TB6-06470

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-06470 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision July 20, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal John Savaglio Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX(the Appellant), a citizen of Pakistan, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and either find him to be a Convention refugee or return the matter to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he adheres to the Shia sect of Islam, and comes from a dedicated Shia family. He claimed that in September of 2013, a number of Shias, including relatives, were murdered by an extremist Sunni group. His uncle filed a police report with respect to the high-profile crime, and suspects from the Sipah-i-Sahaba (SSP) group were arrested. The Appellant assisted his uncle in attending at the police station and court, and he claims that as a result he was threatened by the SSP. The police refused to protect him; he went into hiding and then travelled to the United States in XXXX XXXX XXXX. Three months later he entered Canada, and about two months after that he filed a refugee application. Upon return to Pakistan, he fears harm at the hands of anti-Shia extremists. [4] The Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (the Minister) intervened in the Appellant's refugee claim before the RPD.1 The Minister provided information from U.S. immigration officials about the Appellant's travel to the U.S., his marital status, and his passport, and noted that this information differed from that provided in his refugee claim. The Minister took the position that the Appellant was lacking in credibility and came to Canada for reasons other than to seek refugee protection. [5] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on March 16, 2016. By a decision of April 21, 2016, the RPD rejected the claim. Due to credibility concerns, the RPD did not believe that the Appellant was targeted by the SSP. Although the panel accepted that the Appellant is Shia, it concluded that not every Shia in Pakistan is persecuted. The RPD also determined that the Appellant can access a viable internal flight alternative (IFA) in Hyderabad. [6] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its assessment of his credibility, in finding that his fear is not well-founded, and that he has an IFA in Pakistan. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [7] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected2 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [8] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in his Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.3 Application of Section 110(4) [9] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.4 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in his circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of his claim. If he could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [10] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.5 [11] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD - either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [12] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for the Appellant to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.6 [13] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.7 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [14] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [15] In Singh,8 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza9 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of section 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on the nearly identical wording of section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.10 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of section 110(4).11 [16] Where evidence meets the test in section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [17] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.12 RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [18] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in section110 (6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.13 [19] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to its consideration of the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence that passes the test in section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. [20] The Appellant asks the RAD to admit four articles, each dated in May of 2016. The RAD finds that the articles post-date the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim and therefore meet the test in Section 110(4). The articles are also relevant, as each addresses the situation of Shias in Pakistan. The RAD has no reason to be concerned about the credibility of this evidence. The Appellant's proposed new evidence is admitted in this appeal. [21] The Appellant does not request an oral hearing. Further, as the new evidence admitted here does not raise a serious question with respect to the Appellant's credibility, sections 110(3) and 110(6) of the IRPA provide that the RAD must proceed without an oral hearing. THE ROLE OF THE RAD [22] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [23] The Appellant submits that the RAD must apply a standard of correctness where no questions of credibility are raised. After carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD must carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. [24] It is settled law that the RAD is not to review decisions of the RPD in the manner of a judicial review.14 [25] The RAD is a creature of statute and so is the appeal before it; its role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.15 Such an appeal (i) is directed at the decision of the RPD, (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision, and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD.16 [26] According to the Federal Court of Appeal, the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. It is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.17 [27] With respect to findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness.18 When applying that standard, the RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the RAD to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the RPD; if not, the RAD will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.19 [28] There are, however, cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because such findings require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence heard by the RPD.20 The Federal Court of Appeal, in discussing the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD's decision, has declined to provide the scope and degree of deference to be shown by the RAD: The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is thus no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case.21 [29] While it is clear that some level of deference is warranted, it is less obvious how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo: [T]here also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed.22 [30] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony. As such, credibility findings arising from that oral testimony are deserving of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, as are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [31] Not every finding relating to credibility warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where the determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.23 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.24 [32] How much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? In Huruglica, the Federal Court held that the RAD can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error".25 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Court. [33] Although the Court did not explain what level of deference is established by recognizing and respecting a conclusion of the RPD, it has repeatedly upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD.26 In the RAD's view, this suggests that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [34] In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome. 27 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, the RAD finds this framework helpful in considering its own approach to deference. [35] Even where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of a comprehensible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and understand how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [36] Further, the outcome of that process must be a result that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. For this reason, it is particularly important that the RAD engage in its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to determine whether the RPD's finding is supported by that evidence. [37] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [38] However, the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a comprehensible reasoning process whose premises are rooted in such advantages. If either the process or the outcome does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error. [39] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. The RPD's Findings [40] The Appellant argues that the RPD made a number of errors in rejecting his claim for refugee protection. Court case [41] The RPD noted that the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BOC) form alleges that he drove his uncle to the police station and also to the anti-terrorism court to pursue the murder trial of his relatives. The RPD found his oral testimony on this subject to be evasive and inconsistent with the BOC. The RPD wrote that the Appellant testified that he and his uncle did not attend court because they were afraid. When the RPD pointed out the inconsistency between this testimony and the BOC, the Appellant replied that he had meant to say that the documents are in court and since he was not attending court, he could not get the documents. The RPD found that this could not explain the contradiction and made a negative credibility finding.28 [42] The Appellant argues on appeal that he initially testified that he and his uncle had not attended court, but: [H]e had meant to say that because he and his uncle had stopped attending Court after receiving threatening phone calls, he was unable to provide any documentation relating to the apprehension of the relevant perpetrators. The Appellant further clarified in testimony in this respect that he and his uncle had in fact attended Court in the beginning (on four occasions), but that they had stopped attending Court because they were afraid that the perpetrators would find out they were pursuing the relevant case.29 [43] The Appellant submits that the RPD relied upon an apparent, rather than real, contradiction, and thus erred. [44] The RPD's finding here was based on the Appellant's oral testimony, and the RAD will show deference to that finding. However, such a finding must also be based on the evidence, and the RAD has reviewed the Appellant's testimony about attending at court. [45] The Appellant told the RPD that the police had documents describing the perpetrators of the attack, and that the police submitted the documents to the court. The RPD member asked the Appellant if he had any documents relating to when the police apprehended the perpetrators. The Appellant replied, "Those documents are at the court, and we were not attending the court because we were afraid they might find out who is behind this case."30 He added that it did not come to his mind to seek the documents from the police station, and that he had no evidence that the suspects were apprehended, though he could look for such. [46] The RPD asked the Appellant whether he had evidence that there was a court case against the perpetrators. He again testified that "we didn't attend court because we were afraid that they will suspect we are pursuing the case."31 The RPD pointed out that the uncle had filed the First Information Report (FIR) to police. The Appellant agreed that his uncle is a witness; when the RPD suggested that this would reveal his involvement, the Appellant replied, "But he is not attending court."32 [47] The Appellant's oral testimony was initially consistent: neither he nor his uncle attended court, as they were afraid they would be identified by the perpetrators. While the Appellant submits that he meant to say he stopped attending court after threats, this argument is not supported by the record. The Appellant repeatedly explained that he and his uncle did not attend court because they did not want to be identified. If the uncle had filed the FIR, and if the Appellant and his uncle had already attended four times, it makes little sense that they would subsequently develop a fear of being identified. [48] When the RPD reminded the Appellant that his BOC claims he went to court with his uncle, he then explained that his earlier testimony was about his reluctance to obtain documents from the court.33 While the issue of documents was raised in the member's questions, this cannot explain the Appellant's testimony that neither he nor his uncle attended court because they were afraid they would be identified. [49] Having carefully reviewed the evidence, the RAD finds that the RPD did not err with respect to its treatment of attendance at the court. The Appellant attempted to explain the absence of court documents by testifying that he and his uncle did not attend court, as they were afraid of being identified; at the same time, he attempted to rely upon a BOC narrative which claimed that he was threatened as a result of attending at court four times. This is a contradiction, one that goes to the very heart of the Appellant's claim, and which seriously undermines his credibility. Interactions with the police [50] The Appellant told the RPD that he filed an FIR with the police, but was told that they could not protect him and that he should flee the country instead. The RPD did not consider this response as plausible, as the police had already apprehended several perpetrators, had identified the case as important, and as the case was being monitored by the Inspector-General. The RPD also considered objective evidence with respect to terrorism in Pakistan and the response of the authorities there. It concluded that, in this context, a police officer in Pakistan would not tell the Appellant that he should leave the country. [51] The RAD owes no deference to findings of implausibility made by the RPD, as the RPD has no advantage over the appeal tribunal in reaching such conclusions. Findings of implausibility should be made only in the clearest of cases. [52] In the RAD's view, this was not the clearest of cases. Pakistan has a poor record of state protection against terrorist groups; why was it implausible that a police officer told the Appellant that he could not be protected? As the Appellant points out, there was ample evidence in the record about the failure of police to deal with anti-Shia organizations.34 His new evidence also shows that Pakistan has been unable to effectively deal with extremist groups.35 It was an error for the RPD to make an implausibility finding here. The Appellant's time in hiding [53] The Appellant claims that he went into hiding with a friend in Islamabad, and lived there for two months. The RPD made a negative credibility finding, as this address was not included in the Appellant's list of residences in an immigration form he completed.36 The panel did not accept the Appellant's explanation that he thought he was to provide only his own residences. [54] The Appellant argues on appeal that he provided reasonable explanation for the omission, "having wrongly believed that the subject form required the inclusion of his own residences only."37 The RAD disagrees. The form asks the Appellant to provide "all addresses where you have lived since your 18th birthday or the past 10 years, whichever is more recent." There is nothing in these instructions to suggest that the Appellant should omit an address where he lived with a friend. In fact, the Appellant gave an address in his village, below which he noted, "it was my Permanent address," suggesting that he also included less-permanent addresses in the form. [55] The Appellant argues further that the RPD ignored other evidence showing that he did go into hiding. The RAD notes that the RPD is presumed to have considered all of the evidence, even if not specifically mentioned. More importantly, however, evidence which corroborates the Appellant's hiding place does not resolve the credibility problem here: that he did not provide that address on the form. Subjective fear [56] The Appellant fled Pakistan to the United States, where he lived in Maryland with friends for approximately three months. He did nothing to seek protection there. He told the RPD that he was worried that Donald Trump would become president, and also believed he had a better chance of obtaining asylum in Canada. The RPD found that this was indicative of asylum shopping. The Appellant went from Maryland to Seattle, where he stayed 17 days; he then entered Canada illegally, and took a bus to Toronto. The RPD noted the strange route that the Appellant took, and also his failure to produce even one piece of evidence to corroborate his travel to Canada. The panel also cited his contradictory evidence about family in Canada: he initially said that his relatives would not help him, but then later testified that he travelled to Toronto because he had family there to assist him. The RPD made a negative credibility finding. [57] The Appellant submits on appeal that the RPD placed "undue emphasis" on his failure to claim in the U.S., and points out that such a failure cannot be determinative of his refugee claim. He argues that he provided an explanation for his failure to produce any travel documents - his passport was retained by the smuggler, and he left other documents on a bus. [58] Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD agrees with the RPD that the Appellant's actions are inconsistent with his alleged fear. He allegedly travelled to the east coast of the U.S., and remained there for months without seeking protection. He claims he then travelled to the west coast, for reasons not reasonably explained, and remained there for weeks without seeking protection. He then crossed illegally into Canada, and again travelled across the country. Despite all of this alleged travel, the Appellant could provide no corroboration. [59] If the Appellant was truly fleeing for his life, he could have been expected to seek protection at the first possible opportunity. He is well-educated and well-traveled. The political situation in the U.S., and his belief that his chances were better in Canada, are not adequate explanations for his failure to claim there. The Appellant's actions are not consistent with the fear he claims to have. While this issue is not in itself determinative of his refugee claim, his credibility is nevertheless damaged further. Similar-situated uncle [60] The RPD questioned the Appellant about the circumstances of his uncle, who filed the FIR in relation to the alleged massacre of family members. The RPD noted that the uncle, who actually pursued the complaint against the terrorists, would be a much more significant target than the Appellant, whose role was to drive the uncle to the courthouse. The Appellant told the RPD that his uncle continues to live in his own home and has not relocated; he explained that this is because the uncle has a farm and has no other options. To keep himself safe, he does not attend village functions. The RPD found the uncle's actions to undermine the Appellant's claim that he has a well-founded fear in Pakistan; it concluded that the uncle is satisfied with the actions of the police. [61] The Appellant argues on appeal that this was a highly speculative and unsubstantiated finding. The uncle was not a co-claimant and did not provide testimony. Further, the uncle does not venture outside of his home to attend functions; he also provided an affidavit, which the RPD did not specifically address. [62] In the RAD's view, there was no basis for the RPD's conclusion that the uncle was satisfied with the police response. However, while the RPD went too far in making a finding with respect to the uncle's state of mind, this is not fatal to its analysis. In the RAD's view, the RPD considered the uncle as a similarly-situated person. The Appellant fears harm because of his role in bringing the SSP terrorists to justice; his uncle is an even more significant target for the SSP, as he initiated the case against them. In this context, it was not an error for the RPD to consider the situation of the uncle. [63] The Federal Court has cited Professor James Hathaway, who wrote that "the best evidence that an individual faces a serious chance of persecution is usually the treatment afforded similarly situated persons in the country of origin."38 In the RAD's view, the Appellant's uncle is similarly-situated, if not worse off. Despite the Appellant's fear of death at the hands of the SSP, his uncle continues to live, unharmed, in his own house; this is despite the fact that the uncle is a witness in the terrorism trial of the SSP, while the Appellant was only a driver for the witness. In the RAD's view, the evidence does not support the Appellant's claim that the SSP seeks violent retribution for the court case. The Appellant's credibility [64] While the RPD erred in its implausibility finding with respect to the advice given the Appellant by police, its remaining credibility conclusions were not wrong. Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD agrees that the Appellant has serious and unexplained credibility deficiencies. He gave contradictory evidence about the issue at the core of his claim - whether he and his uncle went to court. He failed to include his alleged hiding place in a list of addresses. He escaped to a safe country but did not seek protection there. He fears that he will be persecuted for his minor role in a court case, while his uncle, who plays a larger role, continues to live unharmed in his own home. He has failed to provide documentation with respect to the court case, even though he told the RPD that he did not think to seek this from the police station. [65] The RAD recognizes that the Appellant has provided various corroborating documents, such as affidavits and letters;39 neither the RAD nor the RPD saw or examined the authors of these documents, and the credibility of this evidence is no stronger than that of the Appellant, and cannot overcome his own credibility weaknesses. [66] Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD finds that the Appellant has not established with credible or trustworthy evidence that he is involved in a court case or is sought by the SSP for any reason. The RAD does not doubt that the massacre referred to by the Appellant occurred; however, he has not established that this places him The Appellant's Profile as a Shia [67] The RAD agrees with the RPD that the Appellant has not established the core allegations of his claim - that he is sought by the SSP because of a court case against members of that organization. However, the RPD did accept that the Appellant is Shia. The Appellant argues on appeal that as his name is recognizably Shia, that the Shia are a minority in Pakistan, and that he would have to register with the authorities upon relocating to another city; he asks the RAD to find that he is at risk as a Shia anywhere in Pakistan. [68] Although the RPD found a viable IFA for the Appellant, the RAD will not consider this issue. As the RAD has found that the Appellant is not being pursued by extremists, or by anyone, there is no need for him to relocate. However, the RAD must consider the risk to the Appellant as a Shia in Islamabad, where he lived from 2005 until he left the country in 2015.40 [69] There are approximately 50 million Shias in Pakistan, or 25% of the country's 200 million people.41 They are often employed in government and hold high offices, with notable examples including former presidents and prime ministers. They are well-represented in parliament, in the police, and in the judiciary, including in the sharia courts.42 There are no legal restrictions on their freedom to practice their beliefs, and there is a general willingness by law enforcement authorities to provide protection, including security during religious events.43 While Shias face little societal discrimination, they are threatened by sectarian violence and militants; the risk varies by region.44 Many urban centres, including Islamabad, are home to large Shia communities.45 Attacks against Shias do occur across Pakistan; however, they are particularly prominent in Quetta, Balochistan, Karachi, Gilgit Baltistan, and in the north-west tribal areas.46 The situation is also dangerous for Shias in Lahore and Multan.47 [70] One source reports that, in a 12-month period ending in June of 2014, there were 54 attacks on Shias, resulting in 222 deaths and 289 injuries.48 While these numbers are tragic, they must be considered in relation to the size of Pakistan's Shia community, which numbers as many as 50 million people. It must also be considered that such attacks are most prominent in certain areas, listed above, which suggests that the risk in Islamabad is even less. 49 [71] Objective evidence also indicates that some high-profile Shias are specifically targeted, including scholars and lawyers.50 [72] The Appellant's new evidence indicates that there have been attacks on Shias in Karachi,51 in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, 52 and Peshawar.53 This evidence does not establish that the risk in Islamabad is greater than described above. [73] Having considered the evidence, only some of which is referred to above, the RAD finds that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution as a Shia. He does not have a particular profile which would attract attention, and he has not established with credible evidence that he has come to the attention of any anti-Shia militant group or individuals. While there is some violence against Shias in all areas of Pakistan, there are less problems in Islamabad than in other cities. Although there are many incidents in Pakistan, these must be considered in the context of the very large Shia population; for example, the 54 reported attacks affecting about 500 Shias represent approximately one incident per one million Shias and one victim for every one hundred thousand Shias. The Appellant's risk would appear to be less, as he does not have a high profile and as Islamabad appears to be relatively safe for Shias. The RAD finds that the Appellant, in his particular circumstances, faces only a mere possibility of persecution. CONCLUSION [74] The Appellant has not credibly established his claim that he is or was involved in a court case against individuals associated with an extremist group, nor has he established that he is targeted or pursued by such a group. Further, the objective evidence does not establish that he has a well-founded fear of persecution as a Shia. [75] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld July 20, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 194-213. 2 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 3 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 4 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, October 29, 2014, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 5 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 6 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 54 7 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 8 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 9 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 10 Ibid., Raza, paras. 13-15. 11 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 12 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 13 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 48. 14 See, for example, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, para. 33. 15 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015, 2015 FC 321, para. 14; M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 16 Dhillon, paras. 14-18. 17 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103. 18 Ibid. 19 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9; [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 20 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 70. 21 Ibid., para. 74. 22 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina, Yani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233, para. 11. 23 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; see also M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 72. 24 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, 2014 FC 78, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.). 25 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799, para. 55. 26 See Yin, Sarom v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2845-14), Noël, December 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1209, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Gaelle Leonelle Nguedo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7280-13), Locke, September 10, 2014, 2014 FC 859, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, Allalou, Abedelkrim v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7217-13), Shore, December 17, 2014, 2014 FC 1084, and Sajad, Zeeshan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-926-14), Shore, November 21, 2014, 2014 FC 1107; also Bui, Van Son v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1654-14), Shore, November 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1145. 27Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Reasons, para. 12. 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 34, Memorandum, para. 6. 30 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 00:58:30 to 00:59:11. 31 Ibid., Audio Recording, 1:05:20. 32 Ibid., Audio Recording, 1:06:30. 33 Ibid., Audio Recording, 1:06:45. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 36-37. 35 For example, Exhibit p-2, Appellant's Record, p. 23. 36 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 60, IMM-5669. 37 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 35, para.8. 38 Voskova, Tereza v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5522-11), Mandamin, November 29, 2011, 2011 FC 1376, para. 30. 39 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 498-511. 40 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 60, IMM-5669, Question 12; p. 301, National Identity Card. 41 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Pakistan(January29, 2016), item 1.12, section 2.3; item 12.1, p. 2. 42 Ibid., item 1.16, para. 3.2.2. 43 Ibid., item 1.10, para. 1.3.35. 44 Ibid., item 1.10, para. 1.3.33. 45 Ibid., item 1.16, para. 3.1.2. 46 Ibid., item 1.16, para. 4.1.7. 47 Ibid., item 12.5. 48 Ibid., item 12.22. 49 See also item 1.8, pp. 39-40, which lists urban centres where Shias are at risk. 50 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, NDP for Pakistan (January 29, 2016), item 12.1, p. 13. 51 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 21-22. 52 Ibid., p. 24. 53 Ibid., p. 25. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR: TB6-06470