TB8-09936

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-09936 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision June 30, 2020 Date de la décision Panel J. Lourenço Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Johnson Babalola Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) is a citizen of Pakistan. She appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), dated April 6, 2018, rejecting her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant alleges she faces persecution at the hands of her family. The determinative issue in this case for the RPD was credibility. [2] For the reasons that follow, the appeal is allowed and I substitute a decision that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant alleges that after her father passed away she began working as XXXX XXXX XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Appellant alleges that she did not disclose her actual employment to her family but instead told them that she was overseas teaching as they are conservative and would not have approved of her chosen profession. The Appellant alleges that while working for XXXX XXXX, she met a man with whom she began a relationship and later married. The Appellant alleges that they were married in a religious ceremony in Saudi Arabia, however they could not register their marriage in the country because Saudi men were not allowed to marry Pakistani women. The Appellant alleges that she and her husband then went to Turkey one year later to register their marriage civilly. The Appellant alleges that she did not disclose her relationship and subsequent marriage to her family as they would have disapproved of the union since it was not arranged by them. [4] The Appellant alleges that her husband was abusive during their relationship. Specifically, the Appellant alleges that her husband would force her to take medication that would induce abortions whenever she was pregnant. The Appellant alleges that her husband eventually decided to reconnect with his first wife and their relationship broke down. The Appellant alleges that her husband attempted to terminate her last pregnancy but was unable to procure the medication he needed to carry this out. As such, the Appellant carried her child to term, giving birth to that child in Canada. [5] The Appellant alleges that if she were to return to Pakistan she faces persecution and a risk of honour killing at the hands of her uncle who is now the head of her family. The Appellant alleges that her family would not approve of her previous relationship and her child, that was born out of wedlock. [6] The RPD found that the Appellant had not credibly established her allegations and rejected her claim on that basis. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [7] The Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) reviews decisions of the RPD on a standard of correctness after conducting an independent assessment of the evidence before it. The exception to this rule is where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in the assessment and weighing of oral testimony heard, which in particular cases, attracts deference. Unless specifically stated below, I have applied a correctness standard.1 ANALYSIS Appellant's arguments [8] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its assessment of her credibility. The Appellant argues that the RPD was microscopic in its analysis of the evidence and failed to adequately consider her explanation for minor inconsistencies. The Appellant also argues that the RPD erred when it concluded that the Appellant's allegations of gender-based violence were not credible. Further, the Appellant argues that the RPD failed to apply the Chairperson's Gender Guidelines in its analysis. The Appellant also argues that the RPD failed to consider objective evidence about country conditions in Pakistan which supported the Appellant's allegations. Finally, the Appellant submits new evidence with her appeal which she argues further establishes her allegations as credible and demonstrates that she cannot safely return to Pakistan. New evidence [9] Section 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA)2 sets out that an appellant may only present evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim, or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection. Where evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will then go on to consider the factors affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in Singh.3 [10] The Appellant submits documents as new evidence with her appeal. The Appellant initially submitted new evidence with her memorandum and then filed additional documents with a rule 29 application. [11] The list of new evidence submitted with the appeal is as follows: 1. A death certificate for the Appellant's father issued in 2013.4 2. A letter from the XXXX XXXX Centre.5 3. An affidavit from her family's lawyer in Pakistan dated 7 May 2018.6 4. A letter from the Canadian Council of Imams dated May 1, 2018.7 5. A news article about an honour killing dated April 24, 2018.8 [12] The list of new evidence submitted with a rule 29 application is as follows: 6. An affidavit from the Appellant dated June 10, 2019.9 7. A letter from the XXXX Immigrant Women's Centre dated April 15, 2019.10 8. A letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Community Health Center dated May 22, 2019.11 9. A letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Community Health Center dated XXXX XXXX, 2019.12 [13] In considering the Appellant's new evidence that was submitted with her appeal, I find that items 1, 3 and 4 do not meet the statutory requirements set out in section 110(4) of the IRPA and therefore will not be admitted as new evidence. [14] The death certificate for the Appellant's father issued in 2013 clearly predates the rejection of the Appellant's claim. The Appellant indicates in her memorandum that this certificate was not reasonably available to her at the time of her hearing13 but does not offer any further indication as to why she could not obtain the document or how she now was able to provide a copy. As such I find that the Appellant has not met the burden of establishing that this document was not available to her at the time her claim was rejected. Also, I find that since this certificate establishes her father's death, which is central to her allegation, it is reasonable to have expected it would have been provided prior to her claim being rejected. As such, the death certificate does not meet the requirements set out in section 110(4) of the IRPA and will not be entered as evidence for the appeal. [15] In considering items 3 and 4, I find that while these letters were issued after the Appellant's claim was rejected they set out information that predates her claim. The affidavit from her family's lawyer speaks about events that occurred before the Appellant made a claim in Canada. There is a vague reference in the letter to "recently" meeting14 with the Appellant's family but no date is specified and therefore I find that the Appellant has not established that this document is new. There is also no indication as to why the Appellant was unable to provide this document prior to the rejection of her claim and given that it attempts to corroborate her allegations of gender-based violence, and her fear of her family I find that it could have reasonably been expected to be provided with her claim. [16] The letter from the Canadian Council of Imams essentially indicates the conditions required for religious marriage. Again, I note that while the letter was written after the rejection of the Appellant's claim there's no indication that the information contained in this letter is a new. There is also no indication that the Appellant was unable to obtain this information prior to the rejection of her claim. This letter sets out the conditions for a religious marriage, including the approval of the bride's family, and therefore is directly related to the Appellant's allegations that her family would not approve of her relationship. Therefore, I find that it would have been reasonable to expect the Appellant to provide this evidence before her claim was rejected. For these reasons I find these documents do not meet the statutory requirements of new evidence and will not be considered with the appeal. [17] The letter from the XXXX XXXX Centre is not legible and therefore I am unable to assess whether it meets the statutory requirements of new evidence. However, I note that the Appellant does not set out any arguments about why this letter would meet the statutory requirements in her memorandum of argument, simply stating that the letter corroborates elements of her claim. Given this, I find that the Appellant has not established how this document meets the requirements of new evidence. Further, for the reasons that follow I find that there is sufficient evidence in the record to decide the appeal, even without the contents of this letter. [18] In considering the newspaper article that was submitted as new evidence, I find that this article clearly postdates the rejection of the Appellant's claim. The article is credible on its face, and speaks to the relevant issue of the prevalence of honour killings in Pakistan. As such this news article meets the requirements of new evidence and will be considered with the appeal. [19] I will allow all of the post-perfection evidence (items 6-9) to be considered with the appeal. First, considering the factors set out in rule 29,15 I find that the new evidence submitted post-perfection is relevant and has significant probative value. This evidence all essentially speaks to the continued difficulties of the Appellant as well as the recent diagnosis of her child with autism. The Appellant's psychological difficulties as well as her child's diagnosis are relevant to the issue of internal flight alternative. I also find that there was no way for the Appellant to have provided the information about her child's autism with her claim initially given her child's young age and the fact he was not yet diagnosed at the time she submitted her appeal. [20] Turning to consider the statutory requirements set out in section 110(4) of the IRPA, I find that this evidence is new and clearly postdates the rejection of the Appellant's claim. In considering the factors set out in Singh,16 I find that the evidence is new and relevant for the reasons I have indicated. The evidence is also credible on its face as it is coming from reliable medical and professional sources. For all of these reasons, the post-perfection evidence will be admitted in the appeal. [21] The Appellant requested that an oral hearing be held pursuant to section 110(6) of the IRPA. Although I have allowed some of the new evidence to be admitted with the appeal, I will not hold an oral hearing. The evidence that has been accepted does not raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant. As such, the conditions for an oral hearing have not been met. The Appellant has credibly established her allegations The RPD erred by finding that there were significant contradictions in the Appellant's evidence [22] The RPD found that there were inconsistencies in the Appellant's documents regarding her marriage. The RPD noted that in the Appellant's basis of claim form (BOC), she indicated that she was married in a religious ceremony in August 2014 and then remarried in a civil ceremony in June 2015. The RPD found that the BOC narrative was inconsistent with the Appellant's generic application form which indicated that her religious marriage took place in April of 2014. The RPD also noted that the Appellant's family composition information in her 2013 visa application was inconsistent with the family composition set out in the 2015 application and in her refugee application documents. The RPD also found that the Appellant's previous visa applications contained inconsistencies regarding her marital status. The RPD acknowledged that the Appellant testified that she used an agent to obtain her temporary resident visa in 2013 but found that this did not adequately explain inconsistencies in the applications. [23] The Appellant argues that the RPD's finding that her various immigration applications contained significant inconsistencies was unreasonable. The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to properly consider her explanation for listing herself as single in her visa application. The Appellant once again argues that at the time of her visa application, she had only been married in a religious ceremony and her marriage had not yet been registered in Pakistan or Turkey so she did not consider herself legally married. The Appellant also argues that the RPD's finding regarding inconsistencies around the date of her religious ceremony was microscopic. The Appellant argues that the notation that her religious ceremony took place in April 2014 in her generic application form was a simple typographical error and it did not impugn the credibility of her allegation. The Appellant also argues that the RPD failed to consider the other documentary evidence establishing that she was in fact married. The Appellant also argues that any inconsistencies regarding her siblings and her father in the temporary resident visa applications were due to her use of an agent. [24] Having independently reviewed the record I agree with the Appellant that the RPD was microscopic in its analysis of the evidence. In considering the issue of the inconsistency between the basis of claim form and the generic application form regarding the date of the Appellant's religious ceremony, I find that this inconsistency is not significant and has been reasonably explained. I accept the Appellant's explanation that the reference to a marriage in April is simply a typographical error. I also find that this is not a material issue in the Appellant's claim. What is clear from the evidence on the record is that the Appellant was married first in a religious ceremony in Saudi Arabia and then later in a civil ceremony in Turkey. The RPD makes no negative findings about the credibility of the marriage documents submitted by the Appellant and upon my review there is no reason to doubt their authenticity. [25] Even the evidence submitted by the Appellant from the Complaints and Reports Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario clearly indicates that she was married.17 I would also note that the Appellant's testimony regarding the timing of her second marriage ceremony in Turkey was consistent with the passport stamps that were examined by the RPD. I also find that the Appellant's evidence is consistent with her explanation that she did not indicate that she was married in her visa application in 2015 as the marriage had not been legally registered or recognized at the time of the application. Essentially, while there may have been a typographical error in one of the Appellant's forms I find that she has clearly established, on a balance of probabilities, that she was married as alleged. I find that the RPD was microscopic in doubting the credibility of the Appellant's marriage due to one typographical error in the face of other supporting documentation. [26] Regarding the other alleged inconsistency of the composition of the Appellant's family, specifically the discrepancy between the number of siblings indicated in the temporary resident visa applications, I find that the Appellant did provide a reasonable explanation for this difference. Further, I find that the number of siblings that the Appellant has is not a material issue to her allegations. I find that the Appellant has credibly established that she was married as alleged first in a religious ceremony in Saudi Arabia and then later in Turkey in an attempt to register that marriage. For the reasons that follow, I also find that the Appellant has credibly established this marriage broke down due to gender-based violence and that she faces a serious possibility of persecution as this relationship would be perceived as dishonouring her family. The RPD failed to follow the Gender Guidelines and its plausibility findings were based on stereotypes and myths [27] In considering the Appellant's allegations that her husband subjected her to gender-based violence and forced her to take medication to induce abortions, the RPD found that the allegation was not plausible. The RPD acknowledged the decision from the College of Physicians and Surgeons which accepted that a Canadian doctor had prescribed medication to the Appellant's husband, which he alleged was for a stomach issue, however noted that this medication could also be used for inducing abortion. The RPD indicated that when the Appellant was asked why she stayed in the relationship, she testified she did not leave her husband as she loved him and believe that they could still be happy. The RPD found that the Appellant was well-educated, spoke English and had travelled the world with her job. On the basis of this, the RPD found that it did not make sense that the Appellant would have continued to remain with her husband. The RPD then indicates "[w]hile the panel is well aware that women from any culture-let alone from Pakistan-can be rendered vulnerable in the best of circumstances to brutal men the panel finds in this case that the claimant is not being truthful."18 [28] The Appellant argues that by coming to this conclusion, the RPD made a plausibility finding that was unsupported by the evidence and failed to consider the Chairperson's Gender Guidelines. [29] Having independently reviewed the record, I agree with the Appellant that the RPD failed to apply the Gender Guidelines19 and made an unsupported plausibility finding regarding the gender-based violence that she suffered at the hands of her husband. It is clear from a review of the reasons of the RPD, that it failed to consider the Gender Guidelines or even the objective evidence regarding the prevalence of gender-based violence. The RPD member erroneously relied on stereotypes when it concluded that a woman who spoke English and who was highly educated would not have stayed with her husband who abused her. At best, this logic is based on speculation and is unsupported by the objective evidence. It shows a clear inability of the RPD to properly understand gender-based violence and a reliance on stereotypes that well-educated women are immune to the cycle of gender-based violence. In coming to this conclusion, the RPD failed to consider the dynamics of gender-based violence and the concept of battered woman syndrome as referenced in the Gender Guidelines. [30] The RPD also clearly failed to meaningfully engage with the objective evidence before it which demonstrated that the Appellant's allegation was credible. The decision from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario indicates that the College interviewed the doctor who prescribed this medication to the Appellant's husband, who admitted to prescribing the medication without examining her husband as required. The doctor also admitted to not keeping adequate records of the interactions with the Appellant's husband and his requests for these medications.20 The decision of the College indicates that the allegation that the Appellant's husband then used the medication to induce abortions was troubling but outside the scope of their review as they were limited to considering the actions of the physician.21 I also note that in support of the Appellant's complaint to the College, she submitted photographs of the medication22 and ultimately the College concluded that the doctor prescribed this medication, which could be used to induce abortions. [31] In view of the evidence, I find that the Appellant has credibly established her allegation that she was subjected to gender-based violence at the hands of her husband. I find that the Appellant's documentary evidence, including the decision from the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, is consistent with her testimony. Further, I find that the Appellant's failure to immediately leave her husband following the abuse is not an indication that her allegation lacks credibility. I find that the RPD was incorrect in concluding that the Appellant's level of education or language skills somehow made it implausible that she was the victim of gender-based violence and continued in a relationship with the perpetrator. [32] The RPD found that the Appellant's allegation that she will face harm at the hands of her extended family was not plausible. The RPD found that it was unclear as to why the Appellant's family would object to her marriage given that she was married in a religious ceremony and a civil ceremony. The RPD also found that it was implausible that the Appellant was working as XXXX XXXX XXXX without disclosing that to her family. The RPD found that it was implausible that the Appellant was able to move overseas to pursue employment without her family verifying the nature of the employment she was engaged in. As such the RPD found that her story was not plausible in the circumstances. [33] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to consider the objective evidence which she argues demonstrates that her marriage would not be accepted by Pakistani society. The Appellant highlights various documents in the objective evidence setting out the requirements for marriage to be socially accepted in Pakistan, as well as norms surrounding how marriages are arranged and how families play a part in these arrangements. The Appellant also highlights objective evidence which she argues sets out that it is common for traditional Pakistani society to disapprove of love marriages and that this can lead to violence being perpetrated against women who are viewed to have dishonoured their family. [34] I find that the RPD erred in finding that the Appellant's allegation that her family was traditional and would not approve of her relationship was implausible. Firstly, I am mindful of the jurisprudence that sets out the plausibility finding should only be made in the clearest of cases.23 In the matter before me, I find that the RPD simply speculated that it was implausible that the Appellant's family would be traditional because she was able to pursue higher education and leave the country for work. The RPD then went on to extrapolate that the Appellant's family members would therefore be approving of her union especially in light of the fact that there was a religious ceremony. I find that this is not supported by any objective evidence and the RPD erred in concluding that the Appellant's allegation was implausible. [35] I find that once again the RPD relied on stereotypes in coming to this conclusion. I find that the RPD's assertion that the Appellant's level of education and work experience were inconsistent with her allegation that her family held traditional values is not supported by the objective evidence. I find that the Appellant's testimony regarding her employment XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX was consistent and credible and she maintained that her family was unaware of the nature of her work in Saudi Arabia. I find that there is nothing to suggest that women who are educated and work outside the home are somehow immune to the expectations of a traditional patriarchal society. I also find that the Appellant's ability to pursue her studies and work does not necessarily demonstrate that her extended family approved of these activities. [36] Even accepting that the family might approve of the Appellant's employment, this does not establish that they would approve of the Appellant's relationship and marriage. In the circumstances before me, there is no reason to doubt the credibility of the Appellant's allegations that her extended family is very traditional and would not accept her relationship. I find that the objective evidence also supports this assertion. As noted by the Appellant in her memorandum, the National Documentation Package (NDP) contains numerous documents which highlight the way in which Pakistani society views women and cultural norms around marriage. The objective evidence highlights that it is generally expected family will play a significant role in matchmaking and approving relationships before marriage takes place and that marriages that do not conform to these traditions may not be accepted socially.24 The objective evidence also sets out that secret relationships are often met with disapproval and violence and can result in women being killed by their families in the name of "honour".25 For these reasons, I find that the Appellant faces a serious possibility of persecution in Pakistan. The Appellant does not have a viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) [37] Although the RPD did not make any findings regarding the viability of an IFA, I find that I have sufficient evidence in the record before me to come to the conclusion that the Appellant does not have a viable IFA given her circumstances. As I find that the IFA test fails on the second prong, I will limit my analysis to that issue. [38] The test for assessing an IFA is two-pronged and is set out in the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Rasaratnam:26 (1) The Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists and/or the claimant would not be personally subject to a risk to life or risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture in the IFA. (2) Moreover, the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claim, for the claimant to seek refuge there. [39] Both prongs must be satisfied to find that the appellant has an IFA. Once the issue of IFA has been raised and the potential IFAs have been identified, the burden of proof rests with the appellant to show that they do not have an IFA. An IFA must be a realistic and attainable option.27 Second Prong: The Appellant has established that it would be unreasonable for her to relocate in Pakistan [40] The Appellant argues that she would be unable to return to Pakistan as a single woman with a child who has been diagnosed with autism. I note that the objective evidence indicates that it is very difficult for single women to live alone in Pakistan. This is especially true of women who do not have familial support.28 The NDP indicates that according to a representative from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan "it was 'next to impossible' for a single woman to live alone in Pakistan due to prejudices against women and economic dependence."29 The objective evidence establishes that women are at risk of societal discrimination and gender-based violence, and that this is exasperated when they live alone. The objective evidence also indicates that divorced women face a high degree of social stigma.30 Given the breakdown of the Appellant's relationship and her lack of familial support, I find that she would face a significant amount of social stigma and discrimination if she were to return to Pakistan. [41] The new evidence tendered by the Appellant indicates that her son was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder and requires "substantial/very substantial support at this time".31 The report goes to indicate that the Appellant's son requires constant supervision and is experiencing significant delays in social and communication skills.32 Given the conclusions of this report, I find that the Appellant's son has a learning disability which would create a further obstacle to the Appellant's relocation in Pakistan. [42] The objective evidence highlights that children with disabilities face significant social stigma and discrimination and even violence.33 According to a United States Department of State report on human rights in Pakistan, while the law provides for equal rights for persons with disabilities, this is often not the case in practice.34 The report also highlights that most children with disabilities did not attend school and face significant barriers to future employment.35 The objective evidence also indicates that Pakistan does not have adequate resources, such as special education centres, for children with cognitive disabilities.36 [43] Considered holistically, I find that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant to relocate within Pakistan with her young son. While I acknowledge that the Appellant is well educated and has work experience, I find that this would not be sufficient to allow her to reasonably relocate given the societal discrimination she would face as a single or divorced mother. I find that given her lack of familial support, the Appellant would face significant hardship in establishing herself in Pakistan. Given that the Appellant would be relocating with her very young son who requires significant assistance due to his diagnosis, I find that this would be further exasperated by the limited resources available for children with disabilities. For all of these reasons, I find that the Appellant has established that it would be unduly harsh and unreasonable for her to relocate within Pakistan. State Protection [44] While the RPD did not consider state protection, I am able to come to a determination after independently reviewing the record. I find that the objective evidence sets out that although Pakistan is still a functioning state, the police lack the ability to adequately protect citizens. A United Kingdom Home Office report highlights these limitations: According to a contributing article to a report compiled by the Asia Society Independent Commission on Pakistan Police Reform, dated July 2012, 'Pakistan's police force is underresourced, poorly trained, badly paid, low in morale, and viewed with suspicion by the courts and society because of its poor human rights record. Most police are regarded as corrupt, inefficient, and unprofessional. There are minimal forensic facilities or modern equipment to help them in doing their job.' ... 'Pakistan's police system suffers severe deficiencies in a number of areas, including equipment, technology, personnel, training, and intelligence capability. Moreover, the political will needed to address these issues is largely missing. Besides a poor public image, both the police leadership and the rank and file appear to lack a sense of accountability to the public they are meant to serve. Moreover, the system simply is not structured to reward good behavior, as merit-based opportunities for professional advancement are scarce, low pay is the norm, and a lack of support and resources compels even many well-intentioned officers to misuse their authority in order to survive. [footnotes omitted]37 [45] The objective evidence also highlights that the police are generally unwilling to assist victims of gender-based violence as they view these cases as "family problems".38 Although some legislative changes have occurred in Pakistan around the issues of gender-based violence, the police have remained generally ineffective in assisting victims. This is especially true of single women who face violence at the hands of their spouses or family.39 Therefore, given my review of the objective evidence, I find that the Appellant would not have access to adequate state protection. CONCLUSION [46] The appeal is allowed. For the reasons given, I am setting aside the RPD's decision and substituting a decision that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. I make this decision pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(b) of the IRPA. (signed) J.Lourenço J. Lourenço 30 June 2020 Date 1 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, [2016] 4 FCR 157, at para 103. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 3 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, [2016] 4 FCR 230. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 38. 5 Ibid., pp. 39-40. 6 Ibid., p. 41. 7 Ibid., p. 42. 8 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 9 Exhibit P-3, Appellant's rule 29 application, pp. 4-5. 10 Ibid., p. 7. 11 Ibid., p. 9. 12 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum, p. 70, para 64. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 41. 15 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 16 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, [2016] 4 FCR 230. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD record, Exhibit 8, pp. 235-240. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD reasons, p. 9, para 17. 19 Chairperson's Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guidelines issued by the Chairperson pursuant to section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, Effective Date: November 13, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002 under the authority found in paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD record, Exhibit 8, p. 238. 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD record, Exhibit 8, p. 240. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD record, Exhibit 8, p. 246. 23 Valtchev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 776. 24 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 5.21. 25 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 5.21, p. 11. 26 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.). 27 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA), [1994] 1 FC 589. 28 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 5.2. 29 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 5.21, p. 28. 30 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 5.9, Pakistan. Social Institutions and Gender Index 2019, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 7 December 2018. 31 Exhibit P-3, Appellant's rule 29 application, p. 9. 32 Ibid. 33 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 2.5, pp. 187-188. 34 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 2.1, pp. 41-42. 35 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 2.1, pp. 44-45. 36 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 1.22, pp. 240-241. 37 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 1.12, pp. 17-18, s. 9.2.1. 38 NDP for Pakistan (31 March 2020), item 5.21, p. 12, s. 2.5.3. 39 Ibid., pp. 12-13. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-09936 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français