TB4-07322

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-07322 TB4-07323 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision January 7, 2015 Date de la décision Panel S.S. Kular Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Adetayo G Akinyemi Barrister & Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX(the Principal Appellant) and XXXX XXXX XXXX(the Female Appellant), both citizens of Iran,1 appeal a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying their claims for refugee protection. [2] The Appellants ask that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD, and make a determination that in the RAD's view ought to have been made, or alternatively, the RAD refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. [3] The Appellants are not submitting new evidence under subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA),2 and do not request an oral hearing before the RAD under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. [4] The Minister is not intervening in the appeal. DETERMINATION [5] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. The appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [6] Specifics regarding the Appellants' claims are included in their Basis of Claim (BoC) forms and the narratives included therein;3 further details were provided by the Appellants at the RPD hearing. The Appellants alleged that they fear the Iranian authorities because they have converted to Christianity. [7] The Appellants' application for refugee protection was heard on July 3, 2014 and July 9, 2014. In the decision of July 30, 2014, the RPD rejected their refugee claims. The RPD found that the Appellants were generally not credible, and that their allegations were not credible. The RPD found that the Appellants have provided insufficient credible and trustworthy evidence to establish, on a balance of probabilities, their involvement with Christianity in Iran or that they are wanted by authorities in Iran for their involvement in those activities. [8] The Appellants submit that the RPD misstated material facts and/or failed to take relevant evidence into consideration in making the determination. The Appellants submit that the RPD misapprehended the evidence and speculated extensively in the determination of their claims. The Appellants submit that the decision of the RPD is perverse, capricious and unreasonable and the reasons given are insufficient / inadequate to support the decision. THE ROLE OF RAD [9] In considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD, while the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [10] Although the RAD is a relatively new body, it now has the benefit of some Federal Court jurisprudence which speaks to the appellate tribunal's role in relation to that of the RPD. [11] In Iyamuremye, the Court found itself: [E]ntirely in agreement with the RAD that the standard of review to be applied to findings of fact made by the RPD is reasonableness. It is well established that an appellate body must review the findings of a trial court by applying a correctness standard to findings that involve questions of law and by applying a reasonableness standard to those involving questions of mixed fact and law....4 The Court went on to hold that the RAD must review the evidence that was before the RPD and conduct its own, independent assessment of that evidence to determine whether the lower tribunal had properly considered the evidence and "reasonably justified its conclusion."5 [12] In the subsequent case of Alvarez, the Court clarified the role of the RAD in relation to the RPD.6 It held that the RAD is not to undertake a process of judicial review, but rather must perform its own assessments of the facts in order to determine whether the RPD made an error of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a "palpable and overriding error."7 In the Court's view, the lower tribunal's ability to hear evidence viva voce makes it better situated than the RAD to make findings of fact, and therefore the appeal tribunal should show deference to the RPD's findings of fact and mixed fact and law. In contrast to its ruling in Iyamuremye, here the Court found that the RAD erred by assessing the decision of the RPD against a standard of reasonableness, but then required the use of a higher standard. The Eng case, released on the same day as Alvarez, contained the same analysis of the issue of standard of review. [13] In Malhotra,8 issued after Alvarez and Eng, the Federal Court considered another decision of the RAD, in which the tribunal applied a standard of reasonableness to the RPD's decision under appeal. Although the Court did not specifically address the RAD's selection of the standard of review, it observed that the RAD had applied a standard of reasonableness and concluded that the RAD's decision did not contain any error which justified the intervention of the Court. [14] More recently, the Court in Huruglica, considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD.9 It found that the RAD erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.10 [15] While the Court had endorsed the standard of reasonableness in Iyamuremye, and accepted it in Malhotra, it found in Huruglica that the application of such standard was in error. In contrast to Alvarez and Eng, the Court held that the RAD is not restricted to intervening only in the event of a palpable and overriding error. In Huruglica, the Court determined that the RAD is to conduct a "hybrid appeal." As instructed by the Court, the RAD will review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, deferring to the RPD only where the lower tribunal enjoys a particular advantage in reaching a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own determination. [16] In this appeal, the RAD adopts and will follow guidance from the case law in Huruglica. The RAD considers the Appellant's submissions in regard to the role of the RAD in reviewing the decision of the RPD.11 The Principal Appellant submitted an affidavit;12 the RAD has reviewed the affidavit and the totality of the Appeal Record. The Appellants have not provided any explanation as to why the Principal Appellant's affidavit be considered as new evidence. Therefore, the RAD determines the Appellants have submitted no new evidence as per Section 110(4) of the IRPA. MERITS OF THE APPEAL The Appellant's Pleadings13 [17] The Appellants raise the following issues: 1. Whether the Panel misapprehended the facts and/or failed to take relevant evidence into consideration. 2. Whether the Panel proceeded on improper principles and based its decision on erroneous findings of fact made in a perverse or capricious manner without regard for the material before it. 3. Whether the decision is unreasonable. 4. Whether the Panel breached the Appellants' right to fair hearing.14 [18] The Appellants submit that a significant portion of the decision was based on misapprehended facts, including inferences that were unreasonable while other portions were solely based on speculations and conjecture.15 The RPD's Findings16 [19] The determinative issue in this case is whether the Appellants have established their allegations of a risk of harm or persecution as Christianity converts upon return to Iran. The Principal Appellant's work history17 [20] The RPD found that the Appellants' evidence did not establish on a balance of probabilities that the Principal Appellant had work-related problems in Iran as alleged in his BoC.18 The RPD noted that the Appellants' evidence was that during their most recent time in Iran, the time of their alleged introduction to and involvement with Christianity in Iran, rather than struggling with personal and work-related problems, they had been for some time planning and preparing to go to the United Kingdom (U.K.) where the Principal Appellant was to continue with his studies, and that they were in the process of winding down their work and getting ready to leave during their final months in Iran.19 Based on the above, the RPD drew a negative inference relating to the Appellants' alleged personal and work-related problems that allegedly precipitated their introduction to Christianity. [21] The Appellants submit that the RPD grossly misapprehended a relevant fact/evidence by looking at the glowing letter of reference from the XXXX XXXXand concluding that the Principal Appellant's testimony that he was having work-related difficulties was not plausible.20 The Appellants submit that the RPD misapprehended the evidence before it when it concluded that "...in this case it was problems at his work that were what led to the claimants' [Appellants'] involvement with and introduction to Christianity."21 [22] The RAD reviewed the totality of the evidence adduced in this case, including the Appellants' testimonies, and finds that the evidence shows that the Appellants' allegations of personal and work-related problems as alleged in their BoC narrative and provided through their testimonies are not consistent with their own evidence which shows that prior to leaving Iran they were in the process of preparing to leave for the U.K. in order for the Principal Appellant to pursue his studies. [23] Relating to the Principal Appellant's problems at work, the RAD notes the RPD did not accept the Principal Appellant's explanation why the letter from the XXXX XXXXdid not mention the Appellant's work-related problems. The RAD finds the Principal Appellant provided satisfactory explanation for why the letter from the XXXX XXXXdid not mention the Appellant's work-related problems. The evidence, on a balance of probabilities, shows that the document was to serve as a reference letter. In this respect, the RAD does not concur with the RPD; however, the RAD finds this does not in and of itself translate into dismissing the RPD's other negative credibility findings. The RAD finds the Appellants provided insufficient reliable and trustworthy evidence to demonstrate that they were having personal and work-related problems and that those problems precipitated their introduction and conversion to Christianity. The RAD finds the evidence, on a balance of probabilities, shows that at the time the Appellants were allegedly having personal and work-related problems, leading to their introduction to Christianity; they were in the process of preparing to leave for the U.K. in order for the Principal Appellant to pursue his studies. [24] Based on the totality of the evidence in this case, including the audio recording of the proceedings, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in drawing a negative inference from the Principal Appellant's testimony around his work and the alleged personal and work-related problems that precipitated the Appellants' introduction to Christianity as alleged. The Appellants' introduction to Christianity, and subsequent involvement with Christianity in Iran, 22 in the U.K. and in Canada23 [25] The RPD drew a number of negative credibility inferences relating to the Appellants' introduction to Christianity in Iran, and their practice of Christianity in Iran, in the U.K., and in Canada. The RPD noted that the Appellants' evidence was inconsistent,24 and not in harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize as reasonable in that place and in those situations.25 [26] The Appellants submit that the RPD utilized a standard of proof higher than the balance of probabilities in resolving the inconsistency relating to the date, in XXXX or in XXXX, when the Appellants were introduced to Christianity.26 The RAD reviewed the evidence in the case and finds that the Principal Appellant's explanation for the inconsistency, on a balance of probabilities, was satisfactory. The RAD does not concur with the RPD in that the Principal Appellant's explanation for the inconsistency was not reasonable. Although the RAD finds the RPD was wrong in drawing a negative credibility inference in this instance; this is not fatal in and of itself given the reasons provided below. [27] The Appellants submit that the RPD ignored their evidence in concluding: The panel notes as well that it does not seem reasonable that this friend, who the principal claimant [Principal Appellant] has been out of touch with for some time and who knew of both claimants' [Appellants'] alleged conservative Islamic family backgrounds, would just invite them to his house and spring an introduction to Christianity on them, not knowing what their reaction would be given their family backgrounds and given the risk he would face if they reported this on to their families or the authorities.27 The Appellants submit the RPD to be speculative in regard to the above.28 [28] In consideration of the entirety of the evidence in this case, including the country documentation on Iran; the RAD finds it was open to the RPD to make credibility findings that the Appellants' behaviour, i.e., conversion to and involvement with Christianity in Iran, was inconsistent with what would be expected of persons in their particular situation and circumstances. In this respect, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in making its negative credibility findings. The documentary evidence shows that Muslim converts to Christianity face persecution in Iran.29 The Appellants are well-educated individuals; the RAD finds it reasonable to expect the Appellants to be informed about the country conditions in Iran. Considering the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD finds it unreasonable for the Appellants to have gone about their conversion to Christianity and thereafter continued their involvement with Christianity in Iran and abroad without having had subjective fear of the Iranian authorities while living in Iran or upon return to Iran from abroad. Therefore, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in its findings. [29] Further, the Appellants alleged that they remained in contact with members of their Iranian Christian group while in the U.K. and in Canada. The Principal Appellant testified that they remained in contact and prayed with members of their Iranian Christian group over the telephone. In consideration of the monitoring and surveillance of e-communications by the Iranian regime reported in the country documentation, the RPD found the Appellants' allegations not credible in this respect.30 Relating to the above, the RAD reviewed the country documentation and finds the RPD was not wrong and the RAD concurs with those findings. The RAD finds several reports in the country documentation showing that the security authorities in Iran closely and routinely monitor telecommunications.31 [30] Regarding the Appellants' alleged introduction to and subsequent involvement with Christianity in Iran, the RAD recognizes and acknowledges the RPD at times was rather microscopic in its analysis. Based on the totality of the evidence, including the country documentation on Iran, the RAD finds this, however, does not take away from the RPD's negative credibility findings relating to the Appellant's alleged introduction and conversion to, and subsequent involvement with Christianity in Iran, in the U.K., and in Canada. Failure to claim in the U.K.32 [31] The Principal Appellant was asked if they had thought of filing a refugee claim or seeking protection while in the U.K. The Principal Appellant testified that at the time they had gone to the U.K. to study and planned to return to Iran. The RPD asked the Principal Appellant about their return to Iran, the Principal Appellant replied that at the time they were willing to return to Iran as no problems had arisen in Iran. The RPD found the Principal Appellant's explanation not satisfactory. The RPD drew a negative inference as to the Appellants' subjective fear and the credibility of their allegations because of the Appellants' failure to claim refugee protection in the U.K. [32] The Appellants argue that given the Adjei33 test, is there a reasonable chance that persecution would take place were the applicant returned to his country of origin, how could they have shown good grounds for fearing persecution considering that they had taken significant precautions to ensure their actions were not detected or known to the state agents in Iran?34 [33] In consideration of the country documentation on Iran, and that the Appellants are well-educated persons, the RAD finds it reasonable to expect the Appellants to be aware of the risk that they would face as Christianity converts upon return to Iran. Therefore, the RAD finds their failure to take any steps to seek protection in the U.K. is indicative of a lack of subjective fear. The RAD concurs with the RPD in this respect. Delay in Claiming in Canada35 [34] The RPD found the Appellants' delay in claiming protection in Canada to be inconsistent with the actions reasonably expected of individuals facing a risk of harm and persecution such as these Appellants.36 The RPD also noted the timing when the Appellants filed their claims. The RPD found that the Appellants filed their claims in September 2013 because they were refused their work and study permits, and that at that time a refugee claim was their next best means to stay in Canada, where the Principal Appellant's parents and siblings reside and where they would be able to work and study as planned.37 [35] The Appellants submit that they did not receive the decision from the Canadian Embassy until the 10th of September, a couple of days after they filed their claims.38 The Appellants alleged that they filed their claims for refugee protection after they became aware on September 2, 2013 that they were wanted by the authorities in Iran for apostasy following the arrest of some of their friends from the Iranian church group. The Appellants submitted summons which were allegedly sent by the Female Appellant's mother by email; a copy of the email was not submitted to the Board. Given the credibility concerns around the Appellants' alleged involvement with a Christian group in Iran, and given the lack of corroborating evidence to establish that the summons were sent from Iran as alleged, and given the availability of forged fraudulently obtained genuine legal documents in Iran, the RPD gave the summons no weight.39 [36] The RAD reviewed the evidence in the case, and finds even if it were true that the Appellants did not receive the decision from the Canadian Embassy until the XXXX XXXX XXXX, the delay in claiming and the timing is, on a balance of probabilities, indicative of a lack of subjective fear. [37] The RAD acknowledges the Appellant's allegations that they filed claims after they became aware on XXXX XXXX, 2013 that they were wanted by the authorities in Iran for apostasy following the arrest of some of their friends in the Iranian church group. The RAD, however, finds the Appellants allegedly were Christianity converts from Iran, where the documentary evidence clearly shows that Christianity converts are at a risk of harm and persecution. These Appellants allegedly also continued to practice Christianity in the U.K., and also while in Canada. The Appellants are well-educated individuals; in consideration of the totality of the evidence including the documentary evidence regarding persecution of Christianity converts in Iran, the RAD finds the Appellants' delay in claiming protection in Canada to be inconsistent with the actions reasonably expected of individuals facing a risk of harm and persecution such as in the alleged situation and circumstances of these Appellants. The Appellants' right to a fair hearing [38] The Appellants submit that the RPD breached the Appellants' right to a fair hearing. [39] In paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Argument,40 the Appellants submit that the RPD's failure to ask the Appellants to comment on if any of their personal difficulties were brought to the attention of XXXX XXXXwas a violation of the Appellants' right to a fair hearing. The RAD finds the argument made here to be moot given that the RAD earlier found the RPD to be in error in this regard, and the RAD is no longer taking this into account in the determination of the appeal. Moreover, upon reviewing the recording of the proceedings, the RAD finds the RPD asked many questions around the topic; the RAD finds just because the RPD did not directly ask the Appellants to comment on if any of their personal difficulties were brought to the attention of XXXX XXXXdoes not amount to a breach of the Appellants' right to a fair hearing. [40] In paragraph 31,41 the Appellants challenge the RPD's finding relating to the Principal Appellant's failure to provide some of the details pertaining to the Appellants' alleged visit to their friend's house, Mr. XXXX XXXXwho introduced them to Christianity in XXXX 2012. The Appellants submit that the RPD's reliance on a passage of "a few seconds" to conclude that the Principal Appellant had nothing more to say appears as a breach of the Appellants' right to a fair hearing. The RAD reviewed the totality of the evidence in the case, including the audio recording of the proceedings. Relating to the issue at hand, the RAD finds the Board member was a bit assertive at the time; however, the RAD finds this in and of itself does not amount to the RPD having breached the Appellants' right to a fair hearing. The RAD finds the RPD did give the Principal Appellant the opportunity to add further to his answer. The Principal Appellant responded that he did not have anything further to add. Moreover, the RAD finds the RPD was cognizant of the difficulties and the challenges the refugee claimants face in providing testimony. The RPD took into consideration some of the difficulties that claimants can face in the hearing room, including cultural factors, the milieu of the hearing room, and the stress inherent in responding to oral questions through an interpreter.42 Based on the totality of the evidence and the above reasons, the RAD finds the Appellants were not denied their right to an open and fair hearing. [41] In paragraph 48,43 the Appellants submit that the RPD made an unreasonable negative inference, relating to the Appellants' attending Christian group sessions during XXXX and XXXX of 2012; the RAD notes the Appellants were in Turkey from XXXX XXXXto XXXX XXXX. The Appellants submit that the RPD's question was vague; the Appellants submit that the RPD could have tested their credibility by asking whether they attended the Christian group sessions in XXXX and XXXX of 2012. The Appellants submit that the manner chosen by the RPD in arriving at its negative inference violates the Appellants' right to a hearing that is fair and open. Based on the evidence in this case, the RAD finds the RPD was microscopic in its analysis in this instance; the RAD does not concur with the RPD's finding. The RAD finds it more likely than not that the Principal Appellant did not understand the context the RPD had in mind in asking the question. Despite this, the RAD does not find that the RPD's failure to ask a more direct question, i.e., the Appellants submit that the RPD could have tested their credibility by asking whether they attended the Christian group sessions in XXXX and XXXX of 2012, violates the Appellants' right to a hearing that is fair and open. The RAD reviewed the RPD proceedings; the RAD finds the RPD asked questions to clarify when and how frequently the Appellants attended Christian group sessions in Iran. The RAD finds the RPD was reconciling information by asking additional questions; the RAD finds the RPD's questions were not vague. In this respect, the RAD finds the Appellants' allegations that they were denied the right to a hearing that is fair and open is without merit. [42] The RAD reviewed the totality of the evidence in this case, including the recording of the RPD proceedings. As mentioned earlier, the RAD finds the RPD was microscopic in its analysis at times; however, the RAD finds the RPD did not breach the Appellants' right to a fair hearing. Conclusion [43] In reviewing the totality of the evidence, including the audio recording of the proceedings, the RAD finds the RPD's decision was not based on misapprehended facts, nor was it based on speculations and conjecture. The RAD also finds the RPD did not breach the Appellants' right to a fair hearing. [44] Based on the totality of the evidence in this case and the reasons provided above, the RAD concurs with the RPD's negative credibility findings relating to the Appellants' allegations of a risk of harm or persecution as Christianity converts upon return to Iran. [45] Therefore, the RAD confirms the RPD's determination that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees, nor persons in need of Canada's protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA. DISPOSITION [46] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. [47] Their appeal to the RAD is, therefore, dismissed. (signed) "S.S. Kular" S.S. Kular January 7, 2015 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibits 1 and 9. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibits 2 and 3. 4 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014; 2014 FC 494, para. 2. 5 Iyamuremye, para. 3. 6 Alvarez, Ismael Garcia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7218-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 702; the same reasons are given in Eng, Sengloem v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7281-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 711. 7 Alvarez, para. 33. 8 Malhotra, Sunil v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6899-13), Bédard, August 1, 2014, 2014 FC 768. 9 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 10 Huruglica, para. 45. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, pp. 103-104. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Applicant's Affidavit. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, p. 103. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 100. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, paras. 13-19. 18 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, para. 17. 19 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, para. 19. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 13. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 15. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, paras. 20-26, 31. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, paras. 44-50. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, paras. 21-22. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, paras. 23-26. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para, 27. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 34. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 38. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 4. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, paras. 47-50. 31 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Exhibit 4. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, paras. 32-34. 33 Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 680; (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 169 (C.A.). 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 53. 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, paras. 35-40. 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, para. 39. 37 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, para. 40. 38 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 64. 39 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, para. 56. 40 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 12. 41 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 31. 42 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons for Decision, para. 9. 43 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Argument, para. 48. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-07322 TB4-07323