MB7-02249

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB7-02249 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision September 4, 2019 Date de la décision Panel Me Maria De Andrade Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Charlemagne Mfera Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] The appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX a citizen of Ukraine, is appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting her claim for refugee protection on the grounds that she did not establish in a credible manner several key elements of her claim and that she has an internal flight alternative (IFA) in Kiev. [2] To corroborate her allegations, the appellant included exhibits P-1 to P-17 in her memorandum of appeal. She requests that these documents be accepted as new evidence and that her claim for refugee protection be referred to another RPD member for an oral hearing under subsection 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act1 (IRPA). [3] The appellant submits that the RPD erred in the interpretation of facts, thereby committing errors in the assessment of her credibility. She also submits that the RPD erred in the examination of the IFA by failing to consider the exceptional situation in eastern Ukraine. [4] After examining all of the evidence, I accept Exhibit P-15 as new evidence. The other exhibits are not admissible as new evidence because they do not meet the criteria in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and the criteria implicitly established by case law. [5] Although I do not agree with the manner in which certain aspects of credibility were addressed, I find that it has not been established that the decision is erroneous. The IFA examination is correct; it is a determinative issue. [6] The appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [7] The appellant is a XXXX from the city of Luhansk, located in the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine. Since 2014, there has been armed conflict in the region of Donbass between Russian-speaking separatists who control the region and the Ukrainian government forces trying to reclaim the territory. The separatists control the region of Luhansk, which has declared itself the "Luhansk People's Republic." [8] The facts as alleged in the Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form) are summarized as follows: * While on a business trip to China in March 2001, she met XXXX XXXX XXXX a Ukrainian who would become her common-law partner. They opened two stores together. As XXXX, they were subject to extortion from members of the mafia who controlled business activities in the city of Luhansk; * In 2014, the situation in Luhansk deteriorated. The separatists took control of the city, prisoners were released and they spread terror by extorting XXXX; * After returning from a trip to Lithuania with her partner in June 2014, she saw that the separatists had closed one of her stores. They demanded that she give them money if she wanted her two other businesses to remain open. At that time, several XXXX were being extorted and people were being raped; * Faced with insecurity, the appellant and her partner moved to Vilnius, Lithuania; * On October 28, 2015, upon returning from a trip to Moscow, the appellant saw an incoming text message on her partner's cellphone. After noticing other text messages, she realized that he was having an affair with a Moscow woman he had met on the Internet in May 2015. After seeking an explanation and saying that she would not tolerate the situation, her ex-partner allegedly beat her and threatened to kill her. She also wanted him to return the money she had invested in the businesses; * The next day, he locked her in the house for the entire day. That is when she contacted a childhood friend who lives in Canada and encouraged her to come visit. So, without informing her partner, the appellant travelled to Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2015. The day after her arrival, she telephoned her partner, who threatened to kill her; * On November 20, 2015, the appellant contacted her partner again to see if they could resolve their conflict, but he told her that he did not want to see her again and that he would not return the money she demanded, and he threatened to kill her if she were to go see him. Impugned decision [9] On February 16, 2017, the RPD rejected the claim for refugee protection because it did not believe the appellant's claims that she had been beaten and threatened by her partner or that he would target her should she return to Ukraine. With regard to her fear on the grounds of insecurity in the Donbass region because of the conflict pitting the Russian-speaking separatists against the Kiev government, the RPD determined that the risk is a generalized risk. Lastly, the RPD concluded that the appellant has an IFA in Kiev. Appellant's arguments [10] The appellant submits that this decision is erroneous because it is [translation] "based on errors of fact in the assessment of the evidence and in the interpretation of the risk of persecution and mistreatment." [11] The appellant also submits that the RPD erred in suggesting Kiev as a possible IFA and that it did not take her particular situation into consideration. Specifically, relying on exhibits P-11 and P-13 submitted as new evidence, she argues that the RPD erred in describing the city of Kiev as being [translation] "Russified." She believes that the RPD also erred in failing to consider that the appellant, a Russian-speaking Ukrainian from the east, would not be able to freely rent an apartment or find a job in another city as other Ukrainians would. ISSUES [12] The appellant raises the following questions: * Did the RPD err in assessing credibility? * Did the RPD err in concluding that the appellant has an IFA in Kiev? SCOPE OF THE APPEAL [13] Except in cases where the credibility of oral evidence is at issue and the RPD has a meaningful advantage, the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) must determine whether the RPD's decision is correct.2 If I must show deference to the RPD because it has a meaningful advantage, I will indicate this in my analysis. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE [14] The following documents were included in the appeal record.3 P-1: Appellant's letter in support of her appeal application; P-2: Letter from the organization "Entraide ukrainienne de Montréal inc.," March 22, 2017; P-3: Statement from Ms. XXXX XXXX. and from Mr. XXXX XXXX XXXX March 12, 2017; P-4: Letter from Ms. XXXX XXXX., March 10, 2017; P-5: Letter from Ms. XXXX XXXX, March 10, 2017; P-6: "Ukraine bans Russian Films in media war," www.bbc.com, April 21, 2016; P-7: "Ukraine bans 38 Russian 'hate' books amid culture war," www.bbc.com, August 11, 2015; P-8: "Attack at pro-Russian Ukraine's Inter TV Chanel," www.vectornews.eu, September 7, 2016; P-9: Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017 (events of 2016); P-10: "Parler russe ou ukrainien? Question plus politique que jamais en Ukraine" [speak Russian or Ukrainian? a question more political than ever before], www.huffingtonpost.fr, March 10, 2014; P-11: "Ukraine : le refus par le peuple du russe comme deuxième langue" [Ukraine: population rejects Russian as second language]; Atlantico.fr, July 11, 2012; P-12: "La Rada interdit la langue russe et nomme un extrémiste nationaliste procureur général d'Ukraine" [Rada bans the Russian language and appoints extremist nationalist as prosecutor general of Ukraine]; http://lemonderusse.canablog.com, February 25, 2014; P-13: " Ukraine : la Rada abroge la loi sur le statut du russe" [Ukraine: Rada repeals act on the status of Russian]; www.sputniknews.com, February 23, 2014; P-14: "Nouvelle loi linguistique en Ukraine : 'Un génocide de la langue russe'" [new language law in Ukraine: "genocide of the Russian language"], www.sputniknews.com, January 23, 2017; P-15: "Russe interdit : en Ukraine, un projet de loi contre l'usage du russe dans le domaine public" [Russian banned: in Ukraine, bill against the use of Russian in public]; www.lecourrierderussie.com, March 1, 2017; P-16: "Russie : certains livres interdits en Ukraine" [Russia: certain books banned in Ukraine]; lefigaro.fr, December 30, 2016; P-17: Procedure for obtaining a propiska, Response to an information request, Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) Research Directorate, UKR42598.E, May 5, 2004. [15] For analysis purposes, I divided the documents into two categories. [16] Firstly, exhibits P-2 to P-5 are letters in support of the appeal application. Their dates are subsequent to the rejection of the claim for refugee protection. [17] Secondly, with the exception of exhibits P-1 and P-15, which I will examine separately, I noted that exhibits P-6 to P-16 are newspaper articles from the Internet that describe the situation in eastern Ukraine between 2012 and January 2017. In this category, I am including Exhibit P-17, which is a response from the IRB Research Directorate dated May 5, 2004. [18] Aside from Exhibit P-15, the documents submitted are not admissible as new evidence, for the following reasons. [19] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. The Federal Court of Appeal4 states that: ... the RAD must always ensure compliance with the explicit requirements set out in this provision. It was also reasonable for the RAD to be guided, subject to the necessary adaptations, by the considerations made by this Court in Raza. [20] The criteria in Raza are credibility, relevance, newness and materiality. As for the last criterion, Justice De Montigny states in Singh that there may be a need for some adaptations to be made by the RAD. [21] Rule 3 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules5 (RAD Rules) provides that the appeal record must contain a statement indicating whether the appellant is relying on any evidence referred to in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Furthermore, the appellant's memorandum must include full and detailed submissions regarding how the documentary evidence referred to in paragraph (e) meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and how this evidence relates to her. Appellant's submissions [22] Despite the numerous exhibits provided, the submissions in the memorandum are trivial. Page 6 of the memorandum reads: [translation] " ... the evidence corroborates our observations and demonstrates that the panel's interpretation and assessment of the facts are false." Exhibit P-1 [23] Exhibit P-1 is a statement by the appellant submitted in support of the appeal. She summarizes the key facts of her claim and the reasons why she fears returning to Ukraine. Her statement does not refer to new facts that would have arisen since her claim for refugee protection was rejected or that were not in evidence before the RPD. Consequently, this statement is not admissible as new evidence within the meaning of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Exhibits P-2 to P-5 [24] The burden of establishing that this is new evidence that meets the criteria set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA falls on the appellant. [25] Exhibits P-2 to P-5 have dates subsequent to the rejection of the claim. They are letters in support of the appellant. They indicate that she was abused by her ex-partner. However, it is not the document's date of creation that determines the newness of the evidence, but rather the evidence the document intends to confirm. In this case, the exhibits are intended to corroborate facts that allegedly arose before the claim for refugee protection was rejected. [26] Specifically, Exhibit P-2, dated March 22, 2017, is a letter of support from the president of "Entraide ukrainienne de Montréal" and was prepared following their meeting, which took place after the claim for refugee protection was rejected. It appears that the letter's signatory does not have personal knowledge of the problems the appellant claims to have experienced. As for the other general information about violence against women in Ukraine, it is similar to that found in section 5 of the National Documentation Package. [27] The statements in exhibits P-3 to P-5 only corroborate the appellant's claims that, prior to her arrival in Canada, she was having problems with her partner. However, the submissions presented on appeal do not explain why these letters were not reasonably available or were not submitted to the RPD before the claim for refugee protection was rejected on February 16, 2017. [28] I note that the hearing before the RPD was held on February 9, 2016, and the RPD rejected the claim for refugee protection on February 16, 2017. It seems to me that this is a long enough time frame in which the appellant could have produced several of these documents. Furthermore, the evidence on the record shows that after the hearing, the appellant sent the RPD additional documents. Exhibits P-6 to P-16 [29] Exhibits P-6 to P-16 are newspaper articles published between 2012 and January 2017, which is several months to several years before the claim for refugee protection was rejected. These articles are general in nature and discuss the conflict in eastern Ukraine during the period that preceded the rejection of the claim for refugee protection. Again, the appellant did not provide submissions to explain why these newspaper articles were not brought to the RPD's attention prior to the rejection of the claim. [30] Furthermore, some of the information in them was in evidence before the RPD. For example, Exhibit P-14, which was published on January 23, 2017, reads: [translation] "The Russian language has no official status in Ukraine. However, according to a recent Gallup poll, 83% of Ukrainians prefer using Russian in daily life."6 This information also appears in Exhibit P-3, which was in evidence before the RPD.7 Exhibit P-17 [31] Exhibit P-17, a response from the IRB Research Directorate dated May 5, 2004, cannot be admitted as new evidence. As with the other documents, the appellant did not provide submissions to explain why this document, which discusses the procedure for obtaining a propiska in Ukraine, was not submitted to the RPD. Moreover, I note that the RPD had a more recent response on the same topic, namely response UKR104122.E, dated December 3, 2012, at Tab 14.4 of the National Documentation Package on Ukraine dated July 31, 2015. Exhibit P-15 [32] I admit as new evidence Exhibit P-15, an article from the Internet published on March 1, 2017, after the claim for refugee protection was rejected. This article follows the evolution of the conflict to restrict the influence of the Russian language in education and in the public sphere since Ukraine's independence in 1991. Although most of the content refers to facts that existed before the claim was rejected, it meets the legislative tests since it addresses a new stage in the conflict, the fact that parliament is examining [translation] "a bill against the use of Russian in the public domain." This new development is relevant and meets the criteria in Raza. [33] However, this article's admissibility in evidence is not sufficient for me to hold an oral hearing. This new evidence does not meet the requirements of subsection 110(6) of the IRPA since it does not represent an issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal and would not justify setting the determination aside. ANALYSIS [34] On appeal, I considered the Chairperson's Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (the Guideline). [35] The appellant's fears are expressed as follows: * She claims to fear her ex-partner, who lives in Lithuania; * She states that she cannot return to the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine for reasons of instability due to the ongoing conflict; and * She cannot live elsewhere in Ukraine as she would be persecuted because she is from the eastern part of the country. Credibility [36] The RPD's credibility findings can be summarized as follows: * The appellant's oral and written statements are contradictory with regard to how she discovered that her partner had a mistress; * When the appellant was questioned about whom she feared should she have to return to Ukraine, the testimony she gave before and after the break was different; * The contradictions between the oral and written statements on the closing of her businesses lead to the conclusion that they had not been closed as alleged; and * Considering that the evidence shows that she has been the sole owner of the company since February 7, 2014, the RPD found that it was not credible that her ex-partner would threaten her because she sold her shares in the business in December 2015, while she was in Canada. Fear of her ex-partner [37] The appellant allegedly fears her ex-partner, who allegedly abused her in October 2015 after she discovered that he was having an affair with a woman living in Moscow. [38] The RPD found that the appellant did not credibly establish her claims regarding the incident of October 2015 because her oral and written statements were different. At the hearing, the appellant stated that she had read only one text message, while her BOC Form indicates that she had seen several text messages. [39] The memorandum outlines several jurisprudential principles concerning the credibility assessment, in particular that [translation] "even if there are inconsistencies and exaggerations, the panel must assess the evidence that is credible and render a decision on the claim based on the evidence." [40] I am not satisfied that an error was made. Given the inconsistency between the oral and written statements, doubt was raised in the mind of the decision-maker. Different testimony before and after the break [41] The RPD concluded that, when the appellant was asked about whom she feared should she have to return, her statements before and after the break were different. [42] The appellant submits that this conclusion is erroneous. [43] After listening to the recording of the hearing, I do not agree that the appellant's statements were different. However, I believe that the appellant can be criticized for not having spontaneously stated that she feared her ex-partner should she return to Ukraine. [44] In this matter, I noted that, after a series of questions regarding the extortion of which she was allegedly a victim in her business activities, when asked if she feared other people, the appellant responded that she feared criminals who controlled the occupied territory. She added that her ex-partner lives in Lithuania and that he too is afraid to return to Ukraine. Fear of her partner because she sold the business [45] At paragraph 53, the RPD found that it [translation] "does not believe the claimant's allegations that her ex-partner threatened her because she sold her company after her arrival in Canada." [46] On appeal, it is submitted that [translation] " ... the panel did not grasp the fact that the death threats made by her partner ... were not made because he now has a new mistress ... , but rather because he did not want to see her again since he has no interest in reimbursing the appellant her share of the funds invested in the businesses .... " [47] I am surprised by the arguments submitted on appeal since, at the hearing, the appellant stated that Roman (her ex-partner) did not threaten her because she sold the business. [48] Exhibit D-3 shows that the appellant has owned all of the shares in the company since February 2014. [49] Contrary to what the RPD writes at paragraph 51, the appellant's statements, as well as exhibits D-9 and D-10 filed after the hearing, show that the appellant had sold 100 shares in the company, Alkost, which represents 20% of the share capital.8 Therefore, she did not sell the entire business. [50] As a whole, these elements lead me to conclude that the appellant did not establish her claims that there is a serious possibility that her partner would target her because she sold shares in the company. [51] Lastly, the RPD accepted the appellant's statements that her partner had a new companion in his life and that the remarks made during the telephone call in November 2015 indicate that he had ended their relationship. [52] I have no reason to conclude that the RPD erred in its conclusion. Conflict-related risks in the Donbass region [53] The RPD concluded that the risk associated with the armed conflict and the risk of extortion in the Donbass region because she is a merchant who is able to pay off criminals are generalized risks. [54] Paragraph 68 of the memorandum indicates that [translation] " ... the appellant stated on many occasions that she fears returning to Ukraine because of the circumstances that led her and her partner to flee from the city of Luhansk for Lithuania; this fear remains justified on the grounds that this civil war situation persists in eastern Ukraine." [55] I agree with the RPD. The appellant did not establish that she fears returning to her native region by reason of one of the five Convention grounds. At the hearing, the appellant stated that the problems began in the spring, at the same time as the turmoil. Criminals who were part of a militia were posing as police officers and demanding money from XXXX. She paid money on two occasions. The other XXXX also paid money.9 She also stated that everyone was afraid. According to her statements, June 2014 was a perilous time to be walking around the city: [translation] "Airplanes were flying over the city. It was scary. We packed up our belongings and left."10 [56] With regard to the appellant's statements that she fears being raped because she is a woman, this statement alone is not sufficient to conclude that there is a serious possibility of persecution or of a personalized risk. In assessing the evidence, I noted that her daughter and her sister continue to live in Luhansk.11 However, the appellant did not mention to the panel any problems they have experienced on account of their gender. Closure of her stores [57] The RPD found that inconsistencies between the appellant's oral and written statements regarding the closure of her businesses undermined her credibility. [58] The RPD noted that the BOC Form indicates that in June 2014, upon returning from a trip to Lithuania, the appellant learned that one of her stores had been closed by separatists and that they demanded that she pay them if she wanted her two other businesses to remain open. Yet at the hearing, she stated that upon returning from her trip, her three businesses had been covered with the same types of signs on the doors. [59] The appellant did not submit specific arguments against this finding. [60] It is fair to say that the oral and written statements are different. In listening to the recording of the hearing, I noted that, when the appellant was asked about the steps she had taken after realizing that her businesses had been closed, her oral and written statements were also different. [61] In the BOC Form, the appellant states that, after they saw the signs posted on the business, she and her partner went to the ministry of agriculture. When asked at the hearing if she had gone to a particular place, she initially stated no, but when confronted with her BOC Form, she changed her testimony to state that she had gone to an office in the shopping centre. These discrepancies undermine her credibility. INTERNAL FLIGHT ALTERNATIVE [62] In addition to the credibility problems, the RPD assessed the IFA while taking into account the two-pronged test identified by the Federal Court of Appeal. The RPD decided that the evidence failed to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that there is a serious possibility of persecution or that the appellant is likely to be subjected to one of the risks outlined in section 97 of the IRPA should she have to relocate to Kiev, or that it would be unreasonable in her case for her to relocate there. [63] The RPD considered it unlikely that her partner would track her down. The RPD was of the opinion that her ex-partner did not want to see her again. The RPD also took into account the appellant's statements that her partner, who lives in Lithuania, fears returning to Ukraine. [64] The RPD then noted an extract from the documentary evidence indicating that Kiev is a city where a large part of the population speaks Russian, the appellant's mother tongue. This language remains an essential means of communication in formal and informal communication situations. For the RPD, being a merchant is not a fundamental right. The appellant is an educated woman and it would not be unreasonable in her situation for her to hold another job. [65] The appellant submits that the RPD's conclusions are erroneous. She alleges that being a member of the particular social group of [translation] "Russian speakers" from the east, the fact that she does not know Ukrainian, and the negative attitude toward Russian-speaking Ukrainians make the IFA unreasonable because she will not be able to find a job in Kiev. [66] The RPD did not err. I am basing this conclusion on the following points. First prong of the IFA: Safety in Kiev [67] The appellant did not establish the likelihood that her ex-partner could or would want to track her down in Kiev. The evidence indicates that he lives in Lithuania and fears returning to Ukraine. He began a relationship with another woman. He said in November 2015 that he was did not want to see her again. [68] The documentary evidence does not establish that Russian speakers from the east are at risk of persecution in Kiev. Second prong of the IFA: Is it unreasonable for her to relocate to Kiev? [69] The appellant claims that since her mother tongue is Russian, it would be unreasonable for her to relocate to Kiev. In addition, she would have difficulty finding a job because she is from the east. [70] At the hearing, the appellant stated that she speaks Ukrainian with an accent and that she has basic knowledge of the language.12 Exhibit P-15 admitted as new evidence shows that the language issue in Ukraine is a precarious and complex matter. Since Ukraine's independence and the "Orange Revolution," there has been pressure to increasingly introduce the Ukrainian language in the public sphere and downgrade the Russian language to a secondary role. The documentary evidence also indicates that Russian speakers are practically on par with Ukrainian speakers in Kiev. Tab 1.4 of the National Documentation Package discusses the matter: [Translation] In the capital, Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism is a necessity more so than in any other city since the number of Russian speakers slightly exceeds the number of Ukrainian speakers. Although Ukrainian has been elevated to the status of sole official language, this status has had only a minimal impact on the use of Ukrainian in Kiev which, as is well known, has been somewhat Russified over an extended period of time, even though some progress has been made since 1991, particularly in government and in educational institutions. On the whole, the Russian language in Kiev remains an essential means of communication in formal and informal communication situations, and ensures its predominance in professional environments, as well as via major cultural outlets, including the press and television. It can even be argued that Kievans are Russian speakers. There is no wrong way to speak Russian in Kiev, and there really is no ideal standard for "proper Russian." In general, it is best to know only Russian in Kiev, as opposed to just Ukrainian. Residence registration system [71] The appellant submits that it would be difficult for her to find employment and housing in Kiev because she is from the east. [72] Ukrainians can choose their place of residence. According to the documentary evidence: ... registration and cancellation of the previous place of residence can be done on the same day ... at the same State Migration Service office.... ... it is "illegal" to deny employment, refuse to provide medical care, and social support due to lack of residence registration.... ... "data related to the place of residence of an individual and other personal data is issued only in exceptional circumstances, foreseen by the legislation of Ukraine or in agreement with the individual himself"....13 [73] The appellant is an educated woman. She used to be a XXXX. But in addressing the life changes that an individual must make when they are threatened, the Federal Court of Appeal states: However, persons claiming to be in need of protection solely because of the nature of the occupation or business in which they are engaged in their own country generally will not be found to be in need of protection unless they can establish that there is no alternative occupation or business reasonably open to them in their own country that would eliminate the risk of harm.14 [74] Taking into account the appellant's particular situation, I conclude that it would not be unreasonable for her to find a job other than as a merchant. [75] The standard for concluding that an IFA is unreasonable is rigorous. The Federal Court of Appeal states: It requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area ... [and] actual and concrete evidence of such conditions.15 [76] It is possible that a move to Kiev would require some adjustments. However, the hardships of moving and resettlement are not the type of undue hardship that makes an IFA unreasonable. In this case, there is no actual and concrete evidence of the existence of conditions that would jeopardize the life and safety of the appellant in Kiev. CONCLUSION [77] For these reasons, I confirm the RPD's determination, namely that XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of the IRPA. [78] The appeal is dismissed. Maria De Andrade Me Maria De Andrade September 4, 2019 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Appellant's memorandum, page 26. 2 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 3 Appellant's memorandum, pages 48 to 126. 4 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 5 Refugee Appeal Division Rules (SOR/2012-257). 6 Appellant's memorandum, page 109. 7 Refugee Protection Division (RPD) record, page 210. 8 CD of the hearing, 2:55 to 3:03. 9 CD of the hearing, 1:17:47. 10 CD of the hearing, 1:09:56. 11 RPD record, page 33. 12 CD of the hearing, 21:03. 13 RPD record, pages 49 to 54. 14 Sanchez, Luis Miguel Trujillo v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FCA 99. 15 M.C.I. v. Ranganathan, Rohini (F.C.A., No. A-348-99). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB7-02249 14 RAD.25.02 (February 7, 2014) Disponible en français