VB5-02937

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB5-02937 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause the subject of the appeal Appeal considered at Vancouver, BC Appel instruit à Date of decision May 6, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Philip MacAulay Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) Dorab Colah Conseil(s) du (de la/des) the subject of the appeal Barrister and Solicitor personne(s) en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (the "appellant"), a national of Georgia, appeals the negative determination of the Refugee Protection Division (the "RPD") regarding his claim for refugee protection. As is set out in the RPD Notice of Decision dated September 17, 2015, the appellant's claim was heard by the RPD on August 29, 2015, with a written decision being rendered on September 8, 2015.1 The RPD determined that the appellant was neither a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA" or the "Act")2 nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of the Act. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(c) of IRPA, the Refugee Appeal Division (the "RAD") sets aside the determination of the RPD and refers the matter to the RPD for reconsideration by a different RPD Member. The appeal is accepted. BACKGROUND [3] The appellant's counsel before the RAD is the same counsel who represented him at the RPD. The Minister did not intervene at either Division. [4] No transcript of the RPD hearing was provided in the Appellant's Record.3 However, a compact disc (CD) forms part of the Refugee Protection Division Record (RPDR) and is found on the back page of that Exhibit.4 The appellant has made specific time-code references to the CD by way of illustration of the alleged RPD errors. I have listened to the CD and reviewed the entire RPDR. [5] The appellant seeks neither to present new evidence to the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Act nor a hearing before the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(6). Basis of Claim [6] The appellant is a 27-year-old married man from Georgia. He alleges that he faces persecution in his country arising from the fact he is of mixed Georgian/Ossetian ethnicity. He specifically alleges that due to his involvement in a XXXX-day pro-Ossetian antigovernment protest in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, he was targeted and beaten by Georgian nationalists who he identifies as the "Veterans Union". The appellant and five other protesters were arrested, detained by the police and forced to sign a statement that they would no longer continue to organize protests. [7] The appellant alleges that he was subsequently attacked again by the Veterans Union on XXXX XXXX, 2014. The appellant was hospitalized for XXXX days. He was interviewed by the police. His mother filed a complaint with the police on XXXX XXXX, 2014. His mother had recognized one of the attackers as being the same man who had killed the appellant's uncle (the mother's brother) in 2002. This man had been charged, arrested and convicted for the murder. He served XXXX out of a XXXX year prison sentence. [8] The appellant attempted to go into hiding but the Veterans Union located him again in XXXX and XXXX 2014 and he was beaten again. The appellant alleges that the Veterans Union has links to the police who provided surveillance so that the Veterans Union could locate the appellant. Complaints made to the police and to the prosecutor's office were closed as the authorities deemed them to be of "no merit". [9] The appellant applied for and received a visitor's visa to Canada where he arrived on XXXX XXXX, 2014, making a claim for protection in June 2015. His wife and child fled to Turkey. [10] The appellant alleges that he would be unsafe everywhere in Georgia and that adequate state protection would not be available to him in his country. RPD Decision [11] The RPD was satisfied that the appellant had established his nationality as a citizen of Georgia. As well, the RPD found that he is ethically one-half Ossetian and one-half Georgian. [12] The primary basis upon which the RPD based its negative decision was credibility. The Member summarized her conclusions in this regard finding that the appellant had difficulty in answering the questions he was asked even when re-directed to answer the question posed; was reluctant to clarify circumstances and provide context to a confusing narrative; repeatedly relied on speculation and conjecture and demonstrated numerous contradictions and inconsistencies regarding central elements of his claim. [13] I will discuss in greater detail the examples provided by the RPD in coming to these conclusions in the Analysis of the Merits of the Appeal portion of these reasons. GROUNDS OF APPEAL [14] The grounds upon which the appellant advances his appeal are focused and succinct. [15] The appellant submits that the RPD Member made "several adverse credibility findings" that misconstrued the actual factual evidence before her rendering her conclusions that the appellant had provided inconsistent evidence "completely unreasonable". [16] The appellant submits that, as evidenced by the Member's own statements, the Member considered these inconsistencies to be "significant" such that, upon it being demonstrated that the Member was in error in her recollection of the evidence, tainted the entirety of the RPD decision. ORDER SOUGHT [17] The appellant seeks an order that the RAD substitute a positive determination for that of the RPD and find that the appellant is a Convention refugee or, alternatively, that the determination of the RPD be set aside and the matter be referred to the RPD for redetermination.5 THE ROLE OF THE RAD AND THE CRITERIA FOR INTERVENTION [18] Other than to submit that the RPD Member had made "unreasonable credibility findings", the appellant provided no submissions on the role of the RAD, the standard of review or the criteria for intervention which the RAD should apply with respect to an appeal from the determination of the RPD. [19] As is set out in the following, on March 29, 2016, Justice Gauthier on behalf of the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) in Huruglica6 dismissed the Minister's appeal and provided guidance on at least some important issues concerning how the RAD is to properly approach its review of the RPD's findings of fact or of mixed fact and law. [20] At the Federal Court level in Huruglica,7 Justice Phelan had rejected the analysis of the RAD whereby it had concluded that the standard of review to be applied by the RAD with respect to RPD findings of fact or of mixed fact and law was "reasonableness". Such language was indicative of judicial review which the Justice concluded was not correct given the appellate nature of an appeal to the RAD. Justice Phelan stated: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error". [21] Justice Phelan certified the following question: What is the scope of the Refugee Appeal Division's review when considering an appeal of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division? [22] Importantly at the outset of her reasons, Justice Gauthier of the FCA noted that the case before Justice Phelan, did not involve a question of law, nor did it raise an issue relating to the credibility of oral evidence heard by the RPD.8 (RAD emphasis) [23] Additionally, Justice Gauthier delineated, "...what is in dispute before us from what is not." She found that the parties agreed that it was not disputed that the role of the RAD is not to review RPD decisions in the manner of a judicial review and that the process before the RAD is a "hybrid appeal". The parties also agreed that in respect of questions of law, the RAD should intervene if the RPD erred and apply the standard of correctness. Finally, Justice Gauthier noted that, "What the parties disagree on is what a 'hybrid appeal' means here, and what the RAD's role is in respect of questions of fact and mixed fact and law."9 [24] Accordingly, in the FCA reasons in Huruglica, Justice Gauthier revised the more expansive wording of the question(s) certified by the Federal Court to read:10 Was it reasonable for the RPD to limit its role to a review of the reasonableness of the RPD's findings of fact (or mixed fact and law), which involve no issue of credibility? (RAD emphasis) [25] The FCA's answer to this question was: No. The RAD ought to apply the correctness standard of review to determine whether the RPD erred. [26] Justice Gauthier found that in the circumstances of the particular case before her, the proper conclusion is that the only reasonable standard for the RAD to apply to alleged RPD errors concerning findings of fact and mixed fact and law where the credibility of oral testimony was not an issue was correctness: [103] I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable. (RAD emphasis) [27] Thus, Justice Gauthier found that in Huruglica, where the credibility of the oral evidence before the RPD was not a determinative issue, a standard of correctness should be applied by the RAD when assessing RPD findings of fact or of mixed fact and law. What then is the case where such findings of fact do relate to the credibility of the oral evidence heard by the RPD? [28] Justice Gauthier notes that, with respect to any particular administrative body one must seek to give effect to the legislator's intent through statutory analysis.11 [29] Some of the important observations set out in the FCA's statutory analysis include that, although the RAD has essentially the same powers as the RPD, there are important distinctions, one of which is that the RAD will rarely hold a hearing and that new evidence can only be accepted by the RAD under particular defined circumstances [e.g. subsection 110(4)]. The task of the RAD is to determine whether or not the RPD was wrong in law, fact or mixed fact and law and that, in the context of the legislation, "wrong" means "not true", "incorrect" or "mistaken"; all of which "definitively points to the standard of correctness".12 [30] Justice Gauthier disagreed with the Minister's submission that, since in the majority of cases the RAD determines the appeal on the basis of the record (i.e. the RAD does not conduct a hearing and relies upon the evidence gathered at the RPD), all of the RPD "findings of fact (and not only those involving the assessment of oral evidence) be reviewed on the standard of reasonableness or palpable and overriding error."13 [31] Although the FCA came to the general conclusion that the RAD should intervene when the RPD is wrong in law, in fact or in fact and law (which involves the application of the correctness standard of review), an appeal before the RAD is clearly not a "true de novo proceeding" whereby the RPD record below is not before the RAD and the RPD decision is ignored in all respects.14 [32] Having come to the foregoing conclusions, Justice Gauthier does acknowledge that the provisions of the IRPA [particularly with respect to paragraph 111(2)(b) concerning the question of when the RAD may refer a matter back to the RPD for redetermination] does acknowledge the fact "that in some cases where oral testimony is critical or determinative in the opinion of the RAD, the RAD may not be in a position to confirm or substitute its own determination to that of the RPD." 15 Further, in a conclusion that indicates in my assessment the high-water mark of Justice Gauthier's opinion (perhaps obiter as well in the circumstances of Huruglica where the credibility of oral evidence was not in issue), the FCA finds: [70] This also recognizes that there may be cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because they require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears. It further indicates that although the RAD should sometimes exercise a degree of restraint before substituting its own determination, the issue of whether the circumstances warrant such restraint ought to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In each case, the RAD ought to determine whether the RPD truly benefited from an advantageous position, and if so, whether the RAD can nevertheless make a final decision in respect of the refugee claim. (RAD emphasis) [33] The FCA had noted earlier that "the IRPA's unique provisions [were] expressly crafted to give effect to the legislator's particular intent in respect of this sui generis scheme.16 I take from this and the Court's conclusion that the application of deference or the extent of that deference regarding the RPD's findings of fact depend upon a case-by-case analysis and that, the FCA having provided a broad but not determinative commentary on the question, the RAD should develop its own approach to the issue.17 [34] Although it was obiter in the case before Justice Phelan in Huruglica, the opinion he offered that, "[the RAD] can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion..." has been applied in many subsequent RAD decisions which have been endorsed on judicial review by the Federal Court, conditional upon the RAD having conducted an independent assessment of the evidence as a whole.18 [35] In appropriate cases I will defer to certain findings of the RPD where the RPD enjoyed an identifiable advantage over the RAD in assessing the oral evidence of witnesses who appeared before it. The extent of this deference will be assessed on a case-by-case basis dependent upon the particular circumstances of the matter and in conjunction with my independent assessment of the evidence as a whole. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [36] As will be evident in the following, I agree with the appellant that the RPD Member made significant errors in construing the evidence sufficient to render her determination wrong. [37] A significant portion of the RPD's analysis concerned what the Member identified as "XXXX Protest Credibility Issues".19 [38] In her reasons, the Member notes that in his original Basis of Claim (BOC) Form narrative (signed June 14, 2015) the appellant stated that "friends associated with a Georgian youth organization had asked him to participate" in a XXXX-day protest.20 As submitted to the RAD by the appellant, the Member then noted that in the appellant's amended BOC narrative (dated August 25, 2015) the appellant wrote that his cousin had been the one to invite him. The Member wrote that the appellant, "... could not reasonably explain why he would say in his original BOC statements that anyone else invited [sic], but his cousin if that was the case." [39] The appellant takes issue with the alleged "inconsistency" noting first that a review of the original BOC indicates that the appellant wrote that a "youth group of Ossetian ethnic citizens has offered me to take a part in protests-demanding protection of Ossertian rights [sic]".21 The appellant never wrote that it was a Georgian youth organization. [40] The appellant also submits that his first disclosure package made to the RPD (prior to the amended BOC narrative) included a letter from his cousin stating that the cousin had suggested to the appellant, "to go for meeting supporting ethnic of the Ossetian people, in order to express solidarity towards our brothers [sic]." 22 [41] My interpretation of the cousin's use of the phrase "our brothers" is that it is likely that both the appellant and the cousin are at least partially Ossetian. In that light and in the circumstances of the BOC amendment (together with the cousin's letter), the reference to being "offered me to take a part in protests" by a group of young Ossetians is not mutually exclusive to the appellant's more precise statement in the amendment that it was specifically his cousin, also an Ossetian, who invited him. The appellant confirmed that it was his cousin in his testimony and also stated that his cousin knew this group but that the appellant did not know how.23 [42] Taking all of the above into account, I do not agree with the RPD that an "inconsistency" is revealed as opposed to the appellant simply refining the evidence in his amendment (together with a number of other refinements after he had the benefit of counsel). He initially stated that the Ossetian group "offered" and then that it was his Ossetian cousin who knew the group who made the specific invitation. [43] The importance to the RPD Member of this perceived inconsistency in the context of the Member's credibility assessment is made clear in paragraph 11 of her reasons: [11] Although he explained he knew of some group organizing and he provided a letter of an individual who alleges that he organized it and witnessed the events in question. It is a significant issue for the panel as the claimant had indicated that he had never participated in protests as he had not heard about them. The protest and his activities in that protest are a central issue and are the alleged source of his troubles today and the very reason he is allegedly targeted. The panel would reasonably expect that the claimant, in recounting his story would be able to state that uncomplicated fact. Although he did make some attempts to rectify the discrepancy it is only after the letter from his cousin, was provided that was contradictory to his first statements. The panel does take a significant negative inference against the claimant's credibility for this significant inconsistency between his statements. (RAD emphasis) [44] The appellant submits that more errors are evident in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the RPD decision. In paragraph 12 the Member wrote: [12] Further to the credibility of the protest, his testimony was very vague as to the precipitating event that caused the protest. He was reluctant to testify to how many were in attendance. He testified to carrying a sign about Ossetian rights, but could not speak what rights they were asking for from the government. The claimant has high-school education which the panel would expect that he would be able to articulate these details without significant hardship. Further, the claimant would in in all probability, be able to communicate, why, as an Ossetian, participating with other Ossetian, over three days, why they were there and what they had hoped to achieve by that protest. This is significant for the panel, as the claimant has had no prior history of community involvement, or activism for Ossetian rights and it would be reasonable for him to have more of an appetite for knowledge, rather than his statements that show almost no understanding of the protest. This protest is the precipitating event to the claimant's allegations of risk; therefore his inability to reasonably testify to the protest does undermine the claimant's credibility before this panel. (RAD emphasis) [45] The appellant makes detailed references to the evidence in order to demonstrate the alleged errors made by the RPD in the foregoing. [46] The appellant submits that his testimony before the RPD reveals that, contrary to what the Member writes, the appellant did identify the precipitating event that caused the protest. The Member asked him,"... was there something particular that spurred this protest?"24 The appellant responded that, due to discrimination, half of the Ossetian population had been forced to leave Georgia and that only 5000 remained.25 The appellant submits that this was clearly a precipitating event in the appellant's mind which he identified as having led him to join the protest.26 I have listened to the CD and the appellant's submissions in this regard are accurate. [47] Further, the appellant submits that the Member's claim that the appellant, "was reluctant to testify to how many were in attendance" is false.27 The Member asked how many people were in attendance at the protest and the appellant immediately, and without reluctance, responded that 100 people were involved.28 Having listened to the CD, I confirm the testimony as cited by the appellant. The appellant submits, "The Member's assertion here is a complete fabrication and she unfairly penalizes the applicant's credibility." I find that the Member misconstrued or otherwise missed the evidence provided by the appellant in response to the Member's question. Accordingly, the conclusions drawn by the Member are not founded in the evidence and were made in error. [48] In paragraph 13 of her reasons the Member writes, "The claimant's own statements in his BOC, say that they were attacked, but no mention that he was singled out in that attack." However, in his original BOC the appellant wrote that:29 They got mad at me as I was Goergian [sic] and was standing on their side. Aggression is increased towards us and they have started to beat us. Espetially [sic] me and they were threatening to kill me. Once again, the Member clearly misconstrued the evidence. [49] The appellant also takes issue with the Member's findings in paragraph 14 of the RPD decision: [14] In addition, there were a number of inconsistencies, in relation to the police treatment and the alleged arrest of the protestors. He states in his BOC that the police got mad at him for being Georgian and that he should be jailed for being a traitor. This was not mentioned in his testimony when asked about the arrest. The claimant also made no mention of the police confiscating the cellphones of the six participants as the letters indicated. [50] In his testimony, the appellant stated that when he attended the XXXX XXXX protest the counter-protesters made up of the Veteran Union members were very aggressive. When they started to insult the appellant's group, the appellant spoke to them trying to normalize the situation by telling them that Georgians and Ossetians should be friends as they were almost one nation. He told them he was half Georgian with a Georgian last name, asked them why they were so aggressive but, in reponse, they told him that he had betrayed his country. He said he got singled out because he approached the counter-protesters and told them this. The Member asked why he had approached an aggressive crowd who was trying to stop the Ossetian protest and he responded that he felt discriminated against and did not like it. When he told them he was half Georgian they became more upset.30 [51] Moreover, in his original BOC the appellant had stated (as written by him):31 Members of couter demonstrations started being abusive and threatening towards us. They were demanding from us-of why Ossetians have expelled Georgians from Ossetia and demolished their houses. At this time I have decided to calm them down, as I thought I had an apportunity as I was half Georgian. I was explaining that Ossetians are not our enemies and they can not be. That I knew then better (because my mom and my relatives were Ossetians), they were good people and never wanted to be enemies of Georgians. I was hopeful that the fact that I am Georgian would be more convincing. But everything has happened opposite way. They got mad at me as I was Goergian and was standing on their side. Aggression has increased towards us and they have started to beat us, espetially me and they were threatening to kill me, because all of this mess Police has arrived and intervened. They havent told anything to Georgian radicals and detained our members for a day. We were warned not to do anything like this again and not to anger Georgian residents. Police considered that we were provocateurs controled from Russian and wanted to inflame instability in public. Espetially they got mad at me when they found out that I was Georgian, told me that I did not deserve anything and people like me should be in jail for being traitors. [sic] [52] With respect to the Member's finding that the appellant made no mention in his testimony of the police confiscating cell phones of the people the appellant was with I have listened to the CD and the Member is clearly mistaken. He testified that the police arrived on XXXX XXXX after the counter-protesters had beaten the Ossetian protesters. A number of the Ossetians were taken to the police station but the police said nothing to the counter protesters. The appellant specifically testified that the police took "our cameras and cell phones" because we were videoing it [the event].32 The police told them that if they made Georgians upset they would be arrested. Once again, the Member made findings of fact unsupported by the evidence. [53] Given the above, I conclude that the Member made significant credibility findings in error. Through her own statements found in the reasons the Member highlighted the fact that she felt these perceived inconsistencies in the evidence were significant with respect to the precipitating event upon which the entire claim was built. I find it likely that these errors affected other credibility findings and created a context of disbelief in which the hearing was conducted. As stated by the Member:33 [22] Without disbelieving every word of the claimant, the panel finds that on the whole of the issues before the panel that the claimant's testimony is unreliable for the purposes of this assessment. The claimant testimony has been shown to be inconsistent with his statements and evidence. Considering, the numerous credibility issues that have not been reasonably explained, the panel finds that the claimant's testimony is wholly unreliable. The record contains numerous other credibility issues however; the panel has concentrated on the most probative for this analysis. The other evidence in the case, such as the letters from family and friends have been found to be inconsistent with the claimants statements and although the claimant had attempted to amend his story to be consistent with those letters, the panel is not persuaded that these documents can then be seen as reliable. Further, the silence of the documentary evidence of the context and agent of harm in the claimants allegation does further the credibility of the claimants allegations. Therefore the panel finds that the claimant has failed to establish with reliable and trustworthy evidence that it is more likely than not that he has been targeted as a result of his Ossetian ethnicity by members of the Veterans Union. REMEDY [54] Given this overall credibility assessment I find it impossible for me to discern which of the overall credibility findings have been tainted by the clear errors made by the Member in her appreciation of the actual evidence before her and which stand independently. I find that this quandary leads me to the conclusion that the RPD determination must be set aside. Moreover, that same problem prevents me from substituting my own determination for that of the RPD inasmuch as I would have to hear the same evidence as did the RPD in order to do so. In any event, the appellant did not seek to introduce any new documents pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Act. That being the case, there were no documents which I potentially might have found admissible. Therefore, there is no vehicle by which the legislation would permit me to conduct a RAD hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6). Accordingly, the only option is to return the matter to the RPD for redetermination. CONCLUSION [55] For the foregoing reasons, the determination of the RPD is set aside and the matter of the claim of XXXX XXXX is referred to the RPD for redetermination by a different RPD Member. The appeal is accepted. (signed) "Philip MacAulay" Philip MacAulay May 6, 2016 Date 1 Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) Exhibit 3, Refugee Protection Division Record (RPDR), pp. 3-14. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA" or the "Act"), S. C. 2001, c. 27. 3 RAD Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record (AR). 4 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 304. 5 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, p. 155, paras. 118-19. 6 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 7 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2014 FC 799. 8 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at para. 23. 9 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 36-38. 10 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at para. 106. 11 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 50-51. 12 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 59-66. 13 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at para. 67. 14 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 78-79. 15 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at paras. 69. 16 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at para. 66. 17 Huruglica, supra, footnote 6, at para. 74. 18 For example see Denbel v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 629 at paras. 31- 34; Ali v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 500 at para. 8; Ngandu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 423 at para. 31; and Cyril v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2015 FC 1106 at para. 10. 19 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, pp. 5-8, paras. 11-15. 20 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, p. 5-6, para. 11. 21 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 26. 22 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp. 136-176 at p. 150. 23 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 304 CD, 02:29:24- 02:29:53. 24 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 304 CD, 00:57:40. 25 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 304 CD, 00:58:03-00:58:40. 26 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, p. 153, paras. 7-8. 27 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, p. 153, para. 9. 28 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 304 CD, 01:27:12- 01:27:35. 29 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 27. 30 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 304 CD, 01:23:45-01:29:00. 31 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 27. 32 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 304 CD, 01:29:45-01:32:00. 33 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 12. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB5-02937