Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc. (Re)

2016 BCSC 107 Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc. (Re)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc. (Re), 2016 BCSC 107 Date: 20160126 Docket: S1510120 Registry: Vancouver In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as Amended And In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57, as Amended And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc. and the Other Petitioners Listed on Schedule "A" Before: The Honourable Madam Justice Fitzpatrick Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Petitioners: Marc Wasserman Mary I.A. Buttery Tijana Gavric Joshua Hurwitz Counsel for United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan and Trust: John Sandrelli Tevia Jeffries Counsel for Steering Committee of First Lien Creditors of Walter Energy, Inc.: Matthew Nied Counsel for Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia: Aaron Welch Counsel for Morgan Stanley Senior Funding, Inc.: Kathryn Esaw Counsel for KPMG Inc., Monitor: Peter Reardon Wael Rostom Caitlin Fell Counsel for Canada Revenue Agency: Neva Beckie Counsel for the United States Steel Workers, Local 1-424: Stephanie Drake Place and Date of Hearing and Ruling given to Parties with Written Reasons to Follow: Vancouver, B.C. January 5, 2016 Place and Date of Written Reasons: Vancouver, B.C. January 26, 2016 Introduction and Background [1] On

December 7, 2015, I granted an initial order in favour of the petitioners, pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended ("CCAA"). [2] The "Walter Group" is a major exporter of metallurgical coal for the steel industry, with mines and operations in the U.S., Canada and the U.K. The petitioners comprise part of the Canadian arm of the Walter Group and are known as the "Walter Canada Group". The Canadian entities were acquired by the Walter Group only recently in 2011. [3] The Canadian operations principally include the Brule and Willow Creek coal mines, located near Chetwynd, B.C., and the Wolverine coal mine, near Tumbler Ridge, B.C. The mine operations are conducted through various limited partnerships. The petitioners include the Canadian parent holding company and the general partners of the partnerships. Given the complex corporate structure of the Walter Canada Group, the initial order also included stay provisions relating to the partnerships: Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (Re) (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div.); Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Limited Partnership, 2009 BCCA 319 at para. 21. [4] The timing of the Canadian acquisition could not have been worse. Since 2011, the market for metallurgical coal has fallen dramatically. This in turn led to financial difficulties in all three jurisdictions in

which the Walter Group operated. The three Canadian mines were placed in care and maintenance between April 2013 and June 2014. The mines remain in this state today, at an estimated annual cost in excess of $16 million. Similarly, the U.K. mines were idled in 2015. In July 2015, the U.S. companies in the Walter Group filed and sought creditor protection by filing a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. It is my understanding that the U.S. entities have coal mining operations in Alabama and West Virginia. [5] From the time of the granting of the initial order, it was apparent that the outcome of the U.S. proceedings would have a substantial impact on the Walter Canada Group. A sales process completed in the U.S. proceeding is anticipated to result in a transfer of the U.S. assets to a stalking horse bidder sometime early this year. This is significant because the U.S. companies have historically supported the Canadian operations with funding and provided essential management services. This is a relevant factor in terms of the proposed relief, as I will discuss below. [6] The Walter Canada Group faces various significant contingent liabilities. The various entities are liable under a 2011 credit agreement of approximately $22.6 million in undrawn letters of credit for post-mining reclamation obligations. Estimated reclamation costs for all three mines exceed

this amount. Further obligations potentially arise with respect to the now laid-off employees of the Wolverine mine, who are represented by the United Steelworkers, Local 1-424 (the "Union"). If these employees are not recalled before April 2016, the Wolverine partnership faces an estimated claim of $11.3 million. As I will discuss below, an even more significant contingent liability has also recently been advanced. [7] This anticipated "parting of the ways" as between the U.S. and Canadian entities in turn prompted the filing of this proceeding, which is intended to provide the petitioners with time to develop a restructuring plan. The principal goal of that plan, as I will describe below, is to complete a going concern sale of the Canadian operations as soon as possible. Fortunately, as of early December 2015, the Walter Canada Group has slightly in excess of US$40.5 million in cash resources to fund the restructuring efforts. However, ongoing operating costs remain high and are now compounded by the restructuring costs. [8] As was appropriate, the petitioners did not seek extensive orders on December 7, 2015, given the lack of service on certain major stakeholders. A stay was granted on that date, together with other ancillary relief. KPMG Inc. was appointed as the monitor (the "Monitor"). [9] The petitioners now seek relief that will set them on a path to a potential

restructuring; essentially, an equity and/or debt restructuring or alternatively, a sale and liquidation of their assets. That relief includes approving a sale and solicitation process and the appointment of further professionals to manage that process and complete other necessary management functions. They also seek a key employee retention plan. Finally, the petitioners seek an extension of the stay to early April 2016. [10] For obvious reasons, the financial and environmental issues associated with the coal mines loom large in this matter. For that reason, the Walter Canada Group has engaged in discussions with the provincial regulators, being the B.C. Ministry of Energy and Mines and the B.C. Ministry of the Environment, concerning the environmental issues and the proposed restructuring plan. No issues arise from the regulators' perspective at this time in terms of the relief on this application. Other stakeholders have responded to the application and contributed to the final terms of the relief sought. [11] The stakeholders appearing on this application are largely supportive of the relief sought, save for two. [12] Firstly, the United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan and Trust (the "1974 Pension Plan") opposes certain aspects of the relief sought as to who should be appointed to conduct the sales process. [13] The status of the 1974 Pension Plan arises from

somewhat unusual circumstances. One of the U.S. entities, Jim Walter Resources, Inc. ("JWR") is a party to a collective bargaining agreement with the 1974 Pension Plan (the "CBA"). In late December 2015, the U.S. bankruptcy court issued a decision that allowed JWR to reject the CBA. The court also ordered that the sale of the U.S. assets would be free and clear of any liabilities under the CBA. As a result, the 1974 Pension Plan has filed a proof of claim in the U.S. proceedings advancing a contingent claim against JWR with respect to a potential "withdrawal liability" under U.S. law of approximately US$900 million. The U.S. law in question is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 USC § 101, as amended, which is commonly referred to as "ERISA". [14] The 1974 Pension Plan alleges that it is only a matter of time before JWR formally rejects the CBA. In that event, the 1974 Pension Plan contends that ERISA provides that all companies under common control with JWR are jointly and severally liable for this withdrawal liability, and that some of the entities in the Walter Canada Group come within this provision. [15] It is apparent at this time that neither the Walter Canada Group nor the Monitor has had an opportunity to assess the 1974 Pension Plan's contingent claim. No claims process has even been contemplated at this time. Nevertheless, the standing of the 1974

Pension Plan to make submissions on this application is not seriously contested. [16] Secondly, the Union only opposes an extension of the stay of certain proceedings underway in this court and the Labour Relations Board in relation to some of its employee claims, which it wishes to continue to litigate. [17] At the conclusion of the hearing, I granted the orders sought by the petitioners, with reasons to follow. Hence, these reasons. The Sale and Investment Solicitation Process ("SISP") [18] The proposed SISP has been developed by the Walter Canada Group in consultation with the Monitor. By this process, bidders may submit a letter of intent or bid for a restructuring, recapitalization or other form of reorganization of the business and affairs of the Walter Canada Group as a going concern, or a purchase of any or all equity interests held by Walter Energy Canada. Alternatively, any bid may relate to a purchase of all or substantially all, or any portion of the Walter Canada Group assets (including the Brule, Willow Creek and Wolverine mines). [19] It is intended that the SISP will be led by a chief restructuring officer (the "CRO"), implemented by a financial advisor (both as discussed below) and supervised by the Monitor. [20] Approvals of SISPs are a common feature in CCAA restructuring proceedings. The Walter Canada Group refers to CCM Master Qualified Fund v. blutip Power

Technologies, 2012 ONSC 1750. At para. 6, Brown J. (as he then was) stated that in reviewing a proposed sale process, the court should consider: (i) the fairness, transparency and integrity of the proposed process; (ii) the commercial efficacy of the proposed process in light of the specific circumstances facing the receiver; and, (iii) whether the sales process will optimize the chances, in the particular circumstances, of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale. [21] Although the court in CCM Master Qualified Fund was considering a sales process proposed by a receiver, I agree that these factors are also applicable when assessing the reasonableness of a proposed sales process in a CCAA proceeding: see PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc. (Re), 2012 ONSC 2840 at paras. 17-19. [22] In this case, the proposed timelines would see a deadline of March 18 for letters of intent, due diligence thereafter with a bid deadline of May 27 and a target closing date of June 30, 2016. In my view, the timeline is reasonable, particularly with regard to the need to move as quickly as possible to preserve cash resources pending a sale or investment; or, in the worst case scenario, to allow the Walter Canada Group to close the mines permanently. There is sufficient flexibility built into the SISP to allow the person conducting it to amend these deadlines if the

circumstances justify it. [23] The SISP proposed here is consistent with similar sales processes approved in other Canadian insolvency proceedings. In addition, I agree with the Monitor's assessment that the SISP represents the best opportunity for the Walter Canada Group to successfully restructure as a going concern, if such an opportunity should arise. [24] No stakeholder, including the 1974 Pension Plan, opposed this relief. All concerned recognize the need to monetize, if possible, the assets held by the Walter Canada Group. I conclude that the proposed SISP is reasonable and it is approved. Appointment of Financial Advisor and CRO [25] The more contentious issues are who should conduct the SISP and manage the operations of the Walter Canada Group pending a transaction and what their compensation should be. [26] The Walter Canada Group seeks the appointment of a financial advisor and CRO to assist with the implementation of the SISP. [27] In restructuring proceedings it is not unusual that professionals are engaged to advance the restructuring where the existing management is either unable or unwilling to bring the required expertise to bear. In such circumstances, courts have granted enhanced powers to the monitor; otherwise, the appointment of a CRO and/or financial advisor can be considered. [28] A consideration of this issue requires some context in terms of the

current governance status of the Walter Canada Group. At present, there is only one remaining director, who is based in West Virginia. The petitioners' counsel does not anticipate his long-term involvement in these proceedings and expects he will resign once the U.S. sale completes. Similarly, the petitioners have been largely instructed to date by William Harvey. Mr. Harvey is the executive vice-president and chief financial officer of Walter Energy Canada Holdings, Inc., one of the petitioners. He lives in Birmingham, Alabama. As with the director, the petitioners' counsel expects him to resign in the near future. [29] The only other high level employee does reside in British Columbia, but his expertise is more toward operational matters, particularly regarding environmental and regulatory issues. [30] Accordingly, there is a legitimate risk that the Walter Canada Group ship may become rudderless in the midst of these proceedings and most significantly, in the midst of the very important sales and solicitation process. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that the management support traditionally provided by the U.S. entities will not be provided after the sale of the U.S. assets. Significant work must be done to effect a transition of those shared services in order to allow the Canadian operations to continue running smoothly. It is anticipated that the CRO will play a key

role in assisting in this transition of the shared services. [31] In these circumstances, I am satisfied that professional advisors are not just desirable, but indeed necessary, in order to have a chance for a successful restructuring. Both appointments ensure that the SISP will be implemented by professionals who will enhance the likelihood that it generates maximum value for the Walter Canada Group's stakeholders. In addition, the appointment of a CRO will allow the Canadian operations to continue in an orderly fashion, pending a transaction. [32] The proposal is to retain PJT Partners LP ("PJT") as a financial advisor and investment banker to implement the SISP. PJT is a natural choice given that it had already been retained in the context of the U.S. proceedings to market the Walter Group's assets, which of course indirectly included the Walter Canada Group's assets. As such, PJT is familiar with the assets in this jurisdiction, knowledge that will no doubt be of great assistance in respect of the SISP. [33] In addition, the proposal is to retain BlueTree Advisors Inc. as the CRO, by which it would provide the services of William E. Aziz. Mr. Aziz is a well-known figure in the Canadian insolvency community; in particular, he is well known for having provided chief restructuring services in other proceedings (see for example Mobilicity Group (Re), 2013 ONSC 6167 at para.

17). No question arises as to his extensive qualifications to fulfil this role. [34] The materials as to how Mr. Aziz was selected were somewhat thin, which raised some concerns from the 1974 Pension Plan as to the appropriateness of his involvement. However, after submissions by the petitioners' counsel, I am satisfied that there was a thorough consideration of potential candidates and their particular qualifications to undertake what will no doubt be a time-consuming and complex assignment. In that regard, I accept the recommendations of the petitioners that Mr. Aziz is the most qualified candidate. [35] The Monitor was involved in the process by which PJT and BlueTree/Mr. Aziz were selected. It has reviewed both proposals and supports that both PJT and BlueTree are necessary appointments that will result in the Walter Canada Group obtaining the necessary expertise to proceed with its restructuring efforts. In that sense, such appointments fulfill the requirements of being "appropriate", in the sense that that expertise will assist the debtor in achieving the objectives of the CCAA: see s. 11; ICR Commercial Real Estate (Regina) Ltd. v. Bricore Land Group Ltd., 2007 SKQB 121 at para. 19. [36] The 1974 Pension Plan does not mount any serious argument against the need for such appointments, other than to note that the costs of these retainers will result in a very expensive

process going forward. The matter of PJT and the CRO's compensation was the subject of some negative comment by the 1974 Pension Plan. However, the 1974 Pension Plan did not suggest any alternate way of proceeding with the SISP and the operations generally. When pressed by the Court on the subject, the 1974 Pension Plan acknowledged that time was of the essence in implementing the SISP and it did not contend that a further delay was warranted to canvas other options. [37] PJT is to receive a monthly work fee of US$100,000, although some savings are achieved since this amount will not be charged until the completion of the U.S. sale. In addition, PJT will receive a capital raising fee based on the different types of financing that might be arranged. Lastly, PJT is entitled to a transaction or success fee, based on the consideration received from any transaction. [38] At the outset of the application, the proposed compensation for the CRO was similar to that of PJT. The CRO was to obtain a monthly work fee of US$75,000. In addition, the CRO was to receive a transaction or success fee based on the consideration received from any transaction. After further consideration by the petitioners and BlueTree, this proposed compensation was subsequently renegotiated so as to limit the success fee to $1 million upon the happening of a "triggering event" (essentially, a recapitalization,

refinancing, acquisition or sale of assets or liabilities). [39] To secure the success fees of PJT and the CRO, the Walter Canada Group seeks a charge of up to a maximum of $10 million, with each being secured to a limit of half that amount. Any other fees payable by the Walter Canada Group to PJT and the CRO would be secured by the Administration Charge granted in the initial order. [40] The jurisdiction to grant charges for such professional fees is found in s. 11.52 of the CCAA: 11.52(1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in respect of the fees and expenses of (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties; (b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and (c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act. [41] In U.S. Steel Canada Inc. (Re), 2014 ONSC 6145 at para. 22, Justice Wilton-Siegel commented on the

necessity of such a charge in a restructuring, as it is usually required to ensure the involvement of these professionals and achieve the best possible outcome for the stakeholders. I concur in that sentiment here, as the involvement of PJT and BlueTree is premised on this charge being granted. [42] In Canwest Publishing Inc., 2010 ONSC 222 at para. 54, Justice Pepall (as she then was) set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider when determining whether the proposed compensation is appropriate and whether charges should be granted for that compensation: (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured; (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge; (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles; (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable; (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and (f) the position of the Monitor. [43] I am satisfied that the Walter Canada Group's assets and operations are significantly complex so as to justify both these appointments and the proposed compensation. I have already referred to the significant regulatory and environmental issues that arise. In addition, relevant employment issues are already present. Any transaction relating to these assets and operations will be anything but straightforward. [44] The factors relating to the

proposed role of the professionals and whether there is unwarranted duplication can be addressed at the same time. As conceded by the petitioners' and Monitor's counsel, there will undoubtedly be some duplication with the involvement of the Monitor, PJT and the CRO. However, the issue is whether there is unwarranted duplication of effort. I am satisfied that the process has been crafted in a fashion that recognizes the respective roles of these professionals but also allows for a coordinated effort that will assist each of them in achieving their specific goals. Each has a distinct focus and I would expect that their joint enterprise will produce a better result overall. [45] Any consideration of compensation will inevitably be driven by the particular facts that arise in the proceedings in issue. Even so, I have not been referred to any material that indicates that the proposed compensation and charge in favour of PJT and the CRO are inconsistent with compensation structures and protections approved in other similarly complex insolvency proceedings. In that regard, I accept the petitioners' submissions that the task ahead justifies both the amount of the fees to be charged and the protections afforded by the charge. In short, I find that the proposed compensation is fair and reasonable in these circumstances. [46] The secured creditors likely to be affected by the charges for

PJT and the CRO's fees have been given notice and do not oppose the relief being sought. [47] Finally, the Monitor is of the view that the agreed compensation of PJT and the CRO and the charge in their favour are appropriate. [48] In summary, all circumstances support the relief sought. Accordingly, I conclude that it is appropriate to appoint the CRO and approve the engagement of PJT on the terms sought. In addition, I grant a charge in favour of PJT and the CRO to a maximum of $10 million to secure their compensation beyond the monthly work fees, subject to the Administration Charge, the Director's Charge and the KERP Charge (as discussed below). Key Employee Retention Plan ("KERP") [49] The Walter Canada Group also seeks approval of a KERP, for what it describes as a "key" employee needed to maintain the Canadian operations while the SISP is being conducted. In addition, Mr. Harvey states that this employee has specific information which the CRO, PJT and the Monitor will need to draw on during the implementation of the SISP. [50] The detailed terms of the KERP are contained in a letter attached to Mr. Harvey's affidavit #3 sworn December 31, 2015. In the course of submissions, the Walter Canada Group sought an order to seal this affidavit, on the basis that the affidavit and attached exhibit contained sensitive information, being the identity of the employee and the compensation proposed to be paid to him. [51] I was satisfied that a sealing order should be granted with respect to this affidavit, based on the potential disclosure of this personal information to the public: see Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41 at para. 53; Sahlin v. The Nature Trust of British Columbia, 2010 BCCA 516 at para.

6. A sealing order was granted on January 5, 2016. [52] The proposed KERP must be considered in the context of earlier events. This individual was to receive a retention bonus from the U.S. entities; however, this amount is now not likely to be paid. In addition, just prior to the commencement of these proceedings, this person was given a salary increase to reflect his additional responsibilities, including those arising from the loss of support and the shared services from the U.S. entities. This new salary level has not been disclosed to the court or the stakeholders. [53] The Walter Canada Group has proposed that this employee be paid a retention bonus on the occurrence of a "triggering event", provided he remains an active employee providing management and other services. The defined triggering events are such that the retention bonus is likely to be paid whatever the outcome might be. In addition, to secure the payment of the KERP to this employee, Walter Energy Canada seeks a charge up to the maximum amount of the retention bonus. [54] The amount of the retention bonus is large. It has been disclosed in the sealed affidavit but has not been disclosed to certain stakeholders, including the 1974 Pension Plan. The Monitor states in its report: The combination of the salary increase and proposed retention bonus were designed to replace the retention bonus previously promised

to the KERP Participant by Walter Energy U.S. [55] I did not understand the submissions of the 1974 Pension Plan to be that the granting of a KERP for this employee was inappropriate. Rather, the concern related to the amount of the retention bonus, which is to be considered in the context of the earlier salary raise. At the end of the day, the 1974 Pension Plan was content to leave a consideration of the level of compensation to the Court, given the sealing of the affidavit. [56] The authority to approve a KERP is found in the courts' general statutory jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant relief if "appropriate": see U.S. Steel Canada at para. 27. [57] As noted by the court in Timminco Ltd. (Re), 2012 ONSC 506 at para. 72, KERPs have been approved in numerous insolvency proceedings, particularly where the retention of certain employees was deemed critical to a successful restructuring. [58] Factors to be considered by the court in approving a KERP will vary from case to case, but some factors will generally be present. See for example, Grant Forest Products Inc. (Re) (2009), 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J.); and U.S. Steel Canada at paras. 28-33. [59] I will discuss those factors and the relevant evidence on this application, as follows: a) Is this employee important to the restructuring process?: In its report, the Monitor states that this employee is the most

senior remaining executive in the Walter Canada Group, with extensive knowledge of its assets and operations. He was involved in the development of the Wolverine mine and has extensive knowledge of all three mines. He also has strong relationships in the communities in which the mines are located, with the Group's suppliers and with the regulatory authorities. In that sense, this person's expertise will enhance the efforts of the other professionals to be involved, including PJT, the CRO and the Monitor: U.S. Steel at para. 28; b) Does the employee have specialized knowledge that cannot be easily replaced?: I accept that the background and expertise of this employee is such that it would be virtually impossible to replace him if he left the employ of the Walter Canada Group: U.S. Steel at para. 29; c) Will the employee consider other employment options if the KERP is not approved?: There is no evidence here on this point, but I presume that the KERP is more a prophylactic measure, rather than a reactionary one. In any event, this is but one factor and I would adopt the comments of Justice Newbould in Grant Forest Products at paras. 13-15, that a "potential" loss of this person's employment is a factor to be considered; d) Was the KERP developed through a consultative process involving the Monitor and other professionals?: The Monitor has reviewed the proposed KERP, but does not

appear to have been involved in the process. Mr. Harvey confirms the business decision of the Walter Canada Group to raise this employee's salary and propose the KERP. The business judgment of the board and management is entitled to some deference in these circumstances: Grant Forest Products at para. 18; U.S. Steel Canada at para. 31; and e) Does the Monitor support the KERP and a charge?: The answer to this question is a resounding "yes". As to the amount, the Monitor notes that the amount of the retention bonus is at the "high end" of other KERP amounts of which it is aware. However, the Monitor supports the KERP amount even in light of the earlier salary increase and after considering the value and type of assets under this person's supervision and the critical nature of his involvement in the restructuring. As this Court's officer, the views of the Monitor are also entitled to considerable deference by this Court: U.S. Steel at para. 32. [60] In summary, the petitioners' counsel described the involvement of this individual in the CCAA restructuring process as "essential" or "critical". These sentiments are echoed by the Monitor, who supports the proposed KERP and charge to secure it. The Monitor's report states that this individual's ongoing employment will be "highly beneficial" to the Walter Canada Group's restructuring efforts, and that this employee is "critical" to

the care and maintenance operations at the mines, the transitioning of the shared services from the U.S. and finally, assisting with efforts under the SISP. [61] What I take from these submissions is that a loss of this person's expertise either now or during the course of the CCAA process would be extremely detrimental to the chances of a successful restructuring. In my view, it is more than evident that there is serious risk to the stakeholders if this person does not remain engaged in the process. Such a result would be directly opposed to the objectives of the CCAA. I find that such relief is appropriate and therefore, the KERP and charge to secure the KERP are approved. Cash Collateralization / Intercompany Charge [62] Pursuant to the initial order, the Walter Canada Group was authorized and directed to cash collateralize all letters of credit secured by the 2011 credit agreement within 15 days of any demand to do so from the administrative agent, Morgan Stanley Senior Funding Inc. ("Morgan Stanley"). This order was made on the basis of representations by the Monitor's counsel that it had obtained a legal opinion that the security held by Morgan Stanley was valid and enforceable against the Walter Canada Group. [63] On December 9, 2015, Morgan Stanley demanded the cash collateralization of approximately $22.6 million of undrawn letters of credit. On December 21, 2015,

Morgan Stanley requested that the Walter Canada Group enter into a cash collateral agreement (the "Cash Collateral Agreement") to formalize these arrangements. [64] The Walter Canada Group seeks the approval of the Cash Collateral Agreement, which provides for the establishment of a bank account containing the cash collateral and confirms Morgan Stanley's pre-filing first-ranking security interest in the cash in the bank account. The cash collateralization is intended to relate to letters of credit issued on behalf of Brule Coal Partnership, Walter Canadian Coal Partnership, Wolverine Coal Partnership and Willow Creek Coal Partnership. However, only the Brule Coal Partnership has sufficient cash to collateralize all these letters of credit. [65] Accordingly, the Walter Canada Group seeks an intercompany charge in favour of Brule Coal Partnership, and any member of the Walter Canada Group, to the extent that a member of the Walter Canada Group makes any payment or incurs or discharges any obligation on behalf of any other member of the Walter Canada Group in respect of obligations under the letters of credit. The intercompany charge is proposed to rank behind all of the other court-ordered charges granted in these proceedings, including the charges for PJT and the CRO and the KERP. [66] No objection is raised in respect of this relief. The Monitor is of the view that the

intercompany charge is appropriate. [67] In my view, this relief is simply a formalization of the earlier authorization regarding the trusting up of these contingent obligations. On that basis, I approve the Cash Collateral Agreement. I also approve the intercompany charge in favour of the Brule Coal Partnership, on the basis that it is necessary to preserve the status quo as between the various members of the Walter Canada Group who will potentially benefit from the use of this Partnership's funds. Such a charge will, as stated by the Monitor, protect the interests of creditors as against the individual entities within the Walter Canada Group. Stay Extension [68] In order to implement the SISP, and further its restructuring efforts in general, the Walter Canada Group is seeking an extension of the stay and other relief granted in the initial order until April 5, 2016. [69] Section 11.02(2) and (3) of the CCAA authorizes the court to make an order extending a stay of proceedings granted in the initial application. In this case, the evidence, together with the conclusions of the Monitor, support that an extension is appropriate and that the petitioners are acting in good faith and with due diligence. No stakeholder has suggested otherwise. [70] As noted above, it is anticipated that the Walter Canada Group will have sufficient liquidity to continue operating throughout the

requested stay period. [71] Further, as the Phase 1 deadline in the SISP is March 18 2016, an extension of the stay until April 5, 2016 will provide sufficient time for PJT to solicit, and the CRO (in consultation with the Monitor and PJT) to consider, any letters of intent. At that time, the process may continue to Phase 2 of the SISP, if the CRO, in consultation with the Monitor and PJT, deems it advisable. In any event, at the time of the next court date, there will be a formal update to the court and the stakeholders on the progress under the SISP. [72] The only issue relating to the extension of the stay arises from the submissions of the Union, who represents the employees at the Wolverine mine owned and operated by the Wolverine Coal Partnership ("Wolverine LP"). The Union wishes to continue with certain outstanding legal proceedings outstanding against Wolverine LP, as follows: a) In June 2015, the B.C. Labour Relations Board (the "Board") found that Wolverine LP was in breach of s. 54 of the Labour Relations Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 224 (the "Code"). The Board ordered Wolverine LP to pay $771,378.70 into trust by way of remedy. This was estimated to be the amount of damages owed by Wolverine LP, but the Union took the position that further amounts are owed. In any event, this amount was paid and is currently held in trust; b) In November 2015, Wolverine LP filed a

proceeding in this court seeking a judicial review of the Board's decision on the s. 54 issue. As a result, the final determination of the damages arising from the Code breach has not yet occurred and may never occur if Wolverine LP succeeds in its judicial review; and c) Following layoffs in April 2014, the Union claimed that a "northern allowance" was payable by Wolverine LP to the employees, including those on layoff. This claim was rejected at arbitration, and upheld on review at the Board. In February 2015, the Union filed a proceeding in this court seeking a judicial review of the Board's decision. [73] The Union's counsel has referred me to my earlier decision in Yukon Zinc Corporation (Re), 2015 BCSC 1961. There, I summarized the principles that govern applications by a creditor to lift the stay of proceedings to litigate claims: [26] There is also no controversy concerning the principles which govern applications by creditors under the CCAA to lift the stay of proceedings to litigate claims in other courts or forums, other than by the procedures in place in the restructuring proceedings: a) the lifting of the stay is discretionary: Canwest Global Communications Corp., 2011 ONSC 2215, at paras. 19, 27; b) there are no statutory guidelines and the applicant faces a "very heavy onus" in making such an application: Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re) (2009), 61 C.B.R.

(5th) 200, at para. 32, 183 A.C.W.S. (3d) (Ont. S.C.J.) ("Canwest (2009)"), as applied in Azure Dynamics Corporation (Re), 2012 BCSC 781, at para. 5 and 505396 B.C. Ltd. (Re), 2013 BCSC 1580, at para. 19; c) there are no set circumstances where a stay will or will not be lifted, although examples of situations where the courts have lifted stay orders are set out in Canwest (2009) at para. 33; d) relevant factors will include the status of the CCAA proceedings and what impact the lifting of the stay will have on the proceedings. The court may consider whether there are sound reasons for doing so consistent with the objectives of the CCAA, including a consideration of the relative prejudice to parties and, where relevant, the merits of the proposed action: Canwest (2009) at para. 32; e) particularly where the issue is one which is engaged by a claims process in place, it must be remembered that one of the objectives of the CCAA is to promote a streamlined process to determine claims that reduces expense and delay; and f) as an overarching consideration, the court must consider whether it is in the interests of justice to lift the stay: Canwest (2009); Azure Dynamics at para. 28. [74] I concluded that the Union had not met the "heavy onus" on it to justify the lifting of the stay to allow these various proceedings to continue. My specific reasons are: a) The Union argues that the

materials are essentially already assembled and that these judicial reviews can be scheduled for short chambers matters. As such, the Union argues that there is "minimal prejudice" to Wolverine LP. While this may be so, proceeding with these matters will inevitably detract both managerial and legal focus from the primary task at hand, namely to implement the SISP, and as such, potentially interfere with the restructuring efforts; b) The Union argues that any purchaser of Wolverine LP's mine will inherit outstanding employee obligations pursuant to the Code. Accordingly, the Union argues that it will be more attractive to a buyer for the mine to have all outstanding employee claims resolved. Again, while this may come to pass, such an argument presupposes an outcome that is anything less than clear at this time. Such a rationale is clearly premature; c) The Union argues that it is unable to distribute the $771,378.70 to its members until Wolverine LP's judicial review is addressed. Frankly, I see this delay as the only real prejudice to the Union members. However, on the other hand, one might argue that the Union members are in a favourable position with these monies being held in trust as opposed to being unsecured creditors of Wolverine. In any event, the Union's claim to these monies has not yet been determined and arises from a dispute that dates back to April 2014.

Therefore, there is no settled liability that would allow such payment to be made; and d) The Union claims that these matters must be determined "in any event" and that they should be determined "sooner rather than later". However, the outcome of the SISP may significantly affect what recovery any creditor may hope to achieve in this restructuring. In the happy circumstance where there will be monies to distribute, I expect that a claims process will be implemented to determine valid claims, not only in respect of the Union's claims, but all creditors. [75] In summary, there is nothing to elevate the Union's claims such that it is imperative that they be determined now. There is nothing to justify the distraction and expense of proceeding with these actions to the detriment of the restructuring efforts. If it should come to pass that monies will be distributed to creditors, such as the Union, then I expect that the usual claims process will be implemented to decide the validity of those claims. [76] In the meantime, if it becomes necessary to determine the validity of these claims quickly (such as to clarify potential successor claims for a purchaser), the Union will be at liberty to renew its application to lift the stay for that purpose. [77] Accordingly, I grant an extension of the stay of proceedings and other ancillary relief until April 5, 2016. "Fitzpatrick J."