MC1-06014

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC1-06014 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX(a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne en cause Date of decision November 26, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Nicole Ginsberg Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Richard Odeleye Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX (Appellant, a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) is a citizen of Nigeria and appeals the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), rendered on July 28, 2021, denying her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant requests that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD and determine that the Appellant is a Convention1 refugee or a person in need of protection.2 [2] The Appellant does not submit new evidence and does not request an oral hearing.3 DECISION [3] The appeal is allowed. Pursuant to section 111(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,4 I substitute my own decision that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. BACKGROUND [4] This is a brief summary of the Appellant's allegations contained in her Basis of Claim (BOC) form and testimony. [5] The Appellant is a 47-year-old bisexual woman from XXXX. In Nigeria, she worked as a XXXX for the XXXX XXXX XXXX of XXXX and XXXX, as part of a team that regulates XXXX activities within the state. [6] The Appellant kept her sexual orientation hidden from family and friends. However, she was in a same-sex relationship with a woman who I will refer to herein as "B," for XXXX XXXX XXXX years. In 2017, the Appellant met a man and became engaged to him. The Appellant's wedding was scheduled for XXXX XXXX, 2017. B objected to the Appellant's relationship with her fiancé. [7] In XXXX 2017, the Appellant travelled to the United States (US) to shop for the wedding. During that time, B disclosed to the Appellant's fiancé and the community that the Appellant is bisexual. The Appellant's fiancé called off the wedding as a result, and the Appellant was ridiculed by her family, friends and community members because of her sexual orientation. [8] Around the same time, the Appellant was being threatened at work by cartel members who were implicated in illegal XXXX activity in the state. [9] The Appellant left Nigeria again on XXXX XXXX, 2017 for the US. She arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017 and made her claim for refugee protection. [10] The Minister intervened in the Appellant's RPD hearing on the basis of credibility, arguing that, on January 10, 2019, a package addressed to the Appellant was intercepted by the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) containing a Nigerian driver's license for the Appellant, and that an examination of that document determined that the document is probably counterfeit.5 The RPD Decision [11] The RPD heard the Appellant's testimony about the driver's licence sent to her from Nigeria, and found that the existence of a possibly counterfeit document is not sufficient to undermine the Appellant's credibility.6 The RPD arrived at this conclusion because it found that the seized driver's license has never been in the Appellant's possession, nor was it provided to the Immigration and Refugee Board in support of her identity, and the RPD did not have any evidence before it to suggest that the documents that were provided in support of her identity had any indication of being counterfeit.7 [12] The RPD found, however, that the Appellant had not credibly established her key allegations, including that she is bisexual. Notice to Minister [13] In considering her claim, on November 10, 2021, the RAD sent a notice to the Minister, pursuant to the Court's recent decision in Alazar,8 that it would be considering the new issues of state protection, internal flight alternative (IFA) and forward-looking risk, and provided ten days to reply. No reply was received within the timeframe provided, or subsequently, as at the date this decision was signed. ROLE OF THE RAD [14] According to the relevant jurisprudence, the RAD reviews decisions of the RPD on a standard of correctness, after conducting an independent assessment of the evidence before it.9 The exception to this rule is where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in assessing and weighing the oral testimony, which may attract deference in certain cases.10 In this case, I do not find that the RPD had such an advantage, and I have therefore applied a correctness standard. ANALYSIS [15] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred by ignoring relevant evidence and relying on inappropriate suppositions and findings of fact and by relying on microscopic or peripheral issues in concluding that the Appellant was not credible.11 [16] I have conducted an independent assessment of all of the evidence, including the entirety of the Appellant's Record and the oral testimony. While I have not addressed all of the Appellant's arguments, I find that it is not necessary to do so, as, for the reasons below, the Appellant has established that she is bisexual. I find that several of the RPD's findings are unsustainable, that the RPD made erroneous implausibility findings, and that the RPD failed to follow Chairperson's Guideline 9: Proceedings Before the IRB involving Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression (SOGIE Guideline)12 in its decision. Considering the Appellant's credible evidence and the objective documentary evidence on file as to the treatment of same-sex relations in Nigeria, I find that she has established that she faces a serious possibility of persecution in Nigeria on a Convention ground, at the hands of both the state and civil society. The RPD's negative inference about B's revelation to the Appellant's fiancé is unsustainable [17] The Appellant indicated in her BOC that B "went ahead to tell my fiancé about my relationship with her."13 In her amended statement, she indicated that B revealed "our innermost secret" with her fiancé.14 In the RPD hearing, she testified that B explained to the Appellant's fiancé "what type of person I am,"15 but that she "did not mention that there was something between her and myself. She talked about me alone."16 [18] The RPD found the Appellant's evidence to be contradictory.17 The RPD further found that her BOC indicated that B implicated the both of them in her revelation about the Appellant's sexual orientation, and that, if B did not mention that she herself was involved with the Appellant, it "does not make sense" that her fiancé would forbid her to see B or that B would be able to successfully convince the Appellant's community that the Appellant is bisexual without also putting herself at risk.18 [19] The RPD Member appeared to have concerns around the plausibility of B having revealed the relationship to others, which she put to the Appellant. The Appellant replied in a way that raised an inconsistency with the BOC narrative, which indicated that B revealed the Appellant's bisexuality, and did not indicate that B revealed that they were in a relationship. The RPD further found that it "does not make sense" that her fiancé would forbid her to see B if he did not also believe B to be in a relationship with the Appellant. At the same time, the RPD found that it "does not make sense" that B would put herself at risk by convincing the fiancé or the community without also putting herself at risk. Although the RPD reasons were less than clear in this regard, the RPD appears to have raised further inconsistencies between the Appellant's testimony and BOC form narrative, such that, on one hand, the Appellant gave an account in her BOC form of B revealing their relationship to the fiancé, and as a result, the fiancé forbidding the Appellant from seeing B, and on the other hand the testimony being inconsistent with the Appellant's narrative that B revealed their relationship to the fiancé and also that the fiancé forbade the Appellant from seeing B after B revealed the relationship to him. [20] While I agree that there are inconsistencies in the Appellant's evidence as to what precisely B revealed to the fiancé, I find that the RPD erred in drawing a negative credibility inference on this basis. The Appellant was not present when B made the revelation to the fiancé and was not a first-hand witness to what she revealed to him. More importantly, whether or not B revealed the Appellant to be bisexual or revealed that they were in a relationship is not, in my view, a material distinction in the circumstances, as in both scenarios B is alleged to have implicated the Appellant in bisexuality. What B was willing to reveal about her own participation in the relationship or her own sexual identity is, in my view, peripheral or tangential, even if, as explained below, B revealing her own sexual identity might put her in harm's way. Thus, even if this inconsistency did cause me some concern, I do not find that it is sufficient to overcome the other credible evidence in the Appellant's claim, whether as regards her relationship with B or her sexual orientation more generally. [21] Further still, and although the RPD's reasoning in this regard is less than clear, in so far as the RPD found that it "did not make sense" that B would put herself at risk by revealing their relationship to others, I find that the RPD erred by implying that to do so would be implausible in the circumstances. As has been repeatedly confirmed by the Federal Court, implausibility findings may only be made in the "clearest of cases."19 This test has not been met in the present case. I do not find it is outside the realm of what can reasonably be expected that, as the Appellant has alleged that B objected to the Appellant's relationship with her fiancé, B would attempt to undermine their relationship by disclosing the Appellant's sexual orientation. While this kind of disclosure may be "risky" behaviour in a country in which same-sex relations are criminalized, the SOGIE Guideline counsels decision-makers to avoid making implausibility findings based on stereotypes, and indicates specifically that it may be plausible that an individual with diverse SOGIE has engaged in an activity that might put them at risk in their country of reference.20 While the guiding principles contained in the SOGIE Guideline are not mandatory, Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) decision-makers are expected to apply them or provide a reasoned justification for not doing so.21 I do not find that to be the case here. [22] Considering all of the foregoing, I find that the RPD's finding about B's disclosure of the Appellant's sexual orientation to the Appellant's fiancé and community is not sustainable. The RPD's implausibility finding about the Appellant's exchange of photographs with B is unsustainable [23] In response to the Appellant's argument that she fears being killed or prosecuted for her sexual orientation because B was arrested by police and that now the police have photographs from B's phone of the two of them nude, the RPD made what amounts to an implausibility finding, this time pertaining to the Appellant's willingness to exchange intimate photographs by phone in a country in which such an activity could put her at risk.22 As a result, the RPD found that the Appellant failed to establish that nude photos of the Appellant were exchanged by the couple or that the police found those photos on B's phone.23 [24] I emphasize that the RPD "appeared" to make an implausibility finding because the title of this section of the RPD's decision refers to an "implausibility" about the existence of nude photographs24 but the finding is not clearly articulated in the body of the analysis itself. The RPD acknowledged that it is "possible"25 that someone would engage in "risky" sexual behavior, and even acknowledged the SOGIE Guideline in this regard,26 but appeared to find that this is implausible in the Appellant's circumstances because she did not give as detailed testimony about the photographs as she did other aspects of her testimony.27 The RPD found that, despite the Appellant's demonstrated ability to freely elaborate and provide detail in other aspects of her testimony, when asked about her willingness to engage in risky behaviour in this way, the RPD noted that she "simply replied that the photos were exchanged to bring pleasure to the couple."28 The RPD noted that she did not indicate that she had weighed the consequences or considered the risks or that she decided to dismiss those risks because of her feelings.29 [25] Upon independent assessment, I find that the RPD erred in the following ways. I find that the Appellant reasonably explained her motivation to have in her possession intimate photos with her partner at the time. While the RPD indicated that she did not demonstrate that she had weighed the consequences or considered the risks, it is unclear what additional information the RPD expected in this regard. The RPD asked the Appellant if she was concerned that having nude photos of themselves together might lead to trouble with the authorities, and the Appellant explained that she did not think that that would happen, and that they took the photos for their own pleasure.30 It is, further, unclear what manner and extent of "weighing" the RPD expected the Appellant to demonstrate in this regard, considering that the Appellant testified that the photos were intended for their own use and she did not think that any harm would come of this. In that regard, while the RPD noted that the Appellant did not appear to be coerced into sharing the photos by her partner, the RPD did not appear to otherwise consider the Appellant's particular circumstances, namely, that the photographs were exchanged privately between two consenting individuals, not, for instance, shared on any public platform. While the RPD found that the Appellant would have acted imprudently by doing so, there does not appear to be any evidence to suggest that the Appellant would or should have feared that the photographs would be seen by others, let alone the police. For instance, there is no evidence before me that the police engage in any kind of spontaneous monitoring of citizens for such content, or that the police were interested in the Appellant or B at the time of their relationship. In this context, it is unclear why the RPD found this behaviour to be "risky" to the extent that the Appellant would be faulted for her purported failure to weigh the consequences of her actions. [26] Even if it does carry some degree of risk to exchange such photographs in Nigeria, I recall the SOGIE Guideline discussed above, in which decision-makers are called upon to consider that it may be plausible that individuals with diverse SOGIE may engage in activity that might put them at risk in their country of reference.31 The decision-maker is expected to apply the guideline or provide a reasoned justification for not doing so. While the RPD acknowledged the guideline in its decision,32 I do not find that it applied it in this case. I note again that implausibility findings must be made in the clearest of cases, and I find that this does not meet that standard. In her particular circumstances, I do not find that it is outside the realm of what can be reasonably expected that the Appellant would have shared intimate photographs privately with her same-sex partner. [27] Considering the foregoing, I find that the RPD erred in its assessment of the Appellant's exchange of intimate photographs, and I am not upholding the RPD's finding in this regard. The RPD's negative inference about her resignation letter is unsustainable [28] The RPD made what amounts to a further implausibility finding, this time concerning the Appellant's letter of resignation from her employment in Nigeria. The RPD noted a discrepancy between the Appellant's BOC form narrative, in which she indicated that she stopped working for the XXXX XXXX XXXX of XXXX and XXXX on XXXX XXXX, 2017, when her home was invaded, but that in her immigration form (IMM5669) she indicated that she worked there until XXXX 2017 (notwithstanding that she had left Nigeria in XXXX 2017).33 The Appellant explained that her last day of work was XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017 but that her letter of resignation was not sent until XXXX 2017. She explained that she had her sister write and send this letter on her behalf. The RPD did not accept that, with the Appellant's profile, she would be willing to ask someone else to write and send such a letter, and that she would not have kept a copy.34 As a result, the RPD found that the Appellant had failed to establish that the resignation letter exists, and also drew a negative inference about her credibility concerning her allegation that she left work because of threats to her life in XXXX 2017.35 [29] I find that the RPD erred in its assessment in the following ways. I find that the Appellant reasonably explained that her last day of work and her formal resignation happened on different dates.36 I do not agree with the RPD's characterization that the Appellant's testimony about this evolved or changed. The Appellant explained that she resigned after she left Nigeria,37 and, soon after, clarified that it was her sister who actually prepared and sent the letter on her behalf.38 I do not find this testimony to be "evolving" because I do not find it reasonable to expect that the Appellant would have spontaneously testified at the outset about who specifically sent her resignation letter to her employer or the circumstances under which it was sent. I find the issue of who sent her resignation letter in and when this was done to be peripheral or tangential to the central issue of B's disclosure of her sexual orientation and the Appellant's sexual orientation more generally. [30] Moreover, while it is perhaps unusual that an individual would have her sister write and send a letter of resignation her employer on her behalf, I do not find that it is clear that this rises to the level of implausibility in the present case. I note that the RPD Member did not question the Appellant on why she asked her sister to prepare and send this letter, instead of doing so herself, either while she was in Nigeria or after she left for the US. Although the RPD Member asked the Appellant about who signed and sent her resignation letter, when this took place, and why her employer would accept an unsigned resignation letter, the RPD Member did not question the Appellant on or provide the Appellant an opportunity to explain why she submitted her resignation in this manner (by her sister) and at that particular time (approximately two months after her last day of work). [31] Furthermore, while the date of the Appellant's last day working at the Ministry is material to the issue of the threats she alleges to have received at work, I find that the date the Appellant formally resigned from work and the manner in which her resignation letter was sent is peripheral to the issue of when she actually stopped working there, and also peripheral to the Appellant's allegations concerning her former same-sex partner, as well as the core issue of the Appellant's sexual orientation. For these reasons, I find that the RPD's finding about the Appellant's resignation from her job is incorrect and I am not upholding it. The RPD's negative inference about the Appellant's place of residence from XXXX to XXXX 2017 is unsustainable [32] In the Appellant's BOC form, she answered "yes" to the question of whether she moved to another part of the country to seek safety.39 In her testimony, she indicated that after her home was broken into, she moved in with her parents in XXXX 2017. In her immigration form (IMM5669), the Appellant indicated that she lived at the same address in XXXX from XXXX 2014 until XXXX 2017,40 which is when she left Nigeria. [33] The RPD asked the Appellant why she did not indicate in her IMM5669 form that she stayed with her parents from XXXX to XXXX 2017.41 The Appellant indicated that she did not think of it and that she thought she should only indicate addresses at which she lived for more than six months.42 When questioned by her Counsel at the time, she testified that she was not represented by counsel when she filled out the form.43 [34] The RPD did not accept the Appellant's explanations. The RPD noted that the Appellant had included other periods of residence of less than six months on her IMM5669 form and also noted the Appellant's profile as an educated person with a mid-level government position as a XXXX, who has travel experience and has applied for visas in the past in various countries,44 and found that she was not credible about having relocated to her parents' house in XXXX 2017.45 [35] Upon independent assessment, I find that the RPD erred by relying unduly on the Appellant's immigration form in the Appellant's particular circumstances. The Federal Court has consistently pointed out the pitfalls in using port of entry notes and forms46 and relying unduly on contradictions or omissions therein as a reason for finding a lack of credibility. In this case, the Appellant was not represented by counsel when she filled out her IMM5669 form. While, as the RPD pointed out, she is well-educated and has international travel experience, I note that the IMM5669 form is one that is particular to Canada. She testified that she was not in a good frame of mind and had followed the advice of someone at the shelter in which she was staying at when she filled out the form. Considering the foregoing, I find that the RPD's negative inference arising from the Appellant's IMM5669 form is incorrect and I am not upholding it. The Appellant credibly established her sexual orientation [36] I have carefully reviewed the Appellant's testimony in the audio recording and have reviewed the transcript of the hearing. I find that the RPD questioned the Appellant in reasonable detail about her sexual orientation and I find that she provided nuanced and reasonably detailed testimony about her sexual orientation, namely how and when she began to be aware of her same-sex attraction,47 how her relationship with B began,48 and how they managed to maintain the secrecy of their relationship, considering its long duration.49 The Appellant testified in reasonable detail about their relationship and what they had in common.50 The Appellant was also able to explain the negative impressions of same-sex relationships she heard growing up in a religious Muslim family,51 as well as the legal consequences for same-sex relations in Nigeria.52 She also provided spontaneous details about how she eventually found herself wanting to have a relationship with a man, and how she wanted to have children with him, and the turmoil that was caused in her relationship with B.53 I find that the Appellant's testimony in this regard demonstrated a significant level of self-awareness and sincerity and it provided me with additional details that helped me to better understand her claim. [37] There are two principal issues that gave me pause, with respect to the Appellant's credibility. Even though the Minister has not intervened in this appeal on the issue of credibility or on any other issue, in my independent assessment of the Appellant's credibility, I have considered the evidence adduced by the Minister before the RPD about the Nigerian driver's license that was intercepted by CBSA en route to the Appellant.54 The Appellant explained that her license was expiring in 2017, and that she had gone to the office in XXXX to have it renewed for five years, but it did not arrive, and she was concerned that it would not arrive from the central office in Abuja by the time she left the country.55 In Canada, the Appellant learned that the document had been issued but was seized at the Canadian border, so she recontacted the Nigerian authorities to have it reissued, because she needed her license in order to obtain a driver's license in Canada.56 The Nigerian authorities issued another license, which the Appellant's sister picked up, and sent to the Appellant with a friend.57 I find no reason to doubt the Appellant's testimony in this regard. [38] The CBSA's assessment was that the driver's license sent to the Appellant in the mail was "probably counterfeit."58 The Minister made no adverse assessment of the driver's license that was submitted by the Appellant in support of her refugee claim, and I do not find that I have any reason to doubt the authenticity of this document either. The driver's license that the CBSA found to be probably counterfeit was not used by the Appellant in support of her claim, and was never even in her possession. As such, I agree with the RPD that the existence of this document, on its own, is insufficient to impugn the Appellant's credibility. Accordingly, I draw no negative inference from the existence of the intercepted driver's license. [39] In addition, as I noted above, there was a discrepancy in the Appellant's evidence as to whether B revealed to the Appellant's fiancé that the Appellant was bisexual or whether the two of them were in a relationship, thus implicating herself in same-sex activity. However, for the reasons already expressed above, I do not find that this is sufficient to overcome her other, credible evidence, both as regards her relationship with B and her sexual orientation more generally. [40] Further still, the Appellant has submitted corroborating documents in support of her claim, including statements from the Appellant's mother,59 brother,60 and sister,61 a letter of the Montreal LGBTQ+ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer+) Community Centre,62 and photographs of the Appellant with her same-sex partner.63 I find no reason to doubt the authenticity of the Appellant's supporting documents. [41] Having considered the foregoing and having found the RPD's findings to not be sustainable, I find that the Appellant has credibly established her key allegations, including that she is bisexual. The Appellant faces a serious possibility of persecution in Nigeria [42] I note the objective documentary evidence on file for Nigeria, which describes the criminalization of same-sex relations in Nigeria, as well as the significant social stigma and mistreatment by civil society faced by individuals of diverse SOGIE. The evidence confirms that same-sex activity is criminalized in Nigeria, under the Same-Sex Marriage Prohibition Act, and can result in as many as 14 years imprisonment.64 News reports and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Questioning and Intersex (LGBTQI) advocates have reported numerous arrests for same-sex activity, and according to Human Rights Watch the law had become a tool used by police and members of the public to legitimize human rights violations against LGBTQI persons, such as torture, sexual violence, arbitrary detention, extortion and violations of due process rights.65 In addition, there exist pervasive social taboos against same-sex activity and widespread objection to any orientation that is not heterosexual.66 Bisexuality is not generally distinguished from homosexuality in that neither are accepted in Nigerian society.67 [43] Considering the Appellant has credibly established that she is bisexual, and she would not be expected to hide his sexual orientation if she was to return to Nigeria, and considering the objective documentary evidence on file, I find that the Appellant faces a serious possibility of persecution in Nigeria, at the hands of the state and civil society. The Appellant has no viable internal flight alternative in Nigeria [44] I have also considered whether the Appellant has a viable IFA in Nigeria. I find that there is sufficient evidence on record to allow me to make such a determination. [45] The test to be applied in determining whether the Appellant has a viable IFA is two-pronged. For the first prong of the IFA analysis, I must be satisfied that there is no serious possibility that the Appellant would be persecuted and that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant would not be personally subjected to a danger of torture or a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the IFA locations. For the second prong, I must be satisfied that it is not objectively unreasonable for her to relocate there.68 [46] I have considered the objective documentary evidence on file for Nigeria. In that regard, I note that the evidence indicates that same-sex relations are criminalized throughout in Nigeria, and the societal treatment of LGBTQ individuals identified in the evidence applies country-wide as well. Accordingly, I find that the Appellant faces a serious possibility of persecution anywhere in Nigeria, and there is no viable IFA for her. As such, the IFA fails on the first prong, and I need not examine the second prong of the IFA analysis. The Appellant has rebutted the presumption of state protection [47] I have also considered whether state protection would be forthcoming to the Appellant in Nigeria. I also find that there is sufficient evidence on record to allow me to make such a determination. Because of the criminalization of same-sex relations throughout Nigeria, and the climate of impunity for perpetrators of violence against LGBTQ community members,69 as well as reported arbitrary arrests, blackmail, physical and psychological abuse by the police of LGBTQ individuals,70 I find that there is clear and convincing evidence that the Nigerian state would be unwilling to protect the Appellant. Accordingly, the Appellant has rebutted the presumption of state protection. CONCLUSION [48] The appeal is allowed. I substitute my own decision that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. Nicole Ginsberg Nicole Ginsberg November 26, 2021 Date 1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status", under the 1951 Convention. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at p. 22, para. 29. 3 Ibid., Written Statement, at p. 5. 4 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001, c. 27, section 111(1)(b). 5 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Notice of Intervention, at p. 160, para. 2. 6 Ibid., RPD Decision, at p. 3, para. 13. 7 Ibid. 8 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Alazar, 2021 FC 637. 9 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, [2016] 4 FCR 157. 10 Ibid. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, para. 11. 12 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Guideline issued by the Chairperson pursuant to paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act: Guideline 9: Proceedings Before the IRB Involving Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity and Expression, Effective date: May 1, 2017 (SOGIE Guideline). 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Basis of Claim (BOC) form narrative, at p. 17. 14 Ibid., Additional Statement, at at p. 135. 15 RPD Hearing Transcript (July 8, 2021), at p. 22 16 Ibid. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, at p. 4, para. 17. 18 Ibid. 19 Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776; Al Dya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 901, at paras. 28-29. 20 SOGIE Guideline, section 7.5, referring to Strugar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 880, at para. 5. 21 Nour v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 805, at para. 38; Zeah v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 711. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, at pp. 9-11, paras. 25-30. 23 Ibid., at p. 11, para. 30. 24 Ibid., at pp. 6-7, para. 25. 25 Ibid., at p. 10, para. 29. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., para. 28. 29 Ibid. 30 RPD Hearing Transcript (July 8, 2021), at p. 26. 31 SOGIE Guideline, section 7.5. 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, at p. 10, para. 29. 33 Ibid., at p. 11, para. 31. 34 Ibid., at p. 12, para. 34. 35 Ibid., at pp. 12-13, para. 35. 36 RPD Hearing Transcript (July 8, 2021), at p. 29. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid., at pp. 29-30. 39 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, BOC form narrative, at p. 17. 40 Ibid., IMM5669, at p. 85. 41 RPD Hearing Transcript (July 8, 2021), pp. 28-29. 42 Ibid., at p. 28. 43 Ibid., at p. 31. 44 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, at p. 9, para. 23. 45 Ibid., para. 24. 46 Singh Amrik v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), no. IMM-2835-95); Kanapathipillai v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 1998 CanLII 8195 (FC). 47 RPD Hearing Transcript (July 8, 2021), at p. 17. 48 Ibid., at pp. 17-18. 49 Ibid., at p. 18. 50 Ibid., at p. 21. 51 Ibid., at p. 19. 52 Ibid., at p. 20. 53 Ibid., at p. 21. 54 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Minister's Intervention, Analysis of driver's license, at pp. 164-169. 55 RPD Hearing Transcript (July 8, 2021), at p. 8. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid., at p. 9. 58 Ibid., at p. 164. 59 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Statement of Risikat Bolajoko Onabanjo, at pp. 120-121. 60 Ibid., Statement of Bosa Ola Onabanjo, at pp. 123-124. 61 Ibid., Statement of Aluko Fausat Ojulape, at pp. 126-127. 62 Ibid., Letter of Montreal LGBTQ+ Centre, at p. 132. 63 Ibid., Photographs, at pp. 141-145. 64 Exhibit RAD-1, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (June 30, 2021), item 2.1: Nigeria. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019, United States, Department of State. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid., item 6.7: Information on how bisexuality is understood and perceived in Nigeria; whether bisexuality is distinguished from both male and female homosexuality (2014-June 2015), Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 67 Ibid. 68 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (F.C.A.). 69 Exhibit RAD-1, NDP for Nigeria (June 30, 2021), item 6.7. 70 Ibid., item 6.2: Nigeria. State-Sponsored Homophobia 2019, International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MC1-06014 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français