TB6-18728

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-18728 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision May 25, 2017 Date de la décision Panel Robert S. Garner Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Helen S Kim Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) claims to be a Tibetan living in India. She appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) that found she was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [2] The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the decision of the RPD and find that the Appellant is a Convention refugee or person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant asks that the matter be remitted to a different RPD panel, in accordance with the reasons and directions of the Refugee Appeal Division. DETERMINATION [3] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed BACKGROUND [4] The Appellant claims that she is a citizen of Tibet and no other country. She describes her grandparents fleeing Tibet in December 1962, and arriving in India. The Appellant states she has to renew her Registration Certificate (RC) every year, and cannot travel freely in India without permission from the foreigner's registration office. [5] The Appellant states she was born in XXXX, and does not have a birth certificate. As a result, he submits that she cannot obtain citizenship. [6] She fears persecution from the Chinese government, if returned, because she joined an international Buddhist community and actively preaches and practices Buddhist dharma. She states that she is a follower of his holiness the Dalai Lama and that if she was returned to Tibet, she would be persecuted for her religious beliefs. The Appellant further states that she has participated in demonstrations for a free Tibet, and that the Chinese would also persecute her because of her political opinion. [7] The Appellant had a refugee determination hearing on May 25, 2016. In a decision of November 21, 2016, her refugee claim was denied. Memorandum of Appeal a. What is the standard of review? b. Did the Panel err in law when it misapplied the Tretsetsang (FCA) test? Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [8] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected1 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [9] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.2 Application of Section 110(4) [10] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.3 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in their circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of their claim. If they could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [11] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.4 [12] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD-either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [13] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for the Appellant to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.5 [14] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.6 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [15] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [16] In Singh,7 the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza8 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of the IRPA section 110(4), it is based on the nearly-identical wording of section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.9 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of section 110(4).10 [17] Where evidence meets the test in section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply to it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [18] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.11 RAD Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [19] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in section 110(6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.12 [20] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence that passes the test in section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. RAD submissions [21] The RAD submitted three articles to the Appellant, and asked for submissions by May 1, 2017. [22] The first article titled, "Tibetans born in India get India passport" was published in Tibet, copyright 2017. The second article was titled, "Ministry of External Affairs upholds Delhi High Court's ruling to issue Passport to Tibetans." This news article was dated Wednesday, March 29, 2017. The third article, "Delhi High Court: Issue Indian Passport to Tibetans As per Citizenship Act." This article is dated September 22, 2016. [23] The Appellant responded by fax, on May 1, 2017, asking for a week extension so that she could arrange to go to the Indian consulate to acquire a new passport. The RPD denied the request for an extension for this reason. The request had no relevance in relation to the articles submitted, or in the RPD's decision. [24] The three articles outlining detail that the Government of India has ordered all passport-issuing authorities to issue passports to Tibetans as per the Citizenship Law of India. The order was released on March 17, 2017. Because no submissions were made, the RAD will use these articles, and refer to them in its decision. Appellant's New Evidence. [25] The Appellant submitted a copy of a letter,13 authored by Mr. XXXX XXXX, M.Com, LLB, a member of the Bar Association XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and a member of the State Bar Council XXXX. The letter outlines an opinion given by this counsel with respect to the Appellant's acquisition of an Indian passport. This letter is undated and this issue was before the RPD at its hearing. According to the RPD's decision, paragraph eight, this letter was crafted in 2006.14 The Appellant provided no explanation why this copy of the letter could not have been provided for the RPD. The RAD rejects this letter as new evidence pursuant to section 110(4) of IRPA. The RAD finds that this letter could reasonably have been before the RPD before its decision was made. [26] The second item of new evidence was a photocopy of the, "Registration Certificate Number Residential Permit"15 of the Appellant's father. The registration certificate indicates that her father was born in Tibet (China). The Appellant stated that she had no way of knowing that the panel wished to see her father's Registration Certificate, and was unaware when it could be submitted. The first issue in any claim is identity, or personal and country of nationality. The Appellant was represented by an experienced and competent counsel at the RPD hearing. The RAD does not accept this new evidence in that it could reasonably have been before the RPD pursuant to section 110(4) of the IRPA. At the hearing, the issue of her nationality was explored. The Appellant was asked about documentation to show her parents' places of birth, and she mentioned that she did not happened to have it with her. The RPD hearing was on May 25, 2016, and the RPD's decision was rendered on November 21, 2016; a time period of almost six months. It is not reasonable or credible that this document could not have been presented to the RPD for its consideration prior to the decision. The RAD does not accept the Appellant's explanation, given that this was an issue for the RPD. [27] In addition, even if this document had been accepted, it has no relevance to the alleged Chinese nationality of the Appellant. The RAD refers to the Nationality Law of the Peoples Republic of China16 where Article 5 states, "But a person whose parents are both Chinese nationals and have both settled abroad, or one of those parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, and who has acquired foreign nationality at birth shall not have Chinese nationality." According to documentation submitted, the Appellant's grandparents emigrated from Tibet with their six children, including the Appellant's father, and settled in India. The Appellant's father clearly settled abroad, and as a result, the Appellant would not be considered a Chinese national. [28] As a result, the RAD does not feel it necessary to hold a hearing, pursuant to section 110(4) and 110(6) of the IRPA. It is also noted that the Appellant did not request an oral hearing. [29] Additional submissions [30] On May 8, 2017, the Appellant submitted additional material under RAD Rules 29 and 37. The submissions were forwarded to the Minister was given until May 16, 2017 to respond. No submissions were made. [31] The Appellant submitted that she had attended the Indian Consulate in Toronto on XXXX XXXX, 2017. The Appellant submitted that she showed, to the consular officials, the articles submitted by the RAD. The consular official stated that it was unwilling to process passport applications from Tibetans and directed the Appellant to the Ministry of Home Affairs in Delhi in order to obtain a passport. As a result, the Appellant submitted that there is no real change of practical consequences for an Indian born Tibetans, such as the Appellant [32] The RAD finds that this late submission has no relevance to the determination of the refugee claim. Although the Appellant was not given a passport at the Toronto consular office, she was informed that she would need to go to India to the Ministry of Affairs in Delhi in order to obtain a passport. Clearly, there is an avenue for the Appellants claim her Indian citizenship, and passport, by returning to India. There is no indication any of the documentation submitted that the Appellant is unable to return, or any indication that she lacks the financial resources to do this.The RAD rejects this late submission Role of the RAD [33] The Appellant supports the provisions outlined in the FCA decision in the case of Huruglica. The decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Huruglica17 provides guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD, to decisions of the first level administrative tribunal. [34] The Court stated that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions by applying the correctness standard. Pursuant to subsection 111(2)(b) of the IRPA, the RAD may refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination if it is "of the opinion" that it cannot make a decision confirming or setting aside the RPD decision without hearing the evidence presented before the RPD. This recognizes that there may be cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because those cases require an assessment of credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears. It further indicates that although the RAD should sometimes exercise a degree of restraint before substituting its own determination, the issue of whether the circumstances warrant such restraint ought to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. [35] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its assessment of the RPD's decision on the basis of the principles outlined above. Merits of the Appeal Error of Law [36] The RPD found that the Appellant failed to provide sufficient or trustworthy evidence to establish any efforts by herself or on her behalf to have her Indian citizenship recognized. The Appellant stated that her father consulted a lawyer in 2006 in an effort to have her citizenship recognized. She further testified that her father again tried in 2014, and was told that without a birth certificate it would be difficult. The RPD found the Appellant's explanation not reasonable as to why this information was not in her Basis of Claim (BoC) narrative. The RPD also noted that there was no mention of the Appellant trying to acquire a birth certificate. [37] The Appellant submits that, contrary to the RPD's decision, she did take steps to determine whether India would recognize the right of citizenship. She refers to the RPD's reasons that stated in testimony she was given an opinion by a lawyer about her citizenship. She also testified that her father consulted a lawyer about her acquiring citizenship in 2014. He was told that time, verbally, that without a birth certificate it would be difficult. She submits that the RPD did not explain why her sworn testimony was rejected with respect to this issue. [38] In reviewing the recording of the RPD hearing, the RAD finds that the claimant did testify as to her father making efforts to acquire her Indian citizenship. The RAD agrees with the Appellant in that the RPD did not specify the reasons why this testimony was rejected. However, as will be outlined later in this decision, the RAD finds that the efforts made by Appellant were minimal. No evidence was given that she approached any authority India to inquire about acquiring citizenship. In addition, according to testimony and documentation, the Appellant has an18 IC that's states her birthdate, United States (USA) visas that state her birthdate,19 and a memorandum from CIC that lists her birthdate and entries into the United States of America.20 A Registration Certificate (RC) has been granted on three occasions and a No Objection to Return to India (NORI) was granted on the return visa each time. In addition, a Registration of Foreigners21 certificate indicates her birthday as well. [39] In referencing the National Documentation Package (NDP) package for India,22 the RAD found that the issuance procedures for an Indian passport requires proof of birth, such as a birth certificate, but also provides a list of other documents that can be used. It would appear that the application procedure allows for individuals without a birth certificate to make an application using other sources for proof of birth. [40] There is no testimony or documentation to indicate that the Appellant had approached any authority with respect to acquiring a passport or citizenship, using these documents as proof of her birth and residence in India. [41] Although the RPD erred by not giving a more fulsome explanation for rejecting the Appellant's testimony with respect to her efforts to acquire citizenship, the RAD finds that this is insufficient to overturn the decision, given the above. Errors in the RPDs use of the Tretsetsang Decision [42] The RPD referenced Federal Court of Appeal23 case law that states: Therefore, a claimant, who alleges the existence of an impediment to exercising his or her rights of citizenship in a particular country, must establish, on a balance of probabilities: a. The existence of a significant impediment that may be reasonably be considered capable of preventing the claimant from exercising his or her citizenship rights of state protection in that country of nationality; and b. That the claimant has made reasonable efforts to overcome such impediment and that such efforts were unsuccessful such that the claimant was unable to obtain protection of that state. What will constitute reasonable efforts to overcome a significant impediment (that has been established by any particular claimant) in any particular situation can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. A claimant will not be obligated to make any effort to overcome such impediment if the claimant establishes that it would not be reasonable to require such claimant to make any such effort. [43] The RPD found that the Appellant failed to establish the existence of a significant impediment that would be reasonably capable of preventing her from exercising her citizenship rights. The RPD also found that she failed to make reasonable efforts to have her citizenship recognized. [44] The RPD found, referencing NDP documentation,24 that the lack of a birth certificate was not an impediment. The documentation indicates that other documents can be used, such as school documents, or affidavits when other documents are unavailable. The RPD also stated that the claimant has had an Identity Card (IC) and Registration Certificate (RC) provided for her claim, and finds that this would be sufficient to establish it. She was born in India during the relevant period to be recognized as a citizen and have a passport issued to her. [45] Referencing country documentation,25 the RPD stated that there are cases where litigation has been used by Tibetans born in India in order to acquire citizenship. The RPD also referenced NDP documentation that indicated there was a move towards Tibetans, born in the requisite period, having their Indian citizenship rights recognized, including voting rights.26 [46] The RPD found that the Appellant had not taken steps to determine whether India would recognize her as a citizen without requiring her to litigate the matter. The RPD also found, on a balance of probabilities, that she failed to establish that there was any impediment, much less any significant impediment, to her ability to access rights inherent in her Indian citizenship. [47] The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to apply the case-by-case analysis as required in Tretsetsang,27 What will constitute reasonable efforts to overcome a significant impediment (that has been established by any particular claimant) in any particular situation can only be determined on a case-by-case basis. A claimant will not be obligated to make any effort to overcome such impediment if the claimant establishes that it would not be reasonable to require such claimant to make any such effort. Referring to a subsequent Federal Court decision, Namgyal,28 the Appellant submits that the FCA ruling was clarified. She stated that the question that must be asked is whether it was reasonable to expect someone in the claimant's position (with her specific attributes) to take additional steps to have her Indian citizenship recognized. [48] The Appellant submits that the RPD did not turn its mind to the Appellant's specific attributes, including her educational background, the level of sophistication, and her financial circumstances. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in law by failing to make a specific analysis of her particular personal situation. [49] The RAD reviewed the testimony and documentation of the Appellant. The Appellant testified that her father made efforts to acquire her Indian citizenship: once by approaching a lawyer in 2006, and receiving an opinion, and the second time in 2014, where an opinion was given about her lack of a birth certificate being an impediment to her acquiring Indian citizenship. There was no other evidence produced that indicated she made any effort with any government authority in India. [50] Her documentation submitted indicate that she has had XXXX years of formal education.29 Other documentation indicates that she resided in the United States of America from XXXX XXXX, 2015 until XXXX XXXX, 2016.30 Documentation indicates that she was a visitor to Halifax, Canada from XXXX 2015 until XXXX 201631 and other documentation indicates that she has lived in several other places outside of India since February 2011.32 There are no indication in documentation or testimony she was denied re-entry to India after each of these trips. [51] Other documentation indicates that she was employed as a "XXXX XXXX [sic]" from XXXX 2011 until XXXX 2015.33 There was no indication in testimony or documentation of financial hardship or limited intellectual ability. It would appear, given the travel record of the Appellant that she and her family had financial resources, and she was a very able person. The RAD finds on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant could reasonably have taken steps "with her specific attributes" to take additional steps to have her Indian citizenship recognized. [52] The RPD erred in not taking into account the personal profile of the Appellant and her ability to take additional steps to acquire her Indian citizenship. However, given the above, the RAD finds this error is insufficient to overturn its decision. Country of Nationality [53] The RPD found that the Appellant was a citizen of India and that her alleged citizenship of China has not been established on a balance of probabilities. [54] With respect to China, the RPD referenced NDP documentation34 to deal with counsel for the Appellant's submission that the Appellant would be a citizen by descent. The RPD noted that Article 5, states that: A person born abroad whose parents are both Chinese nationals or one of whose parents is a Chinese national shall have Chinese nationality. But a person whose parents are both Chinese nationals and have settled abroad, or one of whose parents is a Chinese national and has settled abroad, and who has acquired foreign nationality at birth shall not have Chinese nationality. [55] The RPD found that it was not established on a balance of probabilities the Appellant's father was born in Tibet/China. The RPD noted on her Temporary Resident Visa (TRV)35 application form, she indicated that both her father and mother were born in India. The Appellant explained that his location of birth was on the border between China and India, and thought that he was born in Tibet. The RPD found this explanation speculative. [56] When asked for documentation that would prove her father's place of birth, the Appellant stated she did not have them with her. The RPD noted that there were several months between the date of the RPD hearing, and date of decision, in that no documentation was submitted post hearing. As a result, the RPD found that the Appellant failed to provide sufficient credible evidence to establish her father's place of birth as Tibet. [57] The RPD rejected counsel's references to older Responses to Information Requests (RIR), and stated that this is not the situation at present. The RPD stated that the most recent request for an RIR wasn't able to find information on whether Tibetans born in India between January 26, 1950 and July 1, 1987, are considered by Chinese authorities to have acquired foreign nationality at birth. She further stated the RIR did not know whether they are considered stateless, or whether individuals born at this time in India are eligible for Chinese citizenship. The RPD found, on a balance of probabilities that the claimant is not a citizen of China, and not entitled to citizenship. [58] The Appellant referenced a "lead case" at the IRB dealing with questions such as citizenship of Tibetans, their status in India, and related matters. The Appellant quoted the applicable notes.36 She submits that the evidence had not changed since that time, and that the Appellant's Chinese citizenship is thus established. [59] The RAD rejects the Appellant's reference to an IRB decision, dated 2000, and prefers the more recent documentation and Federal Court jurisprudence on this issue. The RAD reviewed the documentation referenced by the RPD and finds on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant is not a citizen of China, nor would she be recognized as such by any Chinese authority. [60] The RAD, noting documentation, referenced earlier in its decision, finds that there is no documentation to indicate that the Appellant could not return to India, and experience difficulty in doing so. As stated above, referring to many documents, the Appellant has traveled abroad and returned to India without difficulty. In order to gain refugee protection in Canada, the Appellant must establish that she has a well-founded fear of persecution in her countries of nationality. The RAD has found that India is a country of nationality for the Appellant, and as the Appellant has not established a refugee claim against India, she is not entitled to Canada's protection. [61] The RPD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant could return to India without difficulty, and acquire a passport and citizenship. Disposition [62] The RAD confirms the decision of the RPD and dismisses the appeal according to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. (signed) "Robert S. Garner" Robert S. Garner May 25, 2017 Date 1 In the French version of IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022, at para 51. 2 Section 3(3)(g)(iii), Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 3 Olowolaiyemo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 895, at para. 19. 4 Deri v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1042, at para. 55; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 63. 5 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 54. 6 Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, at para. 16. 7 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 64. 8 Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385. 9 Ibid., at paras. 13-15. 10 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 64. 11 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministry of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 12 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 48. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellants Memorandum, at pp. 15-16. 14 Ibid., at p. 4. 15 Ibid., at pp. 17-19 16 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, National Documentation Package (NDP) for China (29 April 2016), item 3.1, Nationality Law of the Peoples Republic of China. 17 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 49-50. 19 Ibid., at pp. 51, 53, 57. 20 Ibid., at pp. 347-354. 21 Ibid., at pp. 456-458. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, NDP for India (29 April 2016), item 3.8, Responses to Information Requests (RIR), IND105133.E. 23 Tretsetsang v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 175. 24 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, NDP for India (29 April 2016), item 3.7, RIR, IND104840.E. 25 Ibid., item 13.2, RIR, IND104480.E. 26 supra, footnote 22. 27 Tretsetsang v. Canada, (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 175. 28 Namgyal v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2016 FC 1060. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 31. 30 Ibid., at p. 29. 31 Ibid., at p. 36. 32 Ibid., at p. 39, Schedule A. 33 Ibid., at p. 36. 34 supra, footnote 16. 35 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 306-346. 36 X (Re), 2000, CanLII 21450 (CA IRB). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-18728