Colchester (County) v. Spencer

Colchester (County) v. Spencer Court Court of Appeal Date 2005-03-18 Citation 2005 NSCA 50 Docket CA 229890 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Saunders, Jamie W. S. (Honourable Justice) (CA); Roscoe, Elizabeth A. (Honourable Justice) (CA); Hamilton, M. Jill (Honourable Justice) Document Type Decision Relations Library Sheet - Colchester (County) v. Spencer - 2005 NSCA 50 - 2005-03-18 - Library Sheet Decision Content NOVA SCOTIA COURT OF APPEAL Citation: Colchester (County) v. Spencer, 2005 NSCA50 Date: 20050318 Docket: CA 229890 Registry: Halifax Between: The Municipality of the County of Colchester Appellant v. Winnifred Spencer Respondent Judge(s): Roscoe, Saunders & Hamilton, JJ.A. Appeal Heard: January 25, 2005, in Halifax, Nova Scotia Held: Appeal dismissed with costs of $1,500.00 plus disbursements, payable by the Municipality to Mrs. Spencer, as per reasons for judgment of Hamilton, J.A., Saunders, J.A. concurring; Roscoe, J.A. dissenting Counsel: Peter Rogers, for the appellant Alain Bégin, for the respondent Reasons for judgment: [1] This is an appeal from a decision of Justice Gerald R.P. Moir in Chambers. The chambers judge refused to exercise his discretion to allow the appellant, the Municipality of the County of Colchester (“the Municipality”), to enter the properties of the respondent, Winnifred Spencer (“Mrs. Spencer”), that were being used in a junk and salvage business, to clean them up and to restrain Mrs. Spencer from interfering. The decision appealed from is reported at (2004), 226 N.S.R. (2d) 92; [2004] N.S.J. No.307(QL). Facts [2] I will summarize the facts that are set out in more detail in the chambers judge’s decision. Mrs. Spencer owns two adjacent parcels of land in Londonderry, Colchester County. Her husband, a licensed mechanic, has been operating a junk and salvage business on at least one of the properties for twenty-five years. No zoning by-law prevents the Spencers from operating such a business on the properties. The evidence indicates that the Spencers’ business fulfills a community need and that the Spencers have always been compliant and cooperative with the Department of the Environment in ensuring applicable environmental standards are met in their business. [3] As a result of a complaint received on October 17, 2003 by the Municipality, inspections were carried out on the properties by municipal employees. [4] By letter dated October 21, 2003 the Municipality informed Mrs. Spencer that one of her properties was deemed to be dangerous and unsightly under Section XV of the Municipal Government Act, S.N.S. 1998, c.18. The letter continued: . . . Therefore you are required to do the following: 1. Remove all derelict vehicles, auto parts, tires, motors, etc. from the property and dispose of them in a lawful manner. 2. Remove all scrap metal, appliances, oil tanks, barrels and miscellaneous junk, garbage and debris from the property, and dispose of it in a lawful manner. 3. Demolish the dilapidated buildings that are located on the property and dispose of the debris in a lawful manner. You have until December 1, 2003 to comply with the above. Failure to comply within the specified time period will result in the matter being sent to Council Committee for further action. [5] A subsequent letter dated October 28, 2003 amended the October 21st letter so that the required removal and demolition applied to both properties. It also notified the Spencers of the date of the “council committee meeting” (the meeting of the whole County Council sitting as a committee): On December 11, 2003 council committee will convene to decide the outcome of these properties and any action to be taken. You will be contacted in writing for the opportunity to present you[r] case. [6] On December 1, 2003 a notice was posted on the properties by the Municipality. It specified the time and place of the council committee meeting and repeated the same directions for the removal of material from the properties and for the demolition of buildings as the prior letters. It indicated Mrs. Spencer could make representations to the council committee at the meeting. [7] On December 11, 2003 the council committee met. Municipal staff recommended the council committee issue an order with terms similar to the earlier correspondence. Mrs. Spencer’s husband and son were present and Mr. Spencer made representations. At ¶ 9 of his decision the chambers judge stated with respect to those representations: . . . It seems clear from what the minutes record of Mr. Spencer’s remarks that he did not contemplate a clean-up order that would put an end to his business. [8] At ¶ 13 he further stated: I do not believe that the Spencers ever took the letter from the Deputy Inspector or the letter from the Inspector or the order of the Committee to purport to shut down their salvage yard operation. The brief minutes of their presentation to the 11 December 2003 meeting suggest to me that they were describing how their operation works. [9] The council committee passed a motion giving effect to staff’s recommendation. The order was issued December 17, 2003. Again the words used in the order mirrored those used in the October 21, 2003 letter. It also contained the following paragraph: 2. Unless the Owner(s) of the property complies with the requirements of this Order within 60 days of the posting of this Order upon the property, the Municipality’s Administrator of Dangerous or Unsightly Premises is hereby directed to enter upon the property and carry out or direct the carrying out of the work specified above in paragraph 1, and to recover such expenses from the Owner or as a lien against the property in the manner provided for by law. [10] The Spencers demolished one of the buildings on the properties. There is no further issue with respect to the buildings. They also removed some of the material described in the order that was on the properties on the date the order was made. The chambers judge found that “to a large extent” the Spencers had disposed of the inventory that was on the properties at the time of the order. In ¶ 15 of his decision he stated: . . . Much of the junk that was the object of the Committee's order has been disposed of. However, the inventory has merely rolled over. I accept Mr. Trevor Spencer's comparisons of the state of the yard in October 2003, December 2003 and May 2004. For example, his attention was drawn to a photograph taken in October 2003 showing angle iron. That has been disposed of. Other photographs show oil tanks that were disposed of after October 2003. New ones were acquired in December 2003 and Mr. Dennis Spencer explained the process for disposing of these to Mr. McElhinney in January 2004. Some of the various scrap metals were disposed of, some remain. [11] In mid January, 2004 the Spencers, at their request, met with David McElhinney, the deputy building inspector for the Municipality, at the properties and received his assurance that no further buildings had to be torn down despite the use of the word “buildings”, rather than “building”, in the order. During this meeting the Spencers made it clear to Mr. McElhinney that they intended to continue carrying on their business, including bringing new material onto the properties. The chambers judge found that the Spencers were never told by Mr. McElhinney or any other Municipal employee that by continuing to carry on their business in this way they would be considered to be violating the order. He stated at ¶ 12 of his decision: . . . I also find that the Spencers made it clear that they intended to continue with their salvage yard operation after the junk referred to in the order had been cleaned up and removed. I find that no County official informed them that the County would regard continuing the operation to be a continuing violation of the order. [12] The Municipality was not satisfied with the removal carried out by the Spencers. It decided to exercise its rights under s. 348(3) of the Act to clean up the properties itself at the Spencers’ expense. The Spencers’ lawyer indicated the Spencers would resist the Municipality doing so. [13] On May 5, 2004 the Municipality applied to the chambers judge pursuant to s.352(3) of the Act for an order authorizing it to enter the Spencers’ properties to give effect to the council committee order and to restrain the Spencers from interfering. The chambers judge refused to grant the order sought by the Municipality and it is from that decision that the Municipality appeals. [14] Section 352(3) provides: If a person refuses to allow the administrator to exercise, or attempts to interfere or interferes with the administrator in the exercise of a power pursuant to this Act, the administrator may apply to a judge of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia for an order to allow the administrator entry to the building and an order restraining a person from further interference. (Emphasis mine) Issue [15] Did the chambers judge err in refusing to exercise his discretion to grant the order sought? Standard of Review [16] Both parties agree on the standard of review that applies. Since the chambers judge’s decision involved his exercise of discretion, this court should not interfere with his decision unless he applied wrong principles of law or a patent injustice would result. Minkoff v. Poole (1991), 101 N.S.R. (2d) 143 (CA), paragraphs 9 and 10. Analysis [17] The chambers judge set out his conclusion with respect to the Municipality’s application in ¶ 32 of his decision: Conclusion - Because the Spencers were not clearly notified that the Municipality was seeking to terminate their use of the property as a scrap yard, because the order does not clearly do so and because of the Municipality’s silence in face of the Spencers’ attempts at both compliance with the order and continuing their business, I would decline to exercise my discretion under s.352(3) of the Municipal Government Act, S.N.S. 1998, c.18. Further, I have concluded that the Municipal order is an attempt to control land use, which is governed by Part VIII (sic) of the statute and is outside the powers of the Municipality under XV. As the Municipal order is without jurisdiction, I would not exercise my discretion to provide aid in the enforcement of the order. [18] Regardless of the chambers judge’s statement in other parts of his decision as to the breadth of inquiry he was entitled to make under s.352(3) of the Act, ¶ 32 indicates the chambers judge refused to exercise his discretion on two alternate bases: (1) his determination that the Municipality intended to shut down the Spencers’ business and inadequate notice of that to the Spencers and (2) lack of jurisdiction. [19] I make no comment with respect to the second basis for the chambers judge’s decision stated in the last two sentences of ¶ 32, namely lack of jurisdiction. For the purpose of this appeal I have assumed that the chambers judge had jurisdiction to grant the order sought. My reason for proceeding in this manner is that I am satisfied it would be dangerous to determine the jurisdiction issue on this record. The jurisdiction issue the chambers judge grappled with was whether the provisions for dangerous and unsightly premises covered in Part XV of the Act could be used to control land use that was covered in a separate part of the Act, Part VIII. This issue was not fully argued before him. Instead the evidence and argument before him was narrowly focussed on whether the Spencers had complied with the order by removing all of the inventory that was on the properties on the date of the order. Before determining the use to which the dangerous and unsightly premises part of the Act can be put, I would want to ensure this issue had been addressed with evidence and argument before the chambers judge. [20] The first basis for the chambers judge’s refusal to exercise his discretion under s.352(3) was based on his determination that the Municipality intended to shut down the Spencers’ business and inadequate notice of that to the Spencers as set out in the first sentence of ¶ 32. He refused to grant the order sought because he inferred from the evidence before him that the Municipality was trying to close down the Spencers’ business, and that this was not made clear to the Spencers from either the wording of the order or by municipal employees once they were aware the Spencers interpreted the order as permitting them to continue in business and bring new inventory onto the properties for that purpose. [21] The chambers judge stated his concern with the notice given to the Spencers in ¶ 21 of his decision: This (his finding that the intent of the order was to close down the Spencers business), however, raised other lines of inquiry, which would explore factors relevant to the exercise of a discretion but irrelevant to review. To what extent did the Municipality notify the Spencers that the very operation of their salvage yard was at risk and to what extent did Municipal officials allow the Spencers to act to their detriment in the belief the Municipality was not seeking to close the business? (Emphasis mine) [22] The Municipality has not satisfied me that the chambers judge applied a wrong principle of law or made a patently unjust decision when he determined on the evidence before him that the Municipality intended to shut down the Spencers’ business or when he determined the Municipality did not adequately notify the Spencers of this by the wording of the order or by remaining silent once the Municipality knew through Mr. MacElhinney that the Spencers interpreted the order as allowing them to continue their business and bring new inventory onto the properties. [23] With respect to the Municipality’s intention to close the Spencers business, the Municipality did not admit it was attempting to do this. However the evidence presented on its behalf and the submissions of its counsel led the chambers judge to draw this inference. [24] The Municipality’s position before the chambers judge and before us was that the order prevented the Spencers from taking new inventory onto the properties, at least until all of the material described in the order was removed, which in its opinion had never occurred. It was not clear what the Municipality would permit the Spencers to do on the properties after this initial clean up. Its position seems to have been, remove everything and then we will talk. It would certainly take some time for the Spencers to get back into business if they were required to get rid of all of their existing inventory and not bring in any new inventory until that was done. [25] Tires and appliances formed part of the Spencers inventory. They were stored outdoors and the Spencers had no building on the properties in which they could be stored. During cross-examination Mannie Withrow, the building inspector for the Municipality, testified that tires should be stored in a building so as not to be unsightly. The desirability of storing tires in buildings was repeated by Mr. McElhinney, who also indicated appliances should be stored in buildings rather than outside. During redirect Mr. Withrow indicated the piled railroad ties on the properties should be fenced in for safety, but there is evidence the Spencers offered to fence in their properties but received no response to this offer from the Municipality. [26] During his submission to the chambers judge, counsel for the Municipality, when asked by the chambers judge if the effect of the order was that the Spencers would be unable to run their scrapyard business on the properties, indicated that it would be difficult for the Spencers to continue to carry on their scrap metal business outdoors as they had in the past. [27] On the basis of this evidence and these submissions, the chambers judge inferred that the order was intended to shut down the Spencers’ business. This court is not to interfere with such an inference unless the chambers judge made a palpable and overriding error, Housen v Nikolaisen, (2002), 211 D.L.R. 4th 577 (SCC). The Municipality has not persuaded me he did. [28] With respect to the issue of inadequate notice, the chambers judge noted that the wording of the order was unclear: [19] One inquiry arising on the facts of this case is what the Committee of the Whole actually ordered. Did it merely order the removal of the junk at the salvage yard when the order was made or were the Spencers out of compliance when they brought in new inventory? [29] The operative wording of the order was as follows: 1. Remove all derelict vehicles, auto parts, tires, motors, etc. from the properties and dispose of them in a lawful manner. 2. Remove all scrap metal, appliances, oil tanks, barrels and miscellaneous junk, garbage and debris from the properties, and dispose of it in a lawful manner. 3. Demolish the dilapidated buildings that are located on the properties and dispose of the debris in a lawful manner. [30] This wording is almost identical to the wording of the October letters and the other notices given to the Spencers. [31] I am not satisfied the chambers judge erred in determining that the wording of the order was not sufficient to adequately notify the Spencers of the Municipality’s intention, as he inferred it, to close down their business. [32] Further with respect to inadequate notice the chambers judge found the Municipality did not inform the Spencers that bringing new inventory onto the properties would be considered a violation of the order even after Mr. McElhinney was aware that the Spencers interpreted the order as requiring them to remove all inventory that was on the properties at the time of the order, but as allowing them to continue bringing new inventory onto the properties in connection with their business. [33] There was evidence supporting the chambers judge’s conclusion. Mr. McElhinney’s testimony with respect to meeting with the Spencers in mid January, 2004, is as follows: Q. And you never told the Spencers they could not continue collecting scrap metals, white goods? A. I didn’t tell them they couldn’t, I don’t believe. That’s...that’s not my real ...role. But I believe they told me that they were going to continue. Q. And you never told them to stop when they said that? You’re shaking your head no? A. I don’t recall. Q. That’s something you would recall, isn’t it, if you’d told them? A. Prob...I...I don’t believe I told them that they would...to stop it. That’s...my...my concern is to...as an inspector is to have the property cleaned up and I’m not going to get into an argument with them on the site. Q. But isn’t your job as an inspector (to) (sic) tell them what has to be done and what doesn’t have to be done? A. Yes. [34] In light of the chambers judge’s inference as to the Municipality’s intent and his findings with respect to the inadequacy of the notice, I am not satisfied he erred in refusing to exercise his discretion in favour of the Municipality. Section 352(3) provides the judge with a discretion that is broad enough to allow him to consider the fairness of the order being sought on the facts before him. Inadequate notice falls within that discretion. [35] Since I am not satisfied the chambers judge erred in his first basis for refusing to grant the order sought, I will not deal with the other grounds of appeal raised by the Municipality because the issues dealt with in those grounds of appeal were not essential to the chambers judge’s decision and are not essential to this appeal. [36] These grounds include whether the evidence supported the chambers judge’s finding that the Spencers had substantially removed all of the inventory that was on the properties at the time the council committee order was issued; his finding that the order was unlawful as an extra-jurisdictional attempt to control land use provided for in a different part of the Act, Part VIII, already discussed in ¶ 19; and those grounds of appeal dealing with the chambers judge’s alternative findings. While I am not dealing with those issues, I want to make it clear that this decision should not be seen as an endorsement of other determinations made by the chambers judge. [37] I also want to be clear that while I am satisfied the chambers judge did not err given the evidence before him, it is not unreasonable to suppose that if the council committee reconsiders the matter and decides that the properties are unsightly or dangerous that an appropriate order might be worded so as to adequately notify and direct the Spencers as to what is required to prevent their properties being dangerous or unsightly. [38] Accordingly I would dismiss the appeal with costs payable by the Municipality to Mrs. Spencer in the amount of $1,500.00 plus disbursements. Hamilton, J.A. Concurred in: Saunders, J.A. Reasons for judgment: Roscoe, J.A., dissenting [39] I have read the reasons for judgment of Justice Hamilton and with great respect, I am unable to agree. In my view, the chambers judge erred in law in his approach to the issue, and the appeal by the Municipality ought to be allowed. [40] The learned chambers judge was not acting pursuant to an application for judicial review or on an appeal of the order of the Municipality. The section of the Municipal Government Act under which the application by the Municipality was brought must be read and interpreted in the context of the whole part dealing with unsightly premises. [41] The definition section of the Act, provides the following relevant definitions: 3 In this Act, ... (r) "dangerous or unsightly" means partly demolished, decayed, deteriorated or in a state of disrepair so as to be dangerous, unsightly or unhealthy, and includes property containing (i) ashes, junk, cleanings of yards or other rubbish or refuse or a derelict vehicle, vessel, item of equipment or machinery, or bodies of these or parts thereof, (ii) an accumulation of wood shavings, paper, sawdust, dry and inflammable grass or weeds or other combustible material, or (iii) any other thing that is dangerous, unsightly, unhealthy or offensive to a person, and includes property, a building or structure (iv) that is in a ruinous or dilapidated condition, ... ... (v) "derelict vehicle, vessel, item of equipment or machinery " includes a vehicle, vessel, item of equipment or machinery that (i) is left on property, with or without lawful authority, and (ii) appears to the administrator to be disused or abandoned by reason of its age, appearance, mechanical condition or, where required by law to be licensed or registered, by its lack of licence plates or current vehicle registration; [42] Part XV of the Act begins with s. 344 which requires every property in a municipality to be maintained so as not to be unsightly or dangerous. Section 345 deals with the power of a municipal council to delegate authority under the Part to an administrator. The sections in the balance of Part XV, relevant here, provide: Order to remedy condition 346 (1) Where a property is dangerous or unsightly, the council may order the owner to remedy the condition by removal, demolition or repair, specifying in the order what is required to be done. (2) An owner may appeal an order of the administrator to the council or to the committee to which the council has delegated its authority within seven days after the order is made. (3) Where it is proposed to order demolition, before the order is made not less than seven days notice shall be given to the owner specifying the date, time and place of the meeting at which the order will be considered and that the owner will be given the opportunity to appear and be heard before any order is made. (4) The notice may be served by being posted in a conspicuous place upon the property or may be served upon the owner. 1998, c. 18, s. 346; 2000, c. 9, s. 51. Order to remedy condition 347 (1) A municipality may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction for a declaration that a property is dangerous or unsightly and an order specifying the work required to be done to remedy the condition by removal, demolition or repair. (2) The court may order any property found to be dangerous or unsightly to be vacated until the condition is remedied. (3) The court may, where any property is found to be dangerous or unsightly, order that no rent becomes due, or is payable by, any occupants until the condition is remedied. 1998, c. 18, s. 347. Effect of order 348 (1) In this Section, "order" means an order made by the administrator, committee, council or court pursuant to this Part. (2) An order may be served by being posted in a conspicuous place upon the property or may be personally served upon the owner. (3) Where the owner fails to comply with the requirements of an order within the time specified in the order, the administrator may enter upon the property without warrant or other legal process and carry out the work specified in the order. (3A) repealed 2003, c. 9, s. 77. (4) After the order is served, any person who permits or causes a dangerous or unsightly condition, continues to permit or cause a dangerous or unsightly condition or who fails to comply with the terms of the order is liable, on summary conviction, to a penalty of not less than one hundred dollars and not more than five thousand dollars, and in default of payment to imprisonment for not more than three months. (5) Every day during which the condition is not remedied is a separate offence. (6) Where an order requires the demolition or removal of a building, the administrator may cause the occupants to be removed, using force if required, in order to effect the demolition or removal. 1998, c. 18, s. 348; 2001, c. 35, s. 22; 2003, c. 9, s. 77. Order to vacate unsafe property 349 (1) A property within a municipality that is unsafe shall be vacated forthwith upon order of the administrator. (2) The administrator shall post notice that the property is unsafe in a conspicuous place on the property. (3) The notice shall remain posted until the unsafe condition is remedied. 1998, c. 18, s. 349. Immediate action 350 Where public safety requires immediate action, the administrator may immediately take the necessary action to prevent danger or may remove the dangerous structure or condition. 1998, c. 18, s. 350. ... [ section dealing with sale of land for non-payment of taxes] Power to enter land 352 (1) The administrator may, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with this Part, enter in or upon any land or premises at any reasonable time without a warrant. (2) Except in an emergency, the administrator shall not enter any room or place actually being used as a dwelling without the consent of the occupier unless the entry is made in daylight hours and written notice of the time of the entry has been given to the occupier at least twenty‑four hours in advance. (3) If a person refuses to allow the administrator to exercise, or attempts to interfere or interferes with the administrator in the exercise of a power pursuant to this Act, the administrator may apply to a judge of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia for an order to allow the administrator entry to the building and an order restraining a person from further interference. 1998, c. 18, s. 352. No action 353 No action shall be maintained against a municipality or against the administrator or any other employee of a municipality for anything done pursuant to this Part. 1998, c. 18, s. 353. [43] Thus, when a property is unsightly, the Act allows the municipal council to either make an order to remedy the condition pursuant to s. 346, or to apply to the court for a declaration that a property is unsightly pursuant to s. 347. Where an order for demolition is proposed the owner is given the right to appear and make submissions at a meeting with prior notice. In either case, once the order is made, the owner who fails to comply is subject to having the administrator enter the property without further warrant or other process to carry out the work (s. 348(3)) and is also liable to being charged with a summary offence for allowing the condition to continue. Each day that the condition remains may constitute a separate offence. [44] Section 352(1) allows the administrator to enter upon the land to ensure compliance with an order to remedy a condition, and s.352(3), relied upon by the Municipality in this case, permits the administrator to apply to the Supreme Court for an order allowing entry and restraining anyone from interference. A municipality with a court order allowing entry would have the added protection of the assistance of peace officers if necessary, and the additional remedy of the restraining order which would not be available if the municipality had proceeded under s. 348(3). [45] In his decision, the learned chambers judge referred to the distinction between an application for judicial review and an application for the court’s aid pursuant to s. 352(3) and concluded after reference to Nanaimo (City) v. Rascal Trucking Ltd., [2000] S.C.J. No. 14, that: ¶ 18 No doubt, on an application for aid under s. 352(3) of the Municipal Act, the judge should be satisfied that the municipal order for removal of materials was correct in that it was made within statutory jurisdiction and that the exercise of that jurisdiction would withstand review at the standard of patent unreasonableness. Those appear to have been the only issues in Rascal Trucking. However, as I said, the judicial exercise of the discretion under s. 352(3) demands a broader inquiry than on judicial review. [emphasis added] [46] I do not agree that the Rascal Trucking decision supports the conclusion that an application for an order for entry should involve a broader inquiry than one for judicial review. In that case, there were two applications before different judges at the trial level. The first was an application by the Municipality for a declaration that it was entitled to access a property to remove a pile of soil it had determined was a nuisance. The second was an application to quash the city council’s resolution declaring the soil to be a nuisance which had been brought by the owner and the lessee of the property. It is the first of those applications that is equivalent to the one brought in this case. In his discussion of the application brought by the City, Justice Major, for the Court, framed the issue as whether the specific section of the Municipal Act empowered the City to pass the resolution declaring the soil to be a nuisance and ordering its removal. The focus was on the interpretation of the section and whether the soil fell within the class of things enumerated in the section, which provided: 936. (1) The council may declare a building, structure or erection of any kind, or a drain, ditch, watercourse, pond, surface water or other matter or thing, in or on private land or a highway, or in or about a building or structure, a nuisance, and may direct and order that it be removed, pulled down, filled up or otherwise dealt with by its owner, agent, lessee or occupier, as the council may determine and within the time after service of the order that may be named in it. [47] The Court performed an exercise in statutory interpretation, using a broad and purposive approach, to determine whether soil was included in the things listed and thus, whether the section conferred the jurisdiction to the City to order that the soil be removed. Using the scheme of the Act as a whole to ascertain the intent of the legislature, the Court concluded that the pile of soil fell within the phrase “building, structure, or erection of any kind”, on the assumption that the soil must have been erected, since it did not materialize on its own. [48] The balance of the decision in Rascal Trucking, after ¶ 26, deals with the second issue which arose from the application to quash the resolution of city council. The standard of review on jurisdiction and questions of law was said to be correctness, and once the Municipality had been found to be acting intra vires, the standard was patent unreasonableness. [49] In this case, the Municipality’s jurisdiction is founded in s. 346, which authorizes the council to order an owner to remedy a property found to be dangerous or unsightly. The evidence clearly establishes, using any objective test, that at the time the clean-up order was made, the property was both dangerous and unsightly as defined in the Act. The property was in the centre of a rural village, surrounded by residential properties and a church. The accumulated piles of junk including more than 2000 tires, numerous derelict vehicles, rusting oil drums, garbage dumpsters, old household appliances and stacks of scrap metal and creosoted railway ties were plainly visible from both the street and the neighbouring properties. There was no barrier or enclosure preventing access or visibility. Photographs introduced at the chambers application proved beyond any doubt that the property remained in an unsightly and dangerous condition long after the expiry of the 60 days allowed for the clean-up, and the Spencers admitted that most of the junk shown in the photographs had been there prior to the council meeting. [50] There is, in my view, no ambiguity, as there might have been in the Rascal Trucking case, as to whether the Municipality acted within its jurisdiction in declaring the respondent’s property to be dangerous and unsightly. Although initially there may have been some confusion about whether more than one building had to be demolished, the Municipality conceded before the court application that the Spencers had complied with that part of the order. The balance of the order made by the council could not have been clearer: remove all the derelict vehicles, auto parts, tires, motors, scrap metal, appliances, oil tanks, barrels and miscellaneous junk, garbage and debris from the property. Do a thorough clean-up. Basically get rid of all of the junk that is making the property dangerous and unsightly. The order on its face is not ambiguous. A time limit was given, and in order to be in compliance, the junk had to be removed by that date. [51] The focus for the court on the s. 352(3) application should be very narrow. Once finding the jurisdiction to make the order, the inquiry should be limited to basic questions such as whether notice of the hearing and the order were provided, and whether there is likely to be a refusal to allow entrance to the property by the administrator to carry out the work. Any dispute about whether the owner has already substantially or completely complied with the order should also be resolved by the chambers judge. In the case of a removal or demolition order, if there has already been complete compliance, the court order will be superfluous in any event. [52] If an owner wishes to dispute the finding by the council that the property is unsightly, or whether the council acted unreasonably in making the removal or demolition order where there was another less expensive or drastic method of remedying the problem, an application for judicial review or declaratory relief should be brought. See for example Sydney Precision Machining Ltd. and Luxandric Ltd. v. Cape Breton Regional Municipality, [2003] N.S.J. No. 428 2003 NSSC 222. [53] With respect, in my view, the chambers judge erred in law in expanding his review into the merits, fairness, and intent of the Municipality’s order. Other than determining whether the Municipality had the jurisdiction over the area in question and whether the Act authorized the issuance of a dangerous and unsightly order for a full clean-up of the property, the application should have been confined to review for obvious or blatant error in process. As the order was not outside the jurisdiction of the Municipality, and there was no error in process or evidence of substantial compliance, the learned chambers judge erred in declining to exercise his discretion to provide aid in the enforcement of the order. [54] I would allow the appeal and grant the order sought by the appellant to authorize the Municipality to enter the respondent’s property for the purpose of carrying out the remediation as ordered by council and restraining the respondent from interfering. Roscoe, J.A.