MB4-01263

RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB4-01263 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision - Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered/heard at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision September 24, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Me Alain Bissonnette Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Antonino Manglaviti Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION I. INTRODUCTION [1] XXXX XXXX, the appellant, who is a citizen of Turkey, is appealing against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), alleging that it rendered a decision based on errors in its assessment of his fear of having to do his military service. II. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) dismisses the appeal and confirms the determination of the RPD, namely that XXXX XXXX is not a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. III. BACKGROUND A. Basis of the claim [3] In the form entitled Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), which he signed on September 10, 2013, the appellant states that he is a citizen of Turkey, born on XXXX XXXX, 1984, of the Alevi faith; he does not specify the languages he speaks, but requests a Turkish-speaking interpreter for his hearing, and indicates that at that time, his mother, father, two sisters and a brother were living in Turkey, one of his sisters was in Germany, and his spouse was in Cyprus.1 [4] In his BOC Form, the appellant states that he is half Kurdish and half Turkish, as his father is Kurdish and his mother is Turkish. He also states that he is of the Alevi faith and that since childhood, he has had problems because of his mixed ethnicity and his beliefs, which left him with psychological scars. He also states that, during his studies, he had to hide his origins, but that after a former friend revealed his origins, he was seriously beaten, and that he completed his studies a few months later than expected.2 [5] In his BOC Form, the appellant states that, on XXXX XXXX, 2013, he took part in a demonstration in XXXX, that he was taken to the police station with other demonstrators, and that he was held until the following day. He also states that he was beaten by four police officers.3 [6] In his BOC Form, the appellant states that, on XXXX XXXX, 2013, he left Adana for the Republic of Cyprus where, one month later, he took part in demonstrations in Mersin, and that he was again arrested and detained. He also states that he was beaten and tortured by police officers, then eventually released since the police officers had no evidence with which to charge him.4 [7] In his BOC Form, the appellant states that he applied for and obtained his American visa in XXXX 2013, that he left Turkey on XXXX XXXX, 2013, and that he arrived in New York City on the same day and remained there for 28 days while looking for a way to cross the Canadian border, knowing that refugee protection claims in the United States of America were not as easily allowed as in Canada. He also states that, on XXXX XXXX, 2013, he went as far as Plattsburgh by bus; then, he went to the border between Canada and Vermont by taxi, crossed the border on foot and, with the help of a taxi driver, reached the home of a friend whose address he had.5 [8] In addition to his BOC Form, the appellant submitted a few documents as evidence before the RPD.6 B. RPD decision [9] The hearing before the RPD was held on November 7, 2013, and the decision to reject the refugee protection claim was rendered on November 18, 2013.7 [10] In its reasons for decision, the RPD indicates that credibility was the determinative issue.8 [11] The RPD first found, regarding his fear of doing his military service should he return to Turkey, that the appellant, then referred to as the claimant, had not established, on a balance of probabilities, that he had been granted a stay for his military service, or that he had been summoned by the army to do his military service. The following is its reasoning on the matter: [translation] 18. ...As mentioned in the documentary evidence, an undergraduate student may be granted a stay until they reach the age of 29. However, the claimant failed to conclusively establish that he was still a student, since he states in his BOC Form that he completed his studies in 2006. Based on the above-mentioned objective documentary evidence, the panel is of the opinion that the claimant could not have obtained a passport that was valid for 10 years if he was about to fulfill his military duties. 19. Given that the claimant failed to mention in his BOC Form that he was still a student in order to avoid military service, given that he was issued a passport that was valid for 10 years, and given the absence of documents from military authorities, the panel does not believe that the claimant did not do his military service, or that he is being sought by military authorities.9 [12] Regarding his fear of being persecuted or his risk of being subjected to mistreatment or to risks to his life, the RPD found that the appellant had given confusing and vague testimony regarding his agents of persecution when he stated that he was illegally sought after, but that he was able to attend to his normal routine since the end of his studies in 2006 and to travel freely.10 [13] While acknowledging the existence of discriminatory treatment of Kurds, in light of the documentary evidence, the RPD found that the reforms undertaken by the Turkish government represent a step forward on the road to better protection of human and minority rights in Turkey, in spite of the fact some of these reforms are not entirely implemented or that they are subject to restrictions.11 [14] While acknowledging the existence of discriminatory treatment of the Alevis, in light of the documentary evidence, the RPD found that the government in power since 2007 has initiated a dialogue with the members of that community and organized workshops for the purpose of meeting their needs.12 [15] As a result, after identifying the appellant's personal characteristics, it concluded: [translation] 30. The claimant's profile is one of a person of mixed origins, with a Kurdish father and a Turkish mother. He does not speak Kurdish and states that he does not practise his Alevi faith. He also states that he is not a member of any political party or organization. He was able to study and obtain a university degree. Then, he was able to work as an XXXX in his country, as soon as he had completed his studies. He was able to travel freely and without difficulty between Turkey and Cyprus, as evidenced by the many stamps in his passport. He did not demonstrate that he is targeted in his country or associated with public figures, that he publicly supports separation, or that he is involved in politics or tied to the PKK. As shown in the documentary evidence, there is no systematic oppression of Kurds and Alevis.13 [16] On the appellant's fear of being persecuted by reason of his political opinion, the RPD finally ruled that he was not credible-first, given a contradiction in his testimony regarding whether or not he was examined by a doctor after being injured during a demonstration;14 second, given the fact that the appellant changed his testimony regarding the issue of whether or not he had consulted a lawyer to help him report the abuse to the police;15 third, given the fact that the appellant provided inconsistent answers regarding when he decided to leave his country;16 and fourth, given the fact that the appellant did not file a refugee protection claim in the United States of America, even though he stayed there for 28 days.17 [17] It therefore concluded: [translation] 39. In short, the accumulation of contradictions, adjustments, omissions and inconsistencies mentioned above, which were not satisfactorily explained, compel the panel to find that the claimant lacks credibility.18 C. Grounds of appeal and decision sought [18] In his memorandum, the appellant argues that the RPD rendered a decision based on errors in its assessment of his fear of having to do his military service.19 [19] In his memorandum, the appellant indicates that, at the outset of his hearing before the RPD, he mentioned his fear of returning to Turkey because he had not done his military service.20 To counter the RPD's reasons and conclusions rejecting the possibility that he could have obtained a stay of over six years before being obliged to do his military service and that he could have obtained a passport without fulfilling his military obligations,21 he submitted two documents related to his status regarding his military service. [20] The first of these documents is dated January 31, 2014, and indicates that there is no constraint upon his military service, since the date he stopped his studies was January 18, 2012, and the possible date of his military enlistment was February 4, 2015.22 [21] The second is dated January 31, 2014, and it is a notification requesting him to report for military service on February 3, 2015.23 [22] The appellant argues that these two documents are important and confirm that, contrary to the RPD's finding, he did not do his military service, that he wants to make it known that he is a conscientious objector on this matter, and that, in light of the documentary evidence, the treatment of Kurds during military service and the non-recognition of conscientious objection in Turkey justify that his refugee protection claim be allowed.24 [23] The appellant is requesting that the RAD allow his appeal, set aside the RPD's determination and allow his claim for refugee protection, or refer the matter to the RPD, or hold a new hearing before the RAD.25 IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL A. The appellant presented evidence on appeal [24] In his memorandum, the appellant indicates that the two documents in question26 were not available at the time of the hearing before the RPD on November 7, 2013.27 B. Test for admissibility [25] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA states that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim for refugee protection or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. It should be noted that the time limit referred to in subsection 110(4) is the rejection of the appellant's refugee protection claim, not the hearing before the RPD. A party who wants to provide a document as evidence after a hearing but before a decision takes effect may make an application to the RPD.28 110. (4) On appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. 110. (4) Dans le cadre de l'appel, la personne en cause ne peut présenter que des éléments de preuve survenus depuis le rejet de sa demande ou qui n'étaient alors pas normalement accessibles ou, s'ils l'étaient, qu'elle n'aurait pas normalement présentés, dans les circonstances, au moment du rejet. [26] The Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules) require that the record of the person who is the subject of the appeal must contain, among other documents, a written statement indicating whether the appellant is relying on any evidence referred to in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, as well as a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding how this evidence meets the requirements of that subsection and how it relates to the appellant.29 [27] On the basis of the thorough analysis carried out by my colleague Edward Bosveld on this issue,30 I share his opinion that similarities and distinctions must be made between subsection 110(4) and paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA, the latter of which concerns new evidence that is admissible in a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA). In other words, I find that some adjustments are needed to the factors developed in the case law concerning PRRAs, in particular in Raza.31 To the criteria specifically mentioned in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, which refer directly to the time the evidence came into existence or to the time the facts to which it refers took place, should be added others that concern the value of the evidence submitted, namely, its credibility, relevance and materiality. C. The RAD's finding on the admissibility of this evidence [28] The two documents that the appellant submitted in support of his appeal are dated January 31, 2014,32 that is, over two months after the appellant's refugee protection claim was rejected. That being said, according to the case law, the newness of documentary evidence cannot be tested solely by the date on which the document was created. What is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the documentary evidence.33 [29] It should then be determined whether the appellant has established that this evidence was not reasonably available for presentation to the RPD before it rejected his refugee protection claim or whether it proves a fact that was unknown to him at the time of the hearing.34 [30] The two documents originate from the military division of the ministry of national defence of the Republic of Turkey and contain information about the appellant's military service commitments in that country and his obligation to report to military authorities on February 3, 2015, in order to complete enlistment procedures. [31] Consequently, I find that these documents meet the statutory test set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. [32] That being said, their credibility, relevance and materiality have yet to be assessed. [33] With regard to the later criterion, I find that the documents in question contain information that is material enough to affect the outcome of the appeal.35 [34] But are they credible? To determine whether evidence is credible, its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence must be considered.36 The case law also states the following: "Evidence may lack credibility for a variety of reasons; it may be vague, unreliable or self-serving."37 In my view, at this point in the appeal proceeding, I see nothing in these documents that would lead me to doubt their credibility. [35] Regarding their relevance, in my opinion, these documents contain relevant information about the appellant's military obligations in his country of origin. Consequently, they are relevant to this appeal.38 [36] Therefore, I find that these documents must be found admissible in the context of this appeal. They can be referred to under A-1 and A-2. V. HEARING BEFORE THE RAD A. The appellant requested a hearing [37] The RAD Rules require that the record of the person who is the subject of the appeal must contain, among other documents, a written statement indicating whether the appellant is requesting that a hearing be held under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, as well as a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding why the RAD should hold such a hearing, if the appellant is requesting that a hearing be held.39 [38] In his memorandum, the appellant asks for a hearing to possibly be held before the RAD.40 In this respect, it is appropriate to point out that pursuant to subsection 110(3) of the IRPA, the RAD generally proceeds without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD: 110. (3) Subject to subsections (3.1), (4) and (6), the Refugee Appeal Division must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the Refugee Protection Division, and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and the person who is the subject of the appeal and, in the case of a matter that is conducted before a panel of three members, written submissions from a representative or agent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and any other person described in the rules of the Board. 110. (3) Sous réserve des paragraphes (3.1), (4) et (6), la section procède sans tenir d'audience en se fondant sur le dossier de la Section de la protection des réfugiés, mais peut recevoir des éléments de preuve documentaire et des observations écrites du ministre et de la personne en cause ainsi que, s'agissant d'une affaire tenue devant un tribunal constitué de trois commissaires, des observations écrites du représentant ou mandataire du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les réfugiés et de toute autre personne visée par les règles de la Commission. B. Tests under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA [39] Pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, when evidence presented on appeal is found to be admissible, it should be determined whether it raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal, whether it is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim and whether it would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. If so, the RAD may then hold a hearing. 110. (6) The Refugee Appeal Division may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3) (a) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; (b) that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (c) that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. 110. (6) La section peut tenir une audience si elle estime qu'il existe des éléments de preuve documentaire visés au paragraphe (3) qui, à la fois : a) soulèvent une question importante en ce qui concerne la crédibilité de la personne en cause; b) sont essentiels pour la prise de la décision relative à la demande d'asile; c) à supposer qu'ils soient admis, justifieraient que la demande d'asile soit accordée ou refusée, selon le cas. C. There is cause to hold a hearing before the RAD [40] In this case, I found that the two documents dated January 31, 2014, constitute new evidence, respectively marked A-1 and A-2, that is admissible in this appeal. [41] As I indicated earlier, at face value at least, these documents originate from the military division of the ministry of national defence of the Republic of Turkey, and contain information about the appellant's military service commitments in that country and his obligation to report to military authorities on February 3, 2015, in order to complete enlistment procedures. Consequently, I find that these documents raise a serious issue with respect to the appellant's credibility regarding his fear of having to do his military service in his country of origin, Turkey. [42] Moreover, I find that this evidence can be considered central to the decision, given that, in its reasons for decision, the RPD found that the appellant had failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that he had obtained a stay for his military service, or that he was summoned by the army to do his military service.41 [43] For these reasons, I find that there is cause to hold a hearing before the RAD. [44] For this hearing, I find that it will first be necessary to analyze how the appellant obtained these documents and whether they are really authentic, as well as their content. The appellant will then have to be questioned about the reasons his obligation to do his military service creates in him a serious fear of persecution, should he return to live in Turkey. [45] The hearing was held on Friday, September 19, 2014. VI. APPROACH TO BE TAKEN IN THIS APPEAL [46] In the appellant's memorandum, his lawyer indicates neither the standard of review or intervention nor the approach to be adopted in this appeal. [47] In my opinion, the arguments raised by the appellant concern the assessment of the evidence, which constitutes a question of fact or a question of mixed fact and law. [48] In the specific context of this administrative appeal, as a member of RAD, I must be careful to avoid conducting a type of judicial review. In fact, in two decisions rendered in July 2014, the Federal Court made the following clarifications: 29. Parliament conferred a true appellate function on the RAD, a specialized (if not overspecialized) tribunal, which sits on appeal of the decisions of another administrative tribunal. Contrary to a court exercising a superintending and reforming power over public bodies, the RAD's primary responsibility is to ensure the integrity and consistency of proceedings before the RPD and to reduce needless duplication of proceedings (including before the Federal Court). When analyzing a decision of the RPD, the RAD must not merely determine whether it was made in a reasonable manner, but, rather, analyze whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error (Housen, above). 30. "Palpable and overriding error" is often used interchangeably with the "clearly wrong" or "unreasonable" decision test. However, this is the appellate-level standard of intervention that a specialized appeal tribunal such as the RAD must apply when reviewing a decision and not the judicial review standard of reasonableness. Even though there are similarities, these standards are different... 34. The Court agrees that the RPD, as the tribunal of first instance, is owed a measure of deference with regard to its findings of fact, and of fact and law. The RPD is better situated to draw such conclusions as it is the tribunal of first instance, the trier of facts, having the advantage of hearing testimony viva voce (Housen, above). However, the RAD must nonetheless perform its own assessment of all of the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error.42 [49] In another decision of the Federal Court rendered on August 22, 2014, it was found that a standard of review analysis is not an appropriate analytical approach in an appeal before the RAD; rather, such factors as the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the relevant statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate appeal regimes should be examined.43 Having analyzed these factors, the Court concluded that the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal, which requires it to review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the refugee protection claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.44 [50] That being said, according to this latter decision, when the RAD conducts an assessment as part of the administrative appeal, "it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a 'palpable and overriding error'."45 [51] In a decision rendered on September 10, 2014, the Federal Court found that, in the case before it, the issue of a standard of review was not determinative because the RPD's dispositive finding concerned the refugee protection claimant's credibility and that the RAD was right to show deference in view of such a finding.46 [52] The Federal Court decisions that I just cited contain distinctions that will be refined or attenuated in subsequent decisions of the Federal Court or of the Federal Court of Appeal. Nevertheless, in light of these decisions, I find that, in this case, I must avoid implementing a standard of review such as that of reasonableness, which is specific to the context of a judicial review. That being said, I also find that I must conduct my own assessment of all the evidence, analyze all aspects of the RPD decision and come to an independent assessment as to whether the appellant is a refugee or a person in need of protection. Lastly, I find that a measure of deference is owed to the RPD's findings regarding issues of credibility or regarding any other issue where it enjoys a particular advantage, which does not apply when it is a matter of interpreting questions of law or analyzing the documentary evidence on country conditions. VII. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [53] Having read all the reasons for the RPD decision, the evidence submitted before the RPD and the arguments contained in the appellant's memorandum of appeal, and having taken into consideration the appellant's testimony given at the hearing held in my presence regarding the two documents analyzed at that time, I have arrived at the conclusion that the appellant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. I will explain why. A. What weight should be given to the two documents submitted as evidence in this appeal? [54] According to the case law, it is clearly established in law that it is the task of the trier of fact to weigh the documentary and testimonial evidence and to draw conclusions as to whether the evidence is sufficient, either to establish the identity of a refugee protection claimant or to establish the other components substantiating their claim.47 To do so, it is not bound to request an expert's report.48 [55] Moreover, in light of paragraph 171(a.3) of the IRPA, I find it appropriate to affirm that the onus is on the appellant to submit "credible" or "trustworthy" documents in order to establish his identity as well as the other components supporting his refugee protection claim. [56] During the hearing held in the course of this appeal, the appellant was asked several questions regarding the reliability of documents A-1 and A-2. First, how did he obtain these documents? Second, are these documents authentic or forged-or, in other words, false? [57] Regarding how he obtained these documents, the appellant stated at the hearing before the RAD that his father had sent him the documents by mail in March 2014 and that, in February 2014, his father had received the two documents at his home. When asked to explain why the documents in question had been sent to his father's address, the appellant replied that in Turkey, his official address since his birth has been the one where his parents live, that this has been the case since his birth and that all official documents are sent to that address. During the hearing, the appellant also stated that a person's official address remains the same until he or she changes it and that, if a person goes to work or study somewhere other than their official address, this does not change their official address and that documents originating from the authorities are always received at the official address. He also stated that he had never requested that his official address be changed. [58] When asked to specify where the envelope in which he received the documents that his father had sent him in March 2014 was, the appellant replied that he threw it out. When asked to specify where the envelope in which his father received the documents that the Turkish authorities had sent him in February 2014 was, the appellant replied that he did not know. [59] In my view, I find that the absence of envelopes in which the documents in question were allegedly forwarded to both the appellant's father and the appellant himself creates doubt regarding the authenticity of the documents, even though such doubt is insufficient to arrive at a conclusion on the matter. [60] Moreover, when confronted with the fact that the address appearing in the second of these documents (A-2: summons requiring him to report on February 3, 2015, to do his military service) is not his official address, but rather that of his home in Cyprus, the appellant replied that in Turkey, there are two types of addresses: the official address and the one where one lives. I find that this is not a reasonable explanation since the appellant stated that authorities in Turkey always communicate by using the person in question's official address, namely, in his case, not the address where he lived in Cyprus, but that of his parents. [61] When also confronted with the fact that on the original version of the first document (A-1: the one indicating that there is no constraint upon his military service), there is no letterhead set apart from the body of the text that could clearly show that this was an official document, the appellant replied that this is the way things are done in Turkey. [62] When confronted with the fact that, on the letterhead that appears in that document and that could have simply been created from a basic computer, the Republic of Turkey is not mentioned and only the initials T.C. are shown, the appellant explained that this is the way things are done in Turkey. [63] When confronted with the fact that, again on the same document, the mark that was made on the original by a seal dipped in ink was practically illegible and did not clearly show that this was a mark made with a seal belonging to Turkish military authorities, the appellant simply stated that he did not know why this was the case. [64] According to the case law, documents purporting to be issued by a foreign jurisdiction are entitled to the presumption of the truth of their contents, unless there are valid reasons to reject them.49 As a rule, an official document contains a certain number of security features, such as an official seal or a letterhead. In its assessment of the weight to be given to documents submitted as evidence, the administrative tribunal in question must make an effort to verify their authenticity, namely, by examining their seals and other security features.50 [65] In my view, having raised my concerns about the security features of the two documents in question, and having considered the answers given by the appellant on this matter, I arrive at the conclusion that these are not official documents bearing reliable security features. Although the appellant submitted these documents as authentic documents, I must instead conclude that the evidence was forged-or, in other words, that these are false documents. Consequently, they cannot be given any value. B. The content of the two documents [66] During the hearing before the RAD, the appellant was asked other questions regarding the content of documents A-1 and A-2, which were submitted in his appeal and previously found admissible. This was done even though, according to the case law, an administrative tribunal is not obliged to conduct further assessment of a document when there is enough evidence to discredit its authenticity.51 [67] When asked to explain why document A-1 refers merely to the faculty of administration rather than to the university in question, the appellant simply explained that the faculty of administration was part of a university that is registered in Adana, and that he had taken courses XXXX XXXX at that university from 2010 to 2012. When asked to explain how the military authorities could have known that he had studied in this way at that university, the appellant replied that the military authorities are in contact with the schools. When confronted with the fact that, in the IMM 5669 form, he had not mentioned that he was a student in 2010, 2011 and 2012, the appellant replied that that document asks about only those studies that led to a diploma. In my opinion, that explanation is unreasonable since question 8 on that form requests details about the nature of a person's activities, such as whether the person was a student, without the requirement that a diploma be obtained. Consequently, I find that this omission undermines the appellant's credibility on the issue of whether or not he was actually studying in 2010, 2011 and 2012. [68] When asked why he had not submitted as evidence documents that could have corroborated his statements that he had been a student during that period, the appellant replied that in December 2013 or January 2014, he called the school, but he was asked to go there in person. When asked to explain why he had not simply submitted as evidence documents that were in his possession, such as marks he obtained, or assignments or documents he used during his studies XXXX XXXX, the appellant replied that he had not kept them. I find that the appellant's explanations are not reasonable, first because he himself had offered to provide such documents during his hearing before the RPD, and second, because it is implausible that university representatives would refuse to issue a document confirming that he was indeed a student in 2010, 2011 and 2012, simply because he was not on site to make the request. Consequently, in a context where the appellant's credibility has already been undermined, I find that the absence of documents that could corroborate his statements that he was a student during that period also undermines his credibility regarding this matter. [69] When asked to explain why, between January 18, 2012 and early May 2012, while he had stopped his studies and was still working and living in Turkey, the military authorities had not asked him to do his military service, the appellant first replied that he did not know. He then added that he could postpone his military service to the end of 2012, even though he had stopped studying on January 18, 2012. When asked to specify the source of this information and whether he had documents from the military authorities indicating that his military service had been postponed to the end of 2012, even though he had stopped his studies on January 18, 2012, the appellant replied that he had no documents. In my view, the appellant adjusted his testimony during the hearing, which again undermines his credibility. I also find that, given the appellant's own testimony to the effect that the military authorities were immediately informed of his status at the universities, it is more likely than not that they would then have asked him to do his military service. Moreover, I find that the absence of a document that could corroborate his statements that his military service was postponed during that period further adds to the other previously identified problems. Considering all these credibility problems and the fact that the appellant submitted as evidence before me documents that were false, I arrive at the conclusion that he is generally not credible. C. To what extent and why does the appellant fear persecution as a member of the Kurdish minority performing his military service or as someone refusing to do his military service? [70] In view of my conclusion with respect to the appellant's general credibility, I find that it is neither useful nor necessary for me to pursue any further my analysis of the appellant's fear of being persecuted within the context of his military service because he belongs to the Kurdish minority or because he refuses to do his military service. In other words, I absolutely do not believe the appellant's allegations regarding this matter. [71] In this context, the documentary evidenced related to individuals who belong to the Kurdish minority and who perform their military service or the evidence regarding individuals who refuse to do their military service cannot be of any benefit to him. It is undoubtedly appropriate to point out at this time that the documentary evidence on country conditions alone does not establish a well-founded fear of persecution or a personalized risk to the life of a refugee protection claimant from that country. This person must also demonstrate a connection between that documentary evidence and their personal situation.52 Within the context of his appeal, given his credibility problems, the appellant clearly failed to establish that necessary link between his personal situation and the documentary evidence. D. Analysis of the other reasons contained in the RPD decision [72] In his memorandum, the appellant did not argue that, aside from the issue of his fear of having to do his military service should he return to Turkey, the RPD decision contained any errors.53 [73] I have carefully read all of the RPD's reasons for its decision. And I clearly noted that the RPD based itself on the sum of a certain number of contradictions, adjustments and inconsistencies in the appellant's testimony to arrive at the conclusion that he lacked credibility. [74] In addition, under subsection 107(2) of the IRPA, the RPD could undoubtedly have mentioned that there is no credible basis for this claim for refugee protection insofar as the appellant failed to submit any credible or trustworthy evidence on which it could have based a favourable decision. [75] In this appeal, having heard the appellant testify regarding two documents that I found admissible but that, following a detailed analysis, seem to me to be false, and having identified other issues regarding his credibility, I have arrived at the conclusion that the appellant is generally not credible. I also find that his appeal is clearly fraudulent, since it is based on documents submitted as authentic, whereas the documents are false. [76] In the circumstances, after my own assessment of all the evidence, and after a review of all aspects of the RPD decision, it is hardly surprising that I arrived at the conclusion that the appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. VIII. CONCLUSION [77] For these reasons, I confirm the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX is not a "Convention refugee" within the meaning of section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. [78] The appeal is dismissed. Alain Bissonnette Me Alain Bissonnette September 24, 2014 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), pages 22, 272, 274 and 275 of the RPD record. 2 Idem, page 276 of the RPD record. 3 Idem, page 277 of the RPD record. 4 Idem, pages 277 and 278 of the RPD record. 5 Idem, page 278 of the RPD record. 6 The list of these documents is reproduced on page 244 of the RPD record. As for the documents themselves, they are reproduced on pages 245 to 265 of the RPD record. 7 RPD decision, pages 6 to 17 of the RPD record. 8 Idem, paragraph 11, page 8 of the RPD record. 9 Idem, paragraphs 18 and 19, page 11 of the RPD record. 10 Idem, paragraph 22, page 12 of the RPD record. 11 Idem, paragraph 25, page 13 of the RPD record. 12 Idem, paragraph 26, page 13 of the RPD record. 13 Idem, paragraph 30, page 14 of the RPD record. 14 Idem, paragraphs 31 and 32, pages 14 and 15 of the RPD record. 15 Idem, paragraphs 33 and 34, pages 15 and 16 of the RPD record. 16 Idem, paragraphs 35 and 36, page 16 of the RPD record. 17 Idem, paragraphs 37 and 38, page 16 of the RPD record. 18 Idem, paragraph 39, page 17 of the RPD record. 19 Appellant's memorandum, April 18, 2014, pages 18 to 22 of the appeal record. 20 Idem, paragraph 15, page 19 of the appeal record. 21 Idem, paragraphs 16 to 21, page 20 of the appeal record. 22 Idem, paragraph 26, page 21 of the appeal record. 23 Idem, paragraph 25, page 21 of the appeal record. 24 Idem, paragraphs 28, 29 and 30, page 21 of the appeal record. 25 Idem, pages 21 and 22 of the appeal record. 26 The two documents in question are reproduced on pages 14 to 17 of the appeal record. 27 Appellant's memorandum, paragraphs 24 and 27, page 21of the appeal record. 28 RPD Rules, SOR/2012-256, rule 43. 29 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257, subrule 3(3). 30 Decision rendered on March 26, 2014, in file TB3-08678, paragraphs 6 to 35; 2014 CanLII 33085 (CA IRB). 31 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), No. A-11-07, Sharlow, Linden and Ryer, December 26, 2007; 2007 FCA 385. 32 The two documents in question are reproduced on pages 14 to 17 of the appeal record. 33 Decision rendered by my colleague Edward Bosveld on March 26, 2014, in file TB3-08678, paragraph 25; 2014 CanLII 33085 (CA IRB). Also see Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), No. A-11-07, Sharlow, Linden and Ryer, December 26, 2007; 2007 FCA 385, paragraph 16. 34 Decision rendered by my colleague Edward Bosveld on March 26, 2014, in file TB3-08678, paragraph 28; 2014 CanLII 33085 (CA IRB). 35 Idem, at paragraphs 17 to 21 and 33. Also see Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), No. A-11-07, Sharlow, Linden and Ryer, December 26, 2007; 2007 FCA 385, paragraph 13. 36 Idem, paragraph 31. Also see Raza, paragraph 13. 37 Mosavat v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), No. IMM-6385-10, Snider, June 6, 2011; 2011 FC 647, at paragraph 13. 38 Decision rendered by my colleague Edward Bosveld on March 26, 2014, in file TB3-08678, at paragraph 32; 2014 CanLII 33085 (CA IRB). 39 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257, subrule 3(3). 40 Appellant's memorandum, page 22 of the appeal record. 41 RPD decision, paragraphs 11 and 13, page 6 of the RPD record. 42 Eng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7281-13, Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 711, at paragraphs 29, 30, and 35. Garcia Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7218-13, Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 702, at paragraphs 28, 29 and 33. 43 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6362-13, Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799, at paragraphs 43 to 45. 44 Idem, at paragraph 54. 45 Idem, at paragraph 55. 46 Njeukam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7280-13, Locke, September 10, 2014; 2014 FC 859, at paragraphs 18 and 19. 47 Fritzner Julien v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-4886-09, Boivin, March 31, 2010; 2010 FC 351, at paragraph 37. 48 Kazadi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-4740-04, de Montigny, February 24, 2005; 2005 FC 292, at paragraph 12. 49 Cao v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-8396-11, Mactavish, June 5, 2012; 2012 FC 694, at paragraph 15. 50 Ru v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), IMM-4746-10, Russell, July 26, 2011; 2011 FC 935, at paragraphs 47, 48 and 49. Zheng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-240-08, Tremblay-Lamer, July 16, 2008; 2008 FC 877, at paragraph 18. 51 Gasparyan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No IMM-3496-02, Kelen, July 10, 2003; 2003 FC 863, at paragraph 7. 52 Morales Alba v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (No. IMM-3943-07), Shore, October 29, 2007; 2007 FC 1116, at paragraphs 31 and 32. 53 Appellant's memorandum, April 18, 2014, paragraphs 18 to 22 of the appeal record. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 RAD 25.02 (April 9, 2013) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB4-01263 2