Bellefontaine v. Westphal Court Limited

Bellefontaine v. Westphal Court Limited Court Small Claims Court Date 2025-10-09 Citation 2025 NSSM 62 Docket 545216 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Pink, Darrel (Adjudicator) Document Type Decision Decision Content Small Claims Court OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Bellefontaine v. Westphal Court Limited, 2025 NSSM 62 On appeal from an Order of the Director of Residential Tenancies Date: 20251009 Docket: 545216 Registry: Halifax Between: Veronica Bellefontaine Appellant v. Westphal Court Limited Respondent Adjudicator: Darrel Pink Heard: September 8 and 11, October 7 in Halifax, Nova Scotia Decision: October 8, 2025 Counsel: The Claimant self-represented John Boyle, for the Respondent By the Court: Introduction [1] The Appellant resides in the Woodbine Mobile Home Park (‘Woodbine’) operated by the Respondent. She alleges her neighbours improperly use or occupy land between the two mobile homes, which she says is part of the land leased to her. The issue on this appeal is whether residents in a manufactured home park have exclusive possession of land adjacent to their trailer, and, if so, how is that defined and what obligations the landlord/park management has to protect or enforce an individual tenant’s rights. The Facts [2] The Appellant lives at 349 Ioney Hill in Woodbine. Number 349 is adjacent to #351. Her mobile home was previously owned by her mother, Cherie Jones, who died in 2024. The Appellant inherited the residence and under a 2024 lease she rents the mobile home lot from the Respondent. [3] The contractual arrangements between the parties are outlined in a lease that incorporates Community Guidelines and Standards ( referred to herein as ‘the Community Guidelines’). In the Community Guidelines, applicable when Ms. Jones moved in, Woodbine stated: In a manufactured home community, some regulations are necessary, not only to protect investment in the development, but also to ensure tenants a certain lifestyle. [4] Ms. Jones signed her lease, incorporating the Guidelines, in November 2009. On inheriting the mobile home in July 2024, the Appellant was approved for occupancy in Woodbine, subject to a number of conditions, including a requirement to relocate a heat pump ‘to an area approved by the park’, ‘remove rotten shed’, replace ‘weeds/plants on home facing 347’, ‘remove all clutter at rear & shed’ and ‘gutters required along both long lengths of home with 3ft downspout directing water away from homes’.[1] Each of these requirements exemplified how the Respondent exercised its authority and responsibility to uphold the Community Guideline and its obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act. [5] On completing the remedial work, Woodbine approved the Appellant’s application to assume residence. [6] The standards, attached to and forming part of the Community Guidelines, prescribe how and what uses tenants can make of their leased property. For example, the standards applicable when Ms. Jones moved in specified that The shed is to be located at the rear of the home location facing street and is to be at least 4’ from any other accessory building, 4’ from the Tenant(s)’ home and 8’ from any other home. Sheds are not to interfere with neighbors’ (Sic) windows or property lines. (Emphasis added) As is evident from what the Respondent did prior to approving the Appellant’s tenancy, Woodbine saw it as its responsibility to identify and enforce guideline requirements. [7] The Appellant testified that each mobile home sits on a pad, with four adjacent areas – two sides, front and back. Side 1 is the longer side between #349 and #351. She asserts the land associated with that side extends to the mobile home at 351and that her unit has exclusive possession of that land. The entrance to the Appellant’s home at 349, along with a deck, is on Side 1 of her mobile home, as is an emergency exit towards the rear. [8] The area to the back has a shed. A parking area is in the front. The fourth side, facing #347, is for the exclusive use of that occupant. It is generically referred to as Side 4. [9] The Appellant described several concerns with the residents of #351 and suggested they improperly use the land between their mobile homes, when it should be used only by her and her husband as the owners of 349. The conduct of the current residents raises issues of good behaviour, quiet enjoyment and exclusive possession. [10] The trailer at #351 is owned by Ellen Gaudet, who rents it to the current occupants. The occupants of 351 did not testify. [11] Ms. Bellefontaine says the occupants of #351 have placed a wood pile, a burn barrel, a ladder, a bird feeder, a hammock and a clothesline on the land adjacent to their unit and between it and 351. The neighbour’s ATV was parked between the two trailers. She says they tether their dog on a lead in that area, and the dog defecates there and barks at the Appellant. There have been verbal confrontations between the neighbours. They play loud music which she hears in her trailer. On at least one occasion, the police were called as a result of a verbal confrontation. A recent visit by a realtor to see the Appellant’s unit resulted in unprovoked loud and intimidating comments from the 351 occupants. In summary, the Appellant testified that the occupants of 351behave poorly and improperly use land that is assigned to her lot under her lease and the Community Guidelines. Their conduct and use of what she considers to be her property has caused considerable stress and anxiety. [12] The Appellant has complained to the Respondent and asked that it enforce the Community Guidelines and prevent the occupants of 351 from using the property leased to her. In addition to the items and uses referred to in her evidence, she noted that what is supposed to be an emergency exit from 351, is on its Side 4, facing 349 and is used as a primary means to access outside. Her view is that this too breaches her lease because it accesses property assigned to her. [13] The Appellant submitted photographic and video evidence of the layout of Woodbine to establish that the design of the mobile home park supports her conclusion that each home has exclusive possession and use of the area adjacent to its Side 1. Put another way, she says that an owner does not have access to the land adjacent to its Side 4, which for #351 is the side facing her home. [14] The Respondent has required the occupants of 351 to remove some items from the area between the two trailers. The ATV has been relocated. The Respondent indicated to the Appellant it has ‘sent a letter to the Landlord of your neighbours (Ms. Gaudet), addressing the clothe line (sic), the fire pit, the ATV and the noise you brought up’. [15] Ellen Gaudet testified. She has owned 351 since 2004, along with several other units in Woodbine. The trailer had two entrances on the side facing 351, i.e. Side 4. Before her purchase, an addition relocated its front door adjacent to the driveway. There used to be a deck on that side. On its Side 1, there is an embankment, sloping down. She says that area was never used by those living in 351, as it is ‘barely a lot’ and there is no door to the trailer on that side. When asked where the primary access door is, she noted that the front door provided access to the vehicles, but occupants would use the door on Side 4 to access the property. [16] Ms. Gaudet says that when she bought the mobile home, the real estate agent advised her that the land between 351 and 349 was to be ‘shared’, as there was no available land on Side 1 due to the slope. Using the Appellant’s nomenclature, Ms. Gaudet says Side 1, the ‘side you use for outdoor living space’, faces #349 and Side 4 is the bankside, or the driveway side. This is the opposite of what the Appellant and the Respondent’s representative, described as the standard configuration. [17] A small wire fence has been placed between #351 and #349. In Ms. Gaudet’s words, since this dispute arose, when the Appellant acquired ownership, it was intended to be ‘a compromise’ and ‘to keep the peace’ as there is a conflict about yard rights associated with 351. [18] Matthew Scott, the Property Representative for Westphal Court since 2010, testified. He is familiar with the issues between the occupants of #351 and #349. He stated the arrangement of doors on 351 is ‘atypical’. It is uncommon not to have a door on Side 1, which is the case with 351. He noted there are some double trailers in the park that have different configurations, but they are not directly analogous to the situation between 351 and 349. [19] There was no evidence of how or why the trailer was placed on the pad with two doors facing 349. [20] Mr. Scott has inspected the properties. In June 2025, he advised Ms. Gaudet of ‘a number of violations within your community guidelines’. Specifically, he referred to the burn barrel, the clothesline and the ATV. They were to be removed ‘by the weekend’. He raised the issue of ‘loud music’ and requested ‘your occupants have more mindfulness towards their community’. Despite these warnings and enforcement efforts, it appears the occupants have yet to fully appreciate their responsibilities as residents of Woodbine, to cleanup their space or cease to occupy land that is not assigned to #351. [21] Mr. Scott’s position regarding the area between 351 and 349 is that it is ‘a shared space’, with the treeline between the two trailers as the demarcation line. He says that is how it has been over the years. He gave examples of other lots in Woodbine that do not strictly comply with the Side 1/Side 4 configuration. He affirmed that the typical situation is that Side 1 is the accessible space used by the mobile homeowner, and Side 4 is only for maintenance access and is not used by an occupant. [22] He believes the land to the left of 351 is not usable because it is sloped and there is no direct access to it from the trailer. New Community Guidelines/Standards/Amended Lease [23] Mr. Scott says updated community guidelines were drafted following amendments to the Residential Tenancies Act. They were distributed to tenants in May 2025 with an intention to take effect on January 1, 2026. There is some disagreement regarding their in force date, but that is not an issue because they were not applicable at the time the Appellant initiated this matter. There is some confusion and there has been ambiguous communications that have contributed to the uncertainty about the rules governing Woodbine. [24] In July 2024, the Appellant received communication from the Respondent referring to new Community Guidelines and in particular ‘#5.23 for the heat pump and Oil Barrel’. The reference to 5.23 can only refer to new Community Guidelines (likely in draft at that time) as the 2009 version, signed by the Appellant’s mother, had no section 5.23. On May 27, 2025, the Respondent advised the Appellant that changes to the Act came into effect on April 30, 2025, which required the Respondent to provide a written copy of existing landlord rules to all tenants. The Respondent’s new rules were attached, namely the new Community Guidelines. [25] Mr. Scott was recalled as a witness to clarify the status of the Community Guidelines and Standards. Though the May 27 message from the Respondent suggests they were in effect as of April 30, I accept his evidence that the Respondent’s intention, in accordance with the Act amendments, was that they were to become operative at the beginning of 2026. [26] I conclude the Community Guidelines submitted by the Appellant[2] are not in effect and do not yet govern the relationship between the parties. As of January 1, 2026, they will take on their intended role since they state, ‘These Guidelines constitute part of any lease in effect or deemed to be in effect’ (Emphasis in original). [27] The Appellant relies on s. 1.6 of the new Guidelines to specify the dimensions of her land and the area over which she has exclusive possession. It states: 1.6 Lot sizes vary from location to location but, generally speaking, the area leased in front of the home extends from the front wall of the home to the street. The area leased at the rear of the lot extends either to the green are or the back yard of the neighbouring lot. The area leased on the side where the front door is generally located, extends from the front door wall to the wall of the neighbouring home. Therefore, the fourth side of the home has no property in your lease. You will be allowed access to the side of your home for maintenance purposes only. [28] The Appellant asserts this description of lot sizes means that #349’s land on Side 1, where her front door is located ‘extends from the front door wall to the wall of the neighbouring home’ (#351). The Respondent argues the prescription of lot size and dimension is qualified by the phrase ‘generally speaking’ in the first line and though it describes the norm, circumstances on the ground allow for exceptions. The Respondent says the trailer configuration at #351 puts these two properties into the exception category because #351 does not have a front door on what would be Side 1. The evidence of Ms. Gaudet was that an addition was constructed before she purchased the property, but the ‘front door’ was on the side facing #349 and was never on what is conventionally known as Side 1. As noted by Ms. Gaudet and Mr. Scott, the typography of the land on what would be Side 1 was not conducive to this area being used as private space for its occupants [29] My view is that s. 1.6 is intended to describe most situations but given the historic anomaly of lots 351 and 349, when it takes effect, it will not produce the result the Appellant seeks. On its clear wording, it provides for exceptions to a strict Side 1-Side 4 prescriptive approach to defining the land associated with an individual manufactured home. Analysis and Findings [30] The following sections of the Act are relevant to an analysis of the issues identified by this appeal: 2(e) “manufactured home space” means a plot of ground within a land-lease community designed to accommodate one manufactured home; (h) “residential premises” includes any house, dwelling, apartment, flat, tenement, manufactured home, land-lease community, manufactured home space or other place that is occupied or may be occupied by an individual as a residence or that part of any such place that is or may be occupied by an individual as a residence Statutory conditions 9 (1) Notwithstanding any lease, agreement, waiver, declaration or other statement to the contrary, where the relation of landlord and tenant exists in respect of residential premises by virtue of this Act or otherwise, there is and is deemed to be an agreement between the landlord and tenant that the following conditions will apply as between the landlord and tenant as statutory conditions governing the residential premises: 3. Good Behaviour - A landlord or tenant shall conduct himself in such a manner as not to interfere with the possession or occupancy of the tenant or of the landlord and the other tenants, respectively 17A Anorder made by the Director may (a) require a landlord or tenant to comply with a lease or an obligation pursuant to this Act; (b) require a landlord or tenant not to again breach a lease or an obligation pursuant to this Act; [31] What property does the Appellant lease as the occupant of 349 Ioney Hill in Woodbine? What obligations does the Respondent have to preserve the appellant tenant’s property rights? Does the Appellant have rights of exclusive possession to the land adjacent to her manufactured home? Exclusive Possession [32] Though ‘lease’ is not defined by the Act, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a lease as a ‘contract for exclusive possession of lands or tenements for determinate period.’ Key to the relationship of landlord and tenant, under a lease, is that the landlord grants exclusive possession of the leased land and premises to a tenant. Three factors are essential to distinguish a lease from other forms of contractual arrangements dealing with interests in land: one party must grant to the other exclusive possession of certain land, this possession must be for a definite or potentially definite time period, and the parties must intend to create a tenancy.[3] [33] These three factors are present here. The Respondent is the landlord and leases the manufactured home space to the tenant. The lease is renewable annually on January 1. The relationship of landlord-tenant exists under the provisions of the Act. [34] Exclusive possession in the context of a conventional lease to an apartment is easily understood as there is a flat or a room in a property assigned to a tenant. The tenant, unless the Act authorizes entry, has exclusive use of this property, and no one else is entitled to access it without the tenant’s permission. That is why Statutory Condition 7[4] is incorporated into all leases. [35] In a mobile home park, a tenant places its manufactured home on a manufactured home space’ which can only accommodate one manufactured home. [section 2(e)]. This space is the ‘residential premises’ of the occupant which is leased to the tenant. Because the occupancy is pursuant to a lease, the tenant has the right to exclusive possession of the manufactured home space. [36] Though the new Community Guidelines are not yet effective, I find the language of section 1.6 accurately describes the normal situation and the extent of the land over which a tenant has exclusive possession. i.e. the land would ‘extend(s) from the front door wall to the wall of the neighbouring home’ (i.e. #351). [37] For reasons that are not explained by any evidence, for at least twenty years, the mobile home at 351 Ioney Hill has existed without an entrance on Side 1 and with two doors on the side facing #349. The land on what would be Side 1 is unusable by the occupants, so for as long as Ms. Gaudet has owned that unit, the occupants of #351 have accessed and used the area next to Side 4 of their trailer. [38] Though this is not the intention of the new Community Guideline 1.6, the longstanding circumstance between #349 and #351 is an example of why 1.6 will allow for exceptions. If 1.6 was applied literally the area from the front door wall of 349 to the wall of the neighbouring home - #351would be assigned to the Appellant and the owner of 351 would be required to undertake renovations to the existing mobile home to create an entrance on Side 1 adjacent to the embankment and stop using the rear entrance, other than as an emergency exit. They would end up with little or no yard, which was never intended by the Respondent. [39] Though that is the outcome the Appellant seeks, given the length of time the current situation has existed, I do not think the Director or this Court, based on the facts and the governing legal authority, can make such an order under s. 17A. [40] I find, based on the situation that has existed for at least two decades, that all the land between #349 and #351 is not assigned exclusively to the Appellant. Usage for over twenty years and the configuration of #351 with two doors facing 349, before an undated renovation occurred, persuades me that the entire area was never assigned to #349. I find the area of exclusive possession for #349 is less than the entire area between the two trailers. [41] Because the land assigned to #349 does not extend the Appellant’s lot to the side of the home at #351, a boundary between the two mobile homes must be fixed. [42] Though not directly applicable, I have considered HRM By-law L-500[5] which governs the creation of new manufactured home parks. The by-law requires, in s. 38 that lots specify: the location, boundaries, dimensions, frontage, and total area of each proposed manufactured home space, with each manufactured home space numbered for identification purposes; [43] Though this provision applies to new or expanded parks, I find it correctly sets the requirements for a mobile home park landlord. Boundaries, dimensions and area are what must be assigned under a lease to the exclusive use of a tenant of a manufactured home park. [44] Because this is a fundamental lease requirement, it necessitates a landlord to specify the area of exclusive possession provided to the tenant. The Respondent must do so here and take steps to remedy a situation that has caused angst and frustration for the Appellant. Contrary to the suggestion of some evidence, there is no provision for a lease in a manufactured home park to provide ‘shared space’. A landlord must specify the unit or area over which a tenant has sole access and exclusive rights. Allowing an exception to continue, as has happened here (and no fault or malice is attributed to the Respondent), is not acceptable. Once the provisions of 1.6 were written down, it would have been clear that the dispute between these two homes was likely or even inevitable. Behaviour of #351 Occupants [45] That likelihood became more so recently when the occupants of #351 clearly breached rules regarding good behaviour under Statutory Condition 3. Among other violations they left dog feces on the property, had a burn barrel and left their ATV in a location it had no right to be, even under existing rules. This conduct was inappropriate and provocative. It ought to have been sanctioned immediately by the Respondent by making it clear to Ms. Gaudet and her tenants that it had to cease, by issuing orders to terminate all offending actions immediately, because the Respondent has the authority and responsibility to uphold the standards in the community guideline and its obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act. [46] Upholding the Community Guidelines is what the Respondent was doing when it required a number of things to be done by the Appellant before approving her assumption of her mother’s lease in 2024. It should be consistent and uphold the rules vis-à-vis the #351 occupants conduct. Remedy [47] I find, as a landlord, the Respondent has a duty to prescribe the area of exclusive possession for its tenants. It is an obligation under the Act for the Respondent to establish a clear boundary between the two mobile homes. [48] The Respondent’s evidence is that the ‘treeline’ is the natural boundary between these two units. The Appellant has applied to construct a fence. The Respondent has yet to approve it. [49] Fences are permitted under the community guidelines and the standards attached to them. In this instance, given that ‘good fences make good neighbours’, a fence is the only way to establish unambiguous lot lines for #349 and #351. [50] To meet its obligations under the Act to provide a lease that gives exclusive possession to a defined area, the Respondent should assume responsibility to erect a fence demarcating the two parcels in a location consistent with the evidence of Mr. Scott and Ms. Gaudet about where the appropriate location should be. Nothing short of a fixed boundary, clear for all to see, will meet the requirements of defining an area of exclusive occupation. [51] The fence should be put up within forty-five days of this decision, or such timeframe agreed to by the parties. [52] The Respondent has acknowledged the ongoing violations of good behaviour requirements by the current occupants of #351. Mr. Scott was clear he has inspected and identified many issues of concern. Some have been rectified; some have yet to be addressed. Allowing these clear breaches of Woodbine’s expectations for good behaviour has exacerbated the tensions and caused anxiety and stress for the Appellant. Prompt attention by the landlord to unkempt living spaces and lack of care and attention to the reasonable needs of neighbours would likely have mitigated some of the stresses that were apparent at this hearing. The Landlord should attend to these issues and enforce its requirements, without delay. The Respondent’s failure to vigorously enforce its rules and to thereby partially condone the poor behaviour and lack of consideration for the Appellant’s quiet enjoyment is very much an issue giving rise to this appeal. Conclusion [53] Because I find the Respondent has failed to meet its obligations to provide an area of exclusive possession for the Appellant, I allow the appeal. [54] Given the uniqueness of this situation, I will retain jurisdiction to assist the parties in implementing my Order should they request it. [55] I order: 1. Under s. 17A(a) of the Act, the Respondent must comply with its obligations under both its lease and the Act, by a. immediately specifying the Appellant’s area of exclusive possession and b. fixing a line to demarcate the area between #349 and #351 associated with each unit. 2. The Respondent must immediately order the occupants of #351 to cease and desist all activities that involve accessing the property which is exclusive to the Appellant. The Respondent then must effectively enforce its requirements. 3. Within forty-five days, unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the Respondent must erect a fence along the line of demarcation. Darrel Pink, Small Claims Court Adjudicator [1] Exhibit 2/Tab 9 [2] Ex 1, Section 2 [3] The Lease as a Contract, 1981 CanLiiDocs 61, Douglas Stollery [4] Notice of Entry - A landlord may enter the premises if the landlord has given the tenant (a) notice of entry that is in writing; (b) states the purpose of entry, which must be reasonable; (c) states the date and time of the entry, which must be between eight o’clock in the morning and eight o’clock in the evening, unless the tenant agrees to a different time;(d) is given by the landlord to the tenant at least twenty- four hours and not more than thirty days before the day of entry; and (e)is delivered (i) using a method set out in subsection 15(2) of the Act, or (ii) by text sent to a telephone number provided by the tenant for the landlord to provide notice of entry. [5] HALIFAX REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY BYLAW NUMBER L‐500 RESPECTING THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF LAND‐LEASE COMMUNITY