TB6-13767

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-13767 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision December 12, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Robert J. Kincaid Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX(the Appellant), a citizen of Iraq, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and refer the matter back to a differently constituted panel for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that his family is involved in a long-standing blood feud with another family. The Appellant fears that he will be targeted by the opposing family; he has also been insulted by his uncle for failing to take up arms in support of his own family. In 2014, the Appellant fled his village because of the approach of the extremist group ISIS. He found shelter in a refugee camp, but again fled when ISIS approached. He travelled to the United States and came to Canada shortly after that, making a claim for refugee protection in May of 2016. [4] The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness intervened in the Appellant's claim before the RPD, raising issues relating to the credibility of the Appellant.1 [5] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on July 11, 2016. By a decision of August 8, 2016, the RPD rejected the claim. Although the panel believed that the Appellant's family is involved in a blood feud, it found that the Appellant can safely live in the city of Sulaymaniyah, where his well-armed and well-connected uncle, who is a much higher-priority target than the Appellant, has lived for years without harm. The RPD acknowledged that the Appellant might be insulted by his uncle for his unwillingness to participate in the feud, but found that such treatment does not amount to persecution or create a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. The RPD found further that the Appellant is not at risk from ISIS in Sulaymaniyah. [6] The Appellant asks the RAD to accept new evidence, showing that his family members in Sulaymaniyah were in fact attacked around the time of the RPD hearing. He also argues that the RPD erred in finding that he will be safe in Sulaymaniyah. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [7] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected2 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [8] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in his Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.3 Application of Section 110(4) [9] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.4 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in his circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of his claim. If he could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [10] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.5 [11] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD - either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [12] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for the Appellant to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.6 [13] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.7 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [14] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [15] In Singh,8 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza9 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of section 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on the nearly identical wording of section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.10 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of section 110(4).11 [16] Where evidence meets the test in section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [17] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.12 RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [18] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in section110 (6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.13 [19] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to its consideration of the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. [20] The Appellant asks the RAD to admit the following documents: (a) A death certificate, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, for "XXXX," who died from "a bullet shot to his head" on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016;14 (b) An undated medical report indicating that XXXX XXXX XXXX was treated for a bullet injury to the chest on XXXX XXXX, 2016;15 (c) An undated medical report indicating that XXXX XXXX XXXX underwent surgery on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016 for a bullet wound to the thigh;16 and (d) Translations of text messages, apparently sent on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016, and photographs of a Nokia phone showing the untranslated text messages.17 [21] In his Written Statement, the Appellant speaks to the death certificate: "...death learned by client since the date of the refugee hearing and not capable of being filed at the hearing..."18 With respect to the medical documents, he writes that "applicant only learned of this attack after my hearing and was only received the medical document about 4 days ago and only received the death certificate about 2 days ago."19 His Written Statement provides no explanation for the text messages. [22] In his Memorandum, the Appellant states that: The cousin's death only occurred some days prior to the hearing and the claimant only learned of the death after the hearing date of July 11, 2016. He did not receive the documents until about 2 to 4 days ago. He received the death certificate after he received the reasons of the Tribunal. It is submitted the proposed new evidence could not reasonably have been presented before the RPD."20 He also argues that he was not aware of the new evidence prior to his hearing and "only learned of after his hearing."21 [23] Although the Appellant repeatedly argues that he did not know of the new evidence at the time of his RPD hearing, such submissions appear to be based on a misunderstanding of the test in section 110(4). As discussed above, the RAD must consider whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, which happened on August 8, 2016, not whether it arose after his refugee hearing on July 11. [24] It is important to note here that the new evidence relied upon is the allegation that the Appellant's family members were attacked. While the documents provided may corroborate such an attack, it is their content which is the new evidence. There is no requirement that a refugee claimant delay in bringing new evidence to the attention of the RPD because corroborating documents have not yet arrived. [25] Here the Appellant claims that his family members were attacked on XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX, 2016, before his refugee hearing. He tells the RAD that he did not learn of these attacks before his hearing. That may be, but he has not claimed that he only learned of these attacks after the rejection of his claim, which occurred about a month later. [26] These documents did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. He has not established, or even claimed, that he did not know of the incidents reported in the documents until after the rejection of his refugee claim. He has not explained why he did not bring this significant evidence to the attention of the RPD between the date of his hearing and the rejection of his claim almost a month later. As the evidence relates to a key issue in his claim - the safety of his family members in Sulaymaniyah - he could reasonably have been expected to do so. [27] The Appellant's proposed new evidence did not arise after the rejection of his refugee claim. He has not established that the evidence itself - the allegation that his family members were attacked in early XXXX - was not reasonably available for presentation to the RPD before August 8, 2016. He could reasonably have been expected, in his circumstances, to present this evidence to the RPD. [28] The Appellant's proposed new evidence does not meet the requirements of section 110(4) and is not admissible in this appeal. THE ROLE OF THE RAD [29] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [30] The Appellant submits that the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of all of the evidence to determine whether he is a Convention refugee. [31] It is settled law that the RAD is not to review decisions of the RPD in the manner of a judicial review.22 [32] The RAD is a creature of statute and so is the appeal before it; its role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.23 Such an appeal (i) is directed at the decision of the RPD, (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision, and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD.24 [33] According to the Federal Court of Appeal, the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. It is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.25 [34] With respect to findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness.26 When applying that standard, the RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the RAD to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the RPD; if not, the RAD will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.27 [35] There are, however, cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because such findings require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence heard by the RPD.28 The Federal Court of Appeal, in discussing the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD's decision, has declined to provide the scope and degree of deference to be shown by the RAD: The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is thus no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case.29 [36] While it is clear that some level of deference is warranted, it is less obvious how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo: [T]here also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed.30 [37] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony. As such, credibility findings arising from that oral testimony are deserving of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, as are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [38] Not every finding relating to credibility warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where the determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.31 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.32 [39] How much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? In Huruglica, the Federal Court held that the RAD can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error".33 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Court. [40] Although the Court did not explain what level of deference is established by recognizing and respecting a conclusion of the RPD, it has repeatedly upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD.34 In the RAD's view, this suggests that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [41] In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome. 35 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, the RAD finds this framework helpful in considering its own approach to deference. [42] Even where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of a comprehensible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and understand how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [43] Further, the outcome of that process must be a result that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. For this reason, it is particularly important that the RAD engage in its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to determine whether the RPD's finding is supported by that evidence. [44] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [45] However, the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a comprehensible reasoning process whose premises are rooted in such advantages. If either the process or the outcome does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error. [46] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. The RPD's Findings [47] The Appellant does not challenge the RPD's finding that he is not at risk from ISIS.36 However, he argues that the RPD erred by finding that he will be safe in Sulaymaniyah. While his uncle is well-armed and has strong connections to the authorities in the area, he submits that his uncle refers to him as "chicken man" and will not support him unless he picks up arms and involves himself in the blood feud. [48] The Appellant also argues that his new evidence proves that he is at risk in Sulaymaniyah; however, that evidence has not been accepted in this appeal. [49] As the RPD was in an advantageous position to determine the Appellant's credibility, the RAD defers to the RPD's finding that the Appellant was credible with respect to the existence of a blood feud. [50] Did the RPD err, as the Appellant claims, in failing to distinguish between the circumstances of his well-armed uncle and sons and the different risk profile of the Appellant? While he concedes that the uncle is a higher-priority target, having started the land dispute which led to the feud, he submits that he has no relationship with the uncle from which he could expect any support or protection.37 The fact that his well-armed, well-connected uncle has remained safe in Sulaymaniyah does not prove that he can be safe there. [51] The RAD has reviewed the audio recording of the Appellant's testimony on this matter. The panel asked the Appellant about living in Sulaymaniyah; the Appellant appeared concerned more about the fact that his uncle would insult him than about harm by the rival family. When asked why he could not expect protection from the same authorities who were protecting the uncle's family, he did not give a direct answer but instead spoke of the risk in all of Kurdistan.38 He did tell the RPD that his uncle does not care about him and that he did not expect protection from the party with which his uncle had influence.39 [52] The RPD found that the Appellant is not a high-priority target;40 he does not dispute this on appeal. In the RAD's view, if the Appellant's uncle, who appears to be the chief target in the feud, has lived for years in Sulimaniyah without harm, it does not appear likely that the Appellant would be in danger in the same city. As the RPD noted, Kurdistan is virtually violence-free and police and military units have the ability to respond quickly to security incidents and criminal activities.41 [53] While the Appellant's claim before the RPD also rested on fears that he would be harmed by ISIS for ethnic and religious reasons, or that he would be recruited to fight, he does not maintain those grounds in his appeal to the RAD. His appeal focuses on the risk he fears because of the blood feud. Here the fear of harm does not involve a Convention ground, and this part of the Appellant's refugee claim must therefore be assessed under section 97 of the IRPA.42 The risk to the Appellant is to be determined on a balance of probabilities. [54] Having considered the evidence, the RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant does not face a risk to his life, or of torture, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, in Sulaymaniyah. He is a most minor target in a feud in which the chief target has not been harmed for years. [55] Having conducted an independent review of the evidence, the RAD reaches the same conclusion as did the RPD. CONCLUSION [56] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld December 12, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 91. 2 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 3 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 4 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, October 29, 2014, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 5 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 6 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 54 7 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 8 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 9 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 10 Ibid., Raza, paras. 13-15. 11 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 12 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 13 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 48. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 337. 15 Ibid., pp. 340-341. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 342-345. 17 Ibid., pp. 347-355. 18 Ibid., p. 11, para. 4(a). 19 Ibid., p. 11, para. 4(b). 20 Ibid., p. 362, para. 10. 21 Ibid., p. 361, para. 8. 22 See, for example, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, para. 33. 23 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015, 2015 FC 321, para. 14; M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 24 Dhillon, paras. 14-18. 25 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103. 26 Ibid. 27 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9; [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 28 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 70. 29 Ibid., para. 74. 30 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina, Yani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233, para. 11. 31 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; see also M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 72. 32 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, 2014 FC 78, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.). 33 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799, para. 55. 34 See Yin, Sarom v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2845-14), Noël, December 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1209, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Gaelle Leonelle Nguedo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7280-13), Locke, September 10, 2014, 2014 FC 859, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, Allalou, Abedelkrim v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7217-13), Shore, December 17, 2014, 2014 FC 1084, and Sajad, Zeeshan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-926-14), Shore, November 21, 2014, 2014 FC 1107; also Bui, Van Son v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1654-14), Shore, November 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1145. 35Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 360, para. 5. 37 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 363, para. 12. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 1:18 to 1:24. 39 Ibid., 1:40 to 1:44. 40 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Reasons, para. 24. 41 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Reasons, para. 21, citing Exhibit 7 of RPD's Record, p. 286. 42 Zefi, Sheko v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1089-02), Lemieux, May 21, 2003, 2003 FCT 636. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-13767