TB6-15587

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des ré fugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-15587 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision February 14, 2017 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Joseph Osuji Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX(the Appellant), a citizen of Thailand, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the negative determination of the RPD. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she borrowed money from clandestine lenders in Thailand before coming to Canada as a XXXX XXXX XXXX. She claims that the lenders and the police will harm her as she has not been able to repay her debt. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on September 21, 2016. By a decision of September 30, 2016, the RPD rejected the claim. The panel found that there is no nexus between the claim and a Convention ground, that the Appellant's testimony lacked credibility, and that she does not face a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon return to Thailand. The RPD concluded that the Appellant filed a refugee claim only to remain in Canada after the expiry of her work permit. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in rejecting her claim, and submits an affidavit as proposed new evidence in this appeal. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [6] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim or that was not reasonably available, or that she could not reasonably have been expected1 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [7] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in her Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.2 Application of Section 110(4) [8] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.3 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in her circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of her claim If she could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [9] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.4 [10] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD - either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [11] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for the Appellant to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.5 [12] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.6 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [13] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [14] In Singh,7 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza8 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of section 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on the nearly identical wording of section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.9 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of section 110(4).10 [15] Where evidence meets the test in section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [16] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.11 RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [17] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in section110 (6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.12 [18] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. [19] The Appellant presents an affidavit, sworn on November 11th, 2016. As the document contains various allegations and information, the RAD will consider these individually to determine whether they meet the test, set out above, for new evidence. [20] Paragraphs 1 and 2 set out background information. [21] Paragraphs 3, 4, and 8 make the following assertion:13 3. The affiant is concerned that she mostly misunderstood, or there was a misunderstanding in communications between her, and the official Interpreter, at the September 21, 2016 hearing. I was so terrified to complain to the member, or to my counsel about my difficulties of understanding the Madam Interpreter, in the within hearing proceedings. 4. I was able and courageous enough, to tell my lawyer, after the hearing about my difficulties in understanding the official Interpreter, at the said hearing. 8. I am very disappointed that the panel misunderstood my oral testimony, at the hearing, because of my difficulties understanding the interpreter, and my inability to speak to my lawyer, in English about same at the hearing. [22] The RAD finds that these allegations do not meet the requirements of section 110(4). This evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. She claims that she could not understand the interpreter during the refugee hearing, and that she told her counsel of this after the hearing. There is nothing in the Appellant's affidavit or Memorandum to indicate that she realized only after the rejection of her claim that she could not understand the interpreter, or that she only told counsel of this problem after the claim was rejected. The Appellant has not established that this evidence arose after the rejection of her claim. [23] The Appellant has also not established that this evidence was not available to her for presentation to the RPD. The question remains, then, whether she could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to advise the RPD of the alleged interpretation problem. The Appellant was represented by counsel before the RPD, and the same counsel represents her in this appeal. She has not alleged counsel misconduct. The RAD expects that the Appellant is able to communicate with counsel in order to receive advice and provide instructions. In this context, it is difficult to understand why the Appellant and counsel did not tell the RPD of the alleged interpretation deficiencies. Instead, they raise this issue for the first time on appeal, without adequate explanation for the delay. The RAD finds that the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in her circumstances, to have provided this evidence to the RPD, either at the refugee hearing or shortly afterward through counsel. [24] The Appellant's proposed new evidence with respect to the alleged interpretation difficulty does not meet the test in section 110(4) and is not admissible here. Even if it did meet the test, the RAD would find the evidence inadmissible as it is not credible. The Appellant did not raise the interpretation issue when it first occurred, and even now has not provided any objective evidence that the interpretation was deficient. [25] Paragraph 5 of the affidavit simply repeats the basis of the Appellant's claim, and is not new evidence. Paragraph 6 also repeats elements of the claim, while paragraph 7 expresses the Appellant's disappointment at being found lacking in subjective fear. None of this is new evidence. [26] Having considered the Appellant's affidavit, the RAD finds that it does not meet the test for new evidence, and is not admissible here. [27] The Appellant requests an oral hearing. Section 110(6) of the IRPA provides that the RAD may convene such a hearing where there is new evidence which raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the refugee decision, and which, if accepted, could justify allowing or rejecting the claim. The Appellant's proposed new evidence is inadmissible here, and it is therefore unnecessary for the RAD to consider whether the conditions of section 110(6) might be met.14 The Appellant's request for an oral hearing is denied. THE ROLE OF THE RAD [28] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [29] The Appellant submits that the RAD should apply a standard of reasonableness, and consider whether there is a palpable and overriding error in the RPD's decision. [30] It is settled law that the RAD is not to review decisions of the RPD in the manner of a judicial review.15 [31] The RAD is a creature of statute and so is the appeal before it; its role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.16 Such an appeal (i) is directed at the decision of the RPD, (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision, and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD.17 [32] According to the Federal Court of Appeal, the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. It is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.18 [33] With respect to findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness.19 When applying that standard, the RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the RAD to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the RPD; if not, the RAD will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.20 [34] There are, however, cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because such findings require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence heard by the RPD.21 The Federal Court of Appeal, in discussing the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD's decision, has declined to provide the scope and degree of deference to be shown by the RAD: The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is thus no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case.22 [35] While it is clear that some level of deference is warranted, it is less obvious how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo: [T]here also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed.23 [36] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony. As such, credibility findings arising from that oral testimony are deserving of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, as are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [37] Not every finding relating to credibility warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where the determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.24 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.25 [38] How much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? In Huruglica, the Federal Court held that the RAD can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error".26 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Court. [39] Although the Court did not explain what level of deference is established by recognizing and respecting a conclusion of the RPD, it has repeatedly upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD.27 In the RAD's view, this suggests that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [40] In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome.28 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, the RAD finds this framework helpful in considering its own approach to deference. [41] Even where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of a comprehensible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and understand how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [42] Further, the outcome of that process must be a result that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. For this reason, it is particularly important that the RAD engage in its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to determine whether the RPD's finding is supported by that evidence. [43] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [44] However, the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a comprehensible reasoning process whose premises are rooted in such advantages. If either the process or the outcome does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error. [45] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. The RPD's Findings [46] The Appellant argues that the RPD made various errors in rejecting her claim. Did the RPD misunderstand the basis of the claim? [47] The Appellant claims to fear "clandestine money lenders." She argues on appeal that the RPD misunderstand her fear as being of "unregistered money lenders." In her submission, the RPD should have "undertaken a brief analysis about the clandestine nature of money lending in Thailand,"29 as well as consideration of the typical victims of such lenders. She suggests that the nature of these victims - who are often female, and poor - supports her argument that she belongs to a particular social group. [48] The RAD has carefully reviewed the record, including the RPD's decision. It is clear that the RPD understood the basis of the Appellant's claim - that she fears harm at the hands of money lenders "who are connected to the police force and who threated [sic] to kidnap or kill her should she return to Thailand."30 [49] While the RPD did not undertake an analysis of the nature of money lending in Thailand, it was not required to do so in these circumstances. The Appellant claimed she borrowed fifty thousand U.S. dollars but did not know the group which provided the money or the names of those who threatened her. She told the RPD that she had a loan contract but did not present it as evidence. Although the threats were allegedly made before she came to Canada in 2007, she did not seek protection, despite her temporary status, and in fact returned to Thailand in 2008 and 2013. She has had no contact with the money lenders for about ten years and her children remain in Thailand, living with a relative, and also have had no contact with the lenders. Although it would have been better had the RPD made a clear overall credibility determination, it is obvious enough from the decision that the panel did not believe that the Appellant has borrowed money from criminals or faces any risk from them or from anyone else in Thailand. [50] Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD agrees. The Appellant's claim, from her vague Basis of Claim narrative to her very general testimony about the alleged agents of persecution, is simply not credible. Nexus [51] The RPD found that nexus was a determinative issue in this claim.31 The Appellant vigorously disagrees, arguing that she is a part of a particular social group and that she fears persecution because of her gender. [52] It is not clear to the RAD why the RPD considered nexus to be an issue. The claim was dismissed on the basis of credibility: as the RPD did not believe the Appellant's allegations, it found that she has not established that she faces any risk in Thailand. The nexus analysis was neither determinative nor necessary, as a general lack of credibility was sufficient to dispose of the refugee claim under both sections 96 and 97 of the IRPA. For this reason, it is unnecessary for the RAD to consider the Appellant's arguments with respect to nexus: even if the RPD erred here, it is simply of no consequence, as the refugee claim would still fail on the basis of credibility. Failure to consider cumulative persecution [53] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by looking at each incident separately, rather than considering the cumulative mistreatment. The RAD disagrees. The RPD did not find the Appellant to be credible with respect to the alleged incidents. The RAD has reviewed the evidence. It notes that the allegations in the Appellant's Basis of Claim form are very vague - for example, claiming that she was threatened "in 2005 and 2006" by "police and the lenders."32 She claimed that she reported the threats to police, but does state when this happened.33 The RPD found her testimony to be vague - she was unable to provide basic details, such as the name of the individuals or group from whom she borrowed money or the names of those who had threatened her, or even a copy of the contract she allegedly signed. The RAD notes that the BOC narrative is also vague and lacking in details, and does not provide a single date. [54] In this context, the RPD did not err by failing to consider cumulative persecution. It simply did not believe that the incidents happened, and neither does the RAD. Delay and re-availment [55] Although the Appellant had allegedly been threatened before she came to Canada in 2007, she did not seek protection until many years later. During that time, she also voluntarily returned to Thailand on two occasions. The RPD found that these actions undermined her credibility. [56] The Appellant argues on appeal that there was no inconsistency in her evidence; she delayed claiming because she felt safe in Canada, and she returned to Thailand to attend a family funeral. [57] In the RAD's view, there is indeed a significant inconsistency between the Appellant's words and her actions. She claims that she fled Thailand in fear for her life. Despite this, and despite having temporary status in Canada, she did not seek protection. Not only did she delay in seeking protection, but she returned to the place where she claims she is almost certain to be killed. Risking one's life to attend a funeral makes little sense; when considered along with the Appellant's very lengthy delay in claiming, it clearly points to a lack of fear. [58] The Appellant argues that the RPD should have considered whether the delay would bring the refugee protection system into disrepute. This argument relies upon an RPD's decision which considers the delay by the Minister in bringing an application to vacate refugee status previously granted; this has nothing to do with a delay in claiming and is simply not relevant here.34 The Appellant also argues that the RPD failed to consider that a delay in claiming is not generally determinative of a refugee claim. The RAD agrees, and finds that the delay here was not determinative; instead, it was considered in conjunction with other credibility concerns. [59] Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD agrees that the Appellant's delay in claiming and her returns to Thailand seriously damage her credibility. Risk [60] The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to consider human rights abuses in Thailand with respect to money lending practices. However, the RAD finds that the RPD was not required to undertake such an analysis, as the Appellant has failed to establish that she has been involved in such practices. CONCLUSION [61] Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD finds that the Appellant is generally lacking in credibility. She has not established the allegations upon which her claim is based. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld February 14, 2017 Date [62] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. 1 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 2 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, section 3(3)(g)(iii). 3 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, October 29, 2014, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 4 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 5 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 54 6 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 7 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 8 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 9 Ibid., Raza, paras. 13-15. 10 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 11 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 12 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 48. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 12. 14 Tuncdemir, Omer v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-808-16), Gagné, August 31, 2016, 2016 FC 993, para. 40. 15 See, for example, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, para. 33. 16 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015, 2015 FC 321, para. 14; M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 17 Dhillon, paras. 14-18. 18 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103. 19 Ibid. 20 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9; [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 21 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 70. 22 Ibid., para. 74. 23 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina, Yani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233, para. 11. 24 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; see also M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 72. 25 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, 2014 FC 78, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.). 26 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799, para. 55. 27 See Yin, Sarom v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2845-14), Noël, December 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1209, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Gaelle Leonelle Nguedo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7280-13), Locke, September 10, 2014, 2014 FC 859, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, Allalou, Abedelkrim v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7217-13), Shore, December 17, 2014, 2014 FC 1084, and Sajad, Zeeshan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-926-14), Shore, November 21, 2014, 2014 FC 1107; also Bui, Van Son v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1654-14), Shore, November 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1145. 28Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 16, Memorandum, para. 4.1.1. 30 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Reasons, para. 5. 31 Ibid., para. 7. 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 11. 33 Ibid, p. 12. 34 X, Re. 2012 CanLII 71598, Bosveld, CA IRB. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-15587