MB5-04711

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB5-04711 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision June 27, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Me Louis Cousineau Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Perla Abou-Jaoudé Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant, XXXX XXXX, a citizen of Côte d'Ivoire, is appealing against the September 14, 2015, decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting his refugee protection claim. He is asking the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the RPD's determination and grant him status as a "protected person" or, alternatively, to refer the matter to the RPD for re-determination. [2] The appellant submitted a document that he argues is new evidence in accordance with subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), and the appellant is requesting that a hearing be held before the RAD. [3] The Minister did not intervene in the appeal, but he had intervened before the RPD. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [4] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the RPD's determination that the appellant is not a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. [5] The appeal is dismissed. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [6] In his Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), the appellant alleges that he is of the Dioula ethnic group and that his problems began during the 2010 presidential election. One day, while he was driving home, he was allegedly attacked in the street by individuals who were part of the Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FRCI). He allegedly lost consciousness. He reportedly received treatment in a hospital afterwards and was then transferred to another one for an operation, and he supposedly stayed there for three days. Then, he allegedly stayed in the village of XXXX XXXX XXXX for two to three months. [7] He then allegedly travelled back and forth between the village of XXXX XXXX XXXX and Abidjan, where his family supposedly joined him sometime later. He alleged that he did not stay long in Abidjan because he still felt threatened there. He also alleges that he was often stopped at roadblocks and asked to join the FRCI militia. He supposedly hid and lived here and there, and his wife purportedly often told him that people came looking for him. The appellant alleges that he left Côte d'Ivoire with the help of a smuggler who made him a passport and took care of everything because he does not know how to read or write. His wife apparently does not know that he is in Canada. [8] The appellant left Côte d'Ivoire on XXXX XXXX, 2015, with a Canadian visa issued on April 30, 2015. He claimed refugee protection in Canada on June 10. IMPUGNED DECISION [9] In its September 14, 2015, decision, the RPD rejected the refugee protection claim because the appellant's allegations lacked credibility, for the reasons summarized below: - There were several significant contradictions and omissions, including the following: a) With respect to the nature of the problems with the FRCI, particularly the existence of frequent threatening telephone calls, yet he testified that his only issues were repeated physical assaults and numerous visits from the FRCI at the family home; b) Also, there was no mention of the telephone calls in his BOC Form whatsoever; c) With respect to the repeated physical assaults, aside from the alleged assault in 2010, there was no mention of the other assaults he allegedly experienced afterwards at the hands of the FRCI; d) In light of the contradictions and omissions, the RPD did not believe that the alleged physical assaults, problems and threats took place. While the appellant may have scars, the RPD did not believe that they were the result of the physical assaults alleged by the appellant. The RPD granted no probative value to the photographs submitted showing the scars; - The documentary evidence does not support the appellant's allegations that people from the FRCI forcibly recruit individuals from northern Côte d'Ivoire, individuals of Dioula ethnicity, or individuals like the appellant who have the same surname as the current president of Côte d'Ivoire; - Contradictions undermined the appellant's allegations about the nature of his work in Côte d'Ivoire because the documentary evidence establishes that he is an artist, not a driver, as he stated; - Given the accumulation of contradictions and omissions that are central to his refugee protection claim, the RPD found that the appellant lacked overall credibility and did not believe any part of his story, and it granted no probative value to a letter from the appellant's spouse to the effect that the FRCI is still persecuting him. APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS [10] In her memorandum, the appellant's lawyer states that the RPD committed errors for the following reasons, as summarized below: - The RPD's finding that the appellant's testimony lacked credibility with respect to the threatening telephone calls he supposedly received is erroneous, because: a) Factors such as the appellant's psychological state, the fact that he is illiterate, his age and his very limited life experience were not taken into consideration by the RPD; b) The appellant's testimony was spontaneous, detailed and consistent, and he provided explanations for the discrepancies that were raised; c) The RPD put more emphasis on the telephone calls, whereas the physical assaults and visits to his home were more significant to the appellant; - The RPD's finding that the appellant's allegations of physical assaults lacked credibility was erroneous because the written account, the appellant's testimony and Exhibit C-4 concerning the assault in 2010-namely the photographs of the appellant's scars-are consistent; - The documentary evidence does not contradict the appellant's testimony; - The RPD also committed an error in indicating that the omissions in the BOC Form undermine the appellant's credibility; - With respect to the appellant's preparations for departing his country for Canada, the RPD made several errors in its assessment and the appellant provided explanations about those events, including the fact that he is illiterate, that the smuggler had taken care of everything for him, and that he had established that he is not an artist; - The RPD erred in its assessment of the evidence, particularly with respect to the letter from the appellant's wife (Exhibit C-3), which supports the appellant's allegations. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE [11] The appellant's lawyer submitted a copy of a passport issued in the appellant's name on XXXX XXXX, 2011. It was submitted as new evidence in accordance with subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. I will assess its admissibility in light of the relevant IRPA provisions and case law on this subject. [12] First, subsection 110(4) of the IRPA states that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present to the RAD only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [13] In Singh,1 the Federal Court of Appeal indicates that the explicit conditions set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA have to be met and that they leave no room for discretion on the part of the RAD. [14] In that same decision, the Federal Court of Appeal examines the issue of whether the implied conditions of admissibility identified in Raza are also applicable, specifically the credibility, relevance, newness and materiality of the new evidence.2 To this end, I think it useful to reproduce the following excerpt: [64] In conclusion, I am of the view that there is no valid reason not to apply, for the most part, the implicit criteria established by this Court in Raza to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The wording of that provision is almost identical to the wording of paragraph 113(a), and the context in which it was adopted as well as the underlying judicial policy considerations support an identical approach despite the fact that they apply to separate proceedings and different decision-makers...Except for the materiality of evidence, which does not lend itself to the same analysis in an appeal and which subsection 110(6) already considers in determining whether a new hearing should be held, it is not necessary to interpret subsection 110(4) and paragraph 113(a) differently. It goes without saying that the RAD always has the freedom to apply the conditions of subsection 110(4) with more or less flexibility depending on the circumstances of the case.3 [15] I read and assessed the document submitted. To begin, it is a passport from Côte d'Ivoire issued to the appellant on XXXX XXXX, 2011, which is prior to the date his refugee protection claim was rejected. According to my analysis of the recording of the RPD hearing, the appellant testified that the smuggler had given him a copy of his old passport and that the copy was at his home in Côte d'Ivoire, but he could not obtain it because his family did not live there anymore. Although the appellant's memorandum does not indicate how the appellant was able to obtain a copy of the passport, the fact remains that based on his testimony before the RPD, I have no reason to believe that this document was available before the refugee protection claim was rejected. While I do not have the original or a full copy of the passport, the page submitted contains the biometric data that is apparently the appellant's, and I have no reason not to believe that this document was issued by the authorities in Côte d'Ivoire. For these reasons, I accept it as new evidence, labelled A-1, pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. HEARING BEFORE THE RAD [16] In her memorandum, the appellant's lawyer is requesting a hearing before the RAD. Pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, when evidence presented on appeal is found to be admissible, it should be determined if it raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal, if it is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim, and if it would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [17] In the matter at hand, I am of the opinion that the document I admitted as new evidence cannot justify allowing the refugee protection claim. Since the passport indicates that the appellant is a XXXX XXXX I am of the opinion that the decision would not be affected, for the following reasons. First, like the RPD, the appellant's identity has been established, and furthermore, the appellant does not fear returning to his country because of his work, but because individuals from the FRCI allegedly assaulted him in the past and are supposedly looking for him because he refused to join their ranks. [18] For those reasons, there is no cause to hold a hearing before the RAD. SCOPE OF THE APPEAL [19] It should be noted that the appellant's lawyer does not submit any arguments pertaining to the standard of intervention that the RAD should apply. [20] In my opinion, the scope of the RAD must be reviewed in light of the IRPA and the case law on this subject. [21] First, the IRPA does not expressly set out the standard of intervention to be applied by the RAD when reviewing decisions rendered by the RPD. The introductory wording under subsection 110(1) of the IRPA states the following: Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), a person or the Minister may appeal, in accordance with the rules of the Board, on a question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact, to the Refugee Appeal Division against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division to allow or reject the person's claim for refugee protection. [22] Moreover, with respect to the RAD's decisions, subsection 111(1) of the IRPA provides that the RAD shall confirm the determination of the RPD, set aside the determination and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, or refer the matter to the RPD, giving the directions to the RPD that it considers appropriate. [23] In Huruglica, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the role of the RAD is to intervene when the RPD has erred in law, in fact or in fact and law.4 It also concludes that an appeal before the RAD is not a true de novo proceeding.5 And it clearly specifies the approach to be taken by the RAD: [103] I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable. [24] As for the degree of restraint or deference owed by the RAD to the RPD's findings as to the credibility or value of any testimony, the Federal Court of Appeal in Huruglica further states as follows: [70] This also recognizes that there may be cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because they require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears. It further indicates that although the RAD should sometimes exercise a degree of restraint before substituting its own determination, the issue of whether the circumstances warrant such restraint ought to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In each case, the RAD ought to determine whether the RPD truly benefited from an advantageous position, and if so, whether the RAD can nevertheless make a final decision in respect of the refugee claim. [71] One can imagine many possible scenarios. For example, when the RPD finds a witness straightforward and credible, there is no issue of credibility per se. This will also be the case when the RAD is able to reach a conclusion on the claim, relying on the RPD's findings of fact regarding the relative weight of testimonies and their credibility or lack thereof. [72] Problems will occur when the credibility findings themselves are disputed on appeal, and the RAD has no way to reach a conclusion without endorsing or rejecting those findings. If the RAD can identify an error in situations where, for example, a claimant was not found credible because his story was not plausible based on common sense, the RPD may have no real advantage over the RAD. [73] Similarly, there may also be cases where a finding that a witness is not credible was based on discrepancies that could not justify such a conclusion or that simply did not exist. If the assessment of the oral evidence contains an error which the RAD can easily identify, but the weight to be given to this testimony is essential to determine whether the RPD decision should be confirmed or set aside, the RAD may conclude that it is a proper case to refer back to the RPD with specific directions in respect of the error identified in the credibility findings. [74] That said, it is not appropriate to say more about the various scenarios that may arise, for they are not before us. The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is thus no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case. [25] I am therefore of the opinion that the RAD is a specialized tribunal and that I must conduct an independent assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the appellant is a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" under section 97 of the IRPA and, consequently, whether the RPD's decision is well founded in light of the evidence presented to the RPD, the appeal record, and any new evidence within the meaning of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA or any evidence gathered during a hearing under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, if applicable. In this case, it should be noted that one document (Exhibit A-1) was admitted as evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and that there was no hearing held before the RAD. [26] In my review of this matter, I will also show a measure of deference to the RPD's findings on the appellant's credibility that are based on his testimony. Moreover, if there are errors on questions of law or if there are findings that are erroneous or are not supported by the evidence on questions of fact or of mixed law and fact that are central to the claim for refugee protection, I will intervene in accordance with the provisions of subsections 111(1) and 111(2) of the IRPA. ANALYSIS [27] The determinative issue is whether the RPD erred in its decision. To that end, I reviewed the RPD's reasons for decision and I listened to the recording of the RPD hearing. I also read and analyzed all the evidence on the record, as well as the appellant's memorandum. [28] I will address the RPD's findings by first making some preliminary remarks, and then by analyzing the findings regarding the appellant's credibility as it relates to the following aspects: (a) the threatening telephone calls, (b) the physical assaults, (c) the absence of forced recruitment according to the documentary evidence, (d) the visits to the family home, and (e) the circumstances of the appellant's coming to Canada. Preliminary remarks [29] The appellant's lawyer submits that the RPD did not consider the appellant's psychological state when he was testifying for the first time before a specialized tribunal, nor did it consider his illiteracy, his age and his very limited life experience. I find that these arguments are unfounded, for the following reasons. [30] To start, I analyzed the decision in Mayeke6 cited by the appellant's lawyer. In my opinion, the facts of this case are different. The facts in that case concerned a woman who had been the victim of rape and suffered from symptoms of what is known as rape trauma syndrome. In my view, there is no evidence demonstrating that the appellant suffered from this syndrome. [31] Furthermore, based on my analysis of the recording of the hearing held before the RPD, it seems clear to me that the RPD was at all times alert and sensitive to the appellant's particular circumstances, taking into consideration that he is 32 years old, illiterate and has very little education (the equivalent of grade two). [32] For example, at the start of the hearing, the RPD member made sure that the appellant was able to understand the exchanges during the hearing. In this regard, the appellant confirmed that he could speak and understand French and that he also understood the interpreter present, who was speaking his native language, Dioula. [33] The RPD also ensured at the start of the hearing that the BOC Form was accurate and understood, and the appellant confirmed this after making two minor amendments. Furthermore, the lawyer stated that the BOC Form had been read and repeated aloud in preparation for the hearing to take into account his illiteracy. [34] Moreover, throughout the course of the hearing, the questions asked by the RPD member were clear and specific, and the RPD member rephrased the questions at times so that the appellant could provide more details and explanations. As well, when the appellant was questioned about a document, for example, the visa application,7 the document was produced for him and the content of the document in question was explained to him. The appellant then answered the questions asked in connection with the document without raising any comprehension difficulties. For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the arguments from the appellant's lawyer on this point are unfounded. RPD's non-credibility findings a) Threatening telephone calls [35] The RPD found contradictions in the appellant's testimony as to the existence of the threatening telephone calls, as well as their omission from the BOC Form. The appellant's lawyer submits that the appellant's testimony was spontaneous and that there were no discrepancies. As for their omission from the BOC Form, she explains that the physical assaults and visits to his home were more significant than the threatening calls in the appellant's view. [36] Based on my analysis of the recording of the RPD hearing, the appellant testified that his problems were repetitive and that they had started between the two rounds of the presidential elections in 2010. He added that since then, he had been constantly harassed by threatening telephone calls made to him. His spouse received these calls since he did not have a cellphone, and told him about the calls. The calls were so frequent that he could receive two or three per day, for several months. [37] Later, when he was asked by the RPD about the nature of his problems in Côte d'Ivoire, the appellant did not mention these threatening telephone calls, only the physical assaults and visits from people from the FRCI. Furthermore, when confronted about the omission of any allegation pertaining to the threatening calls in his BOC Form, the appellant stated that people were after him. [38] Based on my analysis of all the evidence regarding the existence of the alleged telephone calls, I came to two conclusions. First, I am of the opinion that the appellant did not make any contradictions, since his testimony about these calls came after invoking other problems that he alleges having experienced. However, these alleged calls were still completely omitted from his BOC Form, and that undermines the appellant's credibility for the following reasons. [39] I find it reasonable to believe that if these calls had happened, the appellant would have mentioned them in his BOC Form to establish their existence, given their significance and their frequency. Moreover, simply reiterating that people are after him does not seem sufficient to me to explain this major omission regarding an essential aspect of his claim for refugee protection. [40] Additionally, although the appellant's lawyer submits that the calls were not as important in the appellant's view, I disagree with this argument since the appellant testified that he did not go home because of these calls. Moreover, although the appellant points to his illiteracy and his limited life experience, among other things, that did not prevent him from mentioning in his BOC Form the various problems that he alleges having experienced in his country. Furthermore, if these alleged calls were true, I find that the appellant would reasonably have added them to his BOC Form at the start of the RPD hearing, similar to how he made some amendments. [41] For all these reasons, like the RPD, I do not believe that these threatening calls occurred, and this undermines the appellant's credibility on an essential aspect of his claim for refugee protection. b) Physical assaults [42] The RPD did not find the allegations of physical assault credible, because apart from one assault that took place in 2010, they were omitted from the BOC Form. Also, since the appellant's credibility regarding the problems he allegedly experienced is undermined, the RPD did not believe anything about the alleged physical assaults, problems and threats. The appellant's lawyer submits that this finding is erroneous since the account, the appellant's testimony, and the photographs showing the scars related to the 2010 assault are consistent. [43] Based on my analysis of all the evidence, it is clear to me that the appellant testified that he had been attacked several times by people from the FRCI in the period between the first and second rounds of the 2010 presidential election. He testified that people from the FRCI had approached him to tell him about their organization because his family name was the same as that of the current president of the country, because he was Dioula like them, and because he was from northern Côte d'Ivoire. The appellant stated that the assaults that he experienced had to do with his refusal to join the FRCI. [44] In my analysis, I will first address the alleged assault in 2010 and then the other alleged assaults. 1) Assault in 2010 [45] From my analysis of the recording of the hearing held before the RPD, it seems clear that the appellant testified that he was assaulted by people from the FRCI while he was on his way to see his paternal family between the two presidential election rounds in 2010. He indicated that, during the assault, these assailants stated that they had been looking for him for a long time to settle the score and that he was a traitor. However, they reportedly did not tell him why they had been looking for him. He was allegedly injured and then hospitalized. He submitted photographs8 of scars to support his allegations. [46] First, as context, it should be pointed out that in 2010, and particularly the period between the two rounds of the presidential elections,9 the documentary evidence10 reports widespread acts of violence. For example, the commune of XXXX, where the appellant testified he was assaulted in 2010, became the site of tensions and a curfew was imposed. Following this announcement, youth from the commune demonstrated violently and were suppressed by the police. [47] In my opinion, as the assault alleged by the appellant is consistent with the chaotic situation in Côte d'Ivoire, and in Abobo in particular at that time, the appellant credibly established that he was assaulted between the two presidential election rounds in 2010 by people whom he believes to be FRCI. Consequently, unlike the RPD, I grant probative value to the photographs of scars submitted to support the fact that the appellant was injured in this assault. [48] Nevertheless, although I am of the opinion that the RPD erred in its finding, this finding is not determinative, as I am of the opinion that the appellant did not establish the alleged reasons underlying this assault, for the following reasons. [49] First, the appellant testified that he was a driver and that the assailants did not tell him the reasons why they had been looking for him, and that he did not know them. Moreover, there is no indication that the appellant had had interactions or encounters with FRCI members before the assault. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the appellant did not credibly establish that he was assaulted because of his refusal to join them. 2) Other physical assaults [50] The appellant also testified that he had been assaulted on many occasions since 2010. These assaults occurred while he was on his way to [translation] "odd jobs" or while he was running errands. When confronted by the RPD as to the total omission of any physical assaults other than the one in 2010 in his BOC Form, the appellant explained that he had not written everything. [51] I am not satisfied with these explanations. In fact, I consider it reasonable to believe that if these physical assaults had occurred, the appellant would have mentioned them in his BOC Form, just like the assault he experienced in 2010, given the importance of these assaults and the fact that they occurred frequently. The mere statement that he did not write everything is clearly insufficient to explain the omission of essential aspects of his refugee protection claim from the BOC Form. [52] Also, although I took into account the arguments of the appellant's lawyer with regard to his illiteracy and limited life experience, among other things, that did not prevent him from mentioning in his BOC Form the various problems that he allegedly had in his country. Furthermore, if these alleged calls were true, I find that the appellant would reasonably have added them to his BOC Form at the start of the RPD hearing, similar to how he made some amendments. Moreover, at the start of the hearing, the appellant stated that his BOC Form was complete, true and correct. [53] For all these reasons, like the RPD, I do not believe that these physical assaults occurred, and this undermines the appellant's credibility on essential aspects of his refugee protection claim. c) Documentary evidence: Absence of forced recruitment [54] The RPD found that the objective documentary evidence does not support the appellant's allegations regarding the existence of forced recruitment to join the ranks of the FRCI. The appellant's lawyer maintains that the documentary evidence does not contradict the appellant's testimony. [55] I agree with the RPD's findings for the following reasons. [56] From my analysis of all the evidence, the appellant testified that, every time he was stopped at a roadblock, he was asked questions about himself and was often asked to join the FRCI, a situation that he avoided every time. [57] First, it should be noted that the appellant did not indicate how he was able to avoid the alleged situations. Moreover, the documentary evidence11 mentions the existence of roadblocks erected by the FRCI, among others. These roadblocks are often used to extort money. This same documentary evidence also reports that 80 percent of roadblocks were illegal and that the Ivorian government ordered the dismantling of roadblocks and charged more than 100 soldiers with racketeering. In July 2014, four officers were convicted. [58] Like the RPD, I prefer the objective documentary evidence to the appellant's testimony. This objective documentary evidence does not mention forced recruitment to join the FRCI. Consequently, although the appellant might have been stopped at a roadblock, he did not establish his allegations of forced recruitment to join the FRCI in the circumstances alleged. d) Visits to the family home [59] The RPD did not believe the allegations that FRCI members were going to the appellant's home looking for him. The appellant's lawyer maintains that the appellant's testimony was credible and that the RPD erred in this regard. [60] I agree with the RPD's finding for the following reasons. [61] First, these visits must be considered in the context of the threatening calls that the appellant claims to have received. According to the appellant, his spouse was receiving threatening calls about him. For the reasons set out above, I do not believe these threatening calls occurred. Also, although I believe that there was an assault in 2010, I do not find credible the allegations regarding other assaults, and the documentary evidence does not support the allegations of forced recruitment to join the FRCI. In other words, I am of the opinion that the appellant did not credibly establish that he was being sought, as he claims, by people from the FRCI in the circumstances alleged. Consequently, I do not believe that there were visits to his home, either before or after his departure from Côte d'Ivoire. Thus, like the RPD, I do not grant any probative value to the letter12 from the appellant's spouse mentioning these visits. Moreover, from my analysis of this letter, about which the RPD questioned the appellant, the spouse does not mention any visits to the family home before the appellant's departure. [62] For all these reasons, I do not believe that these alleged visits occurred, which again undermines the appellant's credibility. e) Circumstances surrounding the appellant's coming to Canada [63] The RPD found that the appellant's credibility was undermined with regard to the circumstances surrounding his visa application and his arrival in Canada. Furthermore, it concluded that he was not a driver, as he claimed, but rather a member of a dance troupe. The appellant's lawyer claims that the RPD erred because, as his previous passport shows, the appellant was a merchant and not a dancer. Moreover, the appellant did not know anything about the steps taken to obtain the Canadian visa. [64] Although I agree with the RPD that the appellant is not credible with regard to his testimony explaining his coming to Canada, the fact remains, in my opinion, that this finding refers to aspects that are not central to the refugee protection claim, for the following reasons. [65] From my analysis of the appellant's previous Ivorian passport,13 it is clearly indicated that he is a merchant. This note is consistent with the appellant's explanations before the RPD. That said, I consider implausible the appellant's testimony to the effect that he did not know the other people who obtained a Canadian visa like him as members of this same dance troupe, for the following reasons. [66] First, besides the visa documents describing the appellant as a member of a XXXX group, the documentary evidence14 shows that he cleared Canadian customs in immediate succession with the other members of this XXXX XXXX. Moreover, although the troupe, including the appellant, was traveling in the same vehicle to the show's location,15 the appellant testified that he did not know where he was or with whom. When confronted with the documentary evidence,16 on one hand, regarding this visit to the location where the show was to be held and, on the other hand, regarding the XXXX XXXX departure due to the inability of the organizers to grant their fee request, the appellant repeated that he was unaware of everything, that he was sleeping in the vehicle and that, when he awoke, he was alone with the driver. [67] In the circumstances, because the appellant was on the same airplane as the other group members, cleared Canadian customs with them and was in the same vehicle as them, I do not believe his testimony that he did not know the other troupe members. However, with respect for the RPD member, I am of the opinion that the arrangements relating to his entry into Canada are peripheral in terms of his refugee protection claim. [68] Nevertheless, as I agree with the RPD's findings regarding the appellant's non-credibility regarding essential aspects of his refugee protection claim, I am of the opinion that the appellant did not discharge the burden of establishing a serious possibility of persecution under a Convention ground or, on a balance of probabilities, that he would be personally subjected to a risk to his life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, if he returned to Côte d'Ivoire. CONCLUSION [69] Having reviewed all the oral and documentary evidence, in light of the aforementioned reasons and pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the RPD's determination that the appellant is not a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" under subsection 97(1) of the IRPA. [70] The appeal of XXXX XXXX is dismissed. Louis Cousineau Me Louis Cousineau June 27, 2016 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Singh, No. A-512-16, Nadon, Gauthier, De Montigny, March 29, 2016, paragraphs 34 and 35. 2 Ibidem, paragraph 38. 3 Ibidem, paragraph 64. 4 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Huruglica, No. A-470-14, Gauthier, Webb and Near, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 93, paragraphs 36 to 103. 5 Ibidem, paragraph 79. 6 Mayeke v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] F.C.A. No. 758 (QL). 7 RPD record: (pages 94 to 98): Exhibit M-1: visa application. 8 RPD record (pages 38 to 40): Exhibit C-4. 9 It should be noted that the first round was held on October 31, 2010, and the second round on November 28, 2010. RPD record (pages 140 to 154): National Documentation Package on Côte d'Ivoire dated July 17, 2015, Tab 2.7: Rapport de mission en République de Côte d'Ivoire [Republic of Côte d'Ivoire mission report]. November 26 to December 7, 2012. France. French department for the protection of refugees and stateless persons. May 2013. 10 Ibidem, page 11. 11 Supra, see footnote 9, Tab 2.1: Cote d'Ivoire. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014. United States. Department of State. June 25, 2015. 12 RPD record (pages 36 and 37): Exhibit C-4, letter dated XXXX XXXX, 2015. 13 Appellant's record (page 29): document admitted as new evidence, like Exhibit A-1. 14 RPD's record (pages 134 to 139): Exhibit M-4, XXXX XXXX. 15 RPD's record (page 124): XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. 16 RPD's record (pages 126 and 127): email dated XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB5-04711 2 RAD.25.02 (2014.09.11) Disponible en français