MC0-04423

RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MC0-04423 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision - Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision April 30, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Iris Simixhiu Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Jamal Addine Fraygui Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss the appeal of XXXX XXXX (the appellant), a Haitian citizen. [2] The appellant fears that if he returned to Haiti, his life would be at risk on account of criminals who allegedly beat and threatened him in April 2012. He alleges that he also fears being targeted because he is perceived as a person with financial means because of his trips abroad. [3] On XXXX XXXX, 2012, the appellant left Haiti for Brazil, where he lived until XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016. The appellant obtained permanent residence in Brazil and had a child there. The appellant reportedly left Brazil after seeing one of his assailants on a bus and after he lost his job. [4] The Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (hereinafter "the Minister") intervened to ask the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) to exclude the appellant and determine that he is neither a refugee nor a person in need of protection because he has permanent resident status in Brazil.1 The Minister did not intervene before the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). [5] The RPD concluded that the appellant must be excluded under section 98 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) because he obtained permanent residence in Brazil, which he lost because he left Brazil over two years ago.2 The RPD therefore analyzed the factors set out in Zeng.3 [6] The appellant is appealing this decision.4 He claims that the RPD committed the following errors: a. The RPD incorrectly assessed the appellant's credibility. b. The RPD erred in concluding that the appellant had voluntarily left Brazil and was therefore excluded under 1E. c. The RPD erred in concluding that the appellant would not be persecuted if he returned to Haiti. [7] At issue in this appeal is whether the RPD erred in its analysis of the application of Article 1E of the Convention. Pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, since the appellant did not provide new documents in support of his appeal, I cannot accept his request for an oral hearing to be held before the RAD.5 [8] After conducting a full and independent analysis of the evidence, I am of the opinion that the RPD did not err by concluding that the appellant voluntarily left Brazil and let his status in that country expire, and that he failed to establish a serious possibility of persecution or, on a balance of possibilities, a danger of torture, a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. [9] Furthermore, since the appellant is the father of a Brazilian child, and in light of the documentary evidence in the National Documentation Package on Haiti about the possibility of obtaining permanent residence in Brazil through the family class,6 I invited the appellant by means of a notice of a new issue7 to make submissions as to whether it would be possible for him to return to Brazil by obtaining permanent residence since he is the father of a Brazilian child. After analyzing the appellant's additional submissions8 and the documentary evidence,9 I also conclude that it is possible for the appellant, the parent of a minor Brazilian citizen, to return to live in Brazil and obtain status there. [10] After conducting a full and independent analysis of the evidence provided, I am of the opinion that the RPD's decision is correct. The appellant is excluded from protection in Canada. DETERMINATION [11] I confirm the RPD's determination that the appellant is excluded from the application of Article 1E of the Convention and that, consequently, he is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. I dismiss the appeal. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [12] With regard to questions of fact, questions of law and mixed questions of fact and law, I applied the standard of correctness.10 I will conduct my own analysis of the record, which includes listening to the recording of the hearing, to determine whether the RPD erred. ANALYSIS Analysis of exclusion clause 1E for the appellant Review of the law [13] Article 1E of the Convention reads as follows: This Convention shall not apply to a person who is recognized by the competent authorities of the country in which he has taken residence as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the possession of the nationality of that country. [14] It must be read in concert with section 98 of the IRPA: 98. A person referred to in section E or F of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. [15] Paragraph 28 of the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Zeng11 provides the test to apply to decisions made in accordance with Article 1E of the Convention. It reads as follows: Considering all relevant factors to the date of the hearing, does the claimant have status, substantially similar to that of its nationals, in the third country? If the answer is yes, the claimant is excluded. If the answer is no, the next question is whether the claimant previously had such status and lost it, or had access to such status and failed to acquire it. If the answer is no, the claimant is not excluded under Article 1E. If the answer is yes, the RPD must consider and balance various factors. These include, but are not limited to, the reason for the loss of status (voluntary or involuntary), whether the claimant could return to the third country, the risk the claimant would face in the home country, Canada's international obligations, and any other relevant facts. The appellant lost his status similar to that of Brazilian nationals [16] The first prong of the test consists in determining whether, at the time of the hearing,12 the appellant has status, substantially similar to that of its nationals, in a third country-in this case, Brazil. To define the nature of this status, the Federal Court of Appeal identified four rights in Shamlou:13 1) the right to return to the country of residence; 2) the right to work freely without restrictions; 3) the right to study; and 4) full access to social services in the country of residence. Therefore, "[t]he decision maker has a duty to determine whether the claimant has status substantially similar to that of nationals of that country and whether the claimant enjoys each of those four rights."14 [17] In this case, the evidence on the record shows that the appellant's name and passport number appear on the list of 43,781 Haitians who were given the opportunity to regularize their status and obtain permanent residence in Brazil.15 Moreover, a publication by the Official XXXX of Brazil indicates that the appellant was granted permanent residence in Brazil.16 The appellant also confirmed that he had permanent resident status in Brazil, and the RPD reached the same conclusion. [18] While the appellant is not contesting that he had permanent resident status in Brazil, he alleges that this status did not give him the basic right to work. The appellant submits that he was systematically excluded from all employment opportunities because of his race and that he was not on a level playing field with Brazilian nationals in terms of employment.17 Since the appellant is not contesting his other rights set out in Shamlou, I will focus my analysis on his right to work freely without restrictions in Brazil. [19] Considering all of the evidence, and with all due respect for the appellant's experiences, I am of the opinion that the discrimination against the appellant in Brazil is not such that he could not effectively enjoy the basic right to work set out in Shamlou. [20] First, the appellant is not challenging the fact that Brazilian law, particularly the country's constitution, grants all citizens and permanent residents the four basic rights in Shamlou and recognizes them, including the right to work freely without restrictions in the country. [21] In addition, there is consistent and recent authority from the higher courts that recognizes the existence of racial discrimination against Black people in Brazil, regardless of their nationality. In Noel, Justice Gagné made the following ruling: [28] Moreover, regarding the analysis of the situation of Haitians with permanent residence in Brazil, Mr. Noel submits that the RAD erred in concluding that they enjoyed the same rights as Brazilians. He argues that the evidence establishes that they suffer discrimination and are not informed of their rights. [29] However, for discrimination against a person to amount to persecution, it must be serious and occur with repetition, and must have consequences of a prejudicial nature for the person, such as when an individual is denied a core human right, such as the right to practice religion or to earn a livelihood (Sefa v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1190 at para. 10). [30] In light of the evidence, it is my opinion that the RAD could reasonably conclude that the discrimination alleged by Mr. Noel did not amount to persecution. Mr. Noel did indeed work in Brazil at a time when, by his own admission, the country was going through an unemployment crisis. His allegations that some Brazilians have a racist attitude towards Haitians are, albeit very unfortunate, insufficient to conclude that Haitians are being persecuted. [22] The Federal Court has since referred to these principles in Morissaint,18 and more recently in Riboul.19 In addition, the Federal Court specified that incidents of discrimination reported by refugee protection claimants must be sufficiently serious or occur with repetition in order to amount to persecution.20 [23] In accordance with the case law, I am of the opinion that in this case, the appellant did not demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that he was unable to effectively enjoy the basic right to work set out in Shamlou. First, according to the appellant's testimony and his statements in Schedule A, he worked in Brazil for three years. Second, although he mentions being insulted by his work colleagues and his supervisor, the appellant did not explain how losing his employment was linked to his ethnicity. Third, while the appellant alleges that he was systematically left out of Brazil's labour market after he lost his job, he testified that he did not try to move elsewhere in Brazil to find employment.21 Fourth, the documentary evidence shows that an economic recession hit Brazil in 2016 and resulted in the departure of many Haitians since work was scarce.22 Consequently, the difficulty in finding employment was largely attributable to the economic crisis. I therefore conclude that the appellant failed to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that the discrimination experienced in Brazil was such that he was unable to effectively enjoy the right to work set out in Shamlou. On a balance of probabilities, the appellant's status in Brazil was substantially similar to that of Brazilian nationals. [24] However, on the day of the hearing,23 the appellant had been outside Brazil for more than two years which, according to the documentary evidence, leads to a loss of permanent resident status.24 Like the RPD, I am of the opinion that on the day of the hearing, the appellant had lost the status substantially similar to that of Brazilian nationals which he had previously obtained. [25] At this stage of the analysis, the appellant is not excluded and the factors in Zeng must be analyzed and weighed. Weighing the factors set out in Zeng [26] The third prong of the test in Zeng is to consider and balance various factors such as the reason for the loss of status (voluntary or involuntary), whether the claimant could return to the third country, the risk the claimant would face in the home country, Canada's international obligations, and any other relevant facts. [27] Based on its analysis of the evidence on the record, the RPD excluded the appellant since it was of the opinion that he had voluntarily left the country, that he had failed to establish that he would face a prospective risk in his home country, and that Canada's international obligations had been met. The RPD was of the opinion that it did not have enough information to conclude that the appellant could return to Brazil. [28] The appellant submits in his memorandum that the RPD erred in concluding that his departure was voluntary, that he did not face a risk in Haiti, and that the international obligations had been met. Furthermore, in response to the RPD's notice of a new issue, the appellant submits that he does not want to return to live in Brazil on the grounds of his son's citizenship since he had previously been treated as a second-class citizen in the country. Voluntary nature of the appellant's departure [29] The RPD was of the opinion that the appellant voluntarily left Brazil for economic reasons. While the RPD believed that the appellant had seen one of his Haitian assailants in Brazil, it was of the opinion that the assailant's statement that he had no interest in the appellant, combined with the fact that he never approached the appellant from the time of that encounter until his departure two years later, did not support the appellant's allegations that he had left Brazil involuntarily. The RPD also concluded that the appellant had failed to establish that he was a victim of persecution because of racism in Brazil since he did not explain how the termination of his employment was due to racism and he did not provide any other example where he was a victim of racism. [30] The appellant notes in his memorandum that he lost his status involuntarily because, given that he had already been a victim of assault in Haiti, he wanted to avoid any contact with his aggressor(s) at all costs. The appellant argues that his assailant's statements that he was not interested in him cannot be trusted. The appellant also argues that he was the victim of persecution in Brazil because of his race. [31] With all due respect for the appellant, I cannot accept his arguments. First, the RPD did not rely only on the assailant's statements that he was not interested [translation] "in damn Haitians" when it concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, this person did not pose a risk to the appellant's life. The RPD also considered the fact that the appellant never saw the assailant again and that this individual did not attempt to find or threaten the appellant from the time of that incident to his departure from Brazil nearly two years later. It was both of these factors combined that led the RPD to conclude that the appellant had failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the assailant he reportedly saw in Brazil posed a risk to his life. That conclusion is correct. [32] Similarly, I do not agree with the appellant that the confrontations with his assailant in Brazil amount to persecution. The claimant testified that he saw his assailant from Haiti twice in Brazil about two years prior to leaving the country. The first time on the bus, the appellant and his former assailant only exchanged glances. A few weeks later, the appellant and his former assailant saw each other on the bus a second time, and the assailant told the appellant that he was not interested "in damn Haitians."25 While seeing one of his assailants may have frightened the appellant, the appellant testified that he was not a victim of his assailant from Haiti in Brazil, either during this encounter or afterwards. The appellant confirmed that this person never tried to find him in the two years that followed when he was living in Brazil.26 This incident therefore does not amount to persecution. [33] I also agree with the RPD that the appellant did not establish that he was a victim of persecution in Brazil because of his race. First, as noted by the RPD, the appellant did not explain how losing his employment was connected with his ethnicity. With respect to the other discriminatory incidents the appellant faced in Brazil, he submits in his written statement that his supervisor and work colleagues told him on several occasions to return to Haiti.27 The RPD was sensitive to the appellant's situation and that faced by Haitians in general in Brazil. The same is true for the RAD. Discrimination against the Haitian community in Brazil, but also against other immigrant communities, has been documented.28 That said, the appellant was able to work, find housing and feed himself, and his permanent resident status also gave him the right to enter and leave the country as well as to receive health care and education. Ultimately, the RPD's conclusion that the incidents the appellant experienced in Brazil, even cumulatively, do not constitute persecution within the meaning of Ward29 is correct and in line with consistent case law.30 With all due respect for the appellant's situation in Brazil, I am of the opinion that the RPD did not err in concluding that his departure from Brazil was voluntary. [34] As determined by the RPD, I am of the opinion that, on a balance of probabilities, the appellant left Brazil for economic reasons. While the appellant indicates in his Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form) that the primary reason for leaving Brazil was due to the encounter with his assailant, it is clear from listening to the recording of the hearing that for the appellant, losing his employment was the main reason for leaving Brazil. The appellant responded spontaneously to both the RPD's question31 and his counsel's question that if he had to identify the primary reason for leaving Brazil, it was because he was no longer employed.32 Consequently, like the RPD, I conclude that, on a balance of probabilities, the appellant left Brazil voluntarily. This weighs in favour of the appellant's exclusion. Possibility of returning to Brazil [35] The RPD analyzed the evidence available in the National Documentation Package on Brazil and determined that it did not have enough information to conclude that the appellant would be able to adequately exercise his rights and would have the right to return to Brazil.33 The RPD did not analyze whether it was possible for the appellant to be part of the family class based on his minor son's Brazilian citizenship. As mentioned above, I invited the appellant by means of a notice of a new issue to make submissions regarding whether he could return to Brazil by obtaining permanent residence since he is the father of a Brazilian child.34 [36] In response to the notice of a new issue, the appellant initially submits that under Article 11 of Ministerial Order No. 10 of 2018,35 he cannot reacquire his permanent residence in Brazil.36 In light of the objective evidence, I agree with the appellant that, on a balance of probabilities, he would not be able to reacquire permanent residence that he has already lost. Yet with respect to the new issue as to whether it is possible for the appellant to return to Brazil by obtaining permanent residence since he is the father of a Brazilian child, the appellant submits that he has no desire to acquire residency or citizenship in a country that previously treated him like a second-class citizen.37 The appellant does not contest the fact that Brazilian law allows the parents of a Brazilian child, such as himself, to obtain Brazilian citizenship.38 [37] Based on the response to information requests about whether it is possible for a Haitian parent to apply for a visa for family reunification of the basis of his child being a Brazilian citizen and thus obtain status in Brazil,39 I conclude that, on a balance of probabilities, the appellant could obtain status in Brazil. The Deputy Consul General of the Consulate General of Brazil in Toronto confirmed that "the temporary visa for family reunification is the same as the permanent visa for family reunification, but the terminology has changed with the new immigration legislation [adopted in 2017] and there are no more permanent visas." He also stated that "the visa in itself is temporary, even though its holder might live indefinitely in Brazil as long as they follow some procedures when they arrive in Brazil in order to [be] granted permanent resident status." The document also confirms that the visa application can also be completed online in Canada, without requiring the applicant to be physically present, and that it essentially involves providing identity documents, a completed and signed form, a photograph, proof of status if the application is completed in Canada, proof of income, and a criminal record check. The process itself is not excessive; rather, the application is administrative in nature with no real conditionality.40 [38] Ultimately, the documentary evidence shows that it is possible for the appellant, the parent of a minor child with Brazilian citizenship, to return to live in Brazil and obtain status there. [39] This weighs in favour of the appellant's exclusion. Risk for the appellant in Haiti, his country of origin [40] The appellant argues that the RPD erred in concluding that he would not be persecuted again if he returned to Haiti. The appellant maintains that the RPD did not properly assess his credibility and that the fact he travelled from Brazil to the United States of America does not show a lack of subjective fear on his part. The appellant argues that, on the contrary, taking such a significant risk shows that the risk he would face in Haiti is real and that he wanted to avoid it at all costs. [41] In light of all the evidence, I agree with the RPD's conclusion that the appellant did not establish that he faces a prospective risk in Haiti, on a balance of probabilities. As the RPD noted, since there is no nexus between the appellant's allegations and a Convention ground, I will analyze his risk in Haiti under paragraph 97(1)(b) of the IRPA. [42] First, I note that despite some inconsistencies between the appellant's testimony and the justice of the peace report,41 the RPD accepted that the appellant was the victim of an attack by unknown criminals in April 2012. At the same time, the RPD concluded that the appellant failed to demonstrate that he faces a prospective risk from these criminals if he returns, mainly because he did not show that his assailants from 2012 are still motivated to go after him. [43] I am of the view that the RPD did not err in concluding that the appellant failed to establish a prospective risk in Haiti on a balance of probabilities. It is clear from listening to the recording of the hearing that the appellant confirmed that he has not heard from these criminals42 and that his wife has been in the same place for 8 years and has been safe43 and has not heard from these criminals44 since the appellant left Haiti. I acknowledge that the appellant alleges that the criminals are looking for him, not his family members. However, according to his testimony, these same criminals threatened to kill his wife and set fire to his house if he did not give them more money.45 Consequently, in light of the isolated incident of 2012 and the fact that it occurred 8 years ago without any threats or other altercations since then between the appellant's assailants and his family, which is still in Haiti, I conclude that the appellant did not demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that he would be subjected to a risk or to a threat to his life from his assailants if he returned to Haiti. [44] The appellant does not contest the RPD's conclusion that, as a member of the diaspora, he faces the same generalized risk as his fellow Haitian citizens. After analyzing all of the evidence, I do not see any error by the RPD with respect to this conclusion. I share the RPD's conclusion for the same reasons. [45] With respect to the appellant's perilous journey from Brazil to the United States of America, while I understand that the appellant may be afraid to return to Haiti and wants to avoid it at all costs, the fact remains that in weighing all the evidence on the record, he failed to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that he would be subjected to a risk within the meaning of subsection 97(1) of the IRPA if he returned to Haiti. [46] Consequently, this factor concerning the absence of risk in the country of origin weighs in favour of the appellant's exclusion from the Convention. Canada's international obligations [47] The appellant states in his memorandum that in not granting him refugee protection, Canada was not complying with its international obligations. He argues that the most important international obligation is not to return individuals who face a risk or a serious possibility of persecution where they would be subjected to that risk. [48] In light of the earlier conclusions that the appellant did not establish a serious possibility of persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, a danger of torture, a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in Brazil, that he left Brazil voluntarily and did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution or that he would be personally subjected, on a balance of probabilities, to a threat or a risk under subsection 97(1) of the IRPA if he returned to Haiti, I conclude that the RPD's decision in this regard is correct, and that Canada's international obligations have been met. [49] In weighing all of the factors that were previously analyzed, and also considering that it is possible for the appellant to reacquire permanent resident status in Brazil through the family class, I conclude that the appellant must be excluded under Article 1E of the Convention. The RPD did not err in drawing this conclusion. CONCLUSION [50] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the appeal is dismissed and the RPD's determination is confirmed, namely that the appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection within the meaning of subsection 97(1) and section 98 of the IRPA because he is a person referred to in Article 1E of the Convention. (signed) Iris Simixhiu Me Iris Simixhiu April 30, 2021 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 SPR-1, Refugee Protection Division (RPD) record, Minister's notice of intervention and exhibits M-1 to M-3, pp. 162 to 179. 2 SPR-1, RPD record, RPD decision, February 5, 2020, at pp. 3-13. 3 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Zeng, 2010 FCA 118. 4 P-2, Appellant's record, appellant's memorandum, at pp. 34-46. 5 P-2, Appellant's record, appellant's declaration, at p. 25. 6 SPR-1, RPD record, National Documentation Package (NDP) on Haiti (September 30, 2019), Tab 14.14: Brazil and Haiti: Whether it is possible for Haitian nationals whose children have Brazilian citizenship to obtain permanent resident status; requirements and application procedure (2017-April 2019), Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), April 15, 2019, ZZZ106283.FE. 7 SAR-1, Notice to counsel dated April 7, 2021. 8 P-3, Counsel's additional submissions following the notice of a new issue dated April 20, 2021. 9 SPR-1, RPD record, NDP on Haiti (September 30, 2019), Tab 14.14: Brazil and Haiti: Whether it is possible for Haitian nationals whose children have Brazilian citizenship to obtain permanent resident status; requirements and application procedure (2017-April 2019), IRB, April 15, 2019, ZZZ106283.FE. 10 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 11 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Zeng, 2010 FCA 118. 12 Majebi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 274. 13 Shamlou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] FCJ No. 1537, at para. 35. 14 Célestin v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 97, referring to decisions Vifansi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCJ No. 397, at para. 27; Mahdi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1994] FCJ No. 1691. 15 SPR-1, RPD record, Minister's notice of intervention and exhibits M-1 to M-3, at pp. 169-179. 16 Ibid. 17 P-2, Appellant's record, appellant's memorandum, at paras. 50-52. 18 Morissaint v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 413. 19 Riboul v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 263. 20 Ibid. 21 Recording of the RPD hearing held on January 8, 2020, from 00:20:00 to 00:22:00. 22 SAR-2, NDP on Brazil (October 31, 2019), Tab 1.3: Brazil. The World Factbook, United States, Central Intelligence Agency, September 23, 2019. 23 Majebi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 274. 24 SAR-2, NDP on Brazil (October 31, 2019), Tab 3.8: Whether a permanent resident automatically loses permanent resident status if outside the country for more than two years; recourse available to contest cancellation of permanent resident status (2017-March 2018), IRB, February 14, 2018, BRA106054.FE; Tab 3.9: Brazil and Haiti: Procedure for reacquiring permanent resident status when it has been revoked due to an absence from Brazil for more than two years; whether Haitians who have lost permanent resident status have been able to reaquire it (2017-July 2019), IRB, August 19, 2019. ZZZ106282.FE. 25 Recording of the RPD hearing held on January 8, 2020, from 00:23:00 to 00:29:00. 26 Ibid. 27 SPR-1, RPD record, second amendment to the appellant's written statement, at p. 23. 28 SAR-1, NDP on Brazil, (October 31, 2019), Tab 3.3: Brazil and Haiti: Situation of Haitians in Brazil, including rights and obligations; permanent resident status; documents issued to Haitians, including Foreigner Identity Cards (Cédula de Identidade de Estrangeiro, CIE); treatment of Haitians in Brazil, including access to employment and education, state protection and support services (2010-June 2018), IRB. August 28, 2020. ZZZ200291.FE, Tab 13.2: Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on her mission to Brazil. United Nations. Human Rights Council, February 9, 2016. A/HRC/31/56/Add.1. 29 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 SCR 689. 30 Noël v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1062, at paras. 28-30; Simolia v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1336, at paras. 26-27; Célestin v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 97, at para. 62; Jean-Pierre v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2020 FC 136, at paras. 31-34; Morissaint v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2020 FC 413, at para. 19; Joseph v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 839, at para. 4. 31 Recording of the RPD hearing held on January 8, 2020, from 00:19:00 to 00:22:00. 32 Recording of the RPD hearing held on January 8, 2020, from 01:46:00 to 01:48:00. 33 SPR-1, RPD record, RPD decision, February 5, 2020, at paras. 26-28. 34 SAR-1, Notice to counsel dated April 7, 2021. 35 SAR-2, NDP on Brazil (October 31, 2019), Tab 3.9: Brazil and Haiti: Procedure for reacquiring permanent resident status when it has been revoked due to an absence from Brazil for more than two years; whether Haitians who have lost permanent resident status have been able to reaquire it (2017-July 2019), IRB, August 19, 2019, ZZZ106282.FE. 36 P-3, Counsel's additional submissions following the notice of a new issue dated April 20, 2021, at paras. 1-8. 37 P-3, Counsel's additional submissions following the notice of a new issue dated April 20, 2021, at paras. 9-14. 38 Ibid. at para. 9. 39 IRB Responses to Information Requests of December 22, 2020, ZZZ200391.FE. 40 IRB Responses to Information Requests of December 22, 2020, ZZZ200391.FE. 41 SPR-1, RPD record, appellant's documents, report of the justice of the peace, at pp. 135-136. 42 Recording of the RPD hearing held on January 8, 2020, from 00:59:00 to 01:00:00. 43 Recording of the RPD hearing held on January 8, 2020, from 01:07:00 to 01:08:00. 44 Recording of the RPD hearing held on January 8, 2020, from 00:59:00 to 01:00:00. 45 Recording of the RPD hearing held on January 8, 2020, from 00:55:00 to 00:56:00. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MC0-04423 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 6 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français