MB4-05263
Even accepting the RPD's credibility findings to a degree, the documentary record demonstrates that Roma in Albania face widespread, systemic discrimination across education, employment, housing and health that produces substantially prejudicial consequences and a cumulative effect amounting to persecution on the...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- MB4-05263
- Parties
- Appellant: XXXX XXXX; Appellant (minor): XXXX XXXX; Designated Representative: XXXX XXXX; Respondent: Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada
- Court
- Refugee Appeal Division
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 17 June 2015
- Procedural Posture
- Refugee Protection Appeal to Refugee Appeal Division / Decision on Appeal (no RAD Hearing Held)
- Outcome
- Appeal allowed; RPD determination set aside and substituted
- Legal Topics
- Exclusion Clause 1 E, Credibility Assessment, Persecution Vs Discrimination, Internal Flight Alternative, State Protection, Standards of Appellate Review
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
XXXX XXXX
Appellant
XXXX XXXX
Appellant (minor)
XXXX XXXX
Designated Representative
Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Refugee Protection Appeal to Refugee Appeal Division / Decision on Appeal (no RAD Hearing Held)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the RPD erred in assessing the appellants' credibility
- 2 Whether the RPD erred in concluding that discrimination against Roma in Albania did not amount to persecution
- 3 Whether exclusion clause 1E applied
Ratio Decidendi
Even accepting the RPD's credibility findings to a degree, the documentary record demonstrates that Roma in Albania face widespread, systemic discrimination across education, employment, housing and health that produces substantially prejudicial consequences and a cumulative effect amounting to persecution on the ground of nationality; there is no viable internal flight alternative and state protection is inadequate; therefore the appellants are Convention refugees under section 96 IRPA and the RPD's conclusion to the contrary was reviewable and set aside.
Court Disposition
Appeal allowed; RPD determination set aside and substituted
Orders
- Set aside the RPD decision dated October 16, 2014
- Substitute determination that XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX are Convention refugees under section 96 of the IRPA
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB4-05263 MB4-05264 MB4-05265 MB4-05266 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision - Motifs et décision Persons who are the subjects of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision June 17, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Normand Leduc Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subjects of the appeal Me Noel Saint-Pierre Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX Représentante désignée Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION INTRODUCTION [1] XXXX XXXX; his brother XXXX XXXX; the latter's wife, XXXX XXXX; and XXXX XXXX, the minor son of the latter two individuals-all citizens of Albania-are appealing against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting their claim for refugee protection. [2] They have presented no new documentary evidence on appeal, but they are asking for a hearing to be held before the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). [3] Pursuant to rule 23 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules, since the RPD appointed the female appellant, XXXX XXXX, as the designated representative for her minor son, XXXX XXXX, the representative is designated by the RAD. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [4] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and substitutes a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, namely, that XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX are "Convention refugees" under section 96 of the IRPA. BACKGROUND [5] In the initial Basis of Claim Forms (BOC Forms) that they submitted before the RPD on May 14, 2014, the appellants allege that they are of Roma nationality and have spent their entire life in Albania, where they were the victims of constant discrimination, insults and humiliation by the Albanian population. They allege that the most serious incident happened in 1997, when the neighbourhood where they were living in the town of XXXX was allegedly attacked by armed Albanians. [6] They also allege that they lived in Greece from 1997 until they were deported, in 2000, to Albania, where the discrimination and mistreatment apparently continued. They allege, among other things, that the most serious incident happened in XXXX 2013, when appellants XXXX and XXXX XXXX were allegedly assaulted and threatened at gunpoint by some individuals in a market in the town of XXXX. [7] The appellants allege that they left Albania for Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2014. [8] The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada (the Minister), by notice of intervention filed with the RPD on September 30, 2014, intervened in this case, alleging that the passports of appellants XXXX and XXXX XXXX indicate that they had lived in Greece since 1997, that exclusion clause 1E applies to them, and that the appellants' allegations are not credible. [9] The appellants filed amended BOC Forms with the RPD, dated October 1, 2014, in which they allege that they are all Roma from the town of XXXX and that the entire XXXX family left Albania in 1997 to settle in Greece. They allege that the neighbourhood where they lived in XXXX, which was predominantly Roma, was attacked by armed gangs, and that chaos reigned. [10] The appellants also allege that they were the victims of racism in Greece, particularly since the economic crisis there. [11] Appellant XXXX XXXX alleges that he met appellant XXXX XXXX in Greece and that she was also part of a Roma family that had left Albania in 2006 and settled in Greece. [12] The principal appellant, XXXX XXXX, left Greece on XXXX XXXX, 2013, and travelled to Canada on a false Greek passport. The other appellants left Greece and came to Canada, also on false Greek passports, in XXXX 2013. They all claimed refugee protection on May 12, 2014. [13] The appellants fear returning to Albania, where they claim that they would be victims of discrimination because of their Roma nationality. [14] The RPD held a hearing in this case on October 7, 2014, and rendered a written decision on October 16, 2014, rejecting the claims for refugee protection. [15] After concluding that exclusion clause 1E did not apply to the appellants because the evidence filed by the Minister did not establish prima facie that the Greek authorities recognized the appellants as having the rights and obligations attached to the possession of the nationality of that country, the RPD found that the appellants' credibility was fatally undermined because of the fabricated facts in their initial BOC Forms, particularly the claim that they were deported from Greece to Albania in 2000 and the dates they arrived in Canada. The RPD also found that their living in Canada under false identities-for more than a year in the case of XXXX XXXX, and for four months in the case of the other appellants-constituted behaviour inconsistent with that of individuals who fear returning to their country. [16] The RPD was nonetheless of the opinion that the appellants are of Roma nationality and that they left Albania, in 1997 in the case of XXXX and XXXX XXXX, and in 2006 in the case of XXXX XXXX, and that XXXX XXXX was born in Greece; however, after considering the documentary evidence on the situation of Roma in Albania, it was of the opinion that it could not conclude that anything that could be considered persecution exists against Roma and that the acts of discrimination the appellants may have experienced were not such that they would have a cumulative effect that would amount to persecution. [17] Before the RAD, the appellants argue that the RPD erred in its assessment of their credibility by rejecting the testimony of appellant XXXX XXXX on the matter of the assault he allegedly experienced in 1997 in Albania and by failing to consider in its analysis the Chairperson's Guideline on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution. [18] The appellants also argue that the RPD erred in its assessment of the situation of Roma in Albania as it is described in the documentary evidence and, in particular, that it failed to consider that the minor appellant, XXXX XXXX, born in Greece, could not have the rights of an Albanian citizen because he was not recorded in the civil registers in Albania. [19] For these reasons, the appellants are requesting that the RAD set aside the determination of the RPD and grant them refugee protection. [20] The Minister did not intervene before the RAD. DECISION ON WHETHER TO HOLD A HEARING BEFORE THE RAD [21] Under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, the new evidence adduced in the appeal is admissible and meets the following three criteria: (1) it raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person; (2) it is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (3) if accepted, it would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [22] Since the preliminary requirement to this provision has not been met in this matter, because no new evidence has been adduced in this appeal, I conclude that no hearing can be held in this case. THE RAD'S ROLE [23] The IRPA does not expressly set out the standard of review or intervention that the RAD should apply when it reviews the decisions rendered by the RPD. In this case, the appellants state at paragraph 40 of their memorandum that [translation] "their appeal meets the criteria defined by the Federal Court in Spasoja," a case I will come back to later. [24] The Federal Court, which has the authority to review RAD decisions, has rendered a few decisions to date regarding the RAD's standard of review or intervention and its role when RPD decisions are appealed to it. [25] In Alvarez1 and Eng,2 both rendered on July 17, 2014, the Honourable Justice Shore of the Federal Court of Canada has ruled on this matter. [26] At paragraphs 28 and 29 of Alvarez and at paragraphs 29 and 30 of Eng, the Court writes as follows: [28] Parliament conferred a true appellate function on the RAD, a specialized (if not overspecialized) tribunal, which sits on appeal of the decisions of another administrative tribunal. Contrary to a court exercising a superintending and reforming power over public bodies, the RAD's primary responsibility is to ensure the integrity and consistency of proceedings before the RPD and to reduce needless duplication of proceedings (including before the Federal Court). When analyzing a decision of the RPD, the RAD must not merely determine whether it was made in a reasonable manner, but, rather, analyze whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error (Housen, above). [29] "Palpable and overriding error" is often used interchangeably with the "clearly wrong" or "unreasonable" decision test. However, this is the appellate-level standard of intervention that a specialized appeal tribunal such as the RAD must apply when reviewing a decision and not the judicial review standard of reasonableness. Even though there are similarities, these standards are different. [27] The Court adds the following, at paragraph 33 of Alvarez and at paragraph 34 of Eng: [33] The Court agrees that the RPD, as the tribunal of first instance, is owed a measure of deference with regard to its findings of fact, and of fact and law. The RPD is better situated to draw such conclusions as it is the tribunal of first instance, the trier of facts, having the advantage of hearing testimony viva voce (Housen, above). However, the RAD must nonetheless perform its own assessment of all of the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error. The idea that the RAD may substitute an original decision by a determination that should have been rendered without first assessing the evidence is completely inconsistent with the purpose of the IRPA and the case law dealing with the virtually identical wording of subsection 67(2). The Court finds that the RAD misinterpreted its role as an appeal body in holding that its role was merely to assess, against a standard of reasonableness, whether the RPD's decision is within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes. [28] In a decision rendered on August 22, 2014, in Huruglica,3 the Honourable Justice Phelan of the Federal Court examined the role and functions of the RAD and writes as follows: [44] Subject to specific language, the need for deference, for example, is less compelling between the RAD and the RPD than it is between the judiciary and the executive. The relationship is more akin to that between a trial court and an appellate court but further influenced by the much greater remedial powers given to the appellate tribunal. [45] Therefore, a standard of review analysis is not an appropriate analytical approach.... [29] With respect to the RAD's authority under subsection 111(1) of the IRPA to substitute a determination that "in its opinion, should have been made," Justice Phelan writes: [47] Unlike judicial review, the RAD, pursuant to subsection 111(1)(b), may substitute the determination which "in its opinion, should have been made". One precondition of exercising this power is that the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the application in order to arrive at its own opinion. It is not necessary, in order to trigger this remedial power, that the RAD must find error on some standard of review basis. [48] The restriction on the ability to receive fresh evidence is not a bar to conducting a de novo appeal.... [30] Justice Phelan finally concludes that: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error". [31] In Spasoja,4 rendered on September 23, 2014, the Honourable Justice Roy of the Federal Court also examined the RAD's role. [32] In that case, in line with the previous decisions in Huruglica, Eng and Alvarez, the Court first finds that the RAD erred in applying the standard of reasonableness rather than conducting an independent assessment of the refugee protection claim (paragraph 12). [33] The Honourable Justice Roy proceeds with a detailed analysis of the statutory provisions relating to the RAD under the IRPA; of the case law pertaining to the role of an appellate body within an administrative tribunal, specifically Parizeau;5 and of Parliament's intent as stated by various stakeholders in debates about the RAD before the parliamentary committee of the House of Commons to determine that the appeal referred to in sections 110 and 111 of the IRPA cannot be equated to a judicial review but, rather, to an appeal in its own right (paragraph 39). [34] Relying on the conclusions in Parizeau in terms of the standard of review that an appellate tribunal must apply, and distinguishing himself from his colleague who rendered the Court's decision in Huruglica, the Honourable Justice Roy concludes that the standards of review applicable to the RAD are correctness for questions of law and palpable and overriding error for questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law. In addition, the RAD must give deference to the RPD's findings on the credibility given to the witnesses heard before it (paragraphs 39, 40 and 46). [35] The Honourable Justice Roy also indicates that he could not find any indicators that could lead to the conclusion that the proceedings before the RAD are de novo proceedings (paragraph 42) and states in the following paragraph of his decision that: [43] Instead, the scheme under review addresses appeals on specific questions, be it of fact, of law or of mixed law and fact (subsection 110(1)). In my view, that means that the appellant must identify the questions on which the appeal will focus. It will be on the basis of the record of proceedings before the RPD that the appeal will be heard based on the questions identified and raised, subject to the documentary evidence (subsection 110(3)) or evidence that is consistent with subsection 110(4). [36] Lastly, in a decision rendered on October 8, 2014 (Alyafi v. M.C.I., 2014 FC 952), the Honourable Justice Martineau of the Federal Court, having reviewed the aforementioned decisions, first concludes that they all reject the reasonableness standard of review and then states that, in his opinion, the RAD should be allowed to choose between the two remaining approaches: the one set out in Eng, Alvarez and Spasoja, which is the standard of palpable and overriding error, and the one set out in Huruglica, which he describes as "a composite and variable standard of review resulting from the nature of the claim before the RAD-characterized as a hybrid appeal-and the particular nature of questions of fact, or of mixed fact and law, raised by an appellant" (paragraph 16). [37] Justice Martineau writes at paragraph 46 of Alyafi that: [46] ... I chose the middle path, that of wisdom: allow the RAD to apply the second or third approach as long as the question of the scope of the appellate review of the RPD's decisions has not been settled by a final judgment by the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada. Quite simply. [38] Consequently, I am of the opinion that it is preferable for the RAD to apply the principles established in Spasoja because, with respect, the RAD's role as described therein appears to me to be more easily applicable than that described in Huruglica, particularly when, as in this case, no new evidence was submitted and no hearing was held before the RAD. [39] I note, however, that in this case, even if I had to apply the principles set out in Huruglica regarding the role of the RAD, in other words, to review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the appellants are "Convention refugees" or "persons in need of protection," I would arrive at the same conclusion as the one arrived at in applying the principles set out in Spasoja. [40] In any event, in this case, I am of the opinion that the error alleged by the appellants with regard to the assessment of their credibility is one of fact; I will therefore apply the standard of palpable and overriding error to it. [41] I am of the opinion that the error alleged on the matter of whether the documentary evidence on the situation of Roma in Albania establishes the presence of discrimination that amounts to persecution is a question of mixed fact and law, and I will apply the standard of palpable and overriding error to it as well. [42] I will proceed with an analysis and with my own assessment of all the evidence presented to the RPD to determine whether it committed a palpable and overriding error, and I will give a measure of deference to its findings as to the credibility of the witnesses heard before it. [43] At paragraph 91 of Parizeau, a palpable and overriding error is described as follows: [translation] [91] ... A palpable and overriding error is an error that, in its undeniability-and therefore not a difference of opinion on the assessment of the evidence-determines the outcome of the dispute in that the conclusion of the trier of fact, that is, the result of his or her decision, cannot hold water, thus, ipso facto, making the decision unreasonable. ANALYSIS 1- Did the RPD err in its analysis of the appellants' credibility? [44] Because it is not for this reason that I am setting aside the RPD's determination, it is therefore less relevant that I consider this matter. [45] I will, however, note that after reading the evidence adduced, including the appellants' testimony before the RPD, which I listened to, I am of the opinion that the RPD did not err in this regard. The RPD's determination is based on the fact that the appellants, as they acknowledged, made up a story about being persecuted in Albania starting in 2000, when the truth would seem to be that they had been living in Greece since 1997. [46] In my opinion, that is sufficient to irreparably undermine the appellants' credibility. And, in my opinion, that also applies to the testimony of appellant XXXX XXXX regarding his alleged rape, which the RPD did not ignore but simply rejected, as it did the rest of the appellants' testimony. Moreover, in my opinion, the Chairperson's Guideline on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution cannot be applied in this case because it applies to women only. [47] It goes without saying that the RPD must still be sensitive to the testimony of a man who alleges that he was the victim of sexual assault, but, in my opinion, nothing in this case indicates that the RPD was not. 2- Did the RPD err in its analysis of the situation of Roma in Albania when it concluded that the appellants faced only a risk of discrimination? [48] As indicated earlier, the RPD nonetheless believed that the appellants were of Roma nationality and Albanian citizens even though it found that their allegations of past persecution or mistreatment were not credible. Based on its analysis of the documentary evidence on the situation of Roma in Albania, the RPD concluded that even though the situation of many Roma was not an enviable one, it was not such that it could conclude that this situation could be considered persecution against Roma. [49] I am well aware that the line between what constitutes mere discrimination and what constitutes persecution is very thin; however, having read the recent documentary evidence on the situation of Roma in Albania, and based on the appellants' submissions in their memorandum, I am of the opinion that, with all due respect to the RPD, the situation described, which the appellants would have a serious possibility of facing if they were to return to Albania, does indeed constitute persecution. [50] As the RPD noted in its analysis, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status indicates as follows at paragraphs 54 and 55: 54. Differences in the treatment of various groups do indeed exist to a greater or lesser extent in many societies. Persons who receive less favourable treatment as a result of such differences are not necessarily victims of persecution. It is only in certain circumstances that discrimination will amount to persecution. This would be so if measures of discrimination lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned, e.g. serious restrictions on his right to earn his livelihood, his right to practise his religion, or his access to normally available educational facilities. 55. Where measures of discrimination are, in themselves, not of a serious character, they may nevertheless give rise to a reasonable fear of persecution if they produce, in the mind of the person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity as regards his future existence. Whether or not such measures of discrimination in themselves amount to persecution must be determined in the light of all the circumstances. A claim to fear of persecution will of course be stronger where a person has been the victim of a number of discriminatory measures of this type and where there is thus a cumulative element involved. [51] In this case, as the RPD noted, given the appellants' overall lack of credibility and the fact that they left Albania at a young age, it is hard to know what discriminatory acts they may have experienced in Albania because of their Roma nationality. [52] However, given their credibility regarding their Roma origins and given the documentary evidence adduced on the situation of Roma, I am of the opinion that it is open to me to believe that they may have been the victims of discrimination and insults in Albania, as they allege in general in their BOC Forms. [53] The most recent documentary evidence on the situation of Roma in Albania6 states as follows: Sources indicate that Roma in Albania face societal discrimination (US 27 Feb. 2014, 22; MRG n.d.a). Several sources indicate that Roma face discrimination in education, health care, employment and housing (US 27 Feb. 2014, 22; Freedom House 2013, 4; Roma Active Albania et al. 2013, 7). In correspondence with the Research Directorate, the Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination stated that discrimination against Roma is "widespread in all areas of life" (Albania 11 June 2014). [54] On the matter of education, the same document states as follows: Two sources stated that many Romani children drop out of school (Albania 11 June 2014; ERRC 28 Aug. 2010, 1). According to the ERRC, "[u]nofficial estimates indicate that secondary school attendance of Roma in Albania is very low" compared to 72 percent of Albanian children who attend secondary school (ibid). Moreover, Romani parents [c]ite discriminatory treatment by teachers and other students and large distances between their homes and schools as reasons for low school attendance. Due to poverty many Romani children have to work to contribute to the families' income. (ibid.) [55] On the matter of employment, the same document states as follows: According to sources, the number of unemployed Roma remains high (Albania 11 June 2014; Roma Active Albania et al. 2013, 11; Council of Europe 4 June 2012, 34). ERRC reports that [m]any Roma are unable to access employment in Albania due to low educational qualifications and discrimination. Most Roma earn a living from occasional informal work in agriculture, public service and construction with very low wages. (ERRC 28 Aug. 2010) [56] On the matter of housing: Amnesty International (AI) reports that Romani people "continued to be denied their rights to adequate housing" (AI 2013, 2). Two sources indicated that Romani communities live in poor conditions in areas lacking infrastructure such as access to water (Roma Active Albania et al. 2013, 11; ERRC 28 Aug. 2010), as well as electric and public services (ibid.). The Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination similarly stated that Roma "live in poor housing conditions, with insufficient space, and inadequate premises" (Albania 11 June 2014). [57] And finally, on the matter of health care: The Civil Society Monitoring report indicates that discrimination against Roma in healthcare is not only related to the common concerns of Albanian society about bribing doctors and nurses, but also takes into account many examples of direct or indirect discrimination regarding inappropriate treatment by healthcare providers, communication barriers and violation of healthcare rights that, together, make the health system and health-care facilities hostile places for Roma. Discrimination discourages Roma communities from immediately addressing their health concerns, and negatively affects the impact of the huge efforts made by NGOs to raise awareness to ensure that this community regularly attends the health checks to prevent diseases and protect their children. (Roma Active Albania et al. 2013, 10) Moreover, [o]ne of the main concerns of Roma is lack of Health Insurance Cards. This is related predominantly to employment factors: many Roma are either unemployed or they work without a valid employment contract. In either case they do not pay social security contributions and are thus ineligible for benefits. Roma living on a low income are usually unable to afford health insurance contributions. In addition, many Roma are not aware of the procedures that must be followed to obtain a Health Insurance Card. Thus, Roma face an insurmountable barrier in access to healthcare; the high cost of medical services and medicines are unaffordable for most Roma families. (ibid.) [58] My analysis of this documentary evidence leads me to conclude that the discrimination generally faced by Roma in Albania, which it is reasonable to believe the appellants would also face if they had to return to that country, leads and will lead to consequences of a substantially prejudicial nature for them, including serious restrictions on education, employment, housing and health care. It is therefore not mere discrimination in certain areas of life or faced only by certain persons; rather, it seems to be discrimination that is widespread in nearly all the significant aspects of human life. In my opinion, based on the discriminatory situation faced by Roma in Albania, the feelings of apprehension and insecurity the appellants expressed in their testimony before the RPD are credible and justified. [59] I am therefore of the opinion that this discrimination the appellants allege they would face is sufficiently serious to amount to persecution under the Convention and that this persecution would be on the grounds of the appellants' nationality. Consequently, I am of the opinion that the RPD committed a reviewable error in concluding the contrary. [60] In addition, I am of the opinion that the appellants have no internal flight alternative in Albania. The documentary evidence already cited indicates that there are Roma in many places in Albania, and nothing indicates that discrimination would not take place or would take place to any lesser degree in certain places in the country. [61] Finally, I am of the opinion that state protection in the appellants' case would not be adequate. [62] On the one hand, it is extremely difficult to obtain protection against systemic discrimination, in which each incident, taken in isolation, does not constitute a crime that would lead, for example, to criminal charges by the authorities; on the other hand, the documentary evidence indicates that: State police officers did not always enforce the law equally. Personal associations, political or criminal connections, poor infrastructure, and lack of equipment or inadequate supervision often influenced enforcement of laws. Low salaries, poor motivation and leadership, and a lack of diversity in the workforce contributed to continued corruption and unprofessional behavior. Impunity remained a serious problem, and few police officers were prosecuted for abuses.7 and that: AI reports on the "ill-treatment" of Roma by police and inadequate police protection from threats and attacks (AI 2013, 2). The Commissioner for Protection from Discrimination similarly stated that police reportedly "did not react" to forced evictions and verbal abuses of Roma families (Albania 11 June 2014). Sources report that in 2011, some Romani families were forced to move from their homes near the Tirana railway station after an arson attack (UN Sept. 2013, 14; AI 2013, 2). According to AI, eight families were temporarily moved to the Ombudsperson's Office and later transferred to military barracks (ibid.). However, "their very poor accommodation and inadequate police protection from threats and attacks by the neighbouring community obliged them to leave" (ibid.). Further information on the incident could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within the time constraints of this Response.8 [63] For all these reasons, I conclude that all the evidence submitted establishes a serious possibility of persecution-a serious and repeated attack on physical and mental integrity-for the appellants by reason of their Roma nationality if they were to return to their country. REMEDY [64] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the IRPA, the RAD sets aside the RPD's determination and substitutes a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, namely, that XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX are "Convention refugees" under section 96 of the IRPA. [65] The appeal is allowed. Normand Leduc Normand Leduc June 17, 2015 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Alvarez v. M.C.I., 2014 FC 702. 2 Eng v. M.C.I., 2014 FC 711. 3 Huruglica v. M.C.I., 2014 FC 799. 4 Spasoja v. M.C.I., 2014 FC 913. 5 Parizeau v. Barreau du Québec, 2011 RJQ 1506. 6 National documentation package (NDP) on Albania, dated November 7, 2014, Tab 13.4. Situation of Roma, including access to education, employment, housing and social services; treatment of Roma by society and authorities (2011-June 2014). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. June 16, 2014. 7 Idem; Tab 2.1. Albania. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013. United States. Department of State. February 27, 2014. 8 Supra, footnote 6. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB4-05263 MB4-05264 MB4-05265 MB4-05266 RAD.25.02 (2014.09.11) Disponible en français RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB4-05263 MB4-05264 MB4-05265 MB4-05266 14