TC0-03691

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-03691 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision October 30, 2020 Date de la décision Panel James Sloan Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Brian Ibrahim Cintosun Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] This is an appeal of a January 16, 2020 decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (Board) denying the Appellant's claim for refugee protection under sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c. 27 (IRPA). [2] The Appellant, a Turkish national, claims 1. that he fears persecution from the family of his ex-fiancée who want to kill him; 2. from the Turkish authorities based on the perception that he is a follower of the Gülen Movement;1 and 3. from the Turkish authorities who will perceive him to be an Alevi because he wants to marry an Alevi woman. [3] For the reasons that follow, I deny this appeal. FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS [4] In 2012, the Appellant, a Sunni Muslim, began a sexual relationship with XXXX, a Kurdish Alevi woman. On May 16, 2014, when the Appellant met XXXX brother to discuss marriage, the brother became violent and stabbed him. The Appellant lost consciousness. He was taken by a stranger to a hospital, where he required stiches. He told hospital officials that he had been attacked by a stranger because he did not want to create problems for XXXX family. He telephoned XXXX the next day, but her brother answered and threatened to kill him. Because he was scared for his safety and that of XXXX, he stopped calling her and they eventually lost contact with one another. [5] On November 5, 2016-some two-and-one-half years later-the Appellant was beaten by three men in front of his brother's home. His ribs were broken. He went to the police and reported the beating and the 2014 stabbing, but he was told that he had insufficient evidence about the beating and that he should have reported the stabbing when it occurred. [6] In 2017 he received a phone call from XXXX, who told him that she had been forced to marry her cousin.2 She reported that she had overheard her family planning to kill the Appellant. [7] The Appellant, who worked on a ship, left Turkey on XXXX XXXX, 2018 for work. He jumped ship at the Port of Montreal on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018.3 Upon his arrival in Canada, he called home and learned that some Kurdish strangers were asking questions about him. DETERMINATIVE ISSUE [8] The determinative issue in this case is credibility. STANDARD OF REVIEW [9] In my review of the RPD's decision, I will apply a standard of correctness.4 This is not a case where the RPD enjoyed a meaningful advantage in making its findings.5 ANALYSIS [10] The RPD found that the Appellant lacked credibility on the following bases: a) His testimony about the stabbing incident (that it took place at a gazebo at a public park) was inconsistent with his Basis of Claim (BOC) narrative (that it occurred in an isolated cottage in a forest). b) His testimony about the nature of the stabbing incident (he was stabbed on the leg and then beaten) was inconsistent with his BOC narrative (that he was stabbed on the leg). c) His testimony that he had not been in touch with XXXX brother after the stabbing attack was inconsistent with the evidence in his BOC narrative that he had been threatened over the phone by XXXX brother the day after the attack. It rejected his explanations i) that the BOC was wrong or ii) that his testimony may have been wrong. d) His testimony that his attackers used baseball bats in the 2016 attack was omitted from his BOC narrative. e) His testimony that, although he had made a police report about the 2016 attack, he did not take a copy and did not attempt to obtain a copy in support of his claim was implausible. f) His testimony that XXXX family had attempted to kidnap his brother but had failed to do so was inconsistent with his supporting evidence. First, it conflicted with a letter from his brother (stating that XXXX family had successfully kidnapped the brother and held him for two days)6 and, second, it conflicted with a letter from his friend, XXXX XXXX (who stated that the Appellant's brother had been kidnapped and tortured for two days).7 It did not accept his explanation that his brother might have minimized the incident in discussing it with the Appellant so as not to worry him. g) On the basis of the foregoing, it found that the supporting letters from his brother and Mr. XXXX were of no weight. h) His testimony that, after he jumped ship in Montreal, the shipping company he worked for told the Turkish government he was a supporter of the Gülen Movement was omitted from his BOC narrative. It rejected his explanation that he did not include it in his BOC narrative because of the depth of his fear and because he didn't trust his previous lawyer's interpreter (because she shared his story with others). It also rejected his testimony that he did not amend his BOC narrative because he had only known his lawyer for a short time and because the issue only arose latterly. i) It noted that, while the Appellant claimed that he learned of the Gülen Movement-related threat from his friend, XXXX XXXX, the supporting letter from Mr. XXXX had not mentioned it.8 It rejected his explanation that the threat was not included because he had asked Mr. XXXX not to include it, and drew a negative inference with regard to his credibility. As such, it found the letter from Mr. XXXX was of no weight. j) It held that the supporting evidence submitted by the Appellant was inadequate and, in particular, noted that there was no evidence provided that related to XXXX. It rejected his explanations i) that, while there were text messages between them, he lost his phone at sea in Spain and ii) that they were scared to post photographs on his social media accounts. k) Because it found that three of his six supporting letters were of no weight, it found that the other three letters warranted little weight. l) It found that the medical reports relating to the 2014 stabbing incident and the 2016 attack warranted little weight, given the Appellant's difficulty testifying coherently about the two incidents, and given that the reports did not indicate who his attackers were or how the attacks took place. 1. Credibility Evidence relating to the stabbing incident (findings a)-c) above) [11] The Appellant argues that the RPD's credibility findings a)-c) were in error and, as such, its finding that the stabbing attack never took place was in error. He argues that: i) the findings were microscopic and based on minor inconsistencies; ii) he testified clearly and in great detail about the stabbing attack and that, aside from the inconsistencies, his testimony "corroborated his BOC in all other respects";9 iii) its findings were selective, in that they ignored the "credible, corroborative and uncontested testimony of the Appellant";10 and iv), as regards finding a) above, he was not entirely inconsistent as regards the location of the attack: after all, in both his testimony and his BOC narrative, he stated that he was attacked in a lonely spot in a park, "along with other details,"11 that established his credibility. [12] As to finding a), I do not consider the inconsistency between his statement in his BOC narrative that was stabbed in a cottage and his testimony he stated the attack occurred outdoors, in a gazebo, to be minor. He testified that the attack took place "outdoors, but more like the trees are around, many people around...."12 When challenged about his testimony being inconsistent with his BOC narrative, he stated: "[C]ottage was the wrong word. There are gazebos in the trees area; you know, between the trees there are gazebos to sit together, gather there."13 Nor is it immaterial. That attack is one of the two violent incidents at the very heart of the Appellant's claim. [13] The Appellant's argument that because both of the settings are remote and wooded the inconsistency ought to be ignored is not persuasive. If the Appellant was telling the truth when he described being driven to the location (with the brother driving recklessly), being attacked in the manner described, and then "crawl[ing] for an hour"14 from that location, he would be likely to recall whether the attack occurred inside, in a cottage, or outside, in a gazebo. [14] Nor do I find the Appellant's inconsistency regarding his interaction with XXXX brother (finding c) above) to be minor. This is one of very few interactions the Appellant had with his alleged agent of persecution and represents an important part of his claim. The Appellant's efforts to reconcile the two statements by offering the conflicting explanations described above, suggests to me that he had great difficulty keeping his story straight. [15] As regards finding b), I agree with the Appellant that this distinction is minor. I will not have regard to it in my overall credibility finding. [16] The Appellant's argument-repeated elsewhere his Appellant's memorandum-that the RPD erred in making negative credibility conclusions based on his inconsistencies because it did not consider that other parts of his testimony were not inconsistent with his BOC narrative or were "credible, corroborative and uncontested" is puzzling. It seems to analogize the RPD's duty not to be selective in its assessment of the evidence (e.g., by not looking only at country condition evidence that supports its reasoning) to an obligation to weigh the Appellant's credible and consistent sworn evidence against that which is neither credible nor consistent. That a sworn witness sometimes-or even mostly-testified credibly and in a manner that whereby he did not contradict his earlier sworn evidence, does not somehow cancel out the times when his testimony was incredible or inconsistent. The Board is entitled to expect that a sworn witness will be honest throughout his or her testimony. In assessing the Appellant's credibility, it does not fall to the RPD to weigh his credible testimony against his incredible testimony and decide which type of testimony prevails. Findings relating to the 2016 attack (findings d), e) and f) above) [17] The Appellant argues that RPD's credibility findings d)-f) were in error and, as such, its finding that the 2016 attack did not take place was in error. He argues that: i) its findings were microscopic and based on minor inconsistencies; ii) he testified clearly, as evidenced by the fact that he identified the curse words used and referred to his bruises that arose from the attack; iii) there was enough corroborative detail to establish his credibility regarding the 2016 attack; iv) its findings were selective, in that they ignored the "credible, corroborative and uncontested testimony of the Appellant";15 and, v) as regards finding d) above, in light of the other details provided, the inconsistency was minor and did not go to the heart of the claim or affect his credibility. [18] I agree that the Appellant's failure to mention the use of baseball bats in the 2016 attack from his BOC narrative (finding d) above) does not undermine his credibility. I find it is reasonable that he did not provide that type of detail in the document. Nor do I agree with the RPD that it was implausible that the Appellant would make a complaint to the police but not obtain a copy of it (finding e) above). The Federal Court has made clear that the test for implausibly in a refugee claim is high and, in my view, this does not meet the Federal Court's heightened test.16 [19] As to the Appellant's arguments ii)-iv) above, which suggest an obligation on the RPD to weigh the credible, fulsome, and inconsistent testimony by the Appellant against his testimony that is not credible or is inconsistent with his other evidence, they have been discussed and rejected above. [20] As regards the Appellant's inability to testify about his brother's kidnapping/attempted kidnapping-discussed further below-in a way that is consistent with his supporting evidence (finding f) above), I find that this is definitely not a minor matter. The attack by his agent of persecution against his brother in May 2018 is the basis for his claim that, despite the last violent attack by his agent of persecution having taken place in November 2016, and despite his having left Turkey in XXXX 2018, his agent of persecution continued to be pursuing him (through his brother) as late as May 2018. Kidnapping of the Appellant's brother (findings f) and g) above) [21] The Appellant argues that the discrepancy between his testimony and the two supporting letters is not significant because: i) the Appellant was not present in Turkey at the time and his family was angry with him and had "disowned him in a way"17; ii) his testimony was based on what he had been told: he did not know the content of the letters; iii) "it is entirely possible that the discrepancy was due to communication errors";18 iv) the crucial point is not whether or not his brother was kidnapped; what is essential is that the attack on his brother happened and this is clear from his testimony and the letters; v) its findings were microscopic; vi) it was selective because it ignored his other compelling evidence; vii) it failed to afford him the Maldonado19 presumption of the truthfulness of sworn evidence absent reason to doubt it; and viii) it erred by not acting in accordance with Federal Court jurisprudence that requires that, even in the face of significant omissions and contradictions in his evidence, the Board must consider the rest of the evidence on its merits and demonstrate that it did so (Yankson20). [22] I reject the Appellant's arguments for the following reasons: i. The argument seems to be that since his family was angry with him, and not talking with him, he was not in a position to know whether or not his brother was kidnapped and, as such, it was reasonable that he would testify in a manner that was inconsistent with his brother's evidence and that of Mr. XXXX. This is not persuasive. The fact that he obtained supporting letters from his brother and father shows that he was not estranged. Moreover, he was testifying under oath and, in so doing, was representing that he had knowledge of the matters he testified about. ii. The Appellant's testimony was as follows: "I did not read those letters [i.e. from his brother and Mr. XXXX] very well to be honest."21 It is not reasonable for an appellant to attempt to explain away the fact that his testimony contradicted evidence submitted by him in support of his claim simply by stating that he had not read the supporting evidence carefully enough. It falls to the Appellant to know of the facts of his claim, including the supporting evidence he relies on; after all, he is testifying under oath about them. Moreover, his claim that he did not know the contents of the letters contradicts the evidence in the record. A December 3, 2019 letter from the Appellant's RPD counsel makes clear that the Appellant was familiar with the content of the supporting documents. The purpose of that letter was, inter alia, to advise the RPD of errors in the Appellant's BOC narrative relating to his brother's "kidnapping incident." His letter relies on his brother's letter which provides details of the incident.22 iii. While it may, of course, be possible that communication errors were at play, there is no evidence that there were. Nor is it explained how such errors would have led to the inconsistency. iv. An argument that the inconsistency does not undermine his credibility or the credibility of the two letters of support because the main thing is that his brother came to harm-and not whether or not he was kidnapped-is puzzling. Both elements are relevant to his claim. More importantly, the point being made by the RPD is that if the Appellant's testimony on a central aspect of his story is in conflict with the supporting evidence he relies on, this provides a basis for a negative credibility finding, absent a reasonable explanation for the inconsistency. v. See above. vi. See above. vii. The Maldonado presumption is, of course, rebutted where, as here, there are reasons to doubt a claimant's truthfulness. viii. The Yankson case made clear that even where there were significant omissions and contradictions in the Appellant's evidence, the RPD's obligation to analyze the rest of the evidence on its merits continued. There, the Federal Court faulted the Board because it engaged in a microscopic analysis of aspects of the evidence and discounted the evidence because it was inconsistent with the applicant's evidence in immaterial ways without engaging "in any analysis or weighing of the evidence on its merits."23 In the instant case, I have discounted the findings of the RPD that I have found to be immaterial; however, I have found that other such findings are highly material. Supporting evidence to the effect that the Appellant's brother was tortured that contradicts his testimony is not immaterial and the RPD was correct to find that that inconsistency undermined his credibility and the reliability of the supporting letters. I will weigh all of the evidence below in making my determination as to whether or not the Appellant is credible. The case is inapposite. [23] I find that the inconsistency between the Appellant's testimony and his supporting evidence as regards his alleged agent of persecution's treatment of his brother seriously undermines his credibility. Moreover, I find that the inconsistency between the Appellant's testimony and the letters from his brother and Mr. XXXX undermines their probative value. Finally, I note that because the supporting letters are undated and unsworn, they are of less probative value that they would have been had they been dated and sworn. Last-minute claim of an imputed Gülen Movement membership (finding h) above) [24] The Appellant does not contest the RPD's reasoning on this point-though, it does disagree with its finding that he is not perceived as a Gülen Movement follower (see below). Consequently, I will not address the RPD's finding on this point, other than to note that I have reviewed it and agree with its analysis. Letter from Mr. XXXX (finding i) above) [25] I do not share the RPD's finding that the fact that Mr. XXXX did not mention in his supporting letter the claim that the Turkish authorities had been told that the Appellant was a Gülen Movement supporter undermines the value of his letter. As the Federal Court held recently: "While a Basis of Claim form may be assessed for what it does not say, documents from non-parties must be assessed for what they do say...."24 I will have regard to the letter from Mr. XXXX in my overall credibility assessment below. I note, however, that the fact that Mr. XXXX letter is unsworn and undated makes it less probative that it otherwise would have been. Documentary evidence (findings j), k), and l) above) [26] As regards the documentary evidence, the Appellant argues: i) the RPD erred by finding that he had provided little documentary support for his claim (he provided six letters and two medical reports) and there was enough supporting evidence without evidence from XXXX; ii) the RPD erred by attributing no weight to three of the letters due to inconsistencies with his testimony (findings g) and k) above) because the inconsistencies were minor; and, iii) that, even if three of the letters were inconsistent with his testimony, the RPD erred by not assessing the other three letters25 independently. [27] I find as follows: i) I accept that the Appellant provided the evidence that he outlines-not all of which was found to warrant much weight, of course. To my mind nothing turns on whether it is characterized as "little" in the way described by the RPD. Moreover, I agree that if the evidence is sufficiently persuasive, the absence of direct evidence from XXXX is not fatal to the claim. The question, of course, is whether, when the credible evidence is weighed against the Appellant's credibility problems, it is sufficient to prove his claim. As discussed below, I find that it is not. ii) I have addressed the RPD's treatment of the letters from the Appellant's father, Mr. XXXX, and Mr. XXXX above. iii) I agree with the Appellant that the RPD was incorrect to find that just because the three letters discussed above warranted no weight, the other three supporting letters must also warrant no weight. As the Federal Court recently held in Liu, with any potentially corroborative document, the general rule is that its genuineness: should be examined independently of general concerns about a claimant's credibility before it is rejected (Yu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1138 at paras 31-37; Lu v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 846 at paras 33-35). Otherwise, the decision maker risks reasoning in a way that begs the very question at issue: the corroborative evidence is not believed simply because the claimant is not believed (Sterling v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 329 at para 12).26 I will consider the three letters not assessed by the RPD as part of my overall credibility assessment below. I note, once again, that the three letters are undated and unsworn, making them of less probative value than if they had been dated and sworn. [28] Finally, I will also have regard to the two medical reports when I weigh the Appellant's credibility. Overall conclusion on credibility [29] When I weigh the RPD's finding regarding the Appellant's credibility with which I have agreed against his documentary evidence, I find the Appellant is overall not credible. I find that he was not attacked by XXXX brother or his associates in either 2014 or 2016; that XXXX brother is not pursuing him; that his brother was not kidnapped, tortured, or threatened with kidnapping or torture by XXXX brother or his associates in 2018; and that he is not perceived by the Turkish authorities as a Gülen Movement supporter. I also reject his claim that he plans to marry XXXX upon his return to Turkey. 2. Forward-looking risk under sections 96 and 97 [30] The Appellant argues that even if the RPD's credibility findings were reasonable, the RPD nevertheless erred by failing to determine whether, based on the unimpugned evidence, he is a refugee or a person in need of protection. The jurisprudence, he argues, holds that "a finding that a witness is not credible simply means that person's testimony cannot be relied on to establish propositions of fact; it does not mean that the facts attested to are untrue per se."27 The RPD, he argues, should have considered what facts were established by the evidence to which some weight could have been given, and it failed to consider the corroborative evidence that could be relied on. [31] Given that, as discussed above, I have found that the Appellant is, overall, lacking in credibility; that XXXX brother did not attack him or his brother and is not pursuing him or his brother; and the Turkish authorities do not perceive him to be a Gülen Movement follower, I find that there is no residual profile to consider that would lead to his harm under sections 96 or 97. Is he perceived to be an Alevi based on his professed desire to marry XXXX? [32] The RPD noted that there was no objective evidence to show that he would be thought to be an Alevi based on his professed desire to marry XXXX. In the alternative, it held that even if he was perceived to be an Alevi, the Turkish state was willing and able to provide effective state protection for Alevis. [33] Once again, the Appellant puts forward a number of arguments: i) the objective evidence referred to by the RPD was selective in that it ignored more recent evidence that proves Alevis face discrimination and persecution from the authorities; ii) the RPD ignored country condition evidence that showed that marriages between Alevis and Sunnis are not permissible in Islam; iii) he is justified to fear his girlfriend's family; iv) he is justified to fear he will not be protected by the police; v) he testified that he planned to reunite with his girlfriend and marry her in Turkey and that will lead to his harm and death; and vi) the RPD erred in finding that even if he was perceived to be an Alevi, he would be protected, because this is a misreading of the objective evidence. [34] I agree with the RPD that there is no objective evidence to show that he is likely to be perceived by anyone, including the Turkish authorities, as being Alevi. Because I have found that the Appellant is overall lacking in credibility, I do not accept his evidence that he will be perceived as an Alevi upon his return to Turkey. Consequently, it is not necessary for me to consider the RPD's alternative finding. Nor, of course, is it necessary for me to consider the Appellant's various arguments in relation to that finding-i.e. relating to the mistreatment of Alevis, the mistreatment of Alevis who marry Sunni Muslims, the failure of the state to protect Alevis, etc. [35] If the Appellant was advancing an argument that he fears harm from XXXX family as someone who wanted to participate in a mixed religious marriage with her, I reject this based on my credibility finding, discussed above. 4. Is he perceived to be a Gülen Movement follower? [36] As noted, the Appellant did not contest the RPD's finding (at h) above) that the omission of his claimed fear of being perceived as a Gülen Movement follower from his BOC narrative undermined his credibility. His argumentation under the heading "Issue of the Appellant's imputed status as an Alevi and 'Feto' Member and his fear of persecution if he were to return to Turkey today"28 is limited to arguments regarding the RPD's alternative finding regarding the treatment of Alevis by the Turkish authorities (discussed immediately above). [37] Elsewhere, the Appellant states that his claim to fear "being persecuted as an imputed and falsely accused FETO member is not implausible"29 because the country condition evidence shows that even perceived membership can lead to persecution from non-state and state authorities. I fully accept that a perception that someone is a Gülen Movement follower may be enough to lead to a serious possibility of persecution or a likelihood of other harm in Turkey; however, as discussed above, I have found that the Appellant is not telling the truth when he claims that he will be perceived as a Gülen Movement follower. CONCLUSION [38] I find that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a protected person. The appeal is dismissed. (signed) James Sloan James Sloan October 30, 2020 Date 1 Also known as Hizmet or the Hizmet Movement, Cemaat, the Fethullahist Terror Organization (FETÖ), the Parallel State Structure (PDY), the Parallel State or the Parallel Structure. 2 In the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BOC) narrative, he states "XXXX told me that even though she loved me, her brother had forced her to marry her cousin." (Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, at p. 27). In his testimony, he states that, XXXX was not married: "The story is she was pressured to marry him, but she wasn't married." (Transcript of RPD Hearing at p. 27). I note this discrepancy for the purposes of clarity; I do not draw an adverse credibility inference against the Appellant on this basis. 3 The Appellant's BOC narrative states that his opportunity to leave Turkey arose on XXXX 2016. This would appear to be an error. (Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 28). I note this for clarity; I do not draw a negative credibility inference on this basis. 4 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, Bujar, 2016 FCA 93, at para 103. 5 Ibid., at paras 69-74. See also Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145, at paras 124-125, relying on Guo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 317, at paras 15-19 and Jeyaseelan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 278, at paras 19-21. 6 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, at p. 79. 7 Ibid, at p. 87. 8 Ibid., at p. 84. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 33, para 8b. 10 Ibid, at p. 34, para 8d. 11 Ibid, at p. 33, para 8b. 12 Transcript of RPD Hearing, at p. 10. 13 Ibid. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, at p. 25. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 34, para 8d. 16 Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776 (CanLII). 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 34, para. 9. 18 Ibid. 19 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.); 31 N.R. 34 (F.C.A.). 20 Yankson v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2019 FC 1608 (CanLII). 21 Transcript of RPD Hearing, at p. 28. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at p. 117. 23 Yankson, supra endnote 20, at para 37. 24 Yurtsever v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 312 (CanLII), at para 19, relying on Botros v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 FC 1046; Mui v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2003 FC 1020, 31 Imm LR (3d) 91. 25 Letters from the Appellant's father (Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, at p. 90), a XXXX he worked for (ibid., at p. 92), and his neighbour (ibid., at p. 94). 26 Liu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 576 (CanLII), at para 89. 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 42, para 12. 28 Ibid., at p. 36, para 10. 29 Ibid., at pp. 42-43, para 13. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-03691 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français