G.W.M. v. W.C.M.

2017 BCSC 177 G.W.M. v. W.C.M. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: G.W.M. v. W.C.M., 2017 BCSC 177 Date: 20170203 Docket: E141333 Registry: Vancouver Between: G.W.M. Claimant And W.C.M. Respondent Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Walker Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: K.A. Bowman Counsel for the Respondent: P. Daltrop Place and Dates of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C. January 5, 12 & 31, 2017 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C. February 3, 2017 Introduction [1] W.C.M., who is the respondent in this family law action, applies for an order varying the quantum of child support payable to his three children. He seeks related orders that purport to limit his obligation to pay support for his son, who is the eldest child, to obtain certain records concerning him, and also to limit his ongoing obligation to pay private school tuition fees for the parties' youngest child, which he has been paying as extraordinary or s. 7 expenses. Since he lives in California and pays in US dollars, W.C.M. also seeks an order fixing the exchange rate. [2] This variation application is in respect of orders that I made following trial in 2015. I issued reasons for judgment ("Reasons") on September 19, 2015 ordering W.C.M. to pay child support in the amount of CAD $6,631 per month based on an income of USD $306,878 converted to Canadian dollars at $1.2937 US dollars to Canadian dollars. I also ordered W.C.M. to pay for private school tuition expenses for the parties' two younger children, both girls, who are presently 16 and 9. By consent, an order went requiring W.C.M. to pay tuition and other related university expenses for the oldest child's expenses at the University of British Columbia. [3] The Reasons are indexed at 2015 BCSC 1624. [4] I also ordered W.C.M., who had, in the spring of 2015, been terminated from his job as general counsel for a financial investment/fund company in the United States, to provide particulars of his full or part-time employment forthwith after he obtained it. My reasons concerning his income, income earning circumstances, findings, and order are contained in Part V of the Reasons at paras. 163-233. [5] The other aspect of W.C.M.'s application concerns increasing his parental contact time with the parties' youngest child and removing restrictions on his access to allow it to be unsupervised and to permit him to take her out of the jurisdiction to the United States where he and his parents reside. That part of his application was adjourned in light of my order requiring W.C.M. to provide contact particulars of third party affiants who provided affidavits in support of this part of his application and to allow counsel for G.W.M. to contact them. [6] Consequently, these reasons deal with the financial aspects of W.C.M.'s child support obligations and his request to obtain documents from G.W.M. Application to Vary Child Support [7] W.C.M. says that there has been a material change in his circumstances because he is earning far less than he did at the time I issued the Reasons. In his affidavit evidence, he describes his efforts to obtain work and states that he is now earning USD $125,000 annually since he obtained new employment last September 2015 (the date he started his new job is not set out) as managing director of mergers and acquisitions, for a start-up company, Franklin Data Ventures Inc. (a company that he deposes is struggling financially). He also describes how he has little opportunity to earn any meaningful bonus, and that if he does earn one, it will be a nominal amount. W.C.M. does receive health benefits and a contribution to the United States' equivalent of an RRSP as part of his remuneration. [8] The claimant, G.W.M., acknowledges there has been a material change in W.C.M.'s employment circumstances since the Reasons were issued, but says that he is easily capable of earning greater income, of at least USD $200,000 annually. She says that is a conservative amount inasmuch as net earnings of $100 per hour is low for a seasoned litigator, a status W.C.M. has enjoyed up until approximately 2013. That net hourly rate at 40 hours per week, she says, would result in that income. She also says that W.C.M.'s historical incomes have been substantially higher, including times when he was in private litigation practice. She says that he has not provided any evidence to show that he attempted, let alone considered, returning to private practice. [9] She also says that he still owns stock options from his previous employer that were part of his remuneration package that must be factored in his income generating potential for the purpose of determining his guideline income for child support. [10] There is no doubt, and indeed, G.W.M. agrees, that W.C.M.'s financial circumstances have changed in a material way so as to permit a variation of my existing order. The question for determination is what is the amount of his annual income to be used for child support purposes? [11] Let me begin the discussion of my determination by stating that W.C.M.'s income for 2016 was not USD $125,000. His income is shown on his US tax filing with the Internal Revenue Service to be USD $183,599.94. The additional amount was derived from the sale of certain stock options where he realized USD $58,600. The sale proceeds are treated as income by the United States Internal Revenue Code. The tax treatment for sale of those options, I am advised, is the same for Canada such that his income for child support would include those proceeds. [12] As well, as it turned out, W.C.M.'s income for 2015 was greater than I had set it in the Reasons. I calculated his support obligation recognizing that severance payment he received on termination in 2015, for one year's income, paid in advance, was not to be aggregated in 2015 as it would artificially inflate his income. W.C.M. received that payment in approximately June 2015, such that the severance payment of USD $274,000 spanned from June 2015 to June 2016 and should be treated as income for part of 2016 as well. My finding of his child support obligation was predicated on that amount converted to Canadian dollars. [13] Because W.C.M. obtained work in September 2015 with Franklin Data Ventures, at approximately USD $10,000 per month, his income for 2015 and for January to June 2016 was, in fact, higher than the income upon which his child support obligation was based. W.C.M. did not pay increased child support to correspond with his new circumstances, which I find constituted a material change. There was some disagreement between the parties as to the exact amount of the benefit that W.C.M. obtained by paying a lower amount of child support as a result. The difference depends in part on the point in time used for the start of W.C.M.'s job with Franklin Data Ventures and the exchange rates used. The parties put the amount as low as CAD $15,511 and as high as CAD $23,349. Regardless, I find the amount to be significant in the circumstances. [14] G.W.M.'s counsel made the point that if W.C.M.'s salary with Franklin Data Ventures began on September 1, 2015, then his income from June 1, 2015 to May 31, 2016 was actually USD $367,750, and when his spousal support obligation is deducted, his income was USD $355,500 (as opposed to the finding I made following trial of USD $306,878). Looking at it from a different time perspective, i.e., from October 1, 2015, W.C.M.'s income from that date to September 30, 2016 was just over USD $330,500, based on USD $205,500 (nine months of the severance payment of USD $274,000) and his salary from Franklin Data Ventures of USD $125,000 for one year. After spousal support payments of USD $9,000 are deducted, his income was approximately USD $321,500. Those figures do not take into account the income received from the sale of W.C.M.'s stock options, which adds a further USD $58,600 income to those two annualized amounts. W.C.M. takes issue with that analysis, saying that it distorts the picture of his annual income for 2016. [15] However, in considering the evidence, I find it clear, and thus accept G.W.M.'s submissions to the effect that it is inaccurate to say that W.C.M.'s earnings for 2016 are limited to USD $125,000. I agree with her that at a minimum, it includes the sale of the options, so as to be at least USD $183,599.94. That figure does not take into account the severance he received from his prior job, which included the first five months of 2016 at approximately USD $114,165, which is USD $22,833 per month (determined at USD $274,000 divided equally over 12 months). That would put his 2016 income for tax purposes to be USD $297,764.94. [16] I do not accept W.C.M.'s submission that the sale proceeds from the stock options should not be included because they were part of a property division settlement in the divorce proceedings and cannot be treated as income. I do not accept that the evidence establishes such a finding. The stock options were sold well before the property division agreement was reached, at a time when a restraining order issued in California prohibited W.C.M. from disposing of community property. Absent evidence to the contrary, I agree with G.W.M.'s submission that those particular options fell outside the ambit of that order because they were W.C.M.'s property. Further, the words of the property settlement agreement demonstrate a contrary intention. The parties addressed the effect of the disposition of stock options that were community property by stipulating that the sale of specific options to which G.W.M. was entitled to as part of the agreement were not to be considered for any purpose against the interests of W.C.M.: 1. 21,935 Stock options, [name of company]. To exercise said options: Petitioner [G.W.M.] shall inform Respondent [W.C.M.] in writing of her demand to exercise. Respondent shall cause said options to be exercised and pay Petitioner the sales proceeds net after all fees + tax withholdings. Petitioner shall first advance all fees + costs necessary to exercise options consistent with the company's requirements. Any income from said exercise received by Resp. shall not be used against Resp. for any purpose. [17] Even if those proceeds are taken out of the equation, W.C.M.'s income for 2016 exceeds USD $239,164.94. [18] W.C.M.'s counsel urges me to consider the findings made by a judge of the California Superior Court in the divorce proceedings, which were tried in that jurisdiction, to the effect that his client's income for spousal support purposes as of December 2016 is USD $125,000. I have considered that finding as one of the many factors in determining W.C.M.'s income for child support purposes, but without intending any disrespect to the trial judge or the California Superior Court, that finding is not binding and in any event, I could not regard it as persuasive because I am not aware of all of the evidence that was before the Superior Court, and it is not clear to me if the judge considered the income W.C.M. actually enjoyed in 2015 and for the first five months of 2016, as a result of the effect of income from W.C.M.'s new job at Franklin Data Ventures when coupled with his prior severance payment. [19] I am also troubled by the lack of any evidence concerning W.C.M.'s efforts to earn income by restabilising his own legal private practice. I acknowledge that he was last in private practice approximately 3 ½ years ago, but he was a highly successful litigator with a high dollar income earning practice, and at trial he said that he had and would continue to maintain his licence to practice law in California. [20] Regardless, when considering his actual income in 2015 and 2016 together with some evidence to indicate that there was the possibility for work for him as a contract lawyer at $100 per hour, I find that W.C.M. is capable of earning at least USD $200,000, and I would fix his child support obligation based on that income for 2017. [21] Even if it could be said that his income is now limited to USD $125,000, W.C.M. has obtained a significant benefit from his extra earnings in 2015 and 2016 for which he did not increase his child support payments. That factor, coupled with his limited living expenses (e.g., he claims to be homeless but lives rent-free with his partner), dictates against fixing his child support obligation based on an income at that amount. Child support is the right of the child, in this case his children, and it would be manifestly unfair to them to fix it at that reduced income in the circumstances of this case. [22] In these circumstances, and as well as the significant hardship it would present to G.W.M. in light of her inability to earn income due to a medical disability and her complete reliance on W.C.M. for child support, I have determined that there is also no basis to impose any retroactive aspect to the reduction in W.C.M.'s income. See, D.B.S. v. S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37 at paras. 95-96; G.M.W. v. D.P.W., 2014 BCCA 282 at paras. 40-43. [23] Accordingly, I fix W.C.M.'s child support obligation prospectively, on the basis of USD $200,000 per year, commencing January 1, 2017, and order W.C.M. to provide a monthly statement to G.W.M. of his income earnings. Rate of Exchange [24] W.C.M. seeks to vary my prior order to have me fix a permanent rate of exchange, in order, he submits, to avoid ongoing disagreement between the parties that requires them to expend further funds and time to appear in court. [25] In the Reasons, at paras. 177-180, I provided a means for the parties to resolve the exchange rate issue in order to avoid, what I described at para. 180, unfairness to both parties. I allowed them to seek a review every six months starting from the last day of trial, which was July 15, 2015. Noting the significant changes in the United States/Canadian dollar exchange rates in the prior year, I also permitted either party to seek a review sooner should there be a "significant change" in currency exchange rates. I did not define "significant change". [26] During trial, the parties relied on rates provided by the Bank of Canada in support of their competing submissions concerning exchange rates to be used to calculate past and prospective child support obligations, including s. 7 expenses. My decision was based upon those rates. On this application, W.C.M. says that he is unable to obtain the rate stipulated by the Bank of Canada and seeks an order varying the rate to accord to what he is able to obtain at his bank in California, which is the Union Bank. [27] I am not prepared to accede to his request for several reasons. First, there is no evidence that the rate offered by his bank is the best that W.C.M. can obtain. Second, G.W.M. should not be put in a predicament where she is reliant solely on the rate offered by W.C.M.'s bank. Banks offer different rates to their clients based upon, in part, the nature and volume of the business they offer. Third, the majority of the case authorities that have been brought to my attention use a rate established by a central bank such as the Bank of Canada. Lastly, given that child support is the right of the children who live in Canada, the exchange rate should be the rate set from time to time by their domestic central bank, the Bank of Canada. [28] Further, I do not accede to W.C.M.'s request that he should be able to deduct from his payments the cost of wiring the funds to G.W.M. He chooses to send the funds by wire, which is a more costly means than purchasing a bank draft. Wiring funds is done at his option and for his convenience, and the children's right to child support should not be affected as a result. [29] Finally, as attractive as it is to set a singular rate to apply to W.C.M.'s obligation to pay child support until the children are no longer entitled to it in order to avoid disputes between the parties, the evidence at trial and before me on this application establishes that there have been significant variations in Canadian and United States dollar exchange rates that could dramatically assist one party to the detriment of the other. Consequently, I am not prepared to fix one rate, and will leave the order as it stands so that the parties are required to recalculate the rate every six months. For greater certainty, however, I will vary my prior order to remove the entitlement to seek redress in the event of "significant change" in rates sooner than six months as that may only serve to promote further litigation. Recalculation every six months should avoid any meaningful prejudice to the parties arising from fluctuations in exchange rates. [30] Therefore, in summary, and subject to the caveat I discuss in the next paragraph, I would not vary my prior order in respect of a recalculation every six months. I would vary it to remove the right to seek redress sooner than six months. I would also add a term that the applicable rate is that set by the Bank of Canada. [31] That then leaves the rate to be established for W.C.M.'s child support obligations commencing January 1, 2017. In fixing it, I raise the caveat mentioned above. I presume from their submissions that the parties have not engaged in the six month calculation provided for in the Reasons. If that is the case, then my prior order should be varied so that the Bank of Canada rate effective January 3, 2017 should be utilized (it is the rate closest to January 1, 2017 that was put before me). It is 1.3433 for 1 United States dollar to 1 Canadian dollar, or 0.7444 for 1 Canadian dollar to 1 United States dollar. Also, in that event, the order will be varied so that the first six month re-calculation will commence on July 1, 2017. Otherwise, if the parties have in fact engaged in the six month recalculation spoken of in the Reasons, then they are to apply the applicable Bank of Canada rates since the Reasons were issued. [32] From there, the exchange rate so employed will then be applied to the income determination that I have made, i.e., USD $200,000 effective January 1, 2017, so as to determine the quantum of W.C.M.'s monthly child support obligation, expressed in Canadian dollars, in accordance with the Guidelines. I am confident that counsel in this case will be able to sort that out. Section 7, Special, and Extraordinary, Expenses [33] In these reasons, I refer to these expenses by the generic phrase, "s. 7 expenses". Should G.W.M.'s Guideline Income Be Adjusted? [34] W.C.M. submits that G.W.M.'s income should be adjusted upward to account for imputed income. He bases his submission on the reasons for judgment of the California Superior Court handed down in December 2016 in respect of the divorce proceeding. In those reasons, the trial judge gave a certain form of warning, arising under California law, to G.W.M. to search for employment. The reasons suggest that this was done in the absence of evidence concerning G.W.M.'s medical disability. [35] In the trial before me, medical and other evidence was adduced to confirm that G.W.M. suffers from a medical disability. Moreover, at trial, W.C.M. did not seek to impute income to G.W.M.: Reasons, paras. 20, 146, 231. I found that her income was comprised of government funded universal child care benefits in the amount of CAD $5,400 and spousal support payments of CAD $14,000. There is also medical evidence in the instant application record confirming her medical disability. No material change has been demonstrated in respect of her medical condition. There has, however, been a material change, downward, in respect of her financial circumstances. She no longer receives spousal support, as a result of the determination of the California Superior Court in its December reasons concerning the divorce action. Her child care benefits have also been reduced by half to CAD $2,700 per annum. [36] Accordingly, for the purpose of their respective contributions to s. 7 expenses, I order that effective January 1, 2017, the parties' contributions are premised on W.C.M. earning USD $200,000 per year and G.W.M. receiving CAD $2,700. Payment of the Youngest Child's Private School Expenses [37] In the Reasons, I ordered W.C.M. to continue to pay the private school tuition expenses for his two daughters until the older daughter graduated from school. I determined that W.C.M. could seek a review of his obligation to pay private school tuition for his younger daughter at that time. [38] I now find that I was mistaken when I suggested that she was going to graduate in two years' time, i.e., June 2017. She is due to graduate Grade 12 in June 2018. [39] W.C.M. now applies to vary the prior order so that his obligation to pay private school expenses for the younger daughter terminates when her older sister graduates high school. W.C.M. acknowledges that his application is, being brought much earlier than the time prescribed in the Reasons. It is, he says, predicated on his reduced income. [40] I am not prepared to vary the order at this time. In the Reasons, I found that the younger daughter's continued attendance at private school was of considerable benefit to her and promoted her best interests in very difficult circumstances created to a large degree by W.C.M.: Reasons, paras. 74-111, 118, 141-142, 144, 156, 162, 208, 223-230. I see no basis to revise my findings. Moreover, now that W.C.M. is no longer paying spousal support, he has greater disposable income. That benefit coupled with his annual income also weighs against any premature application to vary the order. [41] During submissions, it became apparent to me that there should be one minor variation to the order in order to promote certainty for the parties' youngest child in respect of her attendance at private school. To that end, it would not be in their younger daughter's best interests to have any such variation application wait until the middle child graduates in June 2018 since the younger daughter's application to continue to attend private school for the 2018/19 school term should be submitted by that time. Thus, the order should be varied in order to permit W.C.M.to seek a review shortly before their younger daughter is due to register for the 2018/19 school term, to ensure that there is no disruption to placing her in school should W.C.M.'s review application succeed. Accordingly, I vary the order so that a review of W.C.M.'s obligation to continue to pay for the younger daughter's private school tuition may take place no sooner than three months before her older sister graduates from Grade 12; in other words, he may bring that application on or after March 15, 2018, but not before. Credit Card Charges for Private School Tuition [42] W.C.M. seeks an order that permits him to only pay the actual tuition charges levied by the two younger children's private school but not the extra cost charged by the school to pay the fees by G.W.M.'s credit card. He says that he should not have to absorb the burden of that additional amount. [43] G.W.M. has paid those tuition fees on her credit card, for a considerable period of time, as a convenience to W.C.M. He has not, for various reasons, been able to pay the fees and the requisite deposits when due. In my opinion, it would be unfair to G.W.M. to impose upon her the burden of the credit card charge, which can be significant in view of the fees charged. It is W.C.M.'s obligation to pay his share of the tuition, which is almost all of it given the parties' respective incomes, when the charges are due. [44] He should not, however, have to bear any portion of those fees that are attributable to G.W.M.'s proportionate share. [45] Accordingly, G.W.M. should pay her pro-rata share of the extra costs arising from the use of her credit card. She may, if she chooses to do so, pay her small proportionate share of the fees to the school by cash or cheque, and thereby avoid incurring any extra costs to her account. [46] W.C.M. has a similar choice: if he wants to avoid those extra costs, he should arrange to pay the monthly fees and deposits directly to the school, either by post-dated cheques, wire transfers, or bank drafts, but if he does, it must be in Canadian dollars, and those payments must be on time. No delinquency can be tolerated. The children's attendance at school should not be jeopardized. Otherwise, unless W.C.M. provides written notice to G.W.M. at least 30 days in advance of his intention to pay his share of the fees and deposits directly to the school, she will continue to pay them with her credit card, as a matter of convenience for W.C.M., and W.C.M. shall absorb his proportionate share of the additional costs. Payment of Deposits for Private School Tuition [47] Consequent upon W.C.M.'s request in respect of those extra fees, G.W.M. says that there has been a material change in terms of the dates in which deposits are due. The private school has changed the payment deadlines for deposits since the Reasons were issued. Instead of issuing an order with specific payment dates that may have to be varied again if the school makes a further change, I will vary the prior order so that W.C.M. is required to pay the deposits and fees on or before the due date set by the two younger children's private school. [48] I also order G.W.M. to forthwith advise W.C.M. of all payment due dates, in written or email communication. She may do that herself, through counsel, or to cause the school to send that information to W.C.M. Is W.C.M. Obliged to Pay for the Eldest Child's University Costs? [49] W.C.M. objects to continuing to pay for the eldest child's university education on the basis that he is not in full-time attendance at university and is no longer a minor (having turned 19 years old on December 27, 2016). In addition, W.C.M. expects a credit in respect of what he says are overpayments for his son's university education last year because, unbeknownst to W.C.M., his son had dropped out of the University of British Columbia ("UBC") all while W.C.M. continued to pay for his tuition, books, and commuting costs pursuant to an order that went by consent during the trial. During trial, W.C.M. agreed to pay for the costs of his son to attend UBC, including fixed dollar amount for commuting costs. The terms of the order are set out at paras. 190-191 of the Reasons. [50] The evidence before me on this application is that the eldest child stopped attending UBC for health reasons, primarily the result of ongoing depression and stress arising from the difficulties posed by his relationship with his father and his parents' marital conflicts. Those issues are discussed in the Reasons. According to a report in evidence from his doctor, dated December 20, 2016, the eldest child: is currently suffering from severe depression which, in the past led to suicidal ideation. He is also suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ["PTSD"]. He currently is unable to work due to these two illnesses. His illnesses also led to him not being able to cope with the stress of University at UBC and as a result could not finish his courses there. [51] There is no evidence, including medical evidence, to challenge that report or to establish that there has been a material change in the findings I made at trial concerning the parties' son. Consequently, I accept that this young adult suffers from ongoing stress, PTSD, and depression. [52] In the face of his medical issues, and to his credit, he has increased his enrolment from one course at Capilano University, which he took after he left UBC, to three courses, which Capliano University considers to be "full-time" attendance. Thus, whether the parties' son's status is considered under the Divorce Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 33, or the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, he will now be attending university full time and is unable to work, and is therefore entitled to contribution from his parents, in accordance with their relative incomes, to the cost of his attendance. See: Longhurst v. Longhurst, 2005 BCSC 1189; McAuley v. McAuley, 2006 BCSC 1643; Farden v. Farden, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1315 (S.C.); Wesemann v. Wesemann, [1999] B.C.J. No. 1387 (S.C.). [53] I am also satisfied that the commute from his home, where he resides with his mother, G.W.M., is difficult such that commuting costs of a small vehicle are reasonable and appropriate. W.C.M. had no difficulty in consenting to commuting costs when his son attended UBC and I see no basis to disallow those costs at this time. [54] Since the costs to attend Capilano University may be less than attending UBC, the variation I would make is to require W.C.M. to pay for his son's costs to attend Capilano University on the same basis that I did for UBC, as set out in para. 190 of the Reasons. G.W.M. should present those costs to W.C.M., with the tuition and costs of books corroborated with documents from the university, for immediate payment by W.C.M. [55] I wish to conclude this section by dealing with W.C.M.'s complaint that he should receive reimbursement or a credit for monies he paid when his son was not attending UBC. W.C.M.'s concern that he paid fictitious costs is understandable. The difficulty with his reimbursement claim lies in the following: (a) It is not clear when his son left UBC. (b) There is no evidence to demonstrate whether, on his son's departure, he was entitled to a refund of any part of his tuition. (c) There does come a point in time during a school semester or year where no refunds will be given on a student's withdrawal. (d) Even assuming a refund of UBC tuition may not have been possible, if the parties' son was not attending school at all, then W.C.M. should not have had to pay for non-existent commuting costs. (e) It is not clear when his son began his singular course at Capilano University. (f) Given their son's inability to work, I find that he is entitled to contribution from his parents for the costs of attending that course, and W.C.M.is obliged to pay his share of them. [56] I lack the evidence necessary to determine if W.C.M. is, in fact, entitled to a refund or credit. To resolve the issue, I order G.W.M. to provide certain information to W.C.M. within 45 days. The information she is required to produce is substantially described in Part 1: ORDER(S) SOUGHT, paras. 5 (b) and (e) of W.C.M.'s notice of application dated December 2, 2016, but modified as follows. She is to provide: (a) confirmation of their son's enrollment in post-secondary in the 2016/2017 school year, including the number of classes in which he was registered; and (b) copies of receipts or other proof of payment documents for s. 7 expenses G.W.M. claims to have paid for their son since September 2015 on account of the cost of tuition, student fees, books, and commuting costs. [57] To that, I would add, and only if it is possible for G.W.M. to obtain it, she is to provide information concerning the possibility, or not, as the case may be, for a refund for their son's tuition upon his withdrawal from UBC. I must note that W.C.M.is at liberty to seek out this information as well per the terms of the order that was entered as a consequence of the Reasons. [58] In making this order, I recognize that continued communications between the parties in the difficult circumstances of this case is not productive, especially for G.W.M.'s health, but at the same time, W.C.M. is not required to pay s. 7 expenses that were not incurred and/or capable of refund. I will leave it to counsel to sort out whether any refund or credit is due, and if it is, in what amount. Failing agreement, the parties may make arrangements to appear before me to determine the issue. [59] Since W.C.M. is no longer the guardian of the children, and given my decision concerning their son's status as a child entitled to payment of s. 7 expenses concerning his attendance at university, I have determined that G.W.M. is not obliged to give to W.C.M. the other documents he seeks in para. 5 of his notice of application. Security for Child Support Obligation [60] During argument, G.W.M. asked for an order requiring W.C.M. to provide life insurance as security for his child support obligation. She reminded me that during the trial, evidence was led demonstrating that W.C.M. removed G.W.M. as the beneficiary under his existing policy and substituted his parents in her place. In light of the opinion that I expressed to counsel that the application was premature given the state of the evidence, counsel for G.W.M. asked that I make an order that the child support obligation be binding on W.C.M.'s estate. I agree that such an order is appropriate. It may be, as W.C.M.'s counsel urged me to conclude, that the order may not have any practical effect given the present state of W.C.M.'s asset position, but the order is a continuing order and will protect the children in what can only be hoped will be W.C.M.'s improved circumstances in time. Accordingly, I will make the order requested by G.W.M. Costs [61] The parties are liberty to address costs. "Walker J." ___________________________________ The Honourable Mr. Justice Walker