TB3-04714

RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB3-04714 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision October 23, 2013 Date de la décision Panel C. Forbes Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Stella I. Anaele Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (Appellant) appeals a negative decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) dated April 29, 2013. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to ss, 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee pursuant to Section 96 of IRPA, nor is she a person in need of protection pursuant to Section 97 of IRPA. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant is a 44-year-old woman with citizenship in both Antigua and Guyana. She alleges that she has been beaten, chastised, humiliated, called names and threatened with death because of her sexual orientation. [4] The first incident occurred on XXXX XXXX, 1998 in Guyana when family and community members caught the Appellant and her same-sex partner, XXXX, in a sexual act. The people called them names, chastised them and roughly handled them. She also alleges that she and her same-sex partner were sexually assaulted and threatened with death. XXXX family told the Appellant's family and blamed her for introducing XXXX to homosexuality. The Appellant's family was angry and threatened to abandon her if she did not change. The Appellant alleges that XXXX family and members of the community planned to exorcise the two by whipping them and parading them around the community. The Appellant feared they may die if they did not run away. The Appellant and XXXX escaped to Antigua, arriving on XXXX XXXX, 1998. [5] The Appellant, while in Antigua, married a man named XXXX on XXXX XXXX, 2008; however, she secretly continued her relationship with XXXX. The Appellant, during her marriage to XXXX, gave birth to a daughter. Her husband became suspicious and stopped XXXX from coming to her home. Despite this, the Appellant continued her relationship with XXXX. XXXX was unhappy that she seldom saw the Appellant and that she had married a man. XXXX left Antigua in XXXX 2010. [6] The Appellant began a same-sex relationship with a woman at her workplace, named XXXX. XXXX was concerned that the Appellant was married to XXXX but understood because she had married a man to please her parents. The Appellant reassured XXXX and said she had given birth to a daughter in Guyana to hide her sexual identity. The Appellant's husband discovered that she was in a relationship with XXXX and ended their marriage on XXXX XXXX, 2011. He told family and friends she was bisexual and ordered her out of their home. The Appellant went to live with XXXX. The Appellant alleges that gossip began to spread about her and XXXX relationship. [7] On XXXX XXXX, 2012, the Appellant alleges that she and XXXX were attacked, called names and sexually molested. The attackers allegedly threatened to expose them to the community. The following morning, their landlord told them to leave because he feared for his life if he allowed them to stay in their home. [8] The Appellant alleges that, although she and XXXX had been hurt and sexually molested, they could not report the matter to the police or seek medical attention because of their sexual orientation. Instead, fearing for their lives, they left Antigua on XXXX 20, 2012 and returned to Guyana to relocate the Appellant's daughter because she did not have an Antiguan passport to travel with her to Canada. The Appellant left Guyana for Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2012. [9] In its reasons, the RPD found that the Appellant was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The RPD made the following findings: 1. The Appellant is a citizen of both Guyana and Antigua. 2. The Appellant's testimony was found not to be credible, and the RPD identified implausibilities in her account of events as follows: a) The Appellant was not able to provide a credible explanation as to why, if XXXX family was so upset and believed that she had brought XXXX into this lifestyle which they vilified, would they allow the Appellant to see her. b) The Appellant fled to Antigua with XXXX, and, for ten years, they seemingly lived a fairly peaceful life. No one knew. No one from Guyana had any contact with them, and no one in Antigua seemed to suspect anything about their relationship. Yet, in 2008, the claimant sought it fit to marry someone else, a man. 3. The Appellant did not provide corroborating documentation of the long-term relationship of almost twenty years between the Appellant and XXXX to support that the relationship ever existed. 4. The claimant did not go to the police, and no medical attention was sought following a sexual assault. There is no corroborating evidence that the incident of sexual assault actually happened. 5. The Appellant returned to Guyana in 2009 to visit the woman in the eastern townships. The woman wanted her to possibly get married and be able to live back in Guyana. The RPD found credibility concerns that a woman in Guyana would discuss the potential of marriage with the Appellant because the woman would have known that the claimant was married in Antigua. 6. The RPD found it not credible that, if the Appellant genuinely feared for her life, she would return to Guyana with her 22-year-old daughter and stay for five months. There was no reasonable explanation provided as to why her 22-year-old daughter could not travel alone or with XXXX or both of them being picked up at the airport. 7. The RPD questioned the Appellant's genuine subjective fear, if she had been concerned for her safety and her desire was to go to the United States and not Canada, then why was the application not applied for earlier and/or why not go directly to Canada from Antigua where a visitor's visa was not required. 8. The RPD found it not credible that the Appellant would have no contact with XXXX after their two-year relationship or to at least see how each other was in their respective new countries. 9. The Appellant would return to Guyana on three occasions: one a lengthy trip of five months, one prior for one month and again a two-month visit. The RPD found that an individual who genuinely fears persecution in such a country would not return and stay for the lengths of time indicated. 10. The Appellant testified that, during her five-month stay in Guyana, she went out evenings; her daughter was attending school, and she had no issues whatsoever. [10] The Appellant submitted an appeal of the negative determination on July 12, 2013. [11] The Minister did not intervene in this application. [12] In the appeal, the Appellant made the following submissions: 1. The panel erred by basing its implausibility findings on misinterpretation of the Appellant's testimony. 2. The panel erred by ignoring the testimony of the Appellant and making conclusions that contradict such testimony without substantiating such conclusions with any evidence. 3. The Tribunal did not apply the principle from Maldonado,1 which says that when a refugee claimant swears to the truth of certain allegations, a presumption is created that those allegations are true unless there are serious grounds to doubt their truthfulness. 4. The panel member should exercise great caution when making an implausibility finding with respect to a claimant's narrative.2 5. The panel based its conclusion on irrelevant considerations. 6. The panel ignored the evidence consisting of the Appellant's testimony and narrative in the Basis of Claim (BoC) form. [13] The Appellant asks that the negative decision of the panel be set aside and substituted with a positive decision, or that the matter be referred back for re-determination by a differently constituted panel with directions that it considers appropriate. Admissibility of Evidence Presented on Appeal [14] The Appellant did not provide any new evidence in support of her appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW [15] As outlined above, the Appellant alleges that the RPD made errors in its decision. The alleged errors concerning credibility and plausibility. [16] The Appellant makes no submissions on the issue of the standard of review. [17] Although IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by RAD. [18] In assessing and selecting the appropriate standard of review for findings of fact, the RAD considered the factors outlined in Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association,3 which take into account the list of factors in Dunsmuir.4 The Newton factors are applied to determine the standard of review for any issue of fact, mixed fact and law, or law. These factors include: a) the respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation; b) the nature of the question in issue; c) the interpretation of the statute as a whole; d) the expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal; e) the need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals; f) preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance; and g) other factors that are relevant in the particular context. [19] The Newton factors deal with the standard of review to be applied by an appellate administrative tribunal to the decision of an administrative tribunal of first instance, and, as such, these factors are very relevant to the relationship between the RPD and the RAD. In addition, the RAD finds that the Newton decision deals directly with the issue of the standard of review of an administrative tribunal of first instance as is the case between the RAD and the RPD. [20] Based on the guidance in Newton, the RAD focused on the factors listed below to determine the standard of review. The Supreme Court of Canada, in Khosa,5 noted that the factors in deciding the standard of review are not a checklist of criteria: a contextualized approach is appropriate in deciding which factors are most relevant. In assessing the relationship between the RAD and the RPD with respect to the Newton factors, the RAD considered the following three most significant factors: * the respective roles of the RPD and RAD in the context of IRPA; * the expertise and advantageous position of the RPD member compared to that of the RAD; and * the nature of the question in issue. [21] Both the RPD and RAD derive their jurisdiction from and interpret the same statute: the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Section 162 of IRPA gives each Division the same powers, including the Refugee Protection Division, "in respect of proceedings brought before it under this Act, sole and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction." With respect to the respective roles of the RPD and RAD in the context of IRPA, the powers of each Division are the same, although their roles are not the same. It is the primary role of the RPD to hear testimony, review evidence and determine a claim on its merits, while the RAD reviews those determinations based on questions of law, fact, or mixed fact and law. However, the fact that the RAD may, where appropriate, substitute a different determination than that made by the RPD does make its role similar to the RPD in that each Division is engaged in refugee determination. [22] The RAD decides appeals of RPD decisions related to refugee protection on questions of law, of fact, or of mixed law and fact;6 however, the presence of a right of appeal in and of itself does not warrant a correctness standard of review given the proscribed relationship between the RPD and RAD, and the limits imposed on the RAD in IRPA highlighted below. [23] The RPD is a tribunal of first instance which has been given the authority in IRPA to make a decision to accept or reject a claim for protection.7 RPD members have expertise in interpreting and applying IRPA and as well are experts in assessing claims based on country conditions. The RPD must conduct a hearing8 and assesses the totality of the evidence, including evidence related to the credibility of the Appellant and witnesses, after it has had an opportunity to see the claimants, hear their testimony and question them. The RPD has expertise in making findings of fact after evaluating, first hand, the testimony of witnesses. [24] In contrast to the RPD's authority to assess a claim for protection, IRPA limits the RAD's ability to gather and consider evidence. The RAD is not a tribunal of first instance but exists to review the decision made by the RPD. The RAD must proceed without a hearing on the basis of the record, submissions by the parties, and new evidence.9 The RAD's authority to consider new evidence and hold hearings is limited to evidence that arose after the rejection of the claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection.10 Oral hearings are limited to circumstances where the new evidence raises a serious credibility issue.11 [25] Given that the RPD has held a hearing on the totality of the evidence, and given that the RPD has heard from the Appellant directly at a hearing, and given that the RAD's authority to consider new evidence is limited in IRPA; the RPD is in the best position to assess the credibility of the Appellant and to make findings on issues of fact, and mixed law and fact related to the claim. This position is consistent with Newton, at paragraph 82, where it indicates with respect to the appellate division that: "The Board is not a tribunal of first instance, and cannot simply ignore the proceedings before the presiding officer, and the conclusions reached by him".12 [26] Newton concludes that: "a decision on such questions of fact by the presiding officer, as the tribunal of first instance, are entitled to deference. Unless the findings of fact are unreasonable, the Board should not interfere".13 Newton adopts the definition of "reasonableness" in Dunsmuir. Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process of the RPD, and that the RPD decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law.14 [27] In the case at hand, the Appellant alleges that the RPD made errors of fact. As such, the RAD afforded the RPD with deference and considered the reasonableness of the determination for these errors. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [28] Based on a review of all of the evidence before the RAD, the RPD's reasons, and the pleadings, the RAD focused on the determinative issue: Did the RPD make erroneous credibility and plausibility findings? The RPD's Findings and Reasons [29] The Appellant argues that the panel erred by basing its implausibility findings on misinterpretation of the Appellant's testimony, ignoring the testimony of the Appellant and making conclusions that contradict such testimony without substantiating such conclusions with any evidence. Specifically: Incident of Discovery of Relationship [30] The RPD did not find it plausible that the Appellant and her same-sex partner, XXXX, would engage in sexual activity when individuals were in the home, because, based on the Appellant's testimony, the two were in constant fear of being discovered. XXXX family assaulted the Appellant, and XXXX called her family and blamed the Appellant on XXXX behaviour. The RPD did not find it credible that XXXX family would allow the two to have contact the very next day. The RPD made the negative credibility finding based on an inference from the Appellant. As such, the RAD finds the RPD's implausibility finding in relation to this matter was reasonable. [31] The Appellant, in her pleadings states that, contrary to the panel member's reasons, she did not testify that XXXX family threatened exorcism, rather that she testified that it was her own family who had threatened to remove the bad spirit from her through exorcism. While the RPD panel member did state, at page 3, paragraph 13, that XXXX family threatened exorcism, the RAD notes, at page 2, paragraph 8, that the panel member clearly understood that it was the Appellant's family who was going to have an exorcism performed upon the Appellant. In addition, the Appellant's BoC narrative, at Page 2, states: "XXXX family, my family and the community were now planning to exorcise us..." The Appellant's marriage [32] The Appellant argues that the panel's reasons are not accurate and are contrary to her testimony. She argues that she testified that she met a man in church, and church members were wondering why she was not responding to his proposal, and she did not want them to become suspicious. In addition, she testified that her daughter told her that she would like to have a father figure and have a family like others. She argues that she was not able to tell her daughter about her sexual preference and decided to accept the marriage proposal. She states in her pleadings that she testified that she was afraid that her church members may find out about her sexual orientation because they had started to question why she was not interested in the man when it was obvious that he loved her. [33] The RPD found it implausible that the Appellant would marry considering the two women were in a long-term relationship; no one suspected the relationship; they slept in separate beds, and it was common in Antigua for people to co-share apartments or expenses. The panel member found it not plausible that the Appellant, just from the urging from women at the church, be that scared that individuals would find out about her sexuality that she would not only just date the man but actually marry him. [34] The RAD noted that the Federal Court has provided guidance on the issue of making plausibility findings in Valtchev.15 A tribunal may make adverse findings of credibility based on the implausibility of an applicant's story provided the inferences drawn can be reasonably said to exist. However, plausibility findings should be made only in the clearest of cases, i.e., if the facts as presented are outside the realm of what could be reasonably be expected, or where the documentary evidence demonstrates that the events could not have happened in the manner asserted by the claimant. A tribunal must be careful when rendering a decision based on a lack of plausibility because refugee claimants come from diverse cultures, and actions which appear implausible when judged from Canadian standards might be plausible when considered from within the claimant's milieu. [35] A review of the audio recording shows the Appellant did in fact provide testimony that she accepted the marriage proposal, not just from the urging of the women at the church or because individuals would find out about her sexuality but because her daughter would like to have a father figure and have a family like others, and she was not able to tell her daughter about her sexual preference. The RPD's negative credibility finding based only on the Appellant's marriage at the urging of the women at the church did not take into account the testimony of the Appellant about her daughter and therefore ignored relevant evidence, and the RAD therefore finds it to be unreasonable. [36] The Appellant argues that she testified that the woman in the eastern township had been urging her to get married and had informed her that she would look for someone for her. The Appellant states that the RPD misunderstood her testimony. The Appellant's argument is not entirely accurate, as the RPD did base its conclusion on testimony provided by the Appellant. The RPD's reasons show that the panel member considered the Appellant's testimony that the woman in the eastern township did not know that she was married and found it not to be credible. The reasons state that the individuals were in contact; the woman had a telephone, and she was purportedly close to the Appellant, that she would protect her on numerous occasions, hid her and helped arrange for travel, that she would have known that the Appellant was indeed married in Antigua. The RPD's finding that the claimant's testimony was not credible and that the woman in the eastern townships would have known that the claimant was married in Antigua was justifiable, intelligible, and transparent. It falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible in respect to the facts and the law and is therefore reasonable. Return to Guyana and delay in departure [37] The RPD had concerns about the Appellant's lack of subjective fear in her return to Guyana three times, at minimum: a lengthy trip of five months, one prior to that for a one-month visit and again for two months.16 The Appellant does not argue with the RPD's statement that this is confirmed in the Appellant's Guyanese passport. The RPD called into question the Appellant's subjective fear in relation to returning to Guyana and individuals knowing about her sexuality. [38] The Appellant argues that she did not return to individuals that knew about her sexuality but that she testified she was in hiding throughout her visits to Guyana; she stayed with the woman who helped in hiding her and XXXX; her visits were as a result of necessity, and she had to accompany her daughter because when she left Guyana she was very young. [39] The RPD stated that "an individual who genuinely fears persecution in such a country would not return and stay for the types of period of time..." [40] The panel member found it not credible that the Appellant would return to Guyana with her 22-year-old daughter who would have been able to travel by herself or be picked up by her friend from the eastern townships and was sure that the daughter would have been able to go back to school. [41] The panel member had concerns and found it not plausible that the Appellant traveled to Guyana and remained there for five months despite having, as mentioned above, a valid Antiguan passport and because there is no visa requirement; the Appellant could have flown directly to Canada from Antigua. The Appellant argues that she presented a reasonable explanation, that being she did not want her daughter to return to Guyana alone or with XXXX, that she applied for a visa to travel to the USA to a protective uncle, but she was refused and that she needed to acquire a name of someone she would be visiting in Canada for her visa application. The Appellant also explained that she could not leave earlier than she did because she was ill due to the attack she suffered and had home treatment from the woman who was hiding them in Guyana. [42] The RAD finds that the RPD reasonably concluded that the Appellant's actions were not consistent with her alleged fear of persecution. The Appellant was given an opportunity to explain her actions, and the RPD considered her explanation. The RPD was not satisfied with the Appellant's explanation; in the RAD's view, this was reasonable given that the Appellant returned to Guyana to renew her passport on one occasion despite having a valid Antiguan passport, and during her five-month stay she left the house in the evenings for walks, and her daughter went to school. Furthermore, the claimant did not apply for the US visa until XXXX XXXX, 2012, after arriving in Guyana on XXXX XXXX, 2012 and, instead, could have flown directly to Canada on her Antiguan valid passport because she did not require a visa. The panel member also reasonably rejected the Appellant's explanation that she was too injured to travel because she had in fact traveled from Antigua to Guyana. [43] The RPD is entitled to make findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and may reject evidence if it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole.17 Where the RPD finds a lack of credibility based on inferences concerning the plausibility of evidence, there must be a basis in the evidence to support such inferences.18 [44] The RPD's concerns that the Appellant's actions were not consistent with her professed fear were justifiable, intelligible, and transparent. It falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible in respect to the facts and the law, and it is therefore reasonable. The Appellant's Culture and Customs [45] The Appellant argues that caution is to be exercised when a claimant is of a different origin and the culture and customs are different. In her pleadings, the Appellant did not provide any specific examples of where the RPD did not consider her culture and customs. Counsel, at the hearing, did not identify any accommodations required and did not make an application for vulnerable person status. The RPD made findings that the Appellant's allegations were not credible based on an analysis of all of the evidence before it. The RAD finds that there was no sufficient credible or trustworthy evidence before the RPD to indicate that the Appellant's cultural background and customs were significant factors to be considered in explaining the credibility concerns at the hearing. Attendance at 519 Community Centre [46] The RPD called into question whether or not the Appellant does in fact attend the 519 on a regular basis because the Appellant was able to share very little information about what happens at the 519 meetings. The Appellant argues that the panel did not question the Appellant about what went on at meetings at the 519. The RAD found the RPD's doubt about the Appellant's attendance at the 519 because the Appellant was able to share very little information about what "happens at 519 meetings" was not reasonable. A review of the audio recording shows that the panel member asked the Appellant when she started to attend, what she did and how often she attended meetings at the 519 but did not question the Appellant about what went on at the meetings. The panel member followed with questions on the Appellant's social life following meetings at the 519. [47] The Appellant proffered to the RPD a membership at the 519 and a welcome letter to corroborate her attendance at the 519. [48] The RPD assessed the totality of the evidence on the Appellant's sexual orientation, including her oral testimony, as well as the credibility of the Appellant's allegations in making her finding that the Appellant's allegations related to her sexuality were not credible. As such, the RAD finds that the RPD did not err in its finding that the Appellant's allegations related to her fear of harm due to her sexuality were not credible. [49] The panel member, in the RPD's reasons, made a finding on the evidence that, following the attack, although medical attention was sought, and there was no corroborating evidence that the incident actually happened. Further, the claimant did not go to the police despite the fact that she states she was sexually assaulted and that the police would not have assisted her in the matter.19 [50] The failure to consider specific evidence must be viewed in context and will lead to a decision being overturned only where such evidence is critical, contradicts the RPD's conclusion, and where the RAD determines that its omission means that the tribunal did not have regard to the material before it.20 The RAD presumes that the RPD considered the entire record, and thus the Appellant bears a high burden of persuasion that this is not the case. The RAD must consider not only the reasons offered by the RPD but also the outcome reached.21 As set out above in the RAD's consideration of the appropriate standard of review, the RAD will defer to the RPD on findings of fact in this appeal, which includes the assessment of the totality of the evidence. [51] It would have been better had the RPD specifically commented on that evidence regarding the Appellant's sexual identity. However, even where the reasons given do not seem wholly adequate to support the decision, the RAD must first seek to supplement them before it substitutes its own decision.22 The RPD's Decision [52] The Appellant contests other findings of the RPD, such as the panel's finding that it was not plausible that XXXX and the Appellant would not continue to have contact after a twenty-year relationship, and it did not find it credible that XXXX and the Appellant would no longer have contact to see how each other was in their respective new countries. It is not necessary for the RAD to deal with further issues, as the RPD's findings on subjective fear centred on the Appellant's return trips to Guyana are sufficient to dispose of this appeal. [53] The RAD has found that the RPD made a number of unreasonable credibility findings in rejecting the Appellant's refugee claim. Are these enough to justify setting aside the decision? The RAD has considered the credibility findings that remain. The Appellant's evidence surrounding the discovery of her sexual identity by her and XXXX family was not reasonable. The RPD also found credibility problems with the Appellant's return to Guyana on three occasions after she allegedly fled persecution, which went to the heart of her claim in that it undermined her allegations of having a subjective fear of reprisals from her family and others because of her sexual orientation. [54] Although the RPD made some unreasonable credibility findings, as set out above, the RAD finds that the RPD's decision to reject the Appellant's refugee claim falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible in regard to the facts and the law, given those credibility findings that remain. DISPOSITION [55] The RAD finds that the RPD's decision was justifiable, intelligible, and transparent, and falls within the range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible in respect to the facts and the law. [56] As per Section 111(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This Appeal is dismissed. (signed) "C. Forbes" C. Forbes October 23, 2013 Date 1 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.), at 305. 2 Miral, Stefnie Dinisha v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3392-97), Muldoon, February 12, 1999. 3 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399, paragraph 44. 4 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9. 5 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339. 6 IRPA, s. 110 (1). 7 IRPA, s. 107. 8 IRPA, s. 170. 9 IRPA, s. 110.3. 10 IRPA, s. 110.4. 11 RAD Rule 57. 12 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399, paragraph 82. 13 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399, paragraph 95. 14 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9, at para 47. 15 Valtchev, Rousko v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4497-99) Muldoon, July 6, 2001; 2001 FCT 776. 16 RPD's Reasons, p. 7, paragraph 4. 17 Numbi, Gaston Kipa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-92-12), Boivin, August 30, 2012; 2012 FC 1037 at 19. 18 Miral, Stefanie Dinisha v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3392-97), Muldoon, February 12, 1999. 19 RPD's Reasons, p. 4, paragraph 8. 20 Herrara Andrade, Luis Carlos v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-544-12), Gleason, December 18, 2012; 2012 FC 1490, para. 9. 21 Ibid., paragraph 11. 22 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador, (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62, paragraph 12. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (April 9, 2013) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB3-04714