TB4-12582

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-12582 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision March 31, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal J.F. Bertrand Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Iran, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted no new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the decision of the RPD and refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she was a political activist in Iran. She and a friend, XXXX, distributed anti-regime flyers over a period of less than a year. In XXXXof 2014, she visited her son in Toronto, and while in Canada she learned that the Iranian authorities had come to her home and seized incriminating material relating to the flyers. The officials told the Appellant's daughter that the Appellant is anti-revolutionary, anti-regime, and a "dirty Sunni". They threatened to execute the Appellant. The Appellant's friend, XXXX, was arrested. The Appellant's family advised her not to return to Iran, and she therefore made a refugee claim in Canada. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on October 24, 2014, and it was rejected in an oral decision at the conclusion of the hearing. The RPD found that the determinative issue was credibility, and concluded that the Appellant failed to credibly establish her allegations of political activism. [5] The Appellant submits on appeal that the RPD erred in its assessment of her credibility, and failed to consider a significant part of her claim. ANALYSIS What is the Role of the RAD? [6] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [7] The Appellant submits that the RAD should consider whether the RPD committed an overriding and palpable error in the evaluation of her credibility.1 For reasons set out below, the RAD disagrees. The Appellant also argues that the RAD should apply a standard of correctness, while conceding that the issue of deference is not yet settled in law.2 [8] The RAD has, in respect of proceedings brought before it under the IRPA, sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction.3 While the RAD is a relatively new tribunal, it has by now rendered more than a thousand decisions on the merits of appeals. It has experience in interpreting the IRPA, its home statute and one with which it has particular familiarity. It is therefore appropriate for the RAD to consider its own role and expertise, the nature of the appeals it considers, as well as the degree and scope of deference it will show to findings of the RPD. In Djossou,4 the Federal Court encouraged the RAD to carefully consider the nature and purpose of a RAD appeal, which the RAD will do below. Background Legislation [9] The legislative history of the RAD is carefully detailed in Djossou,5 and it will not be repeated here. [10] While the IRPA does not specifically set out the purpose of the RAD, it does describe the purposes of the legislation with respect to refugees:6 (a) to recognize that the refugee program is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted; (b) to fulfil Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees and affirm Canada's commitment to international efforts to provide assistance to those in need of resettlement; (c) to grant, as a fundamental expression of Canada's humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution; (d) to offer safe haven to persons with a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group, as well as those at risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment; (e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings; (f) to support the self-sufficiency and the social and economic well-being of refugees by facilitating reunification with their family members in Canada; (g) to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society; and (h) to promote international justice and security by denying access to Canadian territory to persons, including refugee claimants, who are security risks or serious criminals. [11] While all of these objectives are generally relevant to the RAD, (e) is specifically applicable to the appellate tribunal, which must be cognizant of the requirement to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the refugee protection system while at the same time upholding respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. [12] The IRPA sheds some light on the purpose of the RAD in Section 110(1): Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), a person or the Minister may appeal, in accordance with the rules of the Board, on a question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact, to the Refugee Appeal Division against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division to allow or reject the person's claim for refugee protection (emphasis added.) [13] This suggests that the RAD must consider questions arising from the RPD's decision. [14] Section 110(2) of the IRPA restricts access to the RAD. Those without the right of a RAD appeal include designated foreign nationals, refugee claimants whose claims were found to have no credible basis or to be manifestly unfounded, and individuals who have lost their refugee status through vacation or cessation. [15] Section 110(3) requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD's record, though it may also accept documentary evidence and submissions from both the Minister and the subject of the appeal. Section 110(4) imposes restrictions on new evidence filed by the subject of the appeal, who "may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection". These restrictions do not apply to evidence filed in response to evidence submitted by the Minister on appeal. [16] Section 110(6) sets out the exceptional circumstances in which the RAD may hold an oral hearing: where there is new evidence (a) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; (b) that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (c) that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [17] Section 111(1) provides the RAD with a broad range of remedies: it must either confirm the determination of the RPD, set that determination aside and substitute its own determination, or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. According to Section 111(2), the RAD is only to refer a matter back if the decision of the RPD is "wrong in law, in fact or in mixed law and fact", and if it cannot confirm or substitute "without hearing evidence that was presented to the Refugee Protection Division". In the RAD's view, these provisions suggest both an emphasis on finality and a desire to avoid duplication between the RAD and the RPD. [18] Section 165 provides that members of the RAD have the powers and authority of a commissioner appointed under the Inquiries Act, and may do any other thing they consider necessary to provide a full and proper hearing. [19] Section 171 sets out provisions with respect to proceedings before the RAD, including that the Division is not bound by legal or technical rules of evidence, and it may receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances. It also allows the RAD to take notice of facts that may be judicially noticed, of any other generally recognized facts, and of information or opinion within its specialized knowledge. Section 171(c) provides that a decision of a three-member RAD panel has precedential value for the RPD and for single-member panels of the RAD. Where the RAD convokes such a panel, the UNHCR has a right to participate in the appeal through written submissions, and other interveners may apply to do so as well.7 [20] The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations8 set out a 15-day time limit for an appeal to be filed to the RAD and require that, except where an oral hearing is held, "the time limit for the Refugee Appeal Division to make a decision on an appeal is 90 days after the day on which the appeal is perfected".9 Jurisprudence [21] As a new tribunal, the RAD did not initially have the benefit of any jurisprudence specifically dealing with its role, its relationship to the RPD, or the nature of an appeal. In hundreds of cases, the RAD rather consistently determined that it should apply a standard of review of reasonableness, deferring to the RPD's findings of fact and mixed fact and law, while applying a standard of correctness to questions of law, natural justice, and procedural fairness. [22] The Federal Court first spoke to the RAD's role in Iyamuremye.10 In that case, the Court found itself entirely in agreement with the RAD that the standard of review to be applied to decisions of the RPD was one of reasonableness, though it found that the RAD had erred by failing to conduct an independent review of the evidence in order to assess whether the RPD's decision was in fact reasonable. The Court also recognized that it would be absurd, and contrary to subsection 110(3) of the IRPA, to require the RAD to re-examine in every instance whether claimants are in fact refugees or persons in need of protection. [23] In the subsequent cases of Alvarez and Eng, the Court clarified the role of the RAD in relation to the RPD.11 It held that the RAD is not to undertake a process of judicial review, but rather it must conduct its own assessment of the facts in order to determine whether the RPD made an error of law or mis-assessed the facts to the point of making a "palpable and overriding error".12 In the Court's view, the lower tribunal's ability to hear evidence viva voce makes it better situated than the RAD to make findings of fact, and therefore the appeal tribunal should show deference to the RPD's findings of fact and mixed fact and law. In contrast to its ruling in Iyamuremye, here the Court found that the RAD erred by assessing the decision of the RPD against a standard of reasonableness. [24] In Huruglica, the Court considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD.13 It found that the RAD erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of the IRPA. In the Court's view, one should not even engage in a standard of review analysis, but should instead consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.14 [25] While the Court had strongly endorsed the standard of reasonableness in Iyamuremye, it found in Huruglica that the application of such standard was in error. In contrast to Alvarez and Eng, the Court held that the RAD is not restricted to intervening only in the event of a palpable and overriding error. In Huruglica, the Court determined that the RAD is to conduct a "hybrid appeal", respecting and recognizing the findings of the RPD only where the lower tribunal has an advantage in making such findings, and making its own independent assessment of whether the claimant is a refugee. [26] It is important to note here that, while the Court in Huruglica held that both reasonableness and "palpable and overriding error" are not standards to be used by the RAD, it did not clearly set out what level of deference should be given by the RAD to findings of the RPD with respect to credibility or in other areas where the RPD has a particular advantage. The Court also did not clarify the areas in which the RPD has such an advantage. [27] A number of subsequent cases have cited Huruglica and adopted, in whole or in part, the reasoning therein.15 The following passages are frequently repeated: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error". [28] In Spasoja,16 Justice Roy agreed with Huruglica that the RAD should not engage in a judicial review of the RPD's decision. However, he held that the appropriate standard to be applied in a RAD appeal is the appellate standard of "palpable and overriding error". [29] There have been numerous Federal Court decisions since that time which speak to the RAD's role. In some, the RAD's decision was upheld on judicial review, even though it applied a standard of reasonableness, because the Court concluded that the tribunal properly showed deference to findings of credibility, even if it erred in using the language of judicial review.17 In others, the Court found that the application of a reasonableness standard deprived the Appellants of a true appeal. [30] In Alyafi,18 the Federal Court considered three approaches to the RAD's role: a judicial review-like standard of reasonableness, which has been consistently rejected by the Court, as well as the hybrid approach and the palpable and overriding error standard. Justice Martineau found himself faced with an "Olympic dilemma", as there were two competing and contradictory approaches, each adopted by some of his colleagues on the Court. He proposed that the RAD be allowed by the Court to choose either approach until the matter is finally settled by a higher court. [31] In Akuffo, Madam Justice Gagné agreed with Huruglica that deference is owed by the RAD only on matters of credibility and where the RPD has a particular advantage. While the Court did not set out a preferred standard, the Justice wrote that she is "far from being convinced that there is a real and pragmatic difference between an 'unreasonable' error and an 'overriding and palpable' one...."19 She held further, in Kurtzmalaj,20 that the RPD does not hold a particular advantage in considering documentary evidence, including a claimant's personal documents. [32] The RAD was encouraged by the Court, in Djossou,21 to consider the nature of a RAD appeal-whether it is a true appeal, a de novo appeal, or a hybrid. The RAD was directed to consider these three options with an open mind, and to adopt an approach taking all relevant factors into account. On the subject of deference, the Court held that the RPD did not hold an advantage over the RAD other than on issues of pure credibility.22 A few days later, the Court decided Allalou, and it noted that the RPD, as the trier of fact, has the advantage of assessing witnesses and viewing evidence first hand.23 [33] Notwithstanding the prior decisions with respect to the deference owed by the RAD to the RPD, the Court, in Bahta, determined that the RAD owes no deference whatsoever to the RPD on questions of fact; the RAD was directed to make its own determination of the Appellant's credibility based on the record.24 In Aloulou,25 the Court returned to the standard of palpable and over-riding error. [34] While the preceding review of the jurisprudence is necessarily brief and limited, it may nevertheless illustrate the difficulty faced by the RAD in determining its approach. Is the RAD to employ a hybrid approach? Is it to assess the RPD's decision for palpable and overriding errors? Is it to show deference to findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, or only to credibility, or where the RPD has an advantage, or perhaps show no deference at all? Is the RAD to review the evidence in order to properly understand the RPD's decision, or for the purpose of making its own determination of the refugee claim? If the latter, how much attention-if any at all-does the RAD need to pay to the RPD's decision in coming to its own determination?26 [35] In the RAD's view, there are some aspects of the jurisprudence that are relatively consistent. It is clear that the RAD is not to engage in a process of judicial review, and it is not to use the terminology associated with judicial review: "There is a consensus amongst the judges of this Court that the judicial review regime does not apply to appeals of RPD decisions before the RAD. In my view, this implies that the RAD should avoid using and relying on both the jurisprudence and the vocabulary as developed in the context of judicial review".27 [36] The Court has also consistently held that the RAD is to independently review the evidence in the RPD's record, in addition to any admissible new evidence. Most, though not all, decisions of the Court suggest that the RAD owes some degree of deference to some findings of the RPD. [37] The Court has certified a number of questions that may lead to the resolution of the issues set out above. In the meantime, however, the RAD must continue to decide appeals, and to do so within the time limits set out in the Regulations. It is therefore necessary for the RAD to engage in its own analysis of its role, approach, and relationship to the RPD. The Role of the RAD [38] How is the RAD to determine its role? The Court has considered, among other factors, statements made by the Minister responsible for the IRB at the time RAD-related legislation was being discussed in Parliament: I reiterate that the bill would also create the new refugee appeal division. The vast majority of claimants who are coming from countries that do normally produce refugees would for the first time, if rejected at the refugee protection division, have access to a full fact-based appeal at the refugee appeal division of the IRB. This is the first government to have created a full fact-based appeal.28 [39] While the Court did question whether the stated intention of creating a true appeal was actually realized,29 and it noted that legislative debates have questionable weight in the interpretation of a statute,30 this and similar statements seem to factor significantly into the Court's understanding of the role of the RAD. The Court has found that such statements indicate that Parliament intended the RAD process to be an appeal, and not a judicial review or quasi-judicial review,31 and establish that the criteria for admitting new evidence must be flexible,32 and as support for the conclusion that the RAD should show no deference to factual findings of the RPD.33 [40] Such statements provide the RAD with limited assistance in determining its role. There may be some peril in taking words spoken in political discourse-such as "full fact-based appeal"-and giving them a legal or technical meaning without having reason to believe such meaning was attached to them, or intended, at the time they were uttered. As the Court observed in Djossou, "The lax use of the terms 'appeal de novo', 'appeal', or 'full appeal' can only add to the confusion that seems to exist among parties and attorneys."34 In the RAD's view, it would be difficult indeed to consider such political statements-even in context, and when repeated on multiple occasions-as the basis for legal and technical conclusions about the role of the RAD or the nature of an appeal to it.35 [41] However, the legislative provisions themselves distinguish a RAD appeal from the judicial review process: there is a right to appeal without the requirement to seek leave, new evidence may be presented, and the RAD has broad remedial power. [42] There is no doubt that the RAD considers appeals and does not engage in a process of judicial review. The RAD, like the RPD, is an administrative tribunal created by Parliament to fulfill a statutory function. While it is bound to make decisions within the law, its main function is to make refugee determinations (as illustrated by Section 111). In contrast, "Judicial review is the means by which the courts supervise those who exercise statutory powers, to ensure that they do not overstep their legal authority. The function of judicial review is therefore to ensure the legality, the reasonableness and the fairness of the administrative process and its outcomes".36 The courts have a more limited role on judicial review; this role stems from the fact that the courts and administrative tribunals reside in different branches of government. The deferential standard applied by the courts is the result of a balance struck between the need to ensure the legality of administrative decisions and the need to avoid "undue interference with the discharge of administrative functions in respect of the matters delegated to administrative bodies by Parliament and legislatures". [43] It is clear from Sections 18 and 18.1 of the Federal Courts Act that the Federal Court is given broad supervisory authority over all federal boards, commissions, or tribunals, with specific grounds of review found in 18.1(4).37 The RAD, on the other hand, and obviously, only reviews decisions of the RPD. [44] The role of the RAD is best determined from its enabling legislation and the jurisprudence of the Courts interpreting that legislation, both of which are reviewed above. [45] Having considered the legislation and jurisprudence, the RAD finds that its role includes the following: (a) To recognize and implement the objectives of the IRPA with respect to refugee protection: that the program is about saving lives and offering protection; to grant fair consideration to those fearing persecution; and to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system,38 doing so in a manner that is consistent with the Charter and with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory;39 (b) To provide an appeal against a decision of the RPD to allow or deny a person's claim for refugee protection;40 such appeals serve the dual purpose of ensuring that those entitled to protection under the IRPA receive it and of ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the refugee determination process; (c) To efficiently correct errors made by the RPD, by conducting a complete review of questions of fact, law, and mixed fact and law;41 and (d) To ensure consistency in the decision-making process by establishing uniform jurisprudence on refugee law issues.42 The Nature of a RAD Appeal [46] The legislative provisions which set out the task of the RAD make clear that an appeal is made in relation to a decision of the lower tribunal. Section 110(1) refers to an appeal "against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division". The broad remedies available to the RAD in Section 111(1) also refer to such a decision, as the RAD can confirm the RPD's determination, or set it aside and substitute, or refer the matter back to the RPD to make another decision. Section 111(2) provides that the RAD may refer the matter back if it finds that "the decision of the Refugee Protection Division is wrong in law, in fact, or in mixed law and fact". The RAD's plain reading of these legislative provisions leads it to conclude that the appeal described in the legislation is an appeal against the decision rendered by the RPD and the determination reached in that decision. [47] In Djossou, Justice Martineau wrote that "there is general agreement that there are usually three types of appeal: true appeal ("appel veritable"); appeal de novo; and hybrid appeal".43 A true appeal is the most narrow, as the appeal is founded on the record, and the Appellant must demonstrate a reviewable error of law, fact or procedure. An appeal de novo is where the original decision is largely or entirely ignored, except perhaps for the purposes of cross-examination. In a hybrid appeal, the Appellant bears the onus of demonstrating error and the appeal tribunal receives the record, but the appeal is not limited as to grounds. The appeal tribunal reviews the lower decision for correctness, and fresh evidence may be adduced. The Court noted that, at first glance, an appeal to the RAD looks like a true appeal, but that it may also be a hybrid appeal; the RAD was urged by the Court to consider these appeal options with an open mind. [48] The RAD is a unique tribunal, and it may be that it considers all three types of appeals. As set out above, the statutory provisions governing this tribunal's work clearly require it to consider the RPD's decision. The appeal is against a decision of the RPD and, unless there is new evidence, the appeal is founded on the RPD's record. The Appellant is required to demonstrate an error of law, fact, or mixed fact and law.44 The RAD is not to ordinarily hold a hearing; new evidence is subject to restrictions, and the RAD is not to rehear evidence that was presented to the RPD in the course of confirming or setting aside and substituting a determination of the RPD. Where no new evidence has been admitted, an appeal to the RAD is a true appeal. In such an appeal, the RAD must consider the decision of the RPD, the submissions of the Appellant challenging that decision, and determine whether the RPD's determination is wrong. As a true appeal is founded on the record, it is therefore necessary for the RAD to consider the evidence in that record in order to determine the appeal. [49] Where new evidence is admitted on appeal, however, the nature of the appeal necessarily changes. It is no longer a "true appeal", based only on the RPD's record. In the RAD's view, an appeal with admissible new evidence might be characterized as a hybrid appeal where that evidence speaks not to a new risk to the Appellant, but rather to an error in the RPD's decision.45 In such a hybrid appeal, the RAD must consider the RPD's reasons in light of the new evidence, which may establish that the decision of the RPD is wrong.46 [50] There may also be appeals where new evidence is tendered not for the purpose of illuminating an error in the RPD's decision, but rather to establish a new or heightened risk faced by the Appellant, or to otherwise change the overall nature of the claim. In some such appeals, the decision of the RPD may be less relevant in light of the new evidence-that is, the new evidence establishes a risk or degree of risk not considered by the RPD. Such an appeal would be, in effect, a de novo appeal, as the original decision could be largely ignored. However, even such an appeal might not be a true de novo proceeding, as certain findings of the RPD-such as those with respect to identity or credibility-could remain relevant. [51] In Huruglica, the Court noted the RAD's Section 111(1)(b) power to substitute the determination which "in its opinion, should have been made". The Court then added that "one precondition of exercising this power is that the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the application in order to arrive at its own opinion. It is not necessary, in order to trigger this remedial power, that the RAD must find error on some standard of review basis."47 Later in the same decision, the Court required that the RAD "come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection". [52] Was the Court, in Huruglica, instructing the RAD to, in essence, engage in some type of a de novo consideration of the Appellant's refugee claim, regardless of whether the RPD's decision was in error? This would conflict with the strong statement of the Court in Iyamuremye: "The Court recognizes that it would be absurd, and contrary to subsection 110(3)... to task the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board with re-examining, for every instance, whether the claimants are in fact refugees or persons in need of protection...."48 Later in Alvarez (decided before Huruglica) and again in Triastcin (after Huruglica), the Court said clearly that "an appeal before the RAD is not an appeal de novo; the IRPA restricts the power of the RAD, in comparison to that of the IAD, to considering new evidence and to holding a hearing only in exceptional cases ...."49 The Court, in Huruglica, seemed to disagree, however: "the restriction on the ability to receive fresh evidence is not a bar to conducting a de novo appeal".50 [53] In the RAD's view, each appeal to the RAD is not a de novo appeal-that is, an appeal in which the RAD ignores the RPD's decision and makes a determination solely based on its own assessment of the evidence and arguments in the RPD's record, as well as any new evidence; in the RAD's view, Huruglica should not be read to suggest a de novo in this sense. In fact, the statutory language appears to link the RAD's remedial power to its review of the RPD's decision. While Huruglica focused on the remedy set out in Section 111(1)(b), the full language of that section provides that the RAD may, after considering the appeal (which, as per Section 110(1), is an appeal against a decision of the RPD), "set aside the determination [of the RPD] and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made" (emphasis added). There is a relationship between the first step and the second: once the RAD sets aside, it may substitute. It is difficult to conceive the RAD setting aside the determination of the RPD without first finding it to be in error, or proceeding straight to the merits of the refugee claim without first considering the RPD's decision.51 [54] Were the RAD to consider each appeal as a de novo appeal, it would risk duplicating the decision-making function of the RPD. There is no indication in IRPA that Parliament intended the RAD to repeat the RPD's process of refugee determination. The legislation requires the RAD to consider appeals against the decision of the RPD; to normally proceed without a hearing on the basis of the RPD's record; to consider only new evidence that arose after the RPD determined the claim, or was not reasonably available or could not reasonably have been expected before the RPD; and links the RAD's power to substitute to its setting aside of the RPD's decision. Significantly, Section 111(2) permits the RAD to refer a matter back to the RPD only if the RPD's decision was wrong and the RAD cannot confirm it or set it aside and substitute without hearing evidence that was presented to the RPD. In the RAD's view, this provision clearly signals that the RAD is not to duplicate the work of the lower tribunal.52 To do so would be inefficient53 and thus inconsistent with one objective of the IRPA set out in Section 3(2)(e). Moreover, in the RAD's view, if Parliament intended the RAD to redetermine the refugee claim-even absent any error by the RPD-the legislation would have said this, instead of requiring the RAD to consider the RPD's decision. In fact, the provisions of Section 111-allowing the RAD to substitute its own determination when it sets aside the decision of the RPD, and discouraging the RAD from rehearing evidence heard by the RPD-indicate an intent that the RAD consider an appeal against the RPD's decision, not duplicate the RPD's process. [55] Can the nature of a RAD appeal be ascertained by looking to appeals considered by other administrative tribunals? The RAD is unique in that it is a Division which considers appeals against decisions of another Division of the Board. As such, it may be difficult to make accurate comparisons to appellate tribunals in other circumstances.54 In some cases, however, the Federal Court has compared the RAD to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD), another tribunal within the IRB. In Huruglica, the Court found the IAD to be the most relevant comparator to the RAD, and listed a number of "shared elements" between the IAD and the RAD. Significantly, the Court noted that the IAD conducts de novo appeals, even though this is not specifically set out in the legislation. [56] In the RAD's view, it is clear from the legislation that an appeal to the IAD is considerably different than that of an appeal to the RAD. The IAD "must" hold a hearing to consider an appeal,55 while the RAD "must proceed without a hearing"56 except in very specific circumstances. The IRPA also restricts the power of the RAD, but not the IAD, to accept new evidence. Section 111(2)(b) discourages the RAD from rehearing evidence that was previously presented to the RPD, while the IAD has no such constraint. The filing of an appeal to the RAD is governed by relatively short time limits, and a decision must be rendered in relatively short order. [57] While the Courts have found that the IAD's process constitutes a de novo appeal, the RAD process is significantly different in key respects. A comparison to the IAD may be informative in determining that the RAD, like the IAD, is not to engage in a judicial review process, but that is not at issue here. The RAD finds that, although its sibling tribunal conducts de novo appeals, this does not lead to the conclusion that the RAD's process is a de novo appeal.57 [58] Having carefully considered the nature of the RAD appeal, it is appropriate for the RAD to follow the words of Justice Roy in Spasoja: 58 The remaining issue is the nature of the appeal. Some would consider it an appeal de novo, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 10th ed: "Appeal de novo. An Appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial court's record but reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court's rulings." With respect, in the statutory scheme under review, I cannot find any indicators providing for an appeal de novo. As such, the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, for example, specifically sets out an appeal de novo in certain cases with respect to prosecuting offences punishable on summary conviction (see Part XXVII of the Criminal Code, sections 821 et seq.). Parliament was clear. There is nothing of the kind in the Act. Instead, the scheme under review addresses appeals on specific questions, be it of fact, of law or of mixed law and fact (subsection 110(1)). In my view, that means that the appellant must identify the questions on which the appeal will focus. It will be on the basis of the record of proceedings before the RPD that the appeal will be heard based on the questions identified and raised, subject to the documentary evidence (subsection 110(3)) or evidence that is consistent with subsection 110(4). [59] The RAD concludes that, except in certain and limited circumstances, an appeal to the RAD is not a de novo appeal. [60] For these reasons, the RAD concludes that the nature of the RAD appeal is variable. Where there is no admissible new evidence, it is a true appeal, and the RAD must consider the Appellant's submissions and engage in an independent review of the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD was wrong. [61] Where there is admissible new evidence which points to an error in the RPD's decision, the appeal is a hybrid: the RAD must consider the RPD's decision and determination, and also consider the effect of the fresh evidence on the decision. [62] Finally, where there is admissible new evidence which speaks to a new or heightened risk, or otherwise changes the overall nature of the claim, this would justify a limited de novo appeal, in the sense that the RPD's decision (but not necessarily its record) could be largely ignored, though in most cases it would not be appropriate to entirely ignore the RPD's findings on certain issues.59 Should the RAD Show Deference to the RPD? [63] The Singh decision of the Supreme Court was a landmark ruling for Canada's refugee determination system.60 In that judgment, the Court held that refugee claimants in Canada have the right to an oral hearing of their refugee claims. The Court recognized the importance of an oral hearing to determine credibility: I should note, however, that even if hearings based on written submissions are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice for some purposes, they will not be satisfactory for all purposes. In particular, I am of the view that where a serious issue of credibility is involved, fundamental justice requires that credibility be determined on the basis of an oral hearing. Appellate courts are well aware of the inherent weakness of written transcripts where questions of credibility are at stake and thus are extremely loath to review the findings of tribunals which have had the benefit of hearing the testimony of witnesses in person: see Stein v. The Ship "Kathy K", [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802, at pp. 806-08 (per Ritchie J.) I find it difficult to conceive of a situation in which compliance with fundamental justice could be achieved by a tribunal making significant findings of credibility solely on the basis of written submissions.61 [64] The Supreme Court clearly recognized the importance of an oral hearing in determining the credibility of a refugee claimant. Today that hearing takes place before the RPD, while the RAD is, in most cases, limited to listening to an audio recording or reading a written transcript. If the RAD were to show no deference to credibility findings of the RPD, and were to make its own credibility findings on the basis of a transcript or recording, it would do so in disregard of the Supreme Court's words and rationale in Singh. [65] The Supreme Court has also observed, in another matter, that the trier of fact is "in a privileged position to assess the credibility of witnesses' testimony at trial...."62 The RPD sees, hears, and questions the refugee claimant, while the RAD must not normally hold a hearing. The RAD now has considerable experience in reviewing the testimony of Appellants before the RPD, both through audio recordings and written transcripts. While the RAD may have comparable or greater expertise than the RPD in matters of refugee determination, it finds itself at a significant disadvantage when considering credibility through a recording or transcript. For example, a long pause by a claimant in response to a question from the RPD may be interpreted as uncertainty or evasiveness when considered via an audio recording; however, the RPD member may not have made a negative credibility finding because the pause is in fact caused by the interpreter consulting his dictionary, or by counsel making a hand gesture for the witness to wait while counsel finishes her notes of the previous answer. This would not be apparent to the RAD member listening to a recording. Similarly, the RPD might find the emotional state of a visibly distraught claimant to be consistent with and corroborative of her testimony; the RAD is unable to consider this important factor when reading a transcript. Further, having the benefit of seeing and hearing the claimant, the RPD has the advantage of deciding whether to further probe an area of evidence, while the RAD is unable to ask the questions it would like to have answered based on its review of the transcript. [66] Finally, deference is warranted because the legislation suggests that Parliament viewed the RPD as having expertise in determining certain matters. Where the RPD finds that a refugee claim has no credible basis, or is manifestly unfounded, the failed refugee claimant has no right of appeal to the RAD.63 In the RAD's view, this signals a recognition of the RPD's advantage in determining credibility, as does the fact that a decision with respect to a vacation or cessation proceeding also cannot be appealed to the RAD.64 The provisions of Section 111(2)-that the RAD may refer an erroneous decision back to the RPD only if it cannot confirm it or substitute "without hearing evidence that was presented to the Refugee Protection Division"-also suggest that some level of deference is to be accorded to the findings of the RPD, as evidence heard by the RPD is not to be reheard by the RAD. [67] While it is clear that some level of deference is warranted, it is less obvious how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo, "With that said, there also appears to be a consensus that, when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed."65 Scope of Deference [68] Having established that it owes some deference to the RPD, the RAD must consider the extent to which that deference applies to findings of the lower tribunal, after which it will consider the appropriate level of deference. [69] In the judicial review and appellate court context, a distinction is made between questions of fact, questions of law, and questions of mixed fact and law, and the appropriate standard of review is selected on the basis of this distinction. In some decisions, the Federal Court has found that these issue categories are applicable to the determination of the scope of the RAD's deference.66 [70] However, other decisions of the Court have, instead of determining deference by issue categories, instead considered evidentiary categories. In Huruglica, the Court held that the RAD could show deference "on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion".67 The concept of deference based on categories of evidence, rather than issue categories, is also reflected in subsequent cases.68 [71] The RAD is well aware that the IRPA provides for an appeal on a "question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact",69 and has considered whether such a provision requires that the scope of deference be determined on the basis of such questions. The Supreme Court noted in Khosa that a distinction can be made between grounds of review and standards of review.70 Here an appeal to the RAD may be made on certain grounds, but those grounds are not necessarily the basis for determining where deference begins and ends. [72] In fact, in light of the Federal Court's jurisprudence to date, it would be difficult for the RAD to determine, using issue categories, where deference is warranted. This would be particularly awkward in considering the category of mixed fact and law. In the refugee law context, this category is often applied to matters such as state protection and internal flight alternative (IFA), where the RPD is required to apply a legal principle to the specific facts of a refugee claim. [73] In the RAD context, this "mixed" category presents difficulties when it comes to determining the scope of deference. As the Courts have noted, the RAD has similar or greater expertise to the RPD in matters of refugee law. While the RPD has an advantage in making findings relating to oral testimony, that advantage does not extend to objective information, such as country conditions evidence. A "mixed" category issue such as state protection might consist of a finding by the RPD based entirely on objective documentary evidence about the availability of such protection; conversely, it might be entirely based on the refugee claimant's oral testimony about efforts to seek state protection. Similarly, a finding of IFA might be based largely on objective evidence-where deference is not warranted-or on a claimant's testimony, which would attract deference. [74] To put it simply, it is not helpful in the RAD context to determine the scope of deference on the basis of issue categories. Instead, the RAD will determine deference based on categories of evidence. [75] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such findings. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony. As such, credibility findings arising from that oral testimony are deserving of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, as are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [76] Not every finding relating to credibility warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where that determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and it does not arise directly from the oral evidence.71 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference-a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence-the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.72 [77] Where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach a conclusion, the RAD will recognize and respect that finding. Where the RPD did not enjoy such an advantage, the RAD will apply a standard of correctness. Degree of Deference [78] How much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? There is considerable jurisprudence, reviewed above, which has determined that the RAD should not employ "reasonableness" as a standard, and perhaps should not consider whether an error is "palpable and overriding". There is very little in the legislation or jurisprudence, however, to indicate what degree of deference the RAD can and should apply. [79] As an aside, the RAD notes that the difference between the various standards may not make much of a practical difference in the determination of a RAD appeal. It is difficult to conceive of a finding that is determined by the RAD to be unreasonable but is yet not a palpable and overriding error.73 It is nevertheless important that the RAD employ the appropriate language in describing the standard to be applied-and such language must not reflect that of judicial review. [80] In Huruglica, the Court held that the RAD can "recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion, but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a 'palpable and overriding error'".74 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Court. [81] What level of deference does "recognize and respect" establish? Unfortunately, this was not explained in Huruglica or in subsequent jurisprudence. [82] In a number of cases, the Federal Court has upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD. While the use of the judicial review standard was an error, this was not fatal, as it was not an error for the RAD to show deference to certain findings of the RPD.75 In the RAD's view, this suggests that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [83] How then is "recognize and respect" to be defined? In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome. 76 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, it seems appropriate for the RAD to adopt those elements. [84] Even where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of a comprehensible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and understand how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [85] Further, the outcome of that process must be a result that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. For this reason, it is particularly important, as repeatedly noted by the Federal Court, that the RAD engage in its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to determine whether the RPD's finding is supported by that evidence. [86] "Recognize and respect" is therefore a level of deference that will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a comprehensible reasoning process whose premises are rooted in such advantages. If either the process or the outcome does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error or, in the language of Section 111(2), "wrong". [87] On matters where the RAD owes no deference, it will consider the RPD's findings and conclusions on a standard of correctness: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. The RAD's Approach [88] The RAD will take the following approach in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD. It will assess all of the evidence, both that in the RPD's record and any admissible new evidence. It will consider questions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact raised by the Appellant and, where applicable, the Respondent. [89] Where the proceeding is a true appeal-that is, where there is no admissible new evidence-the RAD will consider the decision of the RPD, the submissions in respect of that decision, and determine whether the RPD's determination is wrong. As a true appeal is founded on the record, the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the evidence in that record in order to determine the appeal. [90] Where an appeal includes admissible new evidence that speaks to an error in the RPD's decision, it is a hybrid appeal, where the RAD must consider the RPD's reasons in light of the new evidence, which may establish that the decision of the RPD is wrong.77 [91] Where an appeal presents admissible new evidence which establishes a new, changed, or heightened risk, or otherwise changes the overall nature of the claim, this will result in a limited de novo appeal. In some such cases, the decision of the RPD may be less relevant in light of the new evidence-that is, the new evidence establishes a risk or degree of risk, or other potentially determinative matter not considered by the RPD. Unlike a true de novo proceeding, however, the RAD will not ignore the RPD's record or the findings of the lower tribunal, as these may remain relevant to the appeal. [92] The RAD will recognize and respect findings which the RPD was in an advantageous position to make, which will normally include credibility findings and other findings of fact. Where such deference is to be shown, the RAD will not intervene unless the RPD's reasoning process is not comprehensible or the outcome of that process is not based on and supported by the evidence. [93] Where the RPD's determination is entirely based on findings which warrant deference-such as an overall lack of credibility, based on oral testimony-the RAD will, having conducted its own assessment of the evidence, consider whether the RPD's reasoning process is comprehensible and whether the determination is based on and supported by the evidence. [94] On matters where the RPD has no advantage, the RAD will show no deference and will apply a standard of correctness, engaging in its own analysis of the evidence and reaching its own conclusion to determine if the RPD was wrong. Where the RAD finds that its conclusion does not agree with that of the RPD, the RAD will substitute its own finding and determination or, if it is unable to substitute, will refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. The RPD's Findings [95] The Appellant argues that the RPD made various errors in assessing her credibility and rejecting her claim. [96] Duration of political activities: The RPD found an inconsistency in the alleged duration of the Appellant's distribution of flyers: the Appellant testified that she began her political activities around Nowruz, in XXXXof 2013, and she ended them in XXXXof 2014. The RPD noted that this time period spans ten or eleven months, and it made a negative credibility finding, as the Appellant had claimed that her political activism spanned nine months. [97] The Appellant argues on appeal that this approach was too rigid, particularly since she had told the RPD that the time frames given were estimates. The Appellant also points out that the Iranian calendar is different than the Gregorian calendar, which explains why she provided an estimate rather than trying to give precise dates. [98] The RAD agrees. The Appellant did provide an estimated time period in her evidence to the RPD. The difference between nine months and ten or eleven months is not sufficient basis to justify a negative credibility finding, particularly where there is a calendar conversion involved. The RPD erred by engaging in a microscopic examination of this portion of the Appellant's evidence. [99] Subject matter of the Appellant's activism: The RPD noted that the Appellant was unable to recall specific details of the incidents addressed in most of her ten flyers. She did give specifics of three events; the RPD found that one such incident allegedly protested by the Appellant in 2013 had actually occurred in 2010, while another was not corroborated by objective evidence. It dismissed the Appellant's explanation that she is not good with names, finding that she, even as a low-level political activist, could be expected to have some knowledge of political events occurring during the time she was active. [100] The Appellant submits on appeal that the RPD should not have dismissed her testimony about one incident based on "a very quick Internet search" conducted by the RPD member during a break in the hearing. She argues further that the RPD erred by stating that she could not speak of political events occurring in Iran, when in fact she did mention at least three events; she also points out that the RPD alternately said she was unable to speak of events, then said she spoke of three incidents, but also said she remembered only one incident. The Appellant also submits that, as her role in the activism was largely XXXX-XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXand distributed flyers-it is not surprising that she did not have detailed knowledge of specific events. Finally, she argues that the flyers were largely intended to address general issues, not individual incidents. [101] At one point in the hearing, the RPD member explained, "Now during the break I did a very quick internet search regarding the event you described, the XXXX XXXX in XXXX XXXX in XXXX of last year, and I also searched again very quickly the XXXX XXXXorganization to see if there's any report that they are corrupt. Now in my very brief search I didn't find anything on the XXXX XXXXorganization but I did find an article on the XXXX XXXX which looks very similar to what you described earlier, so I've provided you with a copy of the New York Times article and you've had a chance to go over it with your interpreter and counsel and I'm going to enter it as-maybe I should ask your counsel do you have any objection to enter this article...," to which counsel replied "no."78 [102] The RPD is to follow the Instructions for Gathering and Disclosing Information for Refugee Protection Division Proceedings (the Instructions) issued by the Chairperson in 2008 and last amended in December of 2012.79 The Instructions note that, while RPD members are responsible for identifying information needed for the adjudication of a claim and may gather information, the Research Directorate is primarily responsible for gathering information. The Instructions set out general principles related to the gathering and disclosing of information, as well as specific instructions. The RPD is to gather information through a standard and transparent process to ensure fairness in decision-making. In the RAD's view, a quick internet search by the member during a break in the proceedings does not qualify as a standard and transparent process. Where a member decides to obtain country-of-origin information which, as in this case, was not in the National Documentation Package (NDP) or disclosed by the parties, this is to be done through an Information Request Form to the Research Directorate. The RPD did not follow this process here. [103] While the RPD did not follow the Instructions, it is difficult to see how the Appellant was prejudiced by this failure. The RPD explained its methodology and disclosed the resulting document. The Appellant was represented by experienced counsel before the RPD, and he did not object to the member's research or the admission of the resulting document. [104] In support of her appeal, the Appellant cites jurisprudence which holds that it is a breach of procedural fairness for a decision-maker to rely upon extrinsic evidence.80 However, that case, where the extrinsic evidence was not disclosed to the Applicant, can be distinguished from the Appellant's matter, where the document resulting from the search was disclosed without objection. [105] It is incumbent on the RPD to follow the Chairperson's Instructions, and its failure to do so here was an error. However, the RAD finds that the error is of no consequence to this appeal: the Appellant did not object to the research or the resulting document during the RPD hearing, nor was she prejudiced by the manner in which the information was gathered. [106] Did the RPD err by stating that the Appellant could not speak of political events in Iran? When considered as a whole, the RPD's decision clearly does not claim that the Appellant could give no information whatsoever about such matters. Rather, the decision shows the RPD's concern that the Appellant, who claimed to risk her life in political activism, had remarkably little knowledge of the matters for which she allegedly risked her life. While the RPD does appear to shift from stating that the Appellant had no knowledge to stating that she had knowledge of one, or three, incidents, this is not an error. Again, when the decision is read as a whole, it is clear that the RPD recognized that the Appellant spoke to three specific incidents, but the panel dismissed one as having occurred years earlier and the other as lacking any corroborating objective evidence; after this analysis, only one incident remained. [107] The RAD cannot accept the Appellant's argument that her lack of knowledge can be explained by her "XXXX" role in the alleged activism. She alleged that she wanted to see the end of the Islamist regime, and that "XXXX and I were responsible for XXXX XXXXdistributing anti-regime flyers".81 The Appellant's alleged role was to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX by XXXX and to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, something she did about a half-dozen times. She would also "XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX", something she did "about three times".82 Sometimes she distributed the material with XXXX, and sometimes she did it by herself, always at night. [108] To put it simply: the Appellant lived in a country where she was allegedly at risk as a woman, a religious minority, and an opponent of the government. In her Basis of Claim (BoC) form, she alleged an important role in anti-regime efforts-not only did she XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Then, despite the tremendous risk, she distributed the flyers at night, even doing so alone. If the Appellant actually did what she claims-went out alone, at night, as a Sunni woman, to distribute anti-government pamphlets-she was very determined and very courageous. She could also be expected to remember in some detail the incidents and events which helped shape the context of her activism. In the RAD's view, it is not open to the Appellant to downplay her role as an explanation for her inability to remember much of what she was opposing. [109] The Appellant argues on appeal that the flyers were meant to address general issues, not always specific incidents. The RAD notes, however, that the concerns about which the Appellant testified-such as the torturing of women by the regime-had specific examples. Although the Appellant claimed to have discussed and advocated the issue of women's rights, she admitted she did not know any names of women who were in jail, described by the RPD as "widely reported". Instead, the Appellant stated that "we talked generally about the persons in jail and generally about the hijab, giving information to the people".83 She testified that journalists had been persecuted in Iran, but she could not name any.84 She testified that "sometimes XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, but she could not remember a single name.85 She gave general answers, such as that flyers contained information "about the country, the cheating that takes place in general by the government against the people".86 [110] The RAD acknowledges the Appellant's submission that the stress of a refugee hearing can "create difficulty in identifying details about secondary elements".87 The evidence with which the Appellant struggled went to the heart of her claim-the injustices which caused her to allegedly risk her life. Absent any psychological or medical impairment, the Appellant could be expected to remember this recent and important evidence. [111] For reasons set out above, the RAD is to respect and recognize the findings of the RPD where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. In the RAD's view, this matter is an excellent example of where the RPD had such an advantage. The RPD member saw the Appellant and chose the questions to be put to her. The RPD was in a much better position than is the RAD to determine the credibility of the Appellant's testimony on this core element of her claim. Having reviewed the evidence in the RPD's record, the RAD finds that the RPD did not err in making a negative credibility determination with respect to this central element of the Appellant's claim. [112] Even if the RAD were to show no deference, it would reach the same conclusion as did the RPD after its own independent review of the evidence. The Appellant claimed to have taken tremendous risks to oppose the Iranian regime; despite this, she had little specific knowledge of the abuses she claimed to risk her life to expose. Having reviewed the Appellant's testimony, the RAD finds it to be vague and lacking in detail that she could have been expected to know in her circumstances. The RAD notes that the Appellant did not provide medical or psychological evidence to establish that she suffers from any condition that might impair her ability to testify or to recall facts. Although the RAD was not present at the refugee hearing, it recognizes that the refugee determination process can be stressful and anxiety-inducing for individuals such as the Appellant. However, it must also be borne in mind that the Appellant was brave enough to risk her life by engaging in dangerous anti-regime activities; she could be expected to, at the least, provide specific information about the abuses she was opposing. [113] Other aspects of the claim: The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in paying close attention to the flyers but ignoring serious threats made by the Iranian authorities against her, as well as the alleged detention of her daughter. The Appellant points out that the death penalty is widely used in Iran, and the RPD was therefore obligated to consider the threat that she would be executed. [114] The RPD, having considered the Appellant's evidence, concluded that she was not a political activist in Iran and that she is not wanted by the authorities there.88 Having made this determination, there was no need for the RPD to consider the death penalty, as there was no reason to believe that the Appellant would be subject to such punishment. Similarly, the Appellant alleged that her daughter was detained and questioned because of the Appellant's own political activities. As the RPD did not believe those activities, it was not an error to disbelieve the alleged detention of the Appellant's daughter. [115] The RPD argues that the Appellant also erred when it gave no weight to declarations made by the Appellant's family members in Iran. One such document is a handwritten document from the Appellant's husband. It simply states that "when I found out that my wife was active against the regime of Iran, I asked her not to return to Iran and to stay in Canada".89 The other is from the Appellant's daughter, who reports that officials searched the home, seized a computer and some notes, and detained and questioned her.90 [116] The RPD considered these documents, but gave them no weight in light of the Appellant's credibility problems and the fact that the authors of the statements "are not disinterested parties in these proceedings". [117] The Federal Court has held on numerous occasions that a supporting letter cannot be dismissed only because it comes from a relative of the refugee claimant.91 In fact, had the RPD dismissed the Appellant's husband's and daughter's letters only because they are not disinterested, it would raise the question of how the Appellant-and many other refugee claimants-could be expected to obtain corroborating evidence from disinterested parties.92 Here, however, the RPD also considered the Appellant's own credibility. This is important: the panel was able to see and question the Appellant, and it could not examine her husband and daughter. Further, the documents are simply handwritten statements; they are not sworn or witnessed. The RPD did not err to give no weight to these documents; having considered the evidence, the RAD reaches the same conclusion. [118] Although the RPD engaged in a microscopic analysis of the Appellant's evidence with respect to the length of her alleged activism, it did not err in finding that the core of her claim was generally lacking in credibility. Even if the RAD were to show no deference to the RPD's credibility findings, it would reach the same conclusion. The Appellant has not established with credible evidence that she was or is a political activist, that she was or is sought by the authorities, or that her home was raided or her daughter detained. There is no basis for her refugee claim, which must therefore fail. [119] In her Written Statement, the Appellant requests an oral hearing. Sections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new evidence which meets the requirements of Section 110(6). The Appellant has provided no new evidence, and her request for an oral hearing is therefore denied. CONCLUSION [120] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld March 31, 2015 Date 1 Appellant's Record, p. 43, Memorandum, para. 22. 2 Appellant's Record, p. 55, Memorandum, para. 69. 3 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), Section 162(1). 4 Djossou, Monia Patricia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7980-13), Martineau, November 14, 2014; 2014 FC 1080, paras. 72, 91. 5 Ibid., Djossou, para. 74. 6 IRPA, Section 3(2). 7 IRPA, Section 110(3). 8 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, last amended November 22, 2014. 9 Ibid., Sections 159.91 and 159.92. 10 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014; 2014 FC 494. 11 Alvarez, Ismael Garcia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7218-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 702; the same reasons are given in Eng, Sengloem v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7281-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 711. 12 Alvarez, para. 33. 13 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 14 Huruglica, para. 45. 15 For example, Njeukam, Gaelle Leonelle Nguedo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7280-13), Locke, September 10, 2014; 2014 FC 859; Yetna, Fidele Ngo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7567-13), Locke, September 10, 2014; 2014 FC 858; and Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014; 2014 FC 1063. 16 Spasoja, Francisca v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7630-13), Roy, September 23, 2014; 2014 FC 913. 17 See Yin, Sarom v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2845-14), Noël, December 12, 2014; 2014 FC 1209, para. 36, citing Njeukam; Akuffo; Allalou, Abedelkrim v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7217-13), Shore, November 17, 2014; 2014 FC 1084; and Sajad, Zeeshan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-926-14), Shore, November 21, 2014; 2014 FC 1107; also Bui, Van Son v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1654-14), Shore, November 28, 2014; 2014 FC 1145. In Siliya, Mohamed Yusuf U v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5679-13), Boswell, January 23, 2015; 2015 FC 120, the Court found that the RAD erred by applying a reasonableness standard, but found this error to be irrelevant, as the Appellants failed to challenge the RPD's dispositive finding on appeal. 18 Alyafi, Aghiad v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1091-14), Martineau, October 8, 2014; 2014 FC 952. 19 Akuffo, para. 38. 20 Kurtzmalaj, Eljot v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6639-13), Gagné, November 14, 2014; 2014 FC 1072, para. 35. 21 Djossou, paras. 46-55. 22 Djossou, para. 70. 23 Allalou, paras. 17-19. 24 Bahta, Bethel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5037-13), Simpson, December 19, 2014; 2014 FC 1245, para. 16. 25 Aloulou, Lamia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7949-13), LeBlanc, December 19, 2014; 2014 FC 1236, paras. 57-58. 26 Compare, for example, Huruglica, at para. 47, with Siliya, at para. 25. 27 Akuffo, para. 33; also Djossou, at para. 7. But also see Spasoja (para. 40), in which Justice Roy suggests that Huruglica requires the application of a standard of reasonableness to questions of credibility; further, in at least five cases, the RAD has been upheld even after assessing credibility findings on a standard of reasonableness. 28 Hansard, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, No. 90, Tuesday, March 6, 2012, at p. 5, 874; cited in Huruglica, para. 40; Singh, para. 54; Spasoja, para. 37; Djossou, para. 85; Bahta, para. 12. 29 Huruglica, para. 40. 30 Spasoja, para. 31, citing Canadian National Railway Co. v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 SCC 40. 31 Spasoja, para. 36; Huruglica, para. 41; Bahta, para. 14. 32 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-6711-13), Gagné, 28 October 2014; 2014 FC 1022, para. 55. 33 Bahta, para. 16. 34 Djossou, para. 47. 35 In fact, there were other statements made during the discussion of the RAD's enabling legislation, statements which illustrate the risk of determining the RAD's role on the basis of parliamentary debate. For example, on April 24, 2012, the Minister told Parliament, "Through this legislation, this government is creating, for the first time ever, a full fact-based appeal, including an oral hearing for failed asylum claimants at the new refugee appeal division. It is an extra safeguard to ensure that we do not return people to face danger" (Parliament of Canada, House of Commons Debates, 41st Parliament, 1st Session, April 24, 2012, at 1500, [emphasis added]; see also April 23, 2012, at 17:50: "...a new, full fact-based appeal and oral hearing afford failed claimants at the newly created refugee appeal division." Despite this, the legislation is clear that the RAD must proceed without an oral hearing except in very specific and limited circumstances. 36 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 28. 37 See M.C.I. v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, at para. 36. 38 IRPA, Section 3(2). 39 IRPA, Sections 3(3)(d) and (f). 40 IRPA, Section 110(1). 41 IRPA, Sections 110(1) and 111; Djossou, para 86. 42 Djossou, para. 86. 43 Djossou, para. 46. 44 IRPA, Section 110(1) and Section 111; RAD Rules, Section 3(3). 45 Here, the RAD uses the term "hybrid appeal", as discussed in Djossou-an appeal based on the record, but not limited in grounds, where fresh evidence may be adduced. This may be different than the meaning given to "hybrid appeal" in Huruglica, which appears to refer to the RAD's responsibility to do two things: review the RPD's decision and conduct an independent assessment of the evidence in the record to determine whether the Appellant is a protected person. In Bahta, however, the Court referred to Huruglica and understood "hybrid" as referring to the consideration of both new evidence and evidence in the RPD's record; this is somewhat difficult to reconcile with the factual context of Huruglica, where no new evidence was presented to the RAD. 46 Reference to this type of evidence is made in Singh, para. 55. 47 Huruglica, para. 47. 48 Iyamuremye, paras. 1 and 37. 49 Alvarez, para. 25; Triastcin, Oleg v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5981-13), Shore, October 15, 2014; 2014 FC 975, para. 22. 50 Huruglica, para. 48. 51 See Siliya, at para. 25: "The RAD's decision should not be disturbed because the Applicants never challenged the dispositive finding of the RPD as to an IFA and, thus, there was no basis for any appellate intervention by the RAD." 52 See Spasoja, para. 25. 53 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399, 493 AR 89. 54 See Huruglica, para. 53. 55 IRPA, Section 175(1)(a). 56 IRPA, Section 110(3). 57 See Alvarez, para. 25; Triastcin, para. 22. 58 Spasoja, paras. 41-43. 59 In the strictest sense, a trial de novo is determined on the basis of an entirely new record, as if the original record had not existed (see Molson Breweries v. John Labatt Ltd., [2000] FCJ No 159, [2000] 3 FCR 145 (FCA), paras. 46-48). This strict de novo would not be appropriate in a RAD appeal, given the statutory limitations on the RAD accepting new evidence. 60 Singh (Harbhajan): v. M.E.I., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 50 N.R. 1, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422, 12 Admin. L.R. 137. 61 Singh, SCC, pp. 213-214. 62 Schwartz v. Canada, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 254, at p. 278; see also Bui, para. 23; and Allalou, paras 17-19. 63 IRPA, Section 110(2)(c). 64 IRPA, Section 110(2)(e) and (f). 65 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina, Yani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014; 2014 FC 1233, at para. 11. 66 For example, Alvarez at para 33; Kurtzmalaj at para. 33 and in Certified Question at para 43. 67 Huruglica, para. 55. 68 For example: Njeukam, para 14; Yetna, para. 17; Akuffo, para 39; Allallou, paras. 17-19. 69 IRPA, Section 110(1). 70 Khosa, paras. 3, 50, 51. 71 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014; 2014 FC 879, para. 32; also Yu v. M.C.I., 2015 FC 167, para. 10. 72 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., p. 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-11142-12), Annis, January 23, 2014; 2014 FC 78, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences). 73 See Akuffo, para. 38; Alvarez, para. 29; but also see Aloulou, at para. 67. 74 Huruglica, para. 55. 75 See Yin, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Akuffo, Allalou, and Sajad; also Bui. 76 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquiries into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 77 Reference to this type of evidence is made in Singh, (FC), para. 55. 78 RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 1:18-56-1:20:41. 79 Instructions for Gathering and Disclosing Information for Refugee Protection Division Proceedings, Instructions issued by the Chairperson pursuant to section 159(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, amended December, 2012. 80 Silva, Sylvia Barrios v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3153-11 and IMM-3154-11), Heneghan, November 5, 2012; 2012 FC 1294 (CanLII). 81 RPD's Record, p. 12, Basis of Claim (BoC) Narrative, para. 9. 82 Ibid. 83 RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 50:00. 84 RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 50 :55. 85 RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 2:01. 86 RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 1:07. 87 Appellant's Record, p. 52, para. 58. 88 RPD's Record, p. 7, Line 35. 89 RPD's Record, p. 117. 90 RPD's Record, p. 115. 91 For example, Kaburia, Colin Wagombe v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-230-01), Dawson, May 7, 2002; 2002 FCT 516, para. 25. 92 See Ahmed, Gulzar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-790-03), Mactavish, February 12, 2004; 2004 FC 226, para 31. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-12582