TB5-07301

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-07301 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision October 29, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Sina (Bolanle Olusina) Ogunleye Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) alleges that she is a citizen of St. Lucia and appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and send the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she is lesbian, and she has been and will be persecuted because of her sexual orientation. [4] The Appellant's refugee application was heard on March 31, 2015 and June 23, 2015. By a decision of June 25, 2015, the RPD rejected the claim. The panel found that neither the Appellant's documents nor her oral testimony could credibly establish her personal identity. [5] The Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the RAD on July 17, 2015. However, she did not perfect that appeal within the prescribed time limits. Instead, she filed her appeal record, along with an Application for an Extension of Time to File or Perfect an Appeal, on August 24, 2015. In support of her application, she explained that, after the RPD rejected her claim, she attempted to obtain a St. Lucian passport. However, she was told she must present her original birth certificate, which was seized by Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). She and her counsel requested the document from CIC, but she had not received it by the time she made the Application. [6] A differently constituted panel of the RAD granted the application, finding that the Appellant had provided reason for the delay, that there was no prejudice to the Minister, and that the Appellant had shown a continuing intention to pursue her appeal. The date of perfection was deemed to be September 16, 2015. [7] The Appellant asks the RAD to accept new evidence relating to her efforts to establish her identity. She also requests that the RAD grant a "special extension of time" to submit further evidence to "cover the possibility of a future release of the Appellant's birth certificate by the CIC-Etobicoke/application for a passport to St. Lucian embassy."1 [8] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that she has not established her identity and in making negative credibility findings. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [9] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim, or that was not reasonably available, or that she could not reasonably have been expected2 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [10] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in her Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.3 Application of Section 110(4) [11] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.4 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claims. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of Section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in her circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of her claim. If she could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [12] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim, the evidence does not meet the test in Section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.5 [13] As the RAD understands it, Section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD-either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [14] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.6 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [15] Where a document meets the test in Section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While Section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, or is immaterial to the issues to be considered by the RAD, it would make little sense to admit such document, even if it meets the test in Section 110(4).7 [16] The RAD has, in many appeals to date, applied the factors set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Raza.8 While Raza predates the introduction of IRPA Section 110(4), it is based on the nearly identical wording of Section 113(a). The Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.9 The RAD presumes that Parliament, in creating Section 110(4), was well aware that this provision is almost identical in wording to Section 113(a)-which provides a strong indication that Parliament intended the test from Raza to be used by the RAD.10 [17] In Iyamuremye,11 the Federal Court accepted the RAD's application of the factors in Raza to new evidence submitted on an appeal under the IRPA. Subsequently, in Ghannadi,12 the Court held that the RAD should consider the factors in Raza, but it noted that these are merely considerations to be taken into account and not necessarily determinative of admissibility. In Singh,13 the Court found that the factors in Raza are based specifically on the language of Section 113(a) and are not transferable in the context of an appeal before the RAD. The Court found that it was unreasonable for the RAD to strictly apply the Raza factors without distinguishing its own role from that of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) officer who is bound by Section 113(a).14 [18] In Singh, the Court wrote that: ...in order for there to be a "full fact-based appeal" before the RAD, the criteria for the admissibility of evidence must be sufficiently flexible to ensure it can occur. Often, the evidence at stake will be essential for proving the factual basis of the errors the claimant alleges were made by the RPD. This consideration becomes all the more pertinent in light of the strict timelines a claimant now faces for initially submitting evidence before the RPD. A claimant now has 50 days to present all documents from the date he or she made the claim; the previous legislative scheme required the documents 20 days prior to a hearing, which, on average, took much longer to take place. When the RPD confronts a claimant on the weakness of his evidentiary record, the RAD should, in subsequent review of the decision, have some leeway in order to allow the claimant to respond to the deficiencies raised.15 [19] The Court also held that the "main issue is whether the evidence 'was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably (or normally according to the French version) have been expected in the circumstances to have presented.'"16 [20] The Court did not discuss Iyamuremye or Ghannadi in its analysis of Sections 110(4) and 113(a). It did, however, certify the following question: In considering the role of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment officer and that of the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, sitting in appeal of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division, does the test set out in Raza v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 for the interpretation of paragraph 113(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 apply to its subsection 110(4)? [21] The question of whether the Raza factors are applicable to evidence that passes the test in Section 110(4) is still unsettled.17 It has been found that the application of the Raza criteria by the RAD is reasonable;18 it has also been held that the application of those factors without modification is an error.19 The Raza factors have also been described by the Court as "useful guidance".20 [22] While trusting that the matter will eventually be resolved by the Federal Court of Appeal, the RAD must nevertheless continue to consider new evidence, such as that which has been submitted in support of this appeal. Although it may be inappropriate to strictly apply the factors in Raza, given that they are not specific to Section 110(4) and were not crafted for use in an appellate process, the RAD's consideration of new evidence cannot end with the application of the test in Section 110(4). To limit its analysis to that provision would be to ignore other provisions of the IRPA-such as Sections 162(2) and 171(a.3). Such a restricted analysis would also require the RAD to accept "new" evidence even if it is irrelevant, immaterial, or lacking in credibility. [23] In Denbel, the Federal Court held that: When interpreting legislative intent, the Court must give priority to the written text in the absence of any lexical ambiguity. The Court's opinions on best policy cannot supplant the text of the law; nor can select passages from the Hansard. In my view, Parliament intended these two provisions to enshrine the same legal test. If Parliament had intended to establish more flexible admissibility rules in RAD appeals, it would not have replicated the restrictive language which governs PRRAs.21 [24] The RAD will therefore undertake an analysis of any proposed new evidence, not only for its timeliness, which is largely the focus of Section 110(4), but also to consider whether it has evidentiary value and, if so, how much. While the factors in Raza are indeed helpful guidance, the RAD would undertake a very similar analysis even if it would completely disregard that decision.22 [25] Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances". This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in Section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [26] While the IRPA makes specific reference to the credibility of evidence received by the RAD, there is no corresponding provision which addresses relevance. However, in the RAD's view, it is obvious that evidence must be assessed for its relevance.23 Apart from the support from the case law, it would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to Section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit". [27] It is therefore appropriate for the RAD to consider whether new evidence is relevant, even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [28] The RAD will also consider whether the proposed new evidence is material. In Raza, the Federal Court of Appeal described this factor: "Is the evidence material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been made available to the RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered." This factor may, in the RAD's view, set an inappropriately high standard in the context of a RAD appeal. [29] An officer determining a PRRA application must not engage in a review of the applicant's negative RPD decision. The PRRA process exists to determine whether a risk to the applicant has arisen between the date of issue of the RPD's decision and the date of the applicant's pending removal from Canada,24 and the officer has no power to reconsider or set aside the RPD's decision. A PRRA will in most cases take place a year or more after the RPD's decision.25 In this context, the definition of materiality set out in Raza makes good sense: the new evidence must be so significant that it would have led to a different outcome before the RPD. [30] However, as the Court noted in Singh, the RAD context is considerably different. The RAD is not restricted to making a new assessment of the risk faced by the Appellant, though this could occur as a result of new evidence presented upon appeal. The RAD appeal is meant to be decided within four or five months of the RPD's decision. The Appellant may challenge the decision of the RPD, and the RAD has broad powers to review that decision for errors of fact or law, or mixed fact and law, to confirm the decision, to confirm on other grounds, to set aside the decision and substitute another, or to set aside the determination and refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. It is of paramount importance that the RAD may look only to admissible new evidence when considering whether to hold a hearing under Section 110(6).26 [31] The Court's definition of materiality, which is appropriate for evidence presented in support of a PRRA application, seems overly restrictive when applied to evidence submitted in an appeal to the RAD. If the RAD were to apply the materiality factor as defined in Raza, it could lead to the rejection of evidence that is capable of showing that the RPD's decision was in error, only because that evidence is not so strong that it would have resulted in the acceptance of the refugee claim had the evidence been before the RPD. Further, the RAD is not asking-as the PRRA officer is under Raza-whether the RPD's decision would have been different. The RAD is making its own assessment of whether the determination should have been different or whether the RPD's decision was in error. [32] For example, it is not uncommon for the RPD to reject a refugee claim on the basis that the claimant has not established his or her identity, and in such situations, the RPD is not required to go further to consider the evidence of persecution.27 A claimant rejected by the RPD on the basis of identity-perhaps because identity documents were still in transit from the country of origin at the time of the refugee hearing-might appeal to the RAD and present as new evidence such recently received documents. However, those documents might be rejected by the RAD if it considers their materiality as defined in Raza: whether the refugee claim would probably have succeeded if the documents were made available to the RPD. In many cases, the establishment of identity does not in and of itself warrant the acceptance of a refugee claim, and therefore the Appellant's newly obtained identity documents could be rejected by the RAD as lacking materiality, even though they could be the basis for a successful appeal. [33] In the RAD's view, this restrictive approach to materiality is not consistent with the broad powers given to the RAD. While the PRRA officer is required to focus on a single issue-risk to the applicant-the RAD is required to consider both whether the RPD's decision is in error and, after having reviewed all of the evidence, whether the Appellant is a protected person. An approach that focuses on whether the evidence is material enough to affect the outcome of the RAD appeal rather than the RPD's decision is therefore preferred. [34] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to evidence that passes the test in Section 110(4). (a) The RAD will consider whether the proposed new evidence is credible or trustworthy. (b) The RAD will assess the relevance of the evidence-whether it is capable, together with the other evidence in the record (including other admissible new evidence) of proving or disproving a fact at issue in either the refugee claim or the appeal.28 (c) The RAD will determine whether the evidence is material, in the sense that it could be capable of justifying, with or without the benefit of an oral hearing, as the case may be, a disposition under section 111 of the IRPA. [35] If the proposed new evidence does not meet each of the factors above, the RAD may choose not to admit it. These factors, however, are not exhaustive, as the RAD may consider other factors as appropriate in the circumstances. [36] The Appellant asks the RAD to admit an affidavit, which describes her attempt to obtain a St. Lucian passport. She was advised by the St. Lucian consulate that she must provide her original birth certificate in support of such an application. She also submits correspondence to CIC officials in which she and her counsel ask for the original birth certificate.29 [37] These documents clearly arose after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, and the RAD finds that they meet the test in Section 110(4). The RAD has no reason to doubt the credibility of the documents, and they are relevant to the issue of identity. The difficulty here, however, is that they are not material. At their best, the documents establish that the Appellant went to the St. Lucian consulate, but was not given a passport or any other document corroborating her identity. They also establish that she has sought her original birth certificate from CIC. While this evidence shows that the Appellant has made some attempts-albeit last-minute efforts-to establish her identity, the documents do absolutely nothing to actually corroborate her identity. Even if the RAD were to accept them as new evidence, they simply could not justify a disposition of this appeal. [38] The Appellant's proposed new evidence is not material and is therefore inadmissible in this appeal. What is the Role of the RAD? [39] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [40] The Appellant submits that the RAD should not defer to the findings of the RPD except where the RPD had a particular advantage in reaching a conclusion. [41] In another decision, this panel considered at some length the legislation and jurisprudence concerning the role of the RAD.30 It assessed the nature of a RAD appeal and addressed the scope and degree of deference to be shown to findings of the RPD. The panel reached the following conclusions, which it finds to also be applicable here, about the approach to be taken in a RAD appeal. The RAD's Approach [42] The RAD will take the following approach in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD. It will assess all of the evidence, both that in the RPD's record and any admissible new evidence. It will consider questions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact raised by the Appellant and, where applicable, the Respondent. [43] Where the proceeding is a true appeal-that is, where there is no admissible new evidence-the RAD will consider the decision of the RPD, the submissions in respect of that decision, and determine whether the RPD's determination is wrong. As a true appeal is founded on the record, the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the evidence in that record in order to determine the appeal. [44] Where an appeal includes admissible new evidence that speaks to an error in the RPD's decision, it is a hybrid appeal, where the RAD must consider the RPD's reasons in light of the new evidence, which may establish that the decision of the RPD is wrong.31 [45] Where an appeal presents admissible new evidence which establishes a new, changed, or heightened risk, or otherwise changes the overall nature of the claim, this will result in a limited de novo appeal. In some such cases, the decision of the RPD may be less relevant in light of the new evidence-that is, the new evidence establishes a risk or degree of risk, or other potentially determinative matter not considered by the RPD. Unlike a true de novo proceeding, however, the RAD will not ignore the RPD's record or the findings of the lower tribunal, as these may remain relevant to the appeal. [46] The RAD will recognize and respect findings which the RPD was in an advantageous position to make, which will normally include credibility findings and other findings of fact. Where such deference is to be shown, the RAD will not intervene unless the RPD's reasoning process is not comprehensible or the outcome of that process is not based on and supported by the evidence. [47] Where the RPD's determination is entirely based on findings which warrant deference-such as an overall lack of credibility, based on oral testimony-the RAD will, having conducted its own assessment of the evidence, consider whether the RPD's reasoning process is comprehensible and whether the determination is based on and supported by the evidence. [48] On matters where the RPD has no advantage, the RAD will show no deference and will apply a standard of correctness, engaging in its own analysis of the evidence and reaching its own conclusion to determine if the RPD was wrong. Where the RAD finds that its conclusion does not agree with that of the RPD, the RAD will substitute its own finding and determination or, if it is unable to substitute, will refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. The RPD's Findings [49] The Appellant argues that the RPD made various errors in rejecting her refugee claim. [50] Lack of travel documents: The RPD asked the Appellant to produce the documents upon which she travelled to Canada, and the Appellant was not able to do so. She told the RPD that she travelled with the assistance of a smuggler arranged by her girlfriend. The RPD made a negative credibility finding with respect to the Appellant's lack of travel documents and her testimony surrounding such documents. [51] The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD assessed her identity evidence "through a myopic lens or reasoning".32 The RAD disagrees. Various aspects of the Appellant's evidence caused concern for the RPD. The Appellant claimed that a smuggler was hired to bring her to Canada, but the RPD noted that the amount paid to the smuggler was so small it could barely cover airfare. The RPD considered the testimony of the Appellant's girlfriend-who allegedly arranged for the smuggler but did not seem to know whether the Appellant travelled to Canada with anyone. The RPD found it implausible that the Appellant entered Canada without even knowing the name or birthdate on the false passport that she was using. When this evidence is considered as a whole, it supports the RPD's negative credibility finding. Even if the RAD would show no deference here, it would reach the same conclusion based on its own review of the evidence. [52] Weight given to birth certificate: The Appellant argues that the RPD panel first assigned probative value to the birth certificate, but when the Appellant refused to use that certificate to apply for a passport, the RPD was "infuriated" and "reversed its earlier position on the weight attributable to the birth certificate".33 The Appellant also submits that the birth certificate is a primary identity document and therefore should have been accepted by the RPD. [53] In the RAD's view, the Appellant has misstated the analysis and conclusions of the RPD. At no point did the RPD assign significant weight to the birth certificate. Instead, the panel observed that such a certificate could be used to obtain a document with significant probative value-a St. Lucian passport. The fact that the birth certificate could be used to secure a useful identity document does not establish that the birth certificate itself is such a document. As the RPD noted, the certificate "does not bear a picture of the claimant or any biometric information that could link it to her".34 [54] The RAD has reviewed the birth certificate.35 At its very best, the document establishes that someone named XXXX XXXX was born in St. Lucia in 1993; it cannot establish that the Appellant is the person named in the certificate. Even if this is a true document, there is simply nothing to link it to the Appellant other than her own testimony. While this may be a useful document for the St. Lucia consulate-which presumably has access to other records and information for the purpose of verifying identity-it is not terribly helpful in the context of a refugee hearing. The RAD finds that this document does little, if anything, to establish the Appellant's identity. [55] Girlfriend's testimony: The Appellant told the RPD that she had a lesbian lover, XXXX, in St. Lucia. At the first sitting of the refugee hearing, the Appellant told the RPD that she did not have a phone and therefore is not in phone contact with XXXX. When the RPD suggested that XXXX could be called from the hearing room, the Appellant said that she did not have her lover's phone number. At the next sitting, the Appellant changed her evidence, testifying that she was in phone contact with XXXX even before the first sitting. When the panel asked for XXXX phone number, the Appellant then said she had left it at home and could not remember it. When counsel was able to locate the number, and a call was placed, XXXX repeatedly said she did not have much time to talk because she was at work. She testified long enough to state that she was the Appellant's girlfriend, that the Appellant came to Canada in December of 2014, and that she did not know whether the Appellant traveled with anyone. The RPD noted in its reasons that XXXX provided a letter in which she stated that she arranged the smuggler and saw the Appellant off with him when she left in December of 2014. [56] The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD erred by giving little weight to this "crucial testimony", making a finding that was against common sense. [57] The RPD was in an advantageous position to assess the Appellant's testimony about XXXX and to consider XXXX testimony. Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD finds that the RPD's reasoning is comprehensible and its conclusions based on the evidence. The Appellant appeared reluctant to have XXXX testify, and when she was finally reached, she too appeared reluctant. She then provided testimony that was inconsistent with her own letter with respect to a key issue-how the Appellant came to Canada. Further, the Appellant's own evidence was inconsistent with respect to her phone contact with XXXX. [58] The RPD did not err by giving little weight to XXXX testimony. Even if the RAD would show no deference here, it would reach the same conclusion based on its own review of the evidence. [59] The RPD did not err in rejecting the Appellant's refugee claim on the basis of identity. The Appellant did not produce acceptable identity documents, and her testimony with respect to identity-related issues-such as her travel to Canada-was also lacking in credibility. She rejected a suggestion by the RPD to obtain a St. Lucian passport, which would have helped greatly in establishing her identity. [60] The Appellant's identity was not established by documents, nor was it established by credible testimony. For these reasons, her refugee claim could not succeed. [61] Finally, the RAD notes that the Appellant asks, in her Memorandum, for a "special extension of time" to "cover the possibility of a future release of the Appellant's birth certificate by the CIC-Etobicoke/application for a passport to the St. Lucian embassy".36 It is unclear how long an extension the Appellant seeks, or what further steps she is taking to secure the original birth certificate. [62] The Appellant's refugee claim was rejected on June 25, 2015. Although the Appellant did not perfect her RAD appeal within the time limits prescribed by the Regulations, the RAD allowed the Appellant's request for an extension of time to perfect her appeal, and in fact deemed it perfected some weeks after the Appellant's record was filed. Further time has now passed, and the Appellant has given no indication of whether the documents she awaits are forthcoming. [63] The Appellant has asked for an extension for an unspecified period of time for the "possibility of the future release" of a document she awaits. The RAD has already provided the Appellant with an extension of time. The panel is cognisant of the objectives of Canada's refugee protection system, one of which is to provide fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of that system.37 The RAD is also subject to time restrictions in rendering its decisions.38 The RAD is therefore not prepared to provide an indefinite extension to await documents that may not even be forthcoming. CONCLUSION [64] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant has not established her identity and is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld October 29, 2015 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 154, Memorandum, para. 10. 2 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected"; see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-6711-13), Gagné, 28 October 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 3 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 4 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, July 22, 2015, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 5 Deri v. M.C.I., (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55. 6 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R., para. 16. 7 See Cyril, Edward v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3081-14), Brown, September 22, 2015, 2015 FC 1106, para. 13. 8 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R. 9 Ibid., Raza, paras. 13-15. 10 The presumption of consistent expression holds that "it is presumed that the legislature uses language carefully and consistently so that within a statute or other legislative instrument the same words have the same meaning and different words have different meanings." Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008), at pp. 214-215. 11 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014, 2014 FC 494, para. 45. 12 Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, paras 17-18. 13 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-6711-13), Gagné, 28 October 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 56. 14 See also Khachatourian, Robert v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4928-14), Noèl, February 13, 2015, 2015 FC 182, para. 37. 15 Singh, para. 55. 16 Singh, para. 58. 17 Deri, para. 56. 18 For example, Oluwole, John v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6525-14), Southcott, August 14, 2015, 2015 FC 953, paras. 10 and 39; Ismailov, Dilshod v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6839-14), Strickland, August 13, 2015, 2015 FC 967, para. 59; Denbel, Bekelech v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3827-14), Mosley, May 13, 2015, 2015 FC 629, paras. 40-44. 19 For example, Shukurov, Sharof v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6058-14), Fothergill, August 6, 2015, 2015 FC 949, para. 26; Ajaj, Firas Salem Munef v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5604-14), Gascon, July 28, 2015, 2015 FC 928, paras. 61-63; Ching, Wai Kheong v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1272-14), Kane, June 9, 2015, 2015 FC 725, para. 56; and Khachatourian, Robert v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4928-14), Noèl, February 13, 2015, 2015 FC 182, para. 37. 20 Niyas, Mohamed Zayan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6829-14), Locke, July 17, 2015, 2015 FC 878, para. 27. 21 Denbel, Bekelech v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3827-14), Mosley, May 13, 2015, 2015 FC 629, para. 43. 22 Cyril, Edward v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3081-14), Brown, September 22, 2015, 2015 FC 1106, para. 13. 23 There is a great deal of support for this view. "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence": Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004), at 17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministry of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33, at para. 64. 24 Cupid, Keturah Laverne v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-1737-06), Snider, February 16, 2007, 2007 FC 176, paras. 4, 25, and 26. 25 IRPA, s. 112(b.1). 26 Singh, para. 53. 27 Liu, Yanfen v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4384-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007, 2007 FC 831, para. 18. 28 See Raza at para. 13.4; also David Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 3d ed. (Irwin Law, 2002) at 24: "Evidence is relevant where it has some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would appear to be in the absence of that evidence." 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 14-36. 30 X (Re), 2015 CanLII 19235 (CA IRB). 31 Reference to this type of evidence is made in Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no., IMM-6711-13), Gagné, 28 October 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para. 55. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 158, Memorandum, para. 24. 33 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 161, Memorandum, para. 31. 34 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Reasons, para. 9. 35 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, p. 53, Birth Record. 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 154, Memorandum, para. 10. 37 IRPA, Section 3(3)(2)(e). 38 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (SOR/2002-227), Section 159.92. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-07301