TB3-07676

RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB3-07676 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of Decision February 11, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Ken Atkinson Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal Johnson Babalola Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX a male from Saint Lucia, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting his claim for refugee protection. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to ss. 111 (1) (a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA"), the Refugee Appeal Division ("RAD") confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee pursuant to s. 96 of IRPA nor a person in need of protection pursuant to s. 97 of IRPA. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant states that he is bisexual and, therefore, fears for his life in Saint Lucia. He says that he began a same-sex relationship with XXXX XXXX in XXXX 2010 when he was 16 years of age. He states that he fell in love with XXXX and cohabited with him. [4] In XXXX 2011, Georgehill gang members observed the Appellant kissing XXXX. The gang members approached them, cursed at them, called them names, fought them, and pushed them around. The Appellant and XXXX managed to escape. The Appellant fled to his sister's house. His sister urged him to go to the hospital to receive treatment for his cuts and bruises. He also went to a police station to report the attack. The police, however, mocked him and threatened to arrest and harm him if he did not leave. [5] The next morning the Georgehill gang and other residents of the community threatened him and called him names. The gang members repeatedly appeared at his sister's house armed with knives and harassed him, threw stones at the house and threatened his sister. The Appellant's sister then asked him to leave due to the repeated threats and he went to his cousin's home in Vieux Fort. However, the Georgehill gang found him there and threatened him and his cousin. The Appellant also went to a women's shelter for assistance but was turned away. [6] The claimant's family arranged for him to join his father, who was without status, in Canada. The Appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2011 and went to live with his father in Winnipeg. The claimant relocated to Toronto in XXXX 2012 after his father returned to Saint Lucia. The claimant then made his claim for refugee protection in XXXX 2013 in Toronto. [7] The RPD determined that the Appellant was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection for the following reasons: 1. It was not credible that the Appellant is bisexual. SUBMISSIONS [8] The Appellant submits that the RPD made incorrect findings on credibility. The Appellant requests that the RAD set aside the RPD's decision and find that he is a Convention refugee. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [9] The determinative issue in this appeal is: 1. Whether the RPD made erroneous credibility findings. Appellant's Arguments [10] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that there was a perceived contradiction between the Appellant's reference to himself as a bisexual in his BOC and during his oral testimony, and the RPD's perception, without any evidence to back it up, that the Appellant should have referred to himself as a gay person. The RPD did not take into consideration the testimony of the Appellant that, having had a relationship with a woman, he considered himself a bisexual although he had more interest in men. [11] The RPD did not understand why someone who has had a relationship with a woman in St. Lucia to cover his sexual orientation would still refer to himself as a bisexual ignoring the claimant's explanation during the hearing that he was bisexual because he had an interest in women too. [12] The RPD gave no weight to all the supporting documents submitted by the Appellant because it concluded that the Appellant was not credible with respect to his sexual orientation. [13] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred by basing its negative credibility findings on matters that were peripheral or tangential to the reasons the Appellant sought protection in Canada. [14] The Appellant submits that the central issue in this matter was that the Appellant sought protection because of his sexual orientation and/or because he had engaged in same sex relationship(s), he feared persecution in his country. The RPD did not focus on this issue but fixated extensively on marginal or tangential issues such as the Appellant's reference to himself as bisexual against the RPD's conception that he should have referred to himself as gay when the Appellant's evidence clearly showed that he is a bisexual person. The Appellant submits that little turns on the distinction between a gay or bisexual person when both categories of persons are persecuted in St. Lucia where the Appellant comes from. There was a further tangential issue with respect to the definition of 'couple' in paragraph 13 of the decision. The RPD did not take into consideration the cultural background of the claimant when he had stated that it was his understanding that 'couple' does not necessarily mean two. When used informally as a pronoun, per the Oxford dictionary, 'couple' can mean indefinite numbers; for example, a couple of days does not necessarily mean two days. [15] The Appellant further submits that the RPD ignored his explanation about why he did not put the date he moved in with XXXX in his BOC and was too microscopic in its examination of the matter. He was merely adding details to what was already in the narrative. The RPD was also too microscopic in its analysis when the Appellant stated that he tried to reach XXXX in San Lucia but he was unable to do so and he did not know where he lived at the present time. The RPD expected the Appellant to know where XXXX was living considering that St. Lucia was a small place. The RPD never asked the Appellant about the comparison between the size of St. Lucia and the Appellant's inability to find XXXX. The Appellant was never asked about this matter and given the opportunity to respond. This is an error in procedural fairness. [16] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in finding contradictions between his evidence and the supportive letters and affidavits. The RPD used only part of the documents and also impugned the credibility of the Appellant based on what the documents did not say. The RPD should not make a finding for an error or omission made by a third party. What is important is the reference in the affidavit and other documents that the Appellant had engaged in a same-sex relationship and was discovered and as a result his life remains in danger. The RPD engaged in a selective use of the contents of the affidavits and letter and totally ignored the relevant parts of the documents. [17] The Appellant further submits that a finding that a witness is not credible simply means that the person's testimony cannot be relied on to establish propositions of fact. It is still necessary to consider what facts are established by evidence, to which some weight can be given. The RPD focused on the distinction between gay and bisexual rather than focus on the evidence that the Appellant's life is in danger because he was found to have engaged in a sexual act with a man. The agents of persecution did not put a definition on his sexual orientation. They were simply after him for his same sex act. There is country documentary evidence that a male person who engages in a same-sex relationship and salvation faces a serious possibility of persecution in that country. The RPD did not analyze this matter. The RPD also erred by giving no weight to the letters from XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RPD first determined that the Appellant was not credible and then used its findings as a basis for giving little weight to other pieces of evidence submitted by the Appellant. The RPD placed no weight on certain documents and then used a portion of that document to impugn the credibility of the applicant. [18] The Appellant submits that the RPD's finding that the Appellant lacked subjective fear because of his delay in making a claim for refugee protection was unreasonable. The RPD did not consider the Appellant's explanation for not claiming refugee status immediately when he came to Canada. The Appellant stated that he did not know about the refugee process and he had relied on the advice of his father when he came to Canada. The RPD did not consider that it is possible for individuals to seek to get away from their problems without knowing what to really do. The RPD also did not understand the influence a father has over his child. The RPD misinterpreted the Appellant's evidence and ignored evidence which contradicted its findings. These errors are sufficiently serious and cumulative that its decision cannot stand. Standard of Review [19] The issue of whether the RPD made erroneous findings of credibility is one of fact. In considering this issue it is necessary to determine the standard of review that will be used. The Appellant made no submissions on standard of review. [20] Section 110(1) of the IRPA sets out the grounds for an appeal to the RAD. The appeal may be on a question of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law. There are a number of decisions or determinations of the RPD that cannot be appealed to the RAD as set out in Section 110(2) of the IRPA. [21] Section 111(1) sets out the decisions that the RAD can make after considering the appeal. The RAD can confirm the determination of the RPD; set aside the determination and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made; or, refer the matter to the RPD for re-determination, giving directions to the RPD that it considers appropriate. [22] The standard of review is not specified in the legislation. [23] There are a few cases that have dealt with the standard of review to be applied by administrative appellate tribunals. The Alberta Court of Appeal dealt with the issue in the case of Newton v. Criminal Lawyers Trial Association, 2010 ABCA 399. The case concerned the basic structure and inter-relationship of the tribunals in Alberta that review the conduct of police officers when that conduct is called into question in disciplinary proceedings under the Alberta Police Act. [24] The matter was first heard by a senior police officer ("presiding officer") from the RCMP. There were two counts of misconduct against an officer. The presiding officer found that one count was proven and one count was not proven. The determination of the Presiding Officer was appealed to the Law Enforcement Review Board ("Board"). The Board conducted a hearing de novo. The Board allowed the appeal on the one count not proven, thus, overruling the decision of the presiding officer. The Court found that the Board did not conduct any analysis of the reasoning of the presiding officer, did not reflect on whether it should afford his decision any deference, and did not explain why it disagreed with the inferences he had drawn from the evidence. [25] The Alberta Court of Appeal reviewed the law on standard of review that has developed in Canada. "[30] The standard of review analysis respecting appellate superior courts and trial courts was definitively stated in Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235, 2002 SCC. 33. Shortly put, an appellate superior court reviews the decisions of trial courts on questions of law for correctness. Errors of fact, mixed errors of fact and law and inferences to be drawn from the facts are generally reviewed for palpable and overriding error. [33] The standard of review analysis respecting the relationship between superior courts and administrative tribunals is found in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9, building on the platform laid down in Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982. Dunsmuir summarized the standards used at para. 51: ...questions of fact, discretion and policy as well as questions where the legal issues cannot be easily separated from the factual issues generally attract a standard of reasonableness. Some legal issues, however, attract the more deferential standard of reasonableness. Truly jurisdictional questions are usually reviewed for correctness. Errors of law within the expertise or mandate of the tribunal are often reviewed for reasonableness. Questions of law of more general interest to the legal system are often reviewed for correctness. [34] The standard of law applied by the superior courts to decisions of administrative tribunals recognizes the purely supervisory role of the superior courts. ... Because the role of the superior courts is supervisory, it is not their place to substitute their judgment for that of the tribunal. The legislature has given the authority to make the decisions under review to the tribunal, not the courts. Therefore, deference to the decision of the tribunal is an important factor in setting the standard of review. The standard of review is set by considering four factors: "(1) the presence or absence of a privative clause; (2) the purpose of the tribunal as determined by the interpretation of the enabling legislation; (3) the nature of the question at issue, and (4) the expertise of the tribunal": Dunsmuir, at para 64." The Alberta Court of Appeal Court went on to state: [35] The determination of the standard of review to be applied by an appellate administrative tribunal to the decision of an administrative tribunal of first instance requires a consideration of the same factors that are discussed in Housen and Dunsmuir/Pushpanathan, adapted to the particular context: College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario v. Payne (2002), 219 D.L.R. (4th) 350, 163 O.A.C. 25 (Div. Ct.) at Para 20. [36] The following factors should generally be examined: (a) the respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation; (b) the nature of the question in issue; (c) the interpretation of the statute as a whole; (d) the expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of the first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal; (e) the need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals; (f) preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance; and (g) other factors that are relevant in the particular context." [26] The case of MacNeil v. Canada Employment Commission 2009 FCA 306 also dealt with the issue of standard of review between a tribunal of first instance and an appellate tribunal. In that case, an individual acting as an Umpire allowed the appeal of the Employment Insurance Commission from a decision of the Board of Referees. The issue in the case was whether the pension payments received by the Appellant were earnings that had to be deducted from the benefits payable to the Appellant under the Employment Insurance Act. [27] The Court stated that the Umpire did not set out the standard of review he applied in arriving at his decision. Counsel for the Appellant argued that the reasonableness standard should have applied, since the question that the Umpire was reviewing was a question of mixed fact and law. The Court did not agree. The Court stated that the application of a legal standard to a set of factual findings is typically regarded as a question of mixed fact and law, which is reviewed on a standard of reasonableness, unless there is a readily extricable question of law. In this case, the legal standard is the definition of pension in regulations to the Act. The collective agreement is also to be considered. The Court found that these questions were questions of law, and the standard of review was correctness. [28] The case of Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Anglican Diocesan, 2010 NSCA 306 also dealt with the issue of standard of review by an appellate tribunal of a decision of a tribunal of first instance. In this case, the Diocese wanted to erect a building with a residential component on land that it owned. Halifax's land use by-law zoned the property as Park and Institutional. The Diocese applied for a development permit, but it was denied by the municipal development officer on the basis that the residential component was not permissible according to the by-law. [29] The Diocese appealed to the Utility and Review Board ("Board"), which allowed the appeal. The Municipality then appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court reviewed the legislation establishing the Board. The relevant parts of the legislation stated that the Board could overturn a development officer's refusal of a development permit only on the grounds that the development officer's decision does not comply with the land-use bylaw or conflicts with the provisions of the land-use bylaw plus other matters that were not relevant. The Board stated that it "may only allow this appeal if it determines that the Development Officer's decision 'conflicts with' or 'does not comply' with the land-use bylaw. The Court stated that the Board should do just what the statute tells it to do. [30] The Court found that the legislation expects the Board to interpret the land-use bylaw. It went on to find that the Board reasonably interpreted the phrase "other institution of a similar type." [31] In my view, the reasoning of the Federal Court of Appeal in McNeil and the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal in Anglican Diocesan is consistent with the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in Newton and might well have been reached using the factors set out in that decision. In the McNeil case, the court appears to have considered the nature of the question in issue, the interpretation of the statute as a whole as well as the other factors. In the Halifax case, the court considered the nature of the question in issue, the interpretation of the statute as a whole, the expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of the first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal as well as the other issues. For that reason, in my opinion, the standard of review to be applied by the RAD should be determined using the factors set out in Newton. [32] In considering the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD decision, I reviewed the factors set out by the Alberta Court of Appeal. (a) The RPD's principal function is to hold oral hearings to determine if a claimant referred to the Immigration and Refugee Board ("Board") by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) or Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is a Convention refugee in accordance with Section 96 of the IRPA or is a person in need of protection according to Section 97 of the Act. The RPD also considers whether a claimant is subject to exclusion under Section 98 of the IRPA. Section 98 incorporates sections "E" and "F" of Article 1 of the Refugee Convention. The RPD may inquire into any matter relevant to the claim. It must hold a hearing, but it may accept a claim without a hearing through an expedited process. It may question the witnesses, including the person who is the subject of the proceeding. The RPD must give the person and the Minister a reasonable opportunity to present evidence, question witnesses and make representations. An appeal to the RAD may be made by the person who is the subject of the RPD proceedings or by the Minister against a decision of the RPD to allow or reject the person's claim for refugee protection. The person or the Minister may appeal to the RAD on a question of law, question of fact or a question of mixed law and fact. There is no appeal to the RAD in certain circumstances as set out in the IRPA. The RAD is able to determine questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction. After considering the appeal, the RAD shall make one of the following decisions: confirm the determination of the RPD; set aside the determination and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made; or refer the matter to the RPD for re-determination, giving the directions to the RPD that it considers appropriate. The Act provides that the RAD must proceed without a hearing on the basis of the record of the RPD proceedings except that the RAD may, in accordance with certain provisions, accept documentary evidence and written submissions and conduct an oral hearing. (b) The basic question before both the RPD and the RAD is whether a claimant is a person in need of protection. Both the RPD and the RAD are given authority to use "specialized knowledge" in reaching their decisions. The RAD is to determine if the question is one of law, fact, or mixed fact and law. (c) In reviewing the interpretation of IRPA as a whole, sections 3(2) and 3(3) set out the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees and the general application of the Act. Among other matters, these sections state that the objectives include: recognition that the refugee program is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted; granting, as a fundamental expression of Canada's humanitarian ideals, fair consideration to those who come to Canada claiming persecution; establishing fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings; promoting international justice and security by denying access to Canadian territory to persons, including refugee claimants, who are security risks or serious criminals; fulfilling Canada's international legal obligations with respect to refugees and affirm Canada's commitment to international efforts to provide assistance to those in need of resettlement. The Act is to be applied in a manner that ensures that the decisions taken are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including its principles of equality and freedom from discrimination and of the equality of English and French as the official languages of Canada; and complies with international human rights instruments to which Canada is signatory. The Act also provides in Section 162 that each Division of the Board has, in respect of proceedings, brought before it sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction and each division shall deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit. (d) The RPD is able to hear and observe the evidence in the original hearing. Both the RPD and the RAD are considered to have the expertise to use "specialized knowledge". The RAD has more than a supervisory role over the RPD, since it can set aside the determination and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made. (e) As noted above, the Act provides that the RAD must proceed informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of natural justice permit. The RAD must proceed without a hearing on the basis of the record of the RPD proceedings except that the RAD may, in accordance with certain provisions, accept documentary evidence and written submissions and conduct an oral hearing. Together with the items mentioned in paragraph (f), these factors indicate that the Act contemplates the need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals. (f) The Act provides that there is no appeal to the RAD in respect of an RPD decision regarding designated foreign nationals; withdrawn or abandoned claims; no credible basis or manifestly unfounded claims; exception to the Safe Third Country Agreement; designated country of origin (DCO); Minister's application that refugee protection has ceased (whether allowed or rejected); Minister's application to vacate refugee protection (whether allowed or rejected); deemed rejection of claim because of Extradition Act; application for protection, i.e., Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA). Along with the factors listed in paragraph (e) the Act preserves the economy and integrity of the RPD. (g) No other relevant factors. [33] These factors indicate that the Act does not contemplate that the proceedings before the RPD are to be given no deference. The RPD is an important step in the process of refugee determination. It has the obligation to decide many matters that cannot be appealed to the RAD, and it has the significant advantage of hearing first-hand evidence from witnesses in an oral hearing. The RAD, in contrast, is primarily an appeal on the record. Deference ought to be given to the tribunal which has the advantage of a full oral hearing in which to make its findings of fact and fact and law. Although the RAD and the RPD have similar expertise in interpreting the enabling legislation, that would support a standard of correctness only for questions of law. The RAD is given the ability to set aside a determination of the RPD and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made. This is a remedy that a court does not have in exercising judicial review of an administrative tribunal. I have taken this into consideration; however, in assessing these remedial powers against the above factors and the roles set out for the RPD and the RAD, I conclude therefore that the RAD is still to give deference to the RPD. [34] In accordance with this deference, findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law are to be assessed on the basis of reasonableness. Both the RPD and the RAD are considered to have specialized knowledge. Therefore, errors of law within the expertise or mandate of the tribunals, as well as questions of law of more general interest to the legal system, are to be reviewed for correctness. Analysis [35] The issues raised by the Appellant in this case challenge the RPD's findings of fact. These findings are to be examined on the standard of reasonableness. [36] The RPD identified a number of credibility concerns that, taken cumulatively, led to the conclusion that the Appellant was not bisexual. The Appellant delayed in making a claim for refugee protection when he came to Canada. He entered Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2011 and had visitor status until XXXX XXXX, 2012. He was a minor when he entered Canada but he attained the age of majority by the time his visitor status expired. His father left Canada in XXXX 2012 and the Appellant went to live with a friend of his father in Toronto. The RPD considered the time from when his visitor status expired and he had attained the age of majority until he applied for refugee protection in XXXX 2013. This was approximately 15 months. The RPD considered the Appellant's explanations for the delay and rejected them. He stated that his father had told him that he would look after regularizing their status. This was prior to the period of delay considered by the RPD. He then stated that his father's friend was a religious man and he could not tell him about his sexual orientation. He said that he did not know he could claim refugee protection until he met a former schoolmate at a mall in Toronto. The schoolmate's affidavit gave no indication that she knew the Appellant in St. Lucia. The RPD considered the explanations and rejected them with transparent reasons. The Appellant argued that this delay did not go to the central determination of the matter. However, if the Appellant was credible when he stated that he feared to return to St. Lucia because of a same-sex relationship then he would have made a refugee claim much earlier. This showed both a lack of subjective fear and a want of credibility. [37] The RPD found that the Appellant did not present any hospital report that would have been corroborative of his allegation that he was treated for injuries after the alleged gang attack when he was observed kissing XXXX. The RPD pointed out that documentary evidence states that medical reports from St. Lucia are available. The Appellant explained that he had asked his mother to obtain a report from the hospital but she advised him in XXXX 2013 that she was unable to obtain the report. The Appellant was not able to say why his mother was unable to obtain the report and what efforts she made to do so. The RPD concluded that the Appellant had not provided a reasonable explanation as to why he was not able to produce the report, calling into question the alleged attack and injuries. [38] The RPD found that the Appellant was inconsistent in his evidence as to when he moved from his sister's house to his cousin's house. In his overall testimony, he indicated that he moved in early XXXX 2011. He stated that the gang members harassed him when they came to his sister's house between the end of XXXX and the beginning of XXXX. In his Basis of Claim Form (BOC), the Appellant stated that he moved to his cousin's house in XXXX 2011. When asked for an explanation, the Appellant stated that he moved to his cousin's house in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RPD asked him again because he referred to two different months and he responded that he was not sure, that his memory was not clear because he was trying to forget what happened to him in St. Lucia. The RPD found that this explanation was not credible since he had signed his BOC on April 28, 2013 only two months prior to his hearing. The RPD concluded that this inconsistency, regarding the Appellant's purported move to his cousin's house, undermined his credibility since he stated that he had to move due to harassment and threats from gang members. [39] The RPD found that the Appellant omitted to mention in his BOC when he began to cohabit with XXXX. The RPD noted that this omission was material given the instructions throughout the BOC to provide detailed information including "dates, names and places, where ever possible" and considering also that the allegation of cohabitation was essential to the allegation of his being in a same-sex relationship. He provided the dates of his relationships with XXXX and XXXX but not the date that he moved in with XXXX. The RPD stated that he provided inconsistent responses when questioned about this matter. [40] The Appellant claimed to be in a same-sex relationship in Canada that commenced three months prior to his hearing. However, his same-sex partner did not attend at the hearing to give evidence nor was there a reasonable explanation provided for his absence. The letter purporting to be from his same-sex partner dated one week prior to the hearing gave no explanation why he was not able to attend the hearing. The Appellant was not able to state the name of the bar at which he claimed to have met this same-sex partner, despite his testimony that it is a bar at which the same-sex partner XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RPD concluded that it could give no weight to the letter or photographs with this same-sex partner as being demonstrative of his sexual orientation. [41] The RPD considered other affidavits and letters provided by the Appellant but gave them little weight for the reasons outlined in paragraph 18 of its decision. The reasons were clearly stated and were transparent. [42] The RPD analyzed the letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX and photographs taken at the Centre but gave them no weight in establishing the sexual orientation of the Appellant. The RPD had no reason to believe the letter was not provided in good faith by its author; however, it only attested to the Appellant's attendance at XXXX XXXX, not his motivation for attending or his sexual orientation. The same reasoning applied to the photographs. [43] The RPD listed some other implausible matters for reaching its decision but there was no clear reasoning why it was improbable for these things to have occurred. However, the matters outlined above were sufficient and reasonable for the RPD to reach its decision. [44] Considering these matters, it was reasonable for the RPD to conclude that it was not credible that the Appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution if he returned to St. Lucia or that it was credible that he was or had been involved in a same-sex relationship or that he was bisexual. On the same evidence, he would not be personally in fear for his life or in danger of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or torture if he returned to St. Lucia. As a result of this conclusion, it was not necessary for the RPD to consider the documentary evidence about the treatment of LGBT individuals in St. Lucia. [45] The RPD's conclusions that the Appellant was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection falls within a range of reasonable outcomes. REMEDIES [46] For all these reasons, the appeal is dismissed and the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) 'Ken Atkinson' Ken Atkinson. February 11, 2014 Date RAD.25.02 (April 9, 2013) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB3-07676