MB6-05710

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB6-05710 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision March 6, 2017 Date de la décision Panel Me Maria De Andrade Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Claude Whalen Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant, XXXX XXXX, a citizen in India, is appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), which rejected his refugee protection claim by determining that is he is not a "Convention refugee" or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). [2] The appellant submitted no new evidence within the meaning of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The appellant is asking the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to allow the appeal, set aside the determination made and allow his claim for protection or refer his case to the RPD, or to hold a new hearing before the RAD. [3] The Minister did not intervene on appeal. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [4] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX is not a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. [5] The appeal is dismissed. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [6] The appellant is originally from the village of XXXX XXXX, in the Hoshiarpur district of Punjab. Since XXXX 2014, he had been operating a XXXX XXXX business in the village market. [7] In the Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), the appellant alleges that he had a friendship with a client named XXXX XXXX, whom he trusted. He learned that his friend was a baptized Sikh who supported the creation of an independent state for Sikhs in Punjab. [8] On XXXX XXXX, 2015, XXXX XXXX settled in front of his business to spread propaganda supporting Khalistan. The appellant asked him to stop spreading propaganda in front of his business, and the conversation became heated. Fearing that the situation would deteriorate, the appellant contacted the police. When they arrived, XXXX XXXX had left the scene. [9] After that incident, the appellant began receiving threatening calls. He informed the police, who, instead of helping him, accused him of associating with XXXX and terrorists. [10] The appellant alleges that on XXXX XXXX, 2015, he escaped an attack in which he was threatened with death if he ever helped the police to arrest XXXX XXXX. He reported the incident to the police. [11] The appellant alleges that the police questioned XXXX parents about their son and that his parents stated that the only person with information about him was the appellant. [12] On XXXX XXXX, 2015, the police summoned the appellant to the police station to identify suspects. The claimant did not identify anyone. Believing that the appellant was making fun of them, the police arrested, detained and tortured him for two days. He was released on XXXX XXXX, 2014, thanks to the intervention of the village panchayat and his family. Afterwards, he was treated for two days. [13] The appellant contacted a smuggler to help him leave the country. On XXXX XXXX, 2015, an agent took him to Delhi and then to Mumbai. From there, he took a flight to Fiji, but the Fijian authorities returned him to India. He states that when he arrived in India, he remained in hiding in XXXX XXXX in the state of Himchaal Pradesh. He allegedly stayed in a gurdwara from XXXX 2015 until he left for Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2016. He claimed refugee protection on June 6, 2016. Impugned decision [14] On August 22, 2016, the RPD rejected the refugee protection claim. According to the RPD, the appellant's credibility is undermined by the following elements: [translation] The appellant stated that he had known XXXX XXXX since XXXX 2014 and that he had developed a friendship with XXXX, a regular client at his business until XXXX XXXX, 2015. In the RPD's view, the fact that the appellant was not able to state whether his friend was part of a political organization or whether he had had problems with the police undermines his credibility. The RPD found it not credible that XXXX XXXX, who did not hide his sympathies for the independence movement in Punjab, could have spread propaganda outside the appellant's store without being bothered by the police. The RPD found that the appellant offered vague, contradictory and not very spontaneous testimony on the threatening calls that he alleged he received. The RPD noted that the appellant did not write in the BOC Form that the police had questioned his brother about him in XXXX 2015. According to the RPD, the appellant was adjusting his testimony as the questions were put to him. The RPD drew a negative inference from the absence of documents demonstrating that he managed a business from XXXX 2014 to XXXX 2015. According to the RPD, those documents were accessible to the claimant through his father. The RPD considered the documents submitted as evidence and found that they are not sufficient or probative to offset the credibility issues that it raised. More specifically, the RPD noted that the affidavits are written in English, while the evidence does not allow for the conclusion that the affiants speak that language. [15] The RPD also found that the appellant has a viable and safe internal flight alternative (IFA) in Delhi or Mumbai, cities with millions of inhabitants and located hundreds of kilometres from his native village. Holding a hearing [16] In his memorandum, the appellant leaves it to the RAD's discretion whether to summon him for a hearing. The criteria to be considered for holding a hearing are set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. One criterion involves the submission of new evidence within the meaning of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. In Singh,1 the Federal Court of Appeal reiterates the principle that the RAD proceeds without holding a hearing. According to the Court, this principle "is subject to an exception only where the documentary evidence '(a) [...] raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; (b) [...] is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (c) [...] if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim.'" In this case, the appellant did not file any new evidence in support of his appeal. Consequently, the RAD cannot hold a hearing. GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND REMEDY SOUGHT The appellant's allegations [17] The appellant submits that the RPD erred in assessing his credibility. More specifically, he argues that it is unreasonable to blame him for his not knowing about his client's political activities. Moreover, according to him, the RPD has interpreted the evidence to state what it does not state. He did not spread propaganda in front of the appellant's business regularly, but only once. [18] The appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding that the photographs and bills submitted are insufficient to establish that he was managing a store. He argues that articles 196 and 197 of the UNHCR Handbook state that caution should be exercised before questioning a claimant's statements due to a lack of documents, and so he or she should be given the benefit of the doubt on that subject. [19] The appellant also submits that the RPD erred in finding that the medical certificate does not mention the cause of the injuries. According to him, the omission was reasonably explained. [20] With regard to the IFA, the appellant argues that the RPD erred by concluding that he does not have a profile of interest to the police because he was released after being detained for two days and he did not encounter problems when the Fijian authorities deported him to India. In his view, the evidence indicates that the authorities continued to be interested in him after he went into hiding in Delhi and Bombay. SCOPE OF THE APPEAL [21] The appellant presented no argument regarding the scope of the RAD's role in reviewing RPD decisions. [22] In Huruglica,2 the Federal Court of Appeal ruled on the scope of an appeal to the RAD. Interpreting the legislative provisions and noting Parliament's intent in creating the RAD, Justice Gauthier notes the following: [98] The RAD was essentially viewed as the safety net that would catch all mistakes made by the RPD, be it on the law or the facts. [23] In Huruglica, the Federal Court of Appeal concludes: [103] I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable. [24] Questions of law must be reviewed by applying the correctness standard. The same is true for questions of mixed fact and law that raise no issue of credibility of oral evidence. [25] With regard to findings of fact or mixed fact and law that are based on an assessment of the credibility or the weight given to the oral evidence, there may be cases where the RPD enjoys an advantage over the RAD. With regard to the degree of deference owed to the RPD, the Court of Appeal states that the level of deference "owed in each case" varies and leaves it up to the RAD to develop its own case law. [26] Taking into account what has been decided, I will conduct an independent analysis of the evidence in order to formulate my own opinion regarding this refugee protection claim and determine whether the decision rendered by the RPD is well founded. If an error of fact, law or mixed fact and law was made, I will intervene using one of the means set out in sections 110 and 111 of the IRPA. MERITS OF THE APPEAL Credibility [27] The RPD first noted certain credibility elements. The assessment of credibility is a question of fact for which I find, generally speaking, that the RPD has an advantage over the RAD because it questions, sees and hears the witnesses. However, in the context of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), and considering the importance for refugee protection claimants of the decision that is rendered, I am of the opinion that this advantageous position enjoyed by the RPD because it questions, sees and hears claimants does not give it carte blanche or render it immune from any intervention by the RAD. The findings made must be based on all the relevant evidence; claimants' statements must not be viewed in isolation, without taking into account the cultural context or the evidence as a whole; and the findings must take into account the applicable jurisprudential principles. [28] The RPD found it curious that the appellant was not in a position to offer more details about his friend, who did not hide his sympathies for an independent state in Punjab. Added to this is the fact that the RPD doubts that XXXX could have come and gone from the business without encountering problems with the authorities when he was suspected of being a terrorist, going as far as spreading propaganda for Khalistan in front of the appellant's business. [29] The appellant argues that the RPD interpreted the evidence to state what it does not state. In his view, the RPD is speculating when it is surprised that XXXX was able to continue his activities without problems and that he could spread propaganda regularly in front of his business. He argues that the RPD's findings are unreasonable and cannot justify a negative credibility finding. The appellant submits that XXXX spread propaganda in front of the appellant's business only once, on XXXX XXXX, 2015. He adds that the evidence does not indicate what the police knew about XXXX. [30] With respect, I am not satisfied that the RPD believed that XXXX had spread propaganda regularly in front of the appellant's business. Rather, it seems to me that the RPD's findings regarding the truth of the alleged facts are based on the documentary evidence on the situation in Punjab. In that regard, the RPD pointed out that the documentation reveals that individuals suspected of being sympathizers of establishing Khalistan are regularly monitored and arrested.3 Taking that information into account, it does not seem wrong to me to be surprised or to doubt that a man suspected of being a terrorist could have come to and gone from the appellant's business, going so far as to publicly spread propaganda, on XXXX XXXX, 2015, without being bothered by the police. [31] In listening to the recording of the hearing, I noted that, on several occasions, the appellant's testimony was vague and imprecise. Instead of answering the questions directly, he recited information in the BOC Form, such as when he was asked about the interest the police had in him and his friend XXXX. The same happened when he was asked to specify what he knew about his friend's activities. His testimony also seemed inconsistent to me when he was asked why the authorities had released him if he was suspected of having ties to terrorists. [32] When a witness does not answer questions directly, it undermines their credibility. I think that is what the RPD meant to say in this case. Omissions in the Basis of Claim Form [33] The RPD questioned the appellant's credibility due to the omission in the BOC Form that in XXXX 2015, the police questioned his brother about him and about XXXX XXXX. [34] The appellant submits that that omission in the BOC Form is not, on its own, sufficient to conclude that he is not credible. [35] I agree. That element alone is not sufficient to conclude that a refugee protection claimant is not credible; however, the omission of a fact from the BOC Form does allow for a conclusion that that fact has not been established on a balance of probabilities. That is the case here. In my opinion, it has not been established that in XXXX 2015 the police questioned his brother about him. It is also worth noting that the RPD considered a number of factors before seriously questioning the appellant's credibility. Threats by telephone [36] The RPD noted that the appellant's testimony lacked spontaneity and that it was vague and contradictory in relation to the telephone threats that he alleged he received between XXXX and XXXX 2015. The appellant put forward no argument in this regard. [37] I listened to the recording of the hearing and I agree with the analysis conducted by the RPD on the quality of his testimony. The appellant first stated clearly that he had received anonymous threatening telephone calls about twice a week and that that is what prompted him to leave his village on XXXX XXXX, 2015. His testimony was difficult when he was asked whether he had received threats in XXXX 2015. Although he ended by stating that he had received threats in XXXX, he also stated that, when he returned from Fiji and telephoned his home, he was told that he had received threatening calls in XXXX 2015. That manner of testifying certainly undermines his credibility and raises doubt as to his allegations about the threats.4 Probative value of the documents [38] The appellant filed Exhibit P-7,5 a letter dated June 14, 2016, supposedly signed by an Indian lawyer. On the topic of that letter, the RPD noted that the document filed was not an original and that the lawyer did not mention that the appellant had been arrested, detained and tortured by the police. When asked to explain the absence of the original letter and the omission of material facts, the appellant did not answer the questions put to him.6 This undermines his credibility. [39] To corroborate the facts alleged, the appellant filed three affidavits under P-5, P-6 and P-9:7 one from his village sarpanch, another from his parents, and the last one from XXXX village sarpanch. The RPD found those affidavits to be insufficient and not probative enough to offset the credibility issues it raised. More specifically, the RPD noted that the affiants' statements are in English, while the appellant stated that those individuals do not speak English. Furthermore, those affidavits are not accompanied by any mention indicating that the content had been translated to the declarants. [40] The appellant provided no submissions concerning that RPD finding. [41] The RPD was correct in making such a finding. Even if the RPD or the RAD is not bound by any legal or technical rules of evidence, it is not sufficient to file statements for which it is almost impossible to determine who the author is and, therefore, that the content is correct, especially in a country where the use of false documents is not unusual. Documents to attest to his business [42] The appellant filed exhibits P-10 and P-11,8 photographs and an invoice to attest that he was operating a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX business. The RPD found those exhibits to be insufficient to corroborate that he owned such a business. Asked whether he had other documents that could establish that he was operating a business, the appellant answered that he did, but that they were at the business. Considering that his father is still in the village and that he has access to the business, the RPD found that the explanations provided to justify the lack of more probative documents undermined his credibility. [43] The appellant submits that the RPD should have given him the benefit of the doubt. [44] Article 196 of the UNHCR Handbook stipulates that the benefit of the doubt can be given when a refugee protection claimant is generally credible. In this case, it is clear that the RPD doubted the credibility of the facts as alleged. Consequently, it did not err in not giving the appellant the benefit of the doubt. [45] The Refugee Protection Division Rules state: The claimant must provide acceptable documents establishing their identity and other elements of the claim. A claimant who does not provide acceptable documents must explain why they did not provide the documents and what steps they took to obtain them.9 [46] The courts have determined that: Rule 7 emphasizes the importance of establishing the claimant's identity and claim. It does not impose any absolute requirement upon a claimant to furnish such documents but it requires a claimant who does not furnish documents establishing identity and other elements of the claim to explain why they were not able to obtain them.10 [47] In my opinion, the RPD did not err in determining that exhibits P-10 and P-11 do not establish that the appellant operates a business in his village. Although corroborating evidence is not always necessary, the refugee protection claimant bears the burden of establishing his allegations on a balance of probabilities. When he makes no effort to obtain documents, the RPD can draw a negative inference from the lack of reasonable efforts. That is the case here; the appellant did not testify that he had made such efforts. [48] Overall, these reasons are sufficient to reject the appeal, as the appellant has not discharged his burden of establishing, on a balance of probabilities, the facts at the heart of his refugee protection claim. Consequently, he has not established that there is a serious possibility of persecution by reason of imputed political opinion, or that he is likely to be subjected to one of the risks set out in sections 97(1)(a) and (b) of the IRPA, if he were to return to India. Internal flight alternative [49] The RPD also concluded that the appellant could relocate safely elsewhere in the country, particularly in Mumbai or Delhi, densely populated cities located far from his native village, and that it would not be unreasonable for him to do so, taking into account his personal situation and his profile. [50] The IFA is a question of mixed fact and law that is reviewable on the standard of correctness when it does not raise an issue relating to the credibility of oral evidence.11 Two-pronged test for the internal flight alternative [51] The case law has developed a two-pronged test to determine whether an IFA exists. First, the location chosen for the IFA must be safe. In terms of a claim based on one of the five Convention grounds, the test is whether there is a serious possibility of persecution in the locations identified as possible IFAs-in this case, the RPD identified Mumbai and Delhi. Second, it must not be objectively unreasonable for a refugee protection claimant to seek refuge there.12 First prong of the internal flight alternative: Safety of the proposed locations [52] In its analysis of the first prong of the IFA test, the RPD considered the following factors: * Regarding his fear of militants (linked to or friends of XXXX), the RPD noted that the claimant did not allege a fear that those individuals can or want to search for him in a large city in a country with a population of more than one billion. * With respect to the police, the RPD noted that the documentary evidence varied as to the effectiveness of the police in locating persons of interest throughout the country. * The RPD considered the tenant registration system and pointed out that the evidence is not very explicit about the verification methods used by the police. * The RPD is of the opinion that the appellant has not established that his name appears on a list of wanted persons, or that he is of any interest to the authorities. He was released after two days without any charges being laid against him or any arrest warrant issued against him. * The appellant's family was not arrested and his brother was not questioned after XXXX XXXX, 2015. * He is not part of a political organization and he has not participated in or supported the activities of an organization engaged in acts of subversion or militancy. * The Indian authorities did not seize his passport obtained on XXXX XXXX, 2015. He also left India for Fiji and returned to India without any particular problems with airport security. He left India a second time in XXXX 2016 to travel to Canada and encountered no particular problems. [53] The appellant submits that the RPD erred in concluding that he would not be sought throughout the country. According to him, the authorities are able to track him down, among other things, through the tenant registration system; the manner in which checks are made is not relevant. [54] He also submits that the RPD's finding that he is not a person of interest to the police because there is no arrest warrant against him and because he was released after two days' detention is unreasonable. He was arrested and detained, and the police continued to be interested in him after he went into hiding in Delhi and Bombay. The fact that he could re-enter India without difficulty, after having been deported from Fiji, is not relevant. [55] The appellant argues that the information in the various responses from the IRB Research Directorate indicates that police officers from different states are working together to locate people. He adds that even if the panel is of the opinion that India has no national infrastructure for police communication, the panel acknowledged that, according to some sources, the police has the capacity to locate people throughout the country. This confirms the effectiveness of the police and the lack of an IFA for him. [56] I have carefully examined all the documentary evidence and, in particular, the arguments presented. With respect, I am of the opinion that the appellant did not establish that Delhi or Mumbai are not safe places for him. Here is why. [57] In India, there is no national police force. The police forces are under each state's jurisdiction and their conditions of work are more than deplorable. Contrary to what the appellant alleges, the documentary evidence is not unanimous on the collaboration between the various police forces and their effectiveness. In that regard, Tab 1.13 of the national documentation package states the following: ...Since each of the states and union territories has its own police force, police competencies, training and conduct would vary to an extent from one state to another. The US State Department 2013 Human Rights Report confirmed, "The effectiveness of law enforcement and security forces varied widely throughout the country." [58] A report published by Human Rights Watch indicates the following:13 ...There is just one civil police officer for every 1,037 Indian residents, far below Asia's regional average of one police officer for 558 people and the global average of 333 people. ...Police infrastructure is crumbling. Decaying, colonial-era police stations and posts across India are stocked with antiquated equipment and lack sufficient police vehicles, phones, computers, and even stationery. ...Police performance is severely undercut by the inadequacy of training.... In parts of India, in-service training is extremely infrequent. ...Human Rights Watch, in a report dated February 2011, stated that "India still lacks a nationwide crime database, leaving state police stations as "virtually unconnected islands". [59] The appellant submits that the RPD acknowledged that, according to some sources, the police has the capacity to locate individuals throughout the country by collaborating with the authorities in other states. According to him, the RPD's acknowledgment of the authorities' capacity in that regard confirms the effectiveness of the police in tracking down those individuals. [60] With respect, I believe that the particular context of each case and the profile of the individual being sought must be taken into account. Even if the police forces could communicate with one another by telephone or by other means, the evidence indicates that the networks in place for sharing information are deficient. A response prepared by the IRB Research Directorate dated May 10, 2016, indicates that some projected communication systems have not even been put into operation despite information to the contrary. It states as follows: ...an assistant professor with the Centre for Criminology and Sociolegal Studies at the University of Toronto, who has conducted research on policing in India, stated that communication methods such as fax, phone, email and databases "may be used to varying degrees by various departments," however, to her knowledge, "there is little inter-state police communication except for cases of major crimes like smuggling, terrorism, and some high profile organised crime." According to information posted on the website of the Kerala Police Department, police stations across India are "virtually unconnected islands in the case of Crime & Criminal Tracking. There is no system of effective data storage ... sharing and accessing data," and there is "no single system" by which a police unit can "talk to another directly." [61] Other sources consulted states that the Indian authorities want to put in place a Crime and Criminal Tracking Network Systems / Réseau de suivi de crimes et de criminels (CCTNS). ...at the national level, the goal of the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS) project is to create "an IT enabled system" that will allow police stations to "talk to [one] another directly" (ibid.). In a 2015 article, India Today, a news magazine, reported that "CCTNS had its origins" in POLNET [1] (India Today 25 Nov. 2015). According to the source, POLNET "never took off," nor did "its successor, the CCTNS" (ibid.). According to the Indian Express, a daily newspaper, "over 11,600 police stations countrywide are now using the CCTNS software to register FIRs [First Information Reports]" (20 Nov. 2015). Without providing further details, the India Today article states that "[o]nly six states have so far implemented the CCTNS network in all police stations," which is [j]ust the ... first stage in getting all police stations to file FIRs online.... [emphasis by the RAD] According to the lawyer, "CCTNS is being used, but not to the fullest" (10 Apr. 2016). According to sources, the initial deadline for completing the CCTNS project was 2012, which was then extended to 2015, and has now been extended to March 2017 (India Express 20 Nov. 2015; India Today 25 Nov. 2015). [62] That information and all the evidence on the record, when considered overall, lead me to conclude that it is not likely that the appellant would be found elsewhere in India, particularly in the proposed IFAs. My understanding of the evidence is that the authorities could conduct searches in another state in exceptional cases; the appellant had not established that that was the case for him. Tenant registration system [63] It is unlikely that the appellant would be found through the tenant registration system. The documentary evidence indicates that in some Indian cities, there is a mandatory tenant registration system. A response prepared by the IRB Research Directorate indicates that that is the case in Mumbai and Delhi.14 Moreover, a representative of Voices for Freedom (VFF) states: ...there are "no written procedures" pertaining to how police verify information, but stated that she "presumes" that information is cross-referenced with lists of wanted persons....records are "checked and cross-checked," "[o]nly in cases of serious incidents of crime, more particularly in cases of terrorism, drug peddling and any such similar crime."15 [64] The legal representative from VFF added that "'a lot' of landlords do not register their tenants, and added that compliance to tenant registration varies from state to state. She also said that the legal requirement to register tenants 'may be stringently applied' in some states, such as Jammu and Kashmir, Manipur, Punjab and Tamil Nadu."16 [65] Another source consulted by the IRB Research Directorate stated that "tenant registration in Delhi, Mumbai, Bangalore and Kolkata 'is a legal requirement, but voluntary. There are no penal consequences if someone does not register his/her tenants.'"17 [66] In this case, the appellant's name is not on a list of wanted persons, nor does the evidence establish that there is an arrest warrant for him or a police report (First Information Report, FIR). The appellant left India twice, in XXXX 2015 and in XXXX 2016, without any particular problems, even though the evidence indicates that there are strict security measures at the airport and that the authorities can seize an individual's passport when the integrity or security of the country is at issue.18 [67] The RPD stated that it does not believe that the claimant would have been released if he had been of interest to the police. I share that point of view. It is important to bear in mind all the documentary evidence and the country's context. Although the situation in Punjab is not what it was in the 1990s, issues relating to terrorism in India are serious. If the appellant were suspected of having ties to terrorists, it is at the very least curious that the authorities released him. Like the RPD, I am of the opinion that if the appellant had the profile of a person being sought throughout India because he was suspected of having ties to XXXX, a terrorist, it is reasonable to believe that he would have been kept in detention. [68] Considering all this evidence, I am of the opinion that the appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that Mumbai or Delhi would not be safe locations for him. Second prong of the internal flight alternative: Is it objectively unreasonable for the appellant to relocate to the proposed locations? [69] The documentary evidence indicates the following: [1.2.9] Internal relocation to another area of India is generally viable. [2.4.1] The US State Department 2013 Human Rights Report, published in February 2014, recorded: The Law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, emigration and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights. [70] The courts have indicated on many occasions that the standard for finding that an IFA is unreasonable is rigorous. In Ranganathan,19 the Federal Court of Appeal states: The threshold for the unreasonableness of an IFA is a very high one. It requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area. In addition, it requires actual and concrete evidence of such conditions. The absence of relatives in a safe place, whether taken alone or in conjunction with other factors, can only amount to such condition if it meets that threshold, that is to say if it establishes that, as a result, a claimant's life or safety would be jeopardized. [71] In this case, the appellant did not establish any "actual and concrete evidence of such conditions" in the locations identified. For this reason, I consider that the appellant did not establish that the IFA would "jeopardize [his] life and safety." [72] For these reasons, having considered all the evidence before me, formed my own opinion of the merits of the refugee protection claim, considered the arguments presented and reviewed the impugned decision, I am of the opinion that the RPD's findings are supported by the evidence that was before it and that they took into account the applicable jurisprudential tests. CONCLUSION [73] For these reasons, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX is not a "Convention refugee" or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. [74] The appeal is dismissed. Maria De Andrade Me Maria De Andrade March 6, 2017 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 2 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 3 National Documentation Package (NDP) on India, May 31, 2016, Tab 4.4: Treatment of members and supporters of the Shiromani Akali Dal (Amritsar/Mann) party, particularly those who speak publicly about the treatment of Sikhs by the Indian authorities or those who call for the creation of Khalistan (a separate homeland for Sikhs); whether members are monitored by the police for signs of links with terrorism (March 2009-April 2012), IND104058.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, April 30, 2012. 4 CD of the hearing, 50:30. 5 Refugee Protection Division record, page 257 6 CD of the hearing, 37:12 to 42:38. 7 Supra, footnote 5, pages 254 to 256 and 259. 8 Ibid., pages 260 and 261. 9 Refugee Protection Division Rules (SOR/2012-256), S.C. 2001, c. 27. 10 Uppal, Harminder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-6808-05), Pinard, September 29, 2006, 2006 FC 1142. 11 Supra, footnote 2. 12 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589, [1993] FCJ No. 1172 (QL). 13 NDP on India, May 31, 2016, Tab 1.13: Country Information and Guidance: India: Background information, including actors of protection, and internal relocation, United Kingdom, Home Office, February 2015, footnote 67. 14 NDP on India, May 31, 2016, Tab 14.8: India: Requirements and procedures for tenant registration, including implementation, particularly in Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and Bangalore (2009-April 2013), IND104372.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, May 9, 2013. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 NDP on India, May 31, 2016, Tab 14.7: India: Reports of police and government authorities seizing passports of political dissidents or suspected terrorists to prevent their departure from India (2010-May 2016), IND105496.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, May 15, 2016. 19 M.C.I. v. Ranganathan, Rohini (F.C.A., No. A-348-99), Létourneau, Sexton, Malone, December 21, 2000. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ N° de dossier de la SAR / RAD File No.:MB5-02458 RAD.25.02 (2014.09.11) Disponible en français RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB6-05710 17 RAD.25.02 (7 février 2014) Available in English