Ireland v. Ireland

2026 BCCA 134 Ireland v. Ireland COURT OF APPEAL FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Ireland v. Ireland, 2026 BCCA 134 Date: 20260309 Docket: CA51206 Between: Wesley Curtis Ireland Appellant (Claimant) And Sahiry Hinndira Ireland also known as Sahiry Hinndira Rivero-Anderson Respondent (Respondent) Before: The Honourable Justice Edelmann (In Chambers) On appeal from: An order of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, dated February 19, 2026 (Ireland v. Ireland, 2026 BCSC 297, Vancouver Docket E220374). Oral Reasons for Judgment The Appellant, appearing in person: W.C. Ireland The Respondent, appearing in person (via videoconference): S.H. Ireland Place and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, British Columbia March 6, 2026 Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, British Columbia March 9, 2026 Summary: This is an application for leave to appeal the order of a chambers judge dismissing the appellant's application for a child advocate to be appointed under s. 203 of the Family Law Act. Held: Leave to appeal granted. The chambers judge's reasons are extremely brief and do not explicitly engage with the factors set out in s. 203 or the evidence presented by the appellant. Although the factual and legal bases for the decision may become discernible when the reasons are read in the context of the record as a whole, the appellant has demonstrated sufficient merit to the appeal in the circumstances to justify the granting of leave. [1] EDELMANN J.A.: This is an application for leave to appeal the order of a chambers judge pronounced on February 19, 2026, dismissing the appellant's application to have a child advocate appointed under s. 203 of the Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25 [FLA], which reads as follows: 203 (1) The court may at any time appoint a lawyer to represent the interests of a child in a proceeding under this Act if the court is satisfied that (a) the degree of conflict between the parties is so severe that it significantly impairs the capacity of the parties to act in the best interests of the child, and (b) it is necessary to protect the best interests of the child. [2] This application arises in the context of a high-conflict parenting dispute that has been ongoing in the Supreme Court for some time. The parties initially entered into a consent order that, among other things, set out parenting time and responsibilities. However, conflict between the parties subsequently intensified, and they have since been unable to agree on virtually any issues relating to the parenting of their children. The chambers judge, who has been seized of this matter since July 2024, has directed that the parties proceed to trial. [3] In a notice of application filed in the Supreme Court on November 26, 2025, the appellant sought to have counsel appointed for the parties' eldest child under s. 203 of the FLA. [4] The eldest child is 12 years old. He has been in contact with the Child and Youth Legal Centre (CYLC), and it appears they are willing to provide counsel to represent him in the proceedings. There was evidence before the chambers judge that the child's counsellor and other professionals are of the view that a child advocate would be beneficial. [5] The chambers judge heard the application on December 8 but declined to decide on the appointment of an advocate, adjourning the issue to trial. I understand no trial date has been set. [6] On February 19, 2026, the parties appeared before the chambers judge again. The appellant presented new evidence in the form of a psychiatric report recommending a child advocate. He argued that the evidence showed a material change in circumstances that warranted the appointment of counsel for the child. [7] The chambers judge dismissed the application. His complete reasons for judgment read as follows: [1] I am dismissing the claimant's application to vary the December 8, 2025 order and for the record you, Mr. Ireland, just gave me the "thumbs up", so you obviously anticipated what my order was going to be and are obviously pleased with it. [2] I realize you intend to appeal and I want to make it very clear to the Court of Appeal that I have been dealing with this matter for what, two years now? Something like that, and I am confident that there are shenanigans going on here that I am not comfortable with. [8] The appellant argues that the chambers judge failed to engage with relevant factors for the appointment of a child advocate and ignored material evidence, including various professional reports commenting on the child's psychiatric condition. Application for Leave to Appeal [9] The test for leave to appeal is well-established. The Court must consider: a) whether the point on appeal is of significance to the practice; b) whether the point raised is of significance to the action itself; c) whether the appeal is prima facie meritorious or, on the other hand, whether it is frivolous; and d) whether the appeal will unduly hinder the progress of the action. See Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Sessions, 2000 BCCA 326 at para. 10 (Chambers). [10] I will consider each of these factors before turning to the overarching consideration of whether it is in the interests of justice to grant leave: Vancouver (City) v. Zhang, 2007 BCCA 280 at para. 10 (Chambers). [11] First, given the limited jurisprudence from this Court on s. 203 of the FLA, I am prepared to accept that the points raised on appeal would have some significance for the practice. [12] Second, the appeal would also have significance for the action itself, as the child's best interests are a central consideration. There are obvious benefits to resolving the question of whether to appoint an advocate before proceeding to trial, particularly given that trial dates have yet to be set. In the circumstances, it does not appear that the appeal would unduly hinder the action, aside from the more general point that the parties would be much better off spending their energy parenting rather than litigating. [13] Third, I accept that the appellant has demonstrated some merit to the appeal. The question on an application for leave to appeal a discretionary order is whether there is an arguable case that the judge below erred in principle, made an order that is not supported by the evidence, or made an order that will result in an injustice: Hagwilneghl v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd., 2011 BCCA 478 at para. 31 (Chambers). [14] The reasons for judgment in this case are extremely brief and do not explicitly engage with the factors set out in s. 203 of the FLA, or the evidence presented by the appellant. It may be that the factual and legal bases for the decision are discernible when the reasons are read in the context of the record as a whole. However, on the face of the materials before me, I find that the appellant has demonstrated sufficient merit to the appeal to justify the granting of leave. [15] Given the factors above, I conclude that it is in the interests of justice to grant leave. I therefore grant leave to appeal. "The Honourable Justice Edelmann"