Canada Judgment

Supreme Court of British Columbia

Tayes v. Snarr

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Professional case brief

Research organized from the available case record

Source document

01

Holding and result

Renewal granted for six months because the plaintiff made prompt and diligent efforts to serve, the COVID-19 pandemic and a defendant's death made timely personal service impracticable through no fault of the plaintiff, and the defendants would not be prejudiced (insurers likely had notice); alternate service was denied because Ms. Jones was located, cooperative and not shown to be evading service and there was adequate time during the renewal period to effect personal service.

Court disposition

Notice of civil claim renewed for six months; application for alternate service dismissed.

Orders

  • Notice of civil claim renewed for six months from July 14, 2020.
  • Application for alternate service on Melody Snarr (aka Melody Jones) dismissed.

02

Material facts

Parties

Taryn Jennie Tayes

Plaintiff Counsel: W.T. Rogers

Melody Snarr (aka Melody Jones)

Defendant

Margaret Jones

Defendant

Chelsea Garvin

Defendant

Susan Ramsay

Defendant

03

Procedural history

  1. Posture

    Civil Claim – Personal Injury (motor Vehicle Collision) / Application to Renew Notice of Civil Claim and Application for Alternate Service (written Submissions)

04

Questions and positions

Legal issues

Party arguments

Applicant
Plaintiff submitted she made timely and diligent efforts to serve the notice of civil claim but was prevented by the COVID-19 pandemic, that one defendant was deceased and one was quarantined in the United States, that she applied promptly to renew and requested alternate service on Ms. Jones to ensure ability to pursue compensation and to identify and serve a representative of the deceased defendant's estate.
Respondent
No appearance by defendants; no opposing submissions. Court notes implicit defence position that there is no demonstrable prejudice from renewal, insurers likely had notice under the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, and that Ms. Jones was located and not evading service.

05

Court’s reasoning

  1. 01

    Supreme Court Civil Rules, Rule 3-2 (British Columbia)

    Court may renew a notice of civil claim not served within twelve months for up to twelve months.

  2. 02

    Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Michelin North America (Canada) Inc., 2008 BCCA (citing factors)

    Factors to govern renewal include promptness of application, defendant's prior notice, prejudice to defendant, whether failure to serve is attributable to defendant and whether plaintiff personally was at fault.

  3. 03

    Supreme Court Civil Rules, Rule 4-4 (British Columbia)

    Court may order alternate service where personal service is impracticable, the person cannot be found after diligent search, or is evading service.

  4. 04

    Sutherland v. McLeod, 2004 BCCA

    Overarching objective of the Rules is to see that justice is done; discretion exercised to achieve just outcomes.

06

Ratio, limits and disposition

Ratio decidendi

Renewal granted for six months because the plaintiff made prompt and diligent efforts to serve, the COVID-19 pandemic and a defendant's death made timely personal service impracticable through no fault of the plaintiff, and the defendants would not be prejudiced (insurers likely had notice); alternate service was denied because Ms. Jones was located, cooperative and not shown to be evading service and there was adequate time during the renewal period to effect personal service.

Obiter and limits

  • If renewal were denied the plaintiff's ability to pursue full compensation would be significantly compromised.
  • Insurers likely received notice of the action under s.22 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act and thus the defence would not be prejudiced by renewal.
  • If personal service on Ms. Jones later proves impracticable or she cannot be found or is evading service, the plaintiff may bring a further application for alternate service.
  • A six month renewal was viewed as sufficient to identify and serve a representative of the deceased defendant's estate.

Court disposition

Notice of civil claim renewed for six months; application for alternate service dismissed.

  • Notice of civil claim renewed for six months from July 14, 2020.
  • Application for alternate service on Melody Snarr (aka Melody Jones) dismissed.

Source and reliance status

Supreme Court of British Columbia · 14 July 2020

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Judgment reading view

Judgment text

The complete available source text.

Source document

Supreme Court of British Columbia

Judgment· 14 July 2020

2020 BCSC 1041

2020 BCSC 1041 Tayes v. Snarr

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Tayes v. Snarr, 2020 BCSC 1041 Date: 20200714 Docket: 29329 Registry: Cranbrook Between: Taryn Jennie Tayes Plaintiff And Melody Snarr also known as Melody Jones, Margaret Jones, Chelsea Garvin and Susan Ramsay Defendants Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Marchand Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Plaintiff: W.T. Rogers Counsel for the Defendants: No appearance Written Submissions Received: July 9, 2020 Place and Date of Judgment: Cranbrook, B.C. July 14, 2020 Introduction [1] Taryn Jennie Tayes was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Nelson, British Columbia on July 4, 2017. At the time of the accident, she was a passenger in a vehicle owned by Margaret Jones and driven by Melody Snarr (also known as Melody Jones) that collided with a vehicle owned by Susan Ramsay and driven by Chelsea Garvin. [2] On June 24, 2019, Ms. Tayes filed a notice of civil claim seeking compensation for injuries she suffered in the accident. She named Ms. Jones, Ms. Snarr, Ms. Ramsay and Ms. Garvin as defendants. [3] Ms. Tayes served the notice of civil claim on Ms. Ramsay on May 27, 2020 and on Ms. Snarr on June 23, 2020. On June 17, 2020, Ms. Tayes became aware that Ms. Garvin is deceased. On June 23, 2020, Ms. Tayes learned that Ms. Jones had been diagnosed with COVID-19 and was quarantined in the United States. As a result, despite diligent

efforts, Ms. Tayes was unable to serve Ms. Garvin and Ms. Jones prior to the expiry of the notice of civil claim on June 24, 2020. [4] Ms. Tayes has applied by way of written submission for orders renewing the notice of civil claim for twelve months and permitting alternate service on Ms. Jones. Application to Renew the Notice of Civil Claim [5] Rule 3-2 empowers the court to renew a notice of civil claim that has not been served within twelve months of its filing for a period of not more than twelve months. [6] There are five factors governing the exercise of discretion to renew a writ: · whether the application to renew was made promptly; · whether the defendant had notice of the claim before the notice of civil claim expired; · whether the defendant was prejudiced; · whether the failure to effect service was attributable to the defendant; and · whether the plaintiff, as opposed to his solicitor, was at fault. (See: Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Michelin North America (Canada) Inc. (2008), 81 BCLR (4th) 99 (CA) at paras. 9 and 16). [7] The overarching objective is to see that justice is done: Sutherland v. McLeod (2004), 44 BCLR (4th) 265 (CA). [8] This is a clear case calling for a renewal of the notice of civil claim. [9] Ms. Tayes made timely and diligent efforts to serve the notice of civil claim. Her ability to do so was compromised during the pandemic. Further, while

endeavouring to serve all of the defendants, she learned that she would be unable to personally serve Ms. Garvin, who had passed away, and Ms. Jones, who was quarantined in the United States. That was no one's fault. Ms. Tayes then applied very promptly to renew the notice of civil claim. [10] On the other side of the ledger, I can think of no prejudice to the defence if the renewal is granted. While I do not know whether Ms. Garvin or Ms. Jones were aware of the notice of civil claim, their insurers were certainly aware that Ms. Tayes intended to advance a claim and very likely received notice of the action in accordance with s. 22 of the Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231. [11] In all of the circumstances, the interests of justice demand that the notice of civil claim be renewed. If it is not, Ms. Tayes' ability to pursue full compensation for her injuries will be significantly compromised. If it is, the defence will suffer no prejudice. [12] A renewal of the notice of civil claim is necessary to give Ms. Tayes an opportunity to identify and serve a representative of Ms. Garvin's estate, to serve Ms. Jones and to advance her claim. A renewal of six months should be more than adequate. Application for Alternate Service [13] Rule 4-4 empowers the court to make an order for alternate service if it is impracticable to serve a document by personal service, or if the

person to be personally served cannot be found after a diligent search or is evading service. [14] The affidavit evidence makes clear that process servers retained by Ms. Tayes were able to locate Ms. Jones who was "stuck" in the United States due to the pandemic. The affidavit evidence also makes clear that Ms. Jones appeared to be cooperative, even offering to contact the process servers when she returned to Canada. There is no indication in the affidavit evidence that Ms. Jones is evading service. [15] Given that I will be renewing the notice of civil claim for six months, there should be plenty of time to personally serve Ms. Jones. If it subsequently becomes apparent that service remains impracticable or Ms. Jones cannot be found or is evading service, a further application can be made for alternate service. Order [16] For all of these reasons, I order that the notice of civil claim be renewed for six months. I dismiss Ms. Tayes' application to serve Ms. Jones by alternate service. "L.S. Marchand J." MARCHAND J.

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Authorities

Authorities used by the court

Cases, legislation, regulations, and constitutional provisions identified in the available record.

Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Michelin North America (Canada) Inc., 2008, 81 BCLR (4th) 99 (CA)

Case cited

Sutherland v. McLeod, 2004, 44 BCLR (4th) 265 (CA)

Case cited

Insurance (Vehicle) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 231, s. 22

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Supreme Court Civil Rules (British Columbia), Rule 3-2

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

Supreme Court Civil Rules (British Columbia), Rule 4-4

Legislation

Legislation referenced in the available case record.

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