Hubley (Estate of) v. Hubley
The Court dismissed the Respondent's Notice of Claim from the Nova Scotia Court of Probate for lack of jurisdiction because the bulk of the claims concern title, possession, adverse possession, or bankruptcy-vested trustee rights over real property and therefore must be adjudicated in the appropriate court (Supreme...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- 2021 NSSC 19
- Parties
- Applicant: The Estate of Douglas Gilbert Hubley (Sara Katherine Child, Administrator); Respondent: Craig Douglas Hubley
- Court
- Supreme Court of Nova Scotia
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 4 February 2021
- Procedural Posture
- Probate (estate Administration) / Application for Summary Judgment / Summary Dismissal Decision
- Outcome
- Respondent's Notice of Claim dismissed from the Nova Scotia Court of Probate for lack of jurisdiction, subject to narrow exceptions; costs awarded to Applicant.
- Legal Topics
- Jurisdiction of Probate Court, Adverse Possession/possessory Claims, Summary Dismissal Under Civil Procedure Rules, Trustee in Bankruptcy and Vested Property, Costs and Reimbursement of Out of Pocket Expenses, Inter Jurisdictional Issues (nova Scotia V Ontario)
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
The Estate of Douglas Gilbert Hubley (Sara Katherine Child, Administrator)
Applicant
Craig Douglas Hubley
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Probate (estate Administration) / Application for Summary Judgment / Summary Dismissal Decision
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the Nova Scotia Court of Probate has jurisdiction to adjudicate claims to title or compensation for the Nova Scotia real property
- 2 Whether the Respondent's Notice of Claim discloses a cause of action or is properly dismissed under Civil Procedure Rule 13.03
- 3 Whether claims relating to the 1985 bankruptcy and vested trustee interests can be determined in Probate Court
Ratio Decidendi
The Court dismissed the Respondent's Notice of Claim from the Nova Scotia Court of Probate for lack of jurisdiction because the bulk of the claims concern title, possession, adverse possession, or bankruptcy-vested trustee rights over real property and therefore must be adjudicated in the appropriate court (Supreme Court of Nova Scotia or Ontario where applicable); limited exceptions were allowed for properly documented out-of-pocket expenses and a potential spouse-status issue, and costs were awarded to the Applicant.
Court Disposition
Respondent's Notice of Claim dismissed from the Nova Scotia Court of Probate for lack of jurisdiction, subject to narrow exceptions; costs awarded to Applicant.
Orders
- All claims set forth in the Respondent's Notice of Claim are dismissed from the Court of Probate for Nova Scotia for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice to bringing them in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia or other appropriate forum.
- Respondent may, within one month, file documentation and particulars substantiating any reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred for the benefit of the estate; such claims may be considered by the Probate Court if properly particularized.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
Hubley (Estate of) v. Hubley Court Supreme Court Date 2021-02-04 Citation 2021 NSSC 19 Docket SBW 499813 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Gabriel, D. Timothy (Honourable Justice) (SC) Document Type Decision Decision Content in the court of probate for Nova Scotia Citation: Hubley (Estate of) v. Hubley, 2021 NSSC 19 Date: 20210204 Docket: SBW 499813 Registry: Bridgewater Between: The Estate of Douglas Gilbert Hubley (Sara Katherine Child, Administrator) Applicant v. Craig Douglas Hubley Respondent Judge: The Honourable Justice D. Timothy Gabriel Heard: December 3, 2020, in Bridgewater, Nova Scotia (via Skype) Counsel: A. Lawrence Graham, Q.C., for Sara Katherine Child and the Hubley Estate, Applicant Craig Hubley, self-represented, Respondent By the Court: [1] There is an old saying that "a little knowledge can be a dangerous thing". The word "dangerous" may be too strong for the present context, but if "expensive" or “frustrating” were to be substituted, the adage would fit the circumstances of this case perfectly. Because the Respondent has attempted to self-educate, rather than obtain legal advice, the Applicant estate has been subjected to considerable cost, and the Respondent’s siblings to considerable turmoil. Nature of application [2] The Estate of Douglas Gilbert Hubley ("the Estate"), represented by Sara Katherine Child (“Sara”), Administrator seeks the following relief: "... an order for summary judgment dismissing the claims of the Respondent pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 13.03(1), to the extent that such claims are based on causes of action in the exclusive jurisdiction of another court and, or in the alternative, for any [sic] order dismissing the claims pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 88 as frivolous and vexatious or otherwise abusive..." (Notice of Application, August 13, 2020) [3] Both the Applicant and Respondent are children of Katie Amanda Hubley ("Katie") and Douglas Gilbert Hubley ("Douglas"). Both parents are deceased. During their lifetimes, they were residents of Ontario. [4] The parties have another sibling, Paul James Hubley (“Paul”), who, as of yet, has not taken an active part in these proceedings. Background (i) General [5] Katie obtained two adjacent parcels of land in the late 1960s. They are situate on what is now called George's Island Lane, in Lunenburg County, Nova Scotia. I will refer to them, collectively, as the "real property". Neither parcel has been migrated in conformity to the current land registration system in the Province. [6] It appears that the property was occupied, seasonally, by Katie and Douglas, during their lifetimes. Douglas became unemployed in 1975. After that, he held a teaching position briefly in 1977, and possibly another (in Ontario) in 1980. [7] At some point, a plan was discussed with the family whereby Katie intended to transfer the real property to her husband in order that he might claim it as his principal residence for tax purposes. However, the understanding between the parties and Paul was that this plan was not implemented, and that the real property remained in Katie's name up to the date of her death. [8] Even Katie's Last Will and Testament contained the following provision: "To deliver to my children, Sara Katherine Child and Paul James Hubley my property located in Nova Scotia being in the Municipality of Lunenburg County, George's Island, Nova Scotia on civic # 488 Crescent Beach Road, Nova Scotia..." (Applicant's supplemental affidavit, Exhibit “A”) [9] For whatever reason, the property, in actual fact, was transferred to Douglas. This fact appears to have been unknown to his children, and may not even have been fully understood by either parent. [10] Regardless, in 1985, Douglas, who was at the time residing in Ontario, made an assignment in bankruptcy. Whether he was aware that he held title to the real property or not, it is common ground between the parties that he did not disclose his interest therein to the Trustee. He received a discharge on October 15, 1985, conditional upon his payment of $30,000.00 to the Trustee for the benefit of his creditors, which, insofar as the Applicant has been able to determine, was paid. [11] Katie and Douglas separated in 1986, but never divorced. In 1987, Douglas was admitted to a psychiatric hospital in Ontario. During that time, his affairs were managed by the Ontario Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee. He died, intestate, on September 26, 2009. [12] Katie passed away on September 6, 2015, also in Ontario. As earlier discussed, she left a Will. It appointed Sara and Paul as Executors. They were also the sole heirs to her estate. Paul has since renounced his appointment as Executor. Sara has fulfilled that role on her own. [13] As she went about the discharge of her duties as Executor of her mother's estate, Sara learned that the real property in Nova Scotia had (in fact) been transferred to her father after all, while both of her parents were still alive. Given this, she applied and was successfully appointed “Estate Trustee without a Will” by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice. She then obtained an Extra-Provincial Grant of Administration with respect to her father's estate from the Court of Probate for Nova Scotia on July 20, 2018. Her mandate was (and is) to administer what is left in the estate, which consists entirely of his interest in the real property at the time of his death. (ii) More with respect to the bankruptcy [14] As she was legally obliged to do, Sara has made arrangements for the appointment of a new Trustee in Bankruptcy with respect to her father's estate. Her object is to determine whether the real property is subject to any residual bankruptcy issues, including vested trustee claims, and to deal with all other issues resulting from the failure of Douglas to disclose his ownership in the real property in 1985. [15] Section 67(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c. B-3 (“BIA”) tells us what “property of the bankrupt” excludes and includes. First off, it excludes the following: 67(1)(b) any property that as against the bankrupt is exempt from execution or seizure under any laws applicable in the province within which the property is situated and within which the bankrupt resides; [16] However, it includes the following: … (c) all property wherever situated of the bankrupt at the date of the bankruptcy or that may be acquired by or devolve on the bankrupt before their discharge, including any refund owing to the bankrupt under the Income Tax Act in respect of the calendar year - or the fiscal year of the bankrupt if it is different from the calendar year - in which the bankrupt became a bankrupt, except the portion that (i) is not subject to the operation of this Act, or (ii) in the case of a bankrupt who is the judgment debtor named in a garnishee summons served on Her Majesty under the Family Orders and Agreements Enforcement Assistance Act, is garnishable money that is payable to the bankrupt and is to be paid under the garnishee summons, and (d) such powers in or over or in respect of the property as might have been exercised by the bankrupt for his own benefit. [17] This has been held to vest all property of the bankrupt (provided it falls within s. 67(1)) in the Trustee, at the time of the assignment, regardless of whether the bankrupt or the Trustee is even aware of its existence (see, for example, in Re Stokes, [1919] 2 KB 256, Kelleher v. Meadows Estate, [1983], 48 CBR (NS) 311(Man QB) and MacRury (Re), 2019 NSSC 146). [18] Once the Trustee is appointed, and if s/he is in agreement, only then may Douglas’ interest in the real property properly form part of his estate. In such a case, the Applicant’s objective would be to migrate and sell it for the benefit of herself and her siblings, all three of whom would be heirs-at-law, given his intestacy. (iii) Some of the Respondent’s actions [19] Against this background, Sara has highlighted those actions of the Respondent which have interfered with and/or made her job much more difficult: The Respondent has, to date, brought baseless claims against the Applicant, in other (KAH) Estate proceedings, and has reported, or threatened to report, the Applicant to various entities and regulatory bodies, without merit. The following list highlights some of the known actions taken by the Respondent. (i) The Respondent challenged the Applicant’s appointment to administer KAH’s estate in Ontario, and in doing so filed an 80-page brief with the court. The challenge was rejected by the Ontario Superior Court by Order dated October 5, 2016, and ordered the Respondent pay $1,200.00 in costs within 30 days. No part of such payment was ever paid by the Respondent. (ii) The Respondent contacted the Ontario Child’s Advocate and made false accusations about the Applicant; (iii) The Respondent contacted the office of the Ontario Public Guardian and Trustee resulting in a delay in the Applicant’s ability to gain access to DGH’s accounts. (iv) The Respondent has baselessly threatened to report the Applicant to the Canada Revenue Agency, the Ontario Provincial Police, to sue her personally, to take her home, to ruin her professionally, and to have the administration bond cancelled by her insurer. (v) The Respondent confirms in his Affidavit that he has also made allegations against the Applicant to the Ontario Law Society and the ISED bankruptcy regulator, although the Applicant is uncertain who this regulator is. [Emphasis in original] (Applicant's brief, para. 20) [20] The Respondent has taken the step of filing claims within the context of the current probate proceeding in Nova Scotia, related to his father’s estate. The Applicant refers to these claims as "unfocused and vague". As will be seen, it is difficult to disagree with that characterization. Craig Hubley’s Claims (i) The Notice of Claim filed [21] These claims appear to broadly fall into one of the following categories (although sometimes the categorical boundaries are unclear and “bleed” into one another): i. Claims related to the real property, primarily based upon an alleged possessory or adverse possession claim; ii. Claims related to the bankruptcy of his father's estate and, in some cases, claims alleging priority to other creditors thereof; iii. Claims against Katie’s estate (which is being probated in Ontario) iv. Claims relating to an entitlement to compensation as a result of improvements via labour and monies invested by the Respondent the property; v. Damage claims for "distress, alienation, failure to pursue due legal claims against the Public Guardian and Trustee of Ontario for neglect, destroying evidence, and other breaches of trust". These claims include punitive damages and costs. [22] Not only do some of the Respondent's land claims relate to an asserted interest in the real property itself, the claims also appear to extend beyond its borders. [23] For reasons which will become clear, it is not necessary to exhaustively explore, at this stage, the evidentiary bases asserted by the Respondent with respect to these claims. A very short summary will suffice. (ii) The parties’ positions [24] The Applicant takes the position that the property was occupied by Douglas and/or Katie from the time it was purchased (recollected to be in 1966 or 1967). After Douglas' death, it was occupied by Katie, Sara and/or her brother Paul, on a seasonal basis. All thought that Katie was the registered titleholder to the property. [25] In 2002 (the Applicant continues), the Respondent began residing in the property with the express permission of Katie. He shared this use, on a seasonal basis, with his siblings. The Respondent resides at the property to this day, with the permission of Sara, who is both Executor of her mother’s estate, and the Administrator of her father’s. [26] The Respondent takes the position that he has occupied and possessed the real property and some of the environs for longer than that, and has produced copious notes respecting the research that he has conducted into the history of the ownership of the real property. These include not only historical records, but plans, lengthy assertions with respect to his occupancy of same, and the like. [27] He has augmented his submissions with extensive references to case law related to the acquisition of title by adverse possession, and also quoted from standard legal texts on the subject, such as Anger and Honsberger. I agree with the Applicant's submission (brief, para. 26) that the Respondent's affidavit "...contains significant hearsay, speculation, and reference to documents...", which, in some cases, are not attached. His claims are also, in many respects, significantly unfocussed. [28] To cite merely one example of a misunderstanding (on the part of the Respondent) which has fuelled a misguided response, the Respondent has taken the position that a number of "interested parties" have not been given notice of these probate proceedings. Indeed, he has asserted that his mother's common-law partner (since 1994), his brother Paul's three children, Sara’s two children, the Canada Revenue Agency (which was a creditor of his father and of the estate in 1985 when Douglas declared bankruptcy) as well as the Ontario Public Guardian and Trustee, (his father's Guardian from 1986 – 2009) are all “interested parties”. [29] Unfortunately, this misunderstanding on the Respondent's part has prompted him to contact the Ontario Child's Advocate and make accusations about his sister (at least in part) related to her alleged failure to safeguard the children's "interest" in the Estates. At one point in his oral argument, he even chose to characterize his involvement in these proceedings as an attempt to uphold the interests of Sara’s children and those of his brother Paul. [30] In reality, the only legally interested parties in Douglas’ estate (intestacy) are Sara (as Executor of Katie’s estate, as Administrator of her father’s estate, and in her personal capacity), the Respondent, and their brother Paul. Douglas’ estate is the only one being dealt with in the proceedings in this Province and only in relation to the real property. Katie's estate (except insofar as it may have an interest in Douglas’ estate, because Katie was his wife and still alive when he died) is not at issue in this Province. Her estate is being dealt with in Ontario. Moreover, as far as Katie’s estate goes, the Applicant and her brother Paul are the two named beneficiaries in Katie’s Will. [31] On a related note, and to select another random example, the Respondent states: 7. Applicant raises the issue of reporting criminal actions. I did forward a list of criminal violations by Applicant on her ON attorney Terry Romaniuk to the Ontario Law Society which due to the complexity of facts, has chosen not to pursue discipline until more facts are verified by a court. This list is available to the Court, NSBS, LIANS, RCMP, OPP or other parties, and may be forwarded to all those if a probate continues past the hearing date & a bankruptcy trustee is appointed. No citizen of Canada is required to remain silent while perjured, defrauded & “evicted”, and this should be simple to report. 7a. Despite Applicant’s false accusations of extortion, I have not concealed nor offered to conceal any evidence of crime, nor have I employed veiled language to describe crime. 7b. I submit SKC is an unfit representative who will habitually omit facts not favourable. 7c. Applicant SKC’s August 13, 2020 affidavit contains major omissions & distortions, and appears to contradict itself regarding the exclusivity & interruption of possession. 7d. Under NSRCP 88.02(1)(f), the court has authority to seal such an affidavit for any material omissions, deliberate falsehoods & smears without references to respond to. Also, to declare her prior affidavits in related matters, including Ontario, inadmissible. (Notice of Objection to Application dated September 18, 2020, paras 7, 7(a), 7(b), 7(c) and 7(d)) [Emphasis added] [32] His argument, and the (at times, threatening) manner in which he expresses it, seems to miss a very fundamental point. This Court simply cannot do most of what he asks, even if his claims were felt to have merit. Analysis A) Summary Dismissal (Civil Procedure Rule 13.03) [33] Civil Procedure Rule 13 prescribes: 13.03(1) A judge must set aside a statement of claim, or a statement of defence, that is deficient in any of the following ways: (a) it discloses no cause of action or basis for a defence or contest; (b) it makes a claim based on a cause of action in the exclusive jurisdiction of another court or tribunal; (c) it otherwise makes a claim, or sets up a defence or ground of contest, that is clearly unsustainable when the pleading is read on its own. (2) The judge must grant summary judgment of one of the following kinds, when a pleading is set aside in the following circumstances: … (b) dismissal of the proceeding, when the statement of claim is set aside wholly; … (d) dismissal of a claim, when all parts of the statement of claim that pertain to the claim are set aside. … (5) A judge who hears a motion for summary judgment on pleadings, and who is satisfied on both of the following, may determine a question of law: (a) the allegations of material fact in the pleadings sought to be set aside provide, if assumed to be true, the entire facts necessary for the determination; (b) the outcome of the motion depends entirely on the answer to the question. [Emphasis added] [34] In a nutshell, the Applicant maintains that many of the Respondent’s claims are beyond the jurisdiction which has been conferred upon the Probate Court of Nova Scotia. This jurisdiction is found in the following sections of the Probate Act, SNS 2000, c. 31: 7 (1) Each court has jurisdiction throughout the Province and all grants, licences, orders and process of every court have effect and may be enforced throughout the Province. (2) A court has and may exercise all the powers and jurisdiction exercised by the courts of probate in existence immediately before February 1, 1901, and by the judges of probate. 8 (1) Each court may (a) issue grants; (b) revoke or cancel grants; (c) effect and carry out the judicial administration of the estates of deceased persons through their personal representatives, and hear and determine all questions, matters and things in relation thereto necessary for such administration; (d) order any person who has been named as an executor of a will to appear and probate or renounce executorship of the will; (e) order any person who witnessed a will to prove the will; (f) order a person to comply with this Act; (g) appoint guardians and take the accounts of guardians under the Guardianship Act. (2) Nothing in this Act deprives the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in the matters referred to in subsection(1). … 73. On passing the accounts of the personal representative and the distribution of the estate or in any matter relating thereto, a court has the same powers as the Supreme Court. [Emphasis added] i) Claims involving the real property [35] To begin with, virtually all of the claims which the Respondent apparently intends to advance in relation to ownership (or compensation for an alleged ownership interest) in the real property are patently outside of the jurisdiction of the Nova Scotia Court of Probate. [36] To the extent that any additional authority is needed for this proposition, in MacQuarrie Estate (Re), 2008 NSSC 108, Mr. MacQuarrie had filed a claim against the estate seeking a: "... declaration he is the owner of certain real property through a constructive trust, or in the alternative, he owns the real property pursuant to the equitable doctrines of unjust enrichment and/or, in the alternative, a declaration he is entitled to receive compensation from the Estate on the basis of unjust enrichment and/or quantum meruit." [37] In response to the Estate’s application for an order dismissing Mr. MacQuarrie's claim (in Probate) against the Estate, Coughlan, J. pointed out: 12. …It [the claim] does not effect or carry out the judicial administration of the Estate of Daniel Angus MacQuarrie. It is a claim to certain real property which may involve persons other than the Estate. The claim does not come within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court; rather, it is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [Emphasis added] [38] On that basis, the claim against the estate was dismissed, "...subject to Martin MacQuarrie's right to bring his claim in the Supreme Court." [39] Assuming that the Trustee (whom the Applicant is in the process of having appointed) were to waive, release, or otherwise take the position that it has no interest in the real property, the Estate would then possess that interest – whatever interest Douglas owned at the time he declared bankruptcy in 1985. This would be subject to whatever other legal rights or interests had been acquired in the lands (if any) by other parties at the time of the assignment in 1985, or subsequently. Two of the most common “other legal rights or interests” might involve, for example, claims by the Municipality for unpaid taxes, and/or rights which can be shown to have crystallized based upon adverse possession. [40] A couple of other statements are à propos. First, as we can see, any entitlement to Douglas' interest in the property on the part of his Estate is contingent upon the prior decision of the Trustee. It has not been rendered yet. Indeed, I am uncertain as to whether the Trustee has even been appointed yet. If not, s/he will be shortly. When this was put to the Respondent by the Court during oral argument, he described his claims against the Estate, insofar as they relate to the real property, as “contingent also”. [41] Second, if and when the Trustee disavows any claim upon Douglas’ interest in the real property, any claim advanced by the Respondent to it or derived from it, must have its validity determined by a Court possessing the jurisdiction to do so. That Court is not the Probate Court. It is the Supreme Court. And the Respondent has not instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia. [42] Third, the evidence which the Respondent would purport to advance involves not only a claim to the real property, but in some of the lands of the abutters. His claims would need to be advanced on the appropriate statutory and common law bases. All of the individuals who might have an interest in the outcome (including the abutters) would have to be provided with notice and served accordingly. And to repeat, the claim would have to be adjudicated in the Supreme Court. [43] On top of that (and among other things) the Land Actions Venue Act, RS c. 247 (as amended) would also require that: 2. All actions for trespass to lands or in which possession or recovery of lands is sought, and all actions in which the title to lands is in issue, shall, unless the court or a judge otherwise orders, be tried in the justice centre area in which the lands lie, and if the lands lie in more than one justice centre area, then in any of the justice centre areas in which any part of the lands lie. [44] All of the Respondent’s claims alleging an interest in, right to, entitlement to, or monetary compensation for an alleged interest in the real property are summarily dismissed out of this Honourable Probate Court. This is obviously without prejudice to the Respondent's right to have his claims heard in the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia, and in accordance with the relevant legislation and Civil Procedure Rules. ii) Other claims [45] It will be equally obvious that the Respondent’s claims related to or derived from the bankruptcy of his father (Douglas’) estate may not be determined by the Probate Court either. Similarly, to the extent that the Respondent purports to advance the proposition (in so many words) that he is a creditor of the Estate, no material facts have been presented capable of sustaining this contention, subject to a couple of exceptions to which I will return in due course. [46] Likewise, claims related to or derived from, claims to his mother, Katie’s estate, may not be dealt with in this context. [47] Moreover, the Notice is replete with claims for “estate assistance and cooperation” in advancing possessory claims by the Applicant. These do not relate to recognizable claims against the Estate which could be entertained by any Court, let alone this one. [48] Claims for “punitive damages for distress, alienation, failing to pursue a legal claim” on behalf of the Estate against the Public Guardian and Trustee of Ontario, for neglect, destroying evidence, and “other gross breaches of trust” (Notice of Claim, para. 2 – 5), are likewise implicated. First, it is difficult to understand the basis of such claims. Second, the claims would have to be adjudicated in Ontario, if they were to be brought. In any event, it is clear that the Probate Court of Nova Scotia lacks the jurisdiction to hear them. [49] To the extent that the Respondent appears intent upon alleging an agreement to form an interest in land (for example in para 2.3 of the Notice of Claim), this would have to be stated with a great deal more particularity, and, once again, the pleadings would have to be filed in a Court possessing jurisdiction to hear the claim. Among other things, the Statute of Frauds, RS c. 442 would have to be considered in the event that such a “verbal agreement” to form a “land trust” was to be pursued. [50] To the extent that the Respondent seeks costs in relation to his participation in the probate proceedings in Ontario, and or preparations undertaken by the Estate of his father to eventually migrate the property when it is appropriate to do so, (Notice of Objection, para 2.6), the latter is not available to him unless it can somehow be argued that he has incurred out-of-pocket expenses associated with the eventual migration of the property on behalf of the Estate, a theme to which I will return below. As to the former, (obviously) Nova Scotia Probate Court cannot make a determination with respect to costs related to proceedings conducted in its Ontario counterpart. [51] Additionally, and somewhat ironically, the Applicant has mentioned that: It is worth noting [Mr. Hubley]...had filed a claim in the Ontario Probate proceedings involving [Katie's Estate]... and was awarded costs against him, which have never been paid. (Brief, para. 51) Conclusion i) What is dismissed? [52] Subject to a couple of exceptions, which I will subsequently mention, on the basis of the foregoing, all of the claims set forth in the Respondent’s Notice of Claim are summarily dismissed from the Court of Probate for Nova Scotia for want of jurisdiction. By way of examples, some of those claims dismissed include (all references are to the Respondent’s Notice of Claim – Exhibit 8): 1. Amount of claim(s): $900,000 (not including punitive damages nor costs of this action). 2.1 … Estate cooperation in possession claims by Craig D. Hubley against all lands formerly occupied by either Hubley or Richard families on George Island. In addition or in the alternative, the entire property value of all claims, by advancement or otherwise, remaining in all Douglas G. Hubley land claims after tax & other creditor obligations; Including, all land or other claims of Katie A. Hubley under agreement of May 27, 2015, by which all lands she ever occupied were to be jointly titled with me, but were apparently claimed for sale in either estate on July 20, 2018. Estimated value of maximum extent of claim before intermeddling: —S450,000. 2.2 Primacy against any other creditor obligations as either a named or deceived creditor in the 1985 Ontario bankruptcy of Douglas G. Hubley, in which 2 deeds were concealed hidden assets… 2.3 … Compensation for foregone opportunity: —$200,000 as a long-agreed land trust was pursued, documented in a written record of a verbal agreement of August 30, 2014 & other documents of 2002-14 clearly indicating intent to form family land trust. 2.4 Estate assistance & cooperation … including ungranted Crown land, those occupied by Solomon Bush”, etc., whether or not I am obliged to share access to these. Estimated cost: $50,000 including $5000 cash cost to date, $2000 advanced by Paul J. Hubley, approximately 800 hours of search into land records for response to deceptive & false filings. Unconditional, immediate & fully cooperative support for this land claim versus the Crown and successors of Nicholas or Solomon Bush, or neighbours, will substantially satisfy claim 2.1-2.4. The defendants/estates have repeatedly refused offers of settlement nor will make any offers of their own, and have chosen instead to make repeated aggravated misrepresentations & claims. … 2.5 Punitive damages for distress, alienation, failure to pursue due legal claim against the Public Guardian & Trustee of Ontario for neglect, destroying evidence, and other gross breach of trust. 2.6 Costs associated with objection to, or revocation of, a grant of probate in Ontario, NS, or transferring, modifying or refuting a land registration or PDCA of Dec 3, 2018 re PID 60356920, all arising from 2017-19 defendant trustee/estate pursuit of land claims it neglected since 1977, should have disclosed & surrendered in 1985, and was notified of potential of losing in 1987-88. … 3.1 Property and equity: Real Property Limitations Act (NS) limitations of 20 or 25 years, Land Registration Act (NS) exceptions to continuance of possession (by a co-owner), reliability & necessity tests preventing deceased persons from claiming by possession, doctrines of acquiescence/unconscionability, of advancement to a residuary beneficiary, unjust enrichment, quantum meruit & part performance of an agreement for which legal relations were being pursued at time of death (of Katie A. Hubley), detrimental reliance, boundary estoppel regarding any claim in land that comes closer than 60’ to the house. 3.2 Fraud: concealment of assets in declarations seeking & discharging bankruptcy, claims on such hidden assets advanced without notification to creditors of the prior bankruptcy, capital gains tax fraud (transfer of liability to bare trustee by estate of beneficiary owner). … 3.4 Primacy of myself, Craig Douglas Hubley, and of the Public Trustee of Nova Scotia, in representing the estate in any land claim that must be made against third parties in NS, should it not be extinguished… 3.5 The Ontario Public Guardian & Trustee of Ontario administered the estate of Douglas G Hubley in 2009-10 under the Crown Administration of Estates Act (ON), found insolvent & closed without any notice to heirs or land claim in Nova Scotia. If this was neglectful & such a land claim existed, heirs have grounds & are within limitations in Ontario to sue or at least demand disclosure of all evidence, which neither estate has done, nor explained. 3.6 Perjury: An April 2017 Ontario probate application for Douglas deceived the Ontario court re 3.5, falsely claiming his estate was never administered, falsely declaring assets that were already fully legally disposed & which were never pursued after the grant, and misrepresenting the physical location of lands (“Town of LeHeve”) to obsure [sic] that a will provision of Katie A. Hubleys 2002 will identifies these lands (at 488 Crescent Beach Road”, George Island) and sets conditions requiring all co-owners/heirs to agree to sale… (Respondent’s Notice of Claim, dated February 6, 2019) (ii) What remains? [53] It is difficult to ascertain with any specificity the claims asserted with respect to expenses which Mr. Hubley claims were paid out of pocket by him for the benefit of the estate. For example at para. 2.3 we find: 2.3 Compensation for decades of my investment in & protection of land borders, rights of way & neighbour relations, including perfecting agreements to rights of way & extents both parents left ambiguous. Labour & parts: —$40,000... (Respondent’s Notice of Claim, dated February 6, 2019) [54] To the extent he is asserting that he has paid reasonable out of pocket expenses for the estate’s benefit, can clarify the specifics thereof, and establish them, he may have a right to reimbursement in the Nova Scotia Court of Probate. If he intends to prove such, he will file documentation with the Court and Counsel for the Applicant including particulars, attaching receipts, providing date/time/reason or expense, and an affidavit explaining how he says the estate benefitted from each expenditure, within one month of the date of this decision. [55] The only other claim/matter which he could advance in this Court would relate to any assertions that the Respondent would wish to make that Katie (his mother), who was separated from Douglas when he died intestate, was not a “spouse” within the meaning of the legislation and, therefore, that her estate should not share in the proceeds of Douglas’ estate. In such a case, the Court should be approached to schedule a Motion for Directions, at which motion dates could be set for the hearing, as well as filing deadlines, and the like. [56] In light of my decision above, it is not necessary to deal with the abuse of process claims. Costs [57] Craig Hubley’s actions have been irregular, ill informed (in many instances) and frustrating to the ordinary conduct of the Estate’s affairs. He has not paid the cost award(s) made against him in proceedings in Ontario in relation to his mother’s estate. [58] Under the circumstances, I feel that a lump sum award of costs is necessary to do justice between the parties. Craig Hubley shall forthwith pay costs of this application to the Estate of Douglas Hubley (in care of counsel for the Administrator) in the amount of $2,000.00 . [59] Until this costs award is satisfied, although he may file documents establishing expenses which he alleges that he has actually incurred on behalf of the Estate, he may pursue no further claims in relation to this probate proceeding. Moreover, this costs award, if not satisfied by the date for closing of the Estate, may be satisfied out of any legitimate claims to reimbursement from his father’s estate (if any), that Mr. Hubley is able to eventually establish. Gabriel, J.