Vancouver Fraser Port Authority v. Doe
- Citation
- 2020 BCSC 244
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Court
- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- Decision
- 9 February 2020
- Posture
- Ex Parte Application for Interim Injunction / Interim Injunction Pending Trial
- Language
- English
More details
- Court
- Supreme Court of British Columbia
- Decision
- 9 February 2020
- Posture
- Ex Parte Application for Interim Injunction / Interim Injunction Pending Trial
- Language
- English
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
Applicants satisfied the RJR‑MacDonald test; evidence established organized blockade deliberately interfering with plaintiffs' economic interests and attacking the rule of law; therefore an interim injunction was granted on the terms sought, including a police enforcement clause, and to remain in effect until trial or further order subject to liberty to apply to set aside on 48 hours' notice.
Court disposition
Interim injunction granted
Orders
- Interim injunction granted substantially on terms of draft order
- Order to include a police enforcement clause
- Order to remain in effect until trial or further order (no strict temporal limit)
- Interested parties permitted to apply to set aside the order on 48 hours' notice to the plaintiffs
02
Material facts
Parties
Vancouver Fraser Port Authority
Plaintiff Counsel: G. Tucker, Q.C.; D.H. Coles; L. BuitendykBritish Columbia Maritime Employers' Association
Plaintiff Counsel: R.D. Copeland; A. NichollGCT Canada LP
Plaintiff Counsel: R.D. Copeland; A. NichollDP World (Canada) Inc.
Plaintiff Counsel: R.D. Copeland; A. NichollViterra Inc.
Plaintiff Counsel: R.D. Copeland; A. NichollJohn Doe
DefendantJane Doe
DefendantOther unknown persons
Defendant03
Procedural history
Posture
Ex Parte Application for Interim Injunction / Interim Injunction Pending Trial
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether plaintiffs met the RJR‑MacDonald test for an interim injunction
- 02
Whether the injunction should include a police enforcement clause
- 03
Whether the injunction should have strict temporal limits
- 04
Whether the protest constituted tortious interference with the plaintiffs' economic interests
Party arguments
- Applicant
- Applicants relied on RJR‑MacDonald and argued there was a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm and that balance of convenience favoured injunctive relief; evidence (flyer, organizer statements, media reports) showed deliberate, organized blockade aimed at crippling port operations and interfering with plaintiffs' economic interests; blockade was unlawful and an attack on the rule of law so a police enforcement clause was necessary; order should remain until trial or further order.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
RJR - MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311
Test for interim injunction requires serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience
- 02
This judgment (Tammen J.)
Court may include a police enforcement clause where breach of an injunction involves organized unlawful activity that threatens the rule of law
- 03
This judgment (Tammen J.)
An interim injunction may remain in force until trial or further order unless set aside on application
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
Applicants satisfied the RJR‑MacDonald test; evidence established organized blockade deliberately interfering with plaintiffs' economic interests and attacking the rule of law; therefore an interim injunction was granted on the terms sought, including a police enforcement clause, and to remain in effect until trial or further order subject to liberty to apply to set aside on 48 hours' notice.
Obiter and limits
- Organized, unlawful blockade activity as a means of voicing disapproval of a court order cannot be countenanced by the court.
- The absence of a strict temporal limit is acceptable where the injunction is subject to return at trial or further court order and to applications on notice.
Court disposition
Interim injunction granted
- Interim injunction granted substantially on terms of draft order
- Order to include a police enforcement clause
- Order to remain in effect until trial or further order (no strict temporal limit)
- Interested parties permitted to apply to set aside the order on 48 hours' notice to the plaintiffs
Source and reliance status
Supreme Court of British Columbia · 9 February 2020
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Supreme Court of British Columbia
Judgment· 9 February 2020
2020 BCSC 244 Vancouver Fraser Port Authority v. Doe
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Vancouver Fraser Port Authority v. Doe, 2020 BCSC 244 Date: 20200209 Docket: S201433 Registry: Vancouver Between: Vancouver Fraser Port Authority Plaintiff And John Doe, Jane Doe, and other unknown persons Defendants ‑ and ‑ Docket: S201434 Registry: Vancouver Between: British Columbia Maritime Employers' Association, GCT Canada LP, DP World (Canada) Inc., and Viterra Inc. Plaintiffs And Jane Doe, John Doe, and other unknown persons Defendants Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Tammen Oral Reasons for Judgment In Chambers Counsel for the Plaintiff in Action No. S201433 : G. Tucker, Q.C. D.H. Coles L. Buitendyk, Articled Student Counsel for the Plaintiffs in Action No. S201434: R.D. Copeland A. Nicholl No other appearances Place and Date of Trial/Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. February 9, 2020 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. February 9, 2020 [1] THE COURT: In the interests of time, I am going to give extremely brief reasons immediately. [2] This is an ex parte application by the various plaintiffs for an interim injunction pending the trial of these two actions. The underlying claims centre on allegedly tortious interference with the plaintiffs' economic interests by the defendants. [3] I am satisfied that the appropriate test for injunctive relief to be applied in this case is that set out in RJR - MacDonald Inc. v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 [RJR-MacDonald]. I am also satisfied that the applicants have met that test and are entitled to injunctive relief. [4] I intend to grant the orders sought, substantially on the terms set out in the draft proposed order. The only potentially contentious issues, in my view, are these: 1) whether there should be a police enforcement clause included in the order; and 2) whether there should be some strict or, put another way, brief temporal limits placed on the order. [5] Some very basic background information is required. [6] On December 31, 2019, Madam Justice Church of this Court issued an injunction enjoining blockade activities related to opposition to a pipeline project in northern British Columbia. That was the third such order made by Madam Justice Church in relation to that protest activity. That order included a police enforcement clause. [7] Members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police commenced enforcing that order and making arrests comparatively recently. The activity at issue in the hearing before me is organized protest activity in the form of a blockade attempting to prevent access to the Port of Vancouver. It has been ongoing intermittently for four days now and appears to be escalating. [8] Appended to the affidavit of Brian Gimblett, the vice president of terminal operations at one of the port facilities, is a
leaflet which was handed out to him by one of the protestors on February 7, 2020. The leaflet is two pages. It is attributed to an organization called the Red Braid Alliance for Decolonial Socialism. The heading on page 1 is as follows: Stop the RCMP invasion of Unist'ot'en Camp! No Pipeline without Wet'suwet'en consent! [9] The flyer commences with a reference to the order to which I have just referred made by Madam Justice Church. [10] Page 2 commences with a heading as follows: Why block the Port of Vancouver? [11] In the paragraphs set out beneath that heading are the following quotes: We are using a "choke point" strategy to cut off Canada's business as usual capitalist economy. And then further down: Blocking the Port of Vancouver for a few hours of a few days communicates a powerful message that the Wet'suwet'en nation is not alone and that our movement, while still small, is growing and must become more powerful to break the hold that corporations, police, and colonial courts have over our lives . . . [12] Further down the page is this: We are shutting down the Port to strike at the pro‑business, profit‑driven policies of BC and Canada's governments . . . [13] Articles ran in both local Vancouver newspapers on Saturday and Sunday concerning the protest activity. An individual named Natalie Knight, apparently one of the organizers of the blockade, is quoted as stating
that protestors have no intention of leaving, and that the port was targeted in order to put financial pressure on resource extraction companies and put political pressure on government. Those comments are paraphrased in the newspaper article. In what is meant to be a direct quote by Ms. Knight is the following: "We're here to express solidarity with the Wet'suwet'en nation whose territory is under attack by the RCMP, and provincial and federal government by extension . . . " And then further down: "We will step down if the hereditary chiefs' demands are met, if the RCMP pulls back entirely, if the injunction is no longer enforced." [14] The combined effect of those comments satisfies me that the defendant group appears to be deliberately interfering with the plaintiffs' economic interests. [15] Moreover, the current blockade is designed to be a direct attack on the rule of law. It amounts to organized, unlawful activity as a means of voicing disapproval of a court order. Obviously such conduct cannot be countenanced by the court. A police enforcement clause is clearly appropriate. [16] Moreover, I am satisfied there should not be a strict temporal limit placed on my order. It will remain in effect until trial or further order of the court. All of that, of course, subject to any interested party applying to set this order aside on 48 hours' notice to the plaintiffs. [17] That concludes my ruling. "Tammen J."
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