TB4-12461

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-12461 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXXXX) (a.k.a. XXXXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision April 8, 2015 Date de la décision Panel M. Pettinella Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Eve Sehatzadeh Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Barrister and Solicitor Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister Lauren Gamble Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXXX (the Appellant) alleges to be a citizen of Ethiopia and appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal and requests an oral hearing. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and to either refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination or substitute its own determination that he is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The Minister intervened in this appeal and submits that the RPD decision is reasonable and ought to be upheld by the RAD. DETERMINATION [2] This appeal is allowed. Pursuant to Section 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD refers the matter to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that, upon return to Ethiopia, he will be harmed by members of government forces because he is believed to be a member of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on October 29, 2014. By a decision of November 27, 2014 the RPD rejected the claim finding that the Appellant had provided a fraudulent document to prove his identity and this impeached the overall credibility of his evidence as it related to his identity. It found that the Appellant had not adequately established his identity on a balance of probabilities. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erroneously concluded that his Ethiopian birth certificate was a fraudulent document. He also submits that the RPD erred by failing to have regard to any other evidence regarding his identity. [6] The Minister submits that, given a number of inconsistencies presented in this case, the identity of the Appellant is not any further established than it was at the time of the RPD decision. The Minister further submits that the identity findings of the RPD should stand and be considered dispositive of the Appellant's refugee claim. The Minister requests the RAD dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD. ANALYSIS Role of the RAD [7] What is the role of the RAD in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD? The Appellant submits that the RAD, having appellate jurisdiction and being a specialized body itself, must engage in its own assessment of all the evidence in order to decide whether the RPD committed an error and, as such, does not owe deference to the RPD. He cites Huruglica, a decision from the Federal Court of Canada concerning the standard of intervention by the RAD.1 [8] In Huruglica, the Court considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD. It found that the RAD had erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.2 [9] Justice Phelan stated the following in Huruglica: Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.3 In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error."4 [10] The RAD will therefore review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, recognizing and respecting the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own determination. Admissibility of New Evidence [11] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in his Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to him.5 [12] The Appellant asks the RAD to admit the following documents: * Affidavit of a relative dated January 7, 2015;6 * Affidavit of a family acquaintance dated January 8, 2015;7 * Affidavit of a family acquaintance dated January 8, 2015; 8 * Appellant's affidavit dated January 8, 2015; 9 and, * Australian Migration Review Tribunal Research Response regarding the issuance of birth certificates in Ethiopia dated July 23, 2009.10 [13] The Appellant submits that the documents proposed as new evidence meet the requirements under the IRPA as they were not reasonably available or he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented such evidence at the time his refugee claim was rejected. He argues that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented such evidence at the time his refugee claim was rejected as he had relied on multiple and various forms of other evidence in order to establish his identity at the RPD. The Appellant submits that the affidavits provide relevant and probative evidence of his personal and national identity as a citizen of Ethiopia. He further submits that the Australian Migration Review Tribunal Research Response rebuts the findings made by the RPD regarding his Ethiopian birth certificate. [14] The RAD notes that the RPD had expressed concerns at the Appellant's hearing about his identity and his identity evidence. The RPD expressed particular concern about the birth certificate the Appellant submitted in evidence. The RPD was very clear at the hearing in noting anomalies in the Appellant's evidence regarding his identity. The Appellant's counsel requested that written submissions be made in this case and the RPD agreed to accept them one week after the hearing. The RPD issued its decision and reasons approximately one month after the hearing. As the RPD issued its decision approximately one month after the hearing and it had expressed the concerns noted above, the Appellant could reasonably have been expected to present the affidavits and Australian tribunal report at the time of the rejection of his claim. The Appellant makes no arguments in his appeal with respect to making an application to submit post-hearing evidence to the RPD. The RAD notes that this option was available to him. The Appellant ought to have known that his identity and his identity evidence were issues with the RPD at the time of his hearing. He provided no new evidence in the approximately one month between the date of his hearing and the date the RPD rendered its decision. The Appellant has failed to establish that the documents proposed as new evidence were not reasonably available or he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented such evidence at the time his refugee claim was rejected. The RAD finds that the documents do not meet the test of new evidence and, as such, will not be accepted as new evidence in this appeal. [15] In response to the Minister's intervention, the Appellant asks the RAD to admit the following documents: * Letter from Ogaden Somali Community Association of Ontario (OSCAO) dated January 26, 2015;11 * 2013 IRB Access to Information Data: Outcomes by Country (Legacy Cases);12 and, * 2013 IRB Access to Information Data: Outcomes by Country (New system cases).13 [16] The Appellant submits that the letter from OSCAO proposed as new evidence meets the requirements under the IRPA as it rebuts the RPD finding that his birth certificate was fraudulent due to irregularities. He argues that he could not have reasonably produced such a document while his case was before the RPD as he did not know the RPD findings or its underlying reasons for its findings prior to receiving his negative decision. [17] As noted above, the Appellant ought to have known that his identity and his identity evidence were issues with the RPD at the time of his hearing as they were noted to him. The RPD expressed particular concern about the birth certificate the Appellant had submitted and asked him many questions about it. He had approximately one month to make application to submit further evidence before the RPD rendered its decision but failed to do so. The Appellant has failed to establish that OSCAO letter proposed as new evidence was not reasonably available or he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented such evidence at the time his refugee claim was rejected. Although Section 110(4) of the IRPA does not apply in respect of evidence that is presented in response to evidence presented by the Minister, the RAD is not persuaded that this evidence was submitted in response to evidence presented by the Minister. This proposed new evidence is in response to the RPD finding that the Appellant's birth certificate was fraudulent, as outlined in the reasons for the RPD decision. The Minister provided no new evidence that the Appellant's birth certificate was fraudulent. The analysis of proposed new evidence intended to rebut the RPD finding regarding the Appellant's birth certificate is addressed above. The RAD finds that the OSCAO letter does not meet the test of new evidence and, as such, will not be accepted as new evidence in this appeal. [18] The Appellant further submits that the Access to Information Data reports also meet the requirements under the IRPA as they were submitted in response to the Minister's allegation that he is a citizen of Somalia who lied about such citizenship to increase his claim's success as an Ethiopian. The Appellant argues that the information in the reports demonstrates that the Minister's speculative theory is simply not based on the evidence that Ethiopian citizens have an advantage over Somali nationals in refugee claims. [19] The RAD finds that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the Access to Information Data reports at the time of the rejection as it was unaware of the Minister's intention to intervene in his claim. The Minister filed its Notice of Intervention on January 20, 2015, approximately two months after the RPD rendered its decision. Furthermore, the RPD did not address the allegation that the Appellant is a citizen of Somalia who lied about such citizenship to increase his claim's success as an Ethiopian. As such, the RAD finds that the Access to Information Data reports meet the test of new evidence and, as such, will be accepted as new evidence in this appeal.14 Admissibility of Documents and Written Submissions not Previously Provided [20] The Appellant filed his appeal record on January 9, 2015. On January 20, 2015 the Minister filed a Notice of Intervention and the Appellant replied to the Minister's intervention on February 4, 2015. On March 2, 2015, the Appellant made an application to the RAD under Rule 29 asking that it accept his affidavit concerning a new identity witness and an affidavit of his new identity witness, both dated February 16, 2015. The Appellant submits that the affidavits are probative and relevant to his appeal as they concern the issue of his identity. He argues that it was not reasonable for him to have presented the evidence of his new identity witness to the RPD as he relied on the evidence of another identity witness. He also argues that he was not aware that he could present a non-Canadian citizen as his identity witness when his case was before the RPD. The Appellant submits that he could not have provided the evidence from his new identity witness in his record previously filed with the RAD as he lost touch with him for a period of time after his refugee claim was denied by the RPD. [21] Rule 29 of the RAD rules indicates that if a person, who is the subject of an appeal, wants to use a document or provide written submissions that were not previously provided, the person must make an application to the Division in accordance with rule 37. The person who is the subject of the appeal must include in an application to use a document that was not previously provided an explanation of how the document meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Act and how that evidence relates to the person. In deciding whether to allow an application, the RAD must consider any relevant factors, including the document's relevance and probative value, any new evidence the document brings to the appeal and whether the person, who is the subject of the appeal, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document or written submissions with the appellant's record. [22] As noted above, the Appellant ought to have known that his identity and his identity evidence were issues with the RPD at the time of his hearing as they were noted to him. He had approximately one month to make application to submit further evidence after his hearing and before the RPD rendered its decision but failed to do so. The Appellant has failed to establish that his new identity witness was not reasonably available or he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented such evidence at the time his refugee claim was rejected. The Appellant cannot rely on ignorance as an explanation for not bringing forward evidence at the RPD as he was represented by experienced counsel who is familiar with evidence acceptable to the RPD. Furthermore, the RAD finds that the affidavits could have been presented earlier. The RAD notes that the affidavits were provided to the RAD two weeks after they were sworn. A reading of rules 29 and 37 indicate that an Appellant must make an application to provide documents and written submissions not previously provided, without delay. In this case there was a significant delay in the Appellant making his application. As such, the Appellant's affidavit and the affidavit of his new identity witness, both dated February 16, 2015, and the related submissions will not be accepted in this appeal. Admissibility of Further New Evidence [23] On March 13, 2015, the RAD received additional document disclosure from the Minister. The Minister submits that the RAD may wish to consider the documents in the disclosure in the assessment of the appeal. The Minister noted that the documents were received on March 12, 2015 and could not have been provided at an earlier date. The Minister submits that the information in the documents is relevant and probative. The documents are as follows: * U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Tier 3, Biometric Response Cover Page dated March 10, 2015; * U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Record of Sworn Statement in Proceedings Under Section 235(b)(1) of the Act; * U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien; * Identity documents Supplied to U.S. Authorities from Appellant: a) Republic of South Africa (RSA) Department of Home Affairs, Formal Recognition of Refugee Status in the RSA for XXXXX; b) Main Department for Immigration and Nationality Affairs application form; and c) Unknown identity document with handwritten additions on left margin. [24] Section 110(3) of IRPA allows the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Minister is not bound by the restrictions on new evidence stipulated in Section 110(4) of the IRPA. The restriction of new evidence stipulated in Section 110(4) applies only to the person who is the subject of the Appeal; in this case, the Appellant. As such, the documents submitted by the Minister will be accepted as new evidence in this appeal. 15 Request for Oral Hearing [25] Section 110(3) of IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD's record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the person who is the subject of the appeal. The person who is the subject of the appeal may, pursuant to Section 110(4), present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. Section 110 (4) does not apply in respect of evidence that is presented in response to evidence presented by the Minister. [26] According to Section 110(6), the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in Section 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, that is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [27] The Access to Information Data reports received from the Appellant and noted above have been accepted as new evidence in this appeal. The documents received from the Minister on March 13, 2015 and noted above have also been accepted as new evidence in this appeal. However, after a review of the new evidence, the RAD finds that the new evidence does not justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. The RAD noted many identity and credibility concerns with the Appellant's evidence that were not addressed by the RPD. The RAD also noted inconsistencies between the Appellant's evidence and the new documentary evidence submitted by the Minister that were not previously identified or addressed by the RPD. The new evidence alone does not justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. As such, the RAD must proceed without a hearing. The RPD's Findings [28] Birth Certificate - The RPD found that the Appellant provided a fraudulent birth certificate to attest to his identity. It noted spelling errors on the document that were not reasonably explained and found this to be a strong indication the document was fraudulent. The RPD noted that the stamp on the certificate was affixed using an inkjet printer and found it improbable that a government body issuing official documents would use an inkjet printer to affix an official government stamp. It found the stamp to be an indication that the document was fraudulently produced. The RPD noted that the document was dated 1994 when the Appellant indicated that he had obtained it in 2002. It found the Appellant's explanation, that an Ethiopian calendar was used versus a Western calendar, unacceptable. The RPD noted that the space where the year of birth was to be recorded on the document was pre-printed "20__" and it had been crossed out and "1981" was written in its place. It did not find it credible that a document issued in 1994 would include a date six years into the future and found that it further showed the inauthenticity of the document. Based on the numerous irregularities with the birth certificate, the RPD found that the document was a fake. [29] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by basing its findings on speculation or without regard to any objective evidence concerning Ethiopian birth certificates. He submits that spelling errors are not indications of fraud per se and noted a spelling error in the RPD decision. The Appellant submits that consideration should have been given to the fact that human errors exist even in official documents. The Appellant submits that the RPD made an arbitrary finding that the stamp on the birth certificate had been placed on the document with an inkjet printer without any indication as to how it arrived at such a finding. With respect to the RPD finding that stating dates in both the Ethiopian and Western calendars on the same document were indications that the document was fraudulent, the Appellant submits that the RPD erred by failing to base its finding on any actual independent evidence which would support the proposition that birth certificates in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia are always issued in one particular calendar. With respect to the crossing out of the pre-printed year on the document, the Appellant submits that the RPD relied on an underlying assumption, without any objective evidence, that all dates on the document must have been expressed in an internally consistent manner, in the Western calendar. [30] The RAD notes the incorrect spelling of certain English words on the Appellant's birth certificate.16 It also notes that the document contains information in both English and Amharic, the official Ethiopian language. It would be reasonable to expect official documents to contain the correct spelling for words written in the languages used on the document. The RAD concurs with the RPD that the incorrect spelling of words on the Appellant's birth certificate undermines the credibility of the document. [31] The RAD notes the RPD's observation that the stamp on the Appellant's birth certificate appears to have been produced by an inkjet printer. The RAD compared the appearance of the stamp on the Appellant's birth certificate to the stamps on other official Ethiopian documents in the Appellant's evidence.17 Although the impression of the stamp on the Appellant's birth certificate appears to be similar to the stamp on the identity card of XXXX,18 the RAD is unable to ascertain the method the impression of the stamp was made on the Appellant's birth certificate. As such, the RAD is unable to support the RPD's comments regarding the stamp. [32] The RAD also notes the inconsistency in the issuance date of the birth certificate and the Appellant's explanation that the Ethiopian calendar was used for the date of issuance while the Western, or Gregorian, calendar was used to note his date of birth. The RAD finds that it would be reasonable to expect one calendar to be used for all dates used on a particular official document. The inconsistency in the issuance date or the use of two significantly different calendars on the Appellant's birth certificate further undermines the credibility of the document. [33] The RAD acknowledges that findings cannot be made without relying on evidence, otherwise it is speculative. However, the RAD concurs with the findings noted above on the principle that the RPD is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole, even if that evidence is uncontradicted.19 As such, the RAD concurs with the RPD that there were irregularities with the Appellant's birth certificate that were not reasonably explained and the certificate cannot be relied on to establish his identity. [34] Other identity evidence - The RPD found all the Appellant's responses to questions regarding his nationality and his efforts to obtain other documentation unreasonable and lacking in credibility. It noted in the reasons for its decision that the Appellant impeached all other evidence he submitted in support of his identity after it determined that he had provided it with a fake Ethiopian birth certificate to establish his identity. The RPD also noted that the only reason the Appellant provided a fake document was to deceive it into believing the he is someone other than who he claims to be and led it to place little weight on other evidence he submitted. It goes on to state that it can give no weight to documents, testimony and witnesses tendered by an individual who had established a precedent for submitting fake identity documents. The RPD also found that it could not accept documentation from individuals or organizations who have attested to the Appellant's identity based on his testimony since he tendered a document that impeached his credibility. [35] The Appellant submits that he presented other forms of evidence, besides his Ethiopian birth certificate that squarely contradicted the RPD's finding that he had failed to establish his identity. He argues that it was incumbent upon the RPD to assess that evidence as such evidence was crucial to the sole issue of identity that was before it. The Appellant notes that the Federal Court in Lin20 found that the fact that the applicant's Resident Identity Card (RIC) was found to be fraudulent did not necessarily mean that the second RIC, the child's birth certificate, the school certificate and the household registration card were also fraudulent. The Court also found that the RPD's reasons were silent with respect to the fairly extensive evidence given by the applicant in that case, including testimony about her background and the area she claimed to have lived in in China. The Court indicated that the evidence ought to have at least been considered by the RPD in its assessment as to whether she had established her identity and it seemed that the RPD had no regard to it at all. The Appellant also notes that the Federal Court in Mohmadi21 found that the RPD had erred by assigning the applicant's passport little weight solely because it had found problems with another document proffered by the applicant. [36] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by assigning no weight to the evidence of his identity witness, documents from his failed asylum claim in the U.S. and the letter from the Ogaden Somali Community Association of Ontario, solely due to its finding that his birth certificate was fraudulent. He argues that the RPD erred by failing to have regard to any other evidence regarding his identity, particularly as such evidence squarely contradicted its finding that he had failed to establish his identity. [37] The RPD is presumed to have considered all of the evidence before it, and there is no requirement for the panel to refer to each document in the record.22 However, where there is evidence which is contrary to its decision, the RPD must analyze that evidence and provide reasons why it does not consider it relevant or trustworthy, or why it chose to disregard it.23 In this case, the RPD did not adequately analyze the Appellant's identity evidence, other than his birth certificate. The RPD indicated that it did not consider the Appellant's other identity evidence trustworthy and chose to disregard it based solely on its determination that he had provided a fraudulent document to prove his identity. It found that this impeached the overall credibility of his evidence as it related to his identity. The RAD finds that the RPD erred in this regard. [38] While the RAD acknowledges that submitting a false or irregular document may have an impact on the weight assigned to other documents provided by the refugee claimant and on the overall credibility of a refugee claimant, this does not absolve the RPD from analyzing important evidence that may support the claim. As noted in Bains,24 the more important the evidence that is not mentioned specifically and analyzed in the agency's reasons, the more willing a court may be to infer from the silence that the agency made an erroneous finding of fact without regard to the evidence: In other words, the agency's burden of explanation increases with the relevance of the evidence in question to the disputed facts. Thus, a blanket statement that the agency has considered all the evidence will not suffice when the evidence omitted from any discussion in the reasons appears squarely to contradict the agency's finding of fact. Moreover, when the agency refers in some detail to evidence supporting its finding, but is silent on evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion, it may be easier to infer that the agency overlooked the contradictory evidence when making its finding of fact. [39] The Federal Court has also emphasized that it is important not just to concentrate on exaggerations,25 but neither should a decision-maker disregard aspects of the evidence that are not favourable to the claimant.26 Thus the RPD must do more than simply search through the evidence looking for inconsistencies or for evidence that lacks credibility, thereby building a case against the refugee claimant, and ignore the other aspects of the claim. [40] The RAD does not concur with the RPD's findings on the Appellant's evidence, other than certain findings with respect to his birth certificate. As noted above, the RPD failed to adequately consider and analyze this evidence. This failing undermines the RPD's findings with respect to the Appellant's identity and credibility. Since the RPD's determination of the Appellant's refugee claim was based on an incomplete assessment of his evidence, the determination cannot stand. Minister's Submissions [41] The Minister submits that the evidence shows that the Appellant advanced an asylum claim in an alternate name and country of nationality in the United States immediately before coming to seek protection in Canada. The Minister further submits that the identity findings of the RPD should stand and be considered dispositive of the claim. The Minister requests the RAD dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD. [42] The Appellant submits that, based on the materials contained in the RPD record and materials provided in his appeal, he has established, on a balance of probabilities, his personal and national identity as a citizen of Ethiopia. [43] The RAD notes that, while the RPD questioned the Appellant regarding the information contained in his asylum claim in the United States, it failed to provide an adequate analysis of this evidence in the reasons for its decision. Furthermore, as noted above, the RAD has reviewed all aspects of the RPD's decision and concluded that the RPD's determination cannot stand. Disposition [44] The Minister requests the RAD dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD. The RAD is in no position to do so for the reasons noted above. The Appellant asks the RAD to set aside the determination of the RPD and to find him to be a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The RAD is also in no position to satisfy this aspect of the Appellant's request. There were multiple identity and credibility concerns with the Appellant's evidence and the RAD is unable to make that determination only on the basis of the RPD record and new evidence allowed into evidence. The RAD has not seen or questioned the Appellant and therefore cannot reach its own conclusions on his identity or credibility. [45] In the alternative, the Appellant asks that the RAD refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. The RAD concurs with this remedy. CONCLUSION [46] The determination of the RPD is set aside, and this matter is referred back to the RPD for re-determination. The RAD's rejection of the Minister's request to dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD does not preclude the Minister from intervening in the Appellant's case with the RPD, in accordance with that Division's rules. Furthermore, the RAD's rejection of the documents proposed as new evidence in this appeal does not preclude the Appellant from filing those documents or other documents with the RPD, in accordance with that Division's rules. [47] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(c) of IRPA, the RAD refers this matter to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. [48] This appeal is therefore allowed. (signed) 'M. Pettinella' M. Pettinella April 8, 2015 Date 1 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 2 Huruglica, para. 45. 3 Huruglica, para 54. 4 Huruglica, para 55. 5 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 6 Exhibit P-2, at pp. 8-11. 7 Exhibit P-2, at pp. 12-20. 8 Exhibit P-2, at pp. 21-24. 9 Exhibit P-2, at pp. 25-27. 10 Exhibit P-2, at pp. 28-31. 11 Exhibit P-3, at p. 1. 12 Exhibit P-3, at pp. 2-6. 13 Exhibit P-3, at pp. 7-11. 14 Exhibits P-4 and P-5. 15 Exhibit M-2. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, at p. 85. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 81, 84. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, at pp. 81. 19 Giron, Luis Fernando Soto v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-387-89), Mahoney, MacGuigan, Linden, May 28, 1992. Reported: Giron v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1992), 143 N.R. 238 (F.C.A.) 152; Alizadeh, Satar v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-26-90), Stone, Desjardins, Décary, January 11, 1993. 20 Lin, Jun Mai v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1370-05), Layden-Stevenson, January 27, 2006, 2006 FC 84. 21 Mohmadi, Ahmad Wali v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9264-11), Mandamin, July 13, 2012, 2012 FC 884. 22 Hassan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1992] FCJ No 946; 23 Nasufi, Udi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5925-10), Scott, May 19, 2011, 2011 FC 586; Khan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1076; Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] FCJ No 1425. 24 Bains v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [(1993), 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 296 (F.C.T.D.)]. 25 Yaliniz, Tacir v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-648-87), Marceau, Teitelbaum, Walsh, March 8, 1988, Reported: Yaliniz v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 163 (F.C.A.); Mahathmasseelan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 15 Imm. L.R. (2d) 29 (F.C.A.); Djama, Idris Mohamed v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-738-90), Marceau, MacGuigan, Dcary, June 5, 1992. 26 M.C.I. v. Roitman, Isabella (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1446-00), Nadon, May 10, 2001, 2001 FCT 462. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-12461