the meaning of Rule 9-5(1)(d). It is clear that the continuation of these two actions in this Court would be abusive. [125] In light of this finding, it is not necessary for me to consider whether there is a genuine issue for trial under Rule 9-6(5)(a). C. Issue 3: Leave to Amend [126] As indicated above, it is inappropriate to allow leave to amend when a claim is barred by lack of jurisdiction. As I have found that exclusive jurisdiction over this matter lies with the labour arbitrator, it is not appropriate to grant the plaintiff leave to amend. [127] This finding is reinforced by my conclusion that the plaintiff's claim constitutes an abuse of process. VIII. Disposition [128] For the reasons set out above, the defendants' applications are granted. [129] I have concluded that the plaintiff's claims, in their essential character, arise from the employment relationship and the workplace investigation that led to his termination. As such, the dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of labour arbitration under the applicable Collective Agreement. This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims. [130] In these circumstances, it would be an improper use of this Court's process to permit the action to proceed. The claim attempts to recast a workplace dispute to circumvent the mandatory grievance and arbitration regime. [131] I am satisfied that it is clear that the continuation of this action in this Court would constitute an abuse of process. [132] Accordingly, the plaintiff's claims are struck pursuant to Rule 9-5(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules. [133] Given the nature of the defect, which arises from the Court's lack of jurisdiction and the improper use of this forum, leave to amend is neither appropriate nor required. IX. Costs [134] In the event they were successful, the defendants sought leave to make submissions on costs. [135] Accordingly, they may make written submissions, not exceeding five pages, within 14 days of the date of these reasons. [136] Reply submissions, if any, shall not exceed two pages and shall be delivered within seven days thereafter. "S. Sukstorf J."