MB4-02487

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB4-02487 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision January 29, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Me Maria De Andrade Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal N/A Conseil de la personne en cause Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant, XXXX XXXX, a citizen of Algeria, is appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), which rejected his refugee protection claim, determining that he is not a "Convention refugee" or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). [2] The appellant is not represented by counsel. He is requesting that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) re-examine his refugee protection claim. [3] The appellant attached three documents to his appeal application. On August 20, 2014, he sent additional submissions to the RAD, along with three other articles taken from the Internet. Their admissibility will be considered under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The appellant is not requesting a hearing under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. [4] The Minister did not intervene in this appeal. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [5] Under subsection 111(1) of the IRPA, the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD. As the RAD is unable to substitute the determination that, in it opinion, should have been made without holding a hearing, the matter is referred back to the RPD for re-determination by a differently constituted panel. [6] The appeal is allowed. BACKGROUND [7] In an oral decision rendered on May 1, 2014, the RPD rejected the appellant's refugee protection claim, concluding that his credibility was the determinative issue. [8] The appellant is a Berber from Kabylia. He states in his Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form) that on January XXXX, 2013, while he was working on his land, Armed Islamic Group (GIA) terrorists approached him and demanded that he cooperate with them by providing information about the army and the police, in exchange for money. He states that, during this incident, he was beaten. Because of the pressure exerted, he gave a false identity and agreed, despite himself, to cooperate with them. [9] In a state of shock, he contacted his brother to help him leave the area. His brother allegedly took him home and then to the hospital. [10] A week later, one of the men contacted him on his cellphone and threatened reprisals if he did not honour his commitment. Following this call, he got rid of his cellphone. His brother suggested that he go and live in his sister's apartment, as she was living in France. This apartment was located in a safer area. [11] In March 2013, his brother contacted him on his mother's cellphone to inform him that two strangers had come to the coffee shop where he worked. They were looking for one XXXX XXXX, the identity that he had given in January 2013. [12] Fearing for his safety, the appellant contacted his sister who lives in Canada to have her send him an invitation so that he could obtain a visa to visit her. [13] His visa was issued on XXXX XXXX, 2013. The appellant allegedly left Algeria on XXXX XXXX, 2013, to come to Canada. He claimed refugee protection in December 2013, alleging a risk to his safety should he return. [14] On February 3, 2014, the representative of the Minister of Public Safety sent the RPD a notice of intervention pursuant to paragraph 170(e) of the IRPA. The Minister's representative submitted, in particular, that the appellant's refugee protection claim lacked credibility. He was of the opinion that the appellant would not face a serious possibility of persecution if he had to return to Algeria. [15] In the assessment of the refugee protection claim, the Minister's representative pointed out that the RPD must take into consideration the fact that the appellant did not try to relocate to another part of the country or seek state protection. [16] Furthermore, he argued that the appellant's credibility was undermined by the fact that he alleged a fear of the GIA, whereas the documentation indicates that the GIA has been inactive since 2002 and that it is no longer active in targeting security forces or civilians. Moreover, if this group existed, it would have no interest in the appellant, a simple farmer. Impugned decision [17] In an oral decision rendered on May 1, 2014, the RPD rejected the refugee protection claim, stating that the refugee protection claimant's credibility was the determinative issue. Its decision is based on the following three elements: - In his BOC Form, the appellant states that he fears being persecuted by the GIA. The RPD noted that, during the hearing, the appellant stated that, "in Algeria we call them terrorists but lately in previous years they had a name GIA." Furthermore, the documentary evidence does not list the GIA as a terrorist group active in Algeria. According to the documentary evidence, the group was "virtually dismantled" by the authorities in January 2005. - According to the RPD, the appellant's credibility was undermined by the fact that the sworn statement signed by three people on February 2, 2013, reveals an inconsistency. Specifically, it found it curious that the signatories had sworn in February 2013 that the appellant had lived at his sister's home until he left Algeria in July 2013. - The RPD drew a negative inference based on a contradiction between his testimony during the hearing and his BOC Form concerning the date on which the terrorists allegedly went looking for him at the coffee shop where his brother worked. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE [18] In support of his appeal, the appellant submitted six documents. The first three documents, filed with his notice of appeal, will be marked as A-1. The three others, filed on August 22, 2014, with his additional submissions, will be marked as A-2. These documents are the following: - An article taken from the Internet on June 21, 2014, entitled "Deux terroristes arrêtés près de Tizi Ouzou" [two terrorists arrested near Tizi Ouzou] - Australian Government, an excerpt from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade entitled "Algeria, Latest update," taken from the Internet on June 21, 2014 - Article dated January 22, 2014, taken from the Internet on June 21, 2014, entitled "Algeria kills 11 terrorists in three days" - "Tizi-Ouzou, 5 casemates détruites à Bouzeguène" [Tizi-Ouzou 5 bunkers destroyed in Bouzeguène], taken from the Internet on August 22, 2014 - Article taken from the Internet on August 22, 2014, entitled "Terroristes abattus à Tlemcen" [terrorists killed in Tlemcen], newspaper Elwatan - "Des terroristes abattus à Akerrou" [terrorists killed in Akerrou], taken from the Internet on August 20, 2014 [19] Although required by the RAD rules, the appellant did not file any submissions regarding these documents. The RAD understands that the appellant is seeking to establish that terrorists are still active or present in Kabylia. [20] For these to be admissible as new evidence, the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA must be met. The statutory provisions stipulate that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of rejection. Regarding this provision, Justice Shore states in Iyamuremye1 that this should be evidence "that might have affected the outcome of the RPD hearing if that evidence had been presented to it." [21] In Raza,2 the Federal Court of Appeal examines the different factors to be considered in determining what constitutes "new evidence" under paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA. Although this decision was rendered in the context of a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA), the RAD may draw on the same principles, given the similarity of the statutory language.3 According to the Court, credibility, relevance, newness, materiality, and express statutory conditions are the factors to be taken into consideration. [22] For the following reasons, the documents submitted by the appellant will not be admissible as new evidence. First, the article dated January 2014 was available before the RPD hearing on May 1, 2014. The appellant did not explain why this document was not submitted to the RPD. As for the other documents, although they are dated after the rejection of the refugee protection claim, the RAD is of the opinion that this element in itself is not sufficient to make a document admissible. [23] In this case, none of the documents submitted in support of the appeal add to the information which was available to the RPD, namely, that terrorists are still active in Kabylia. As a result, it is unlikely that the information contained in these documents would have influenced the outcome of the decision. [24] Consequently, the RAD is of the opinion that they are not admissible as new evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND REMEDY SOUGHT The appellant's allegations [25] As previously mentioned, the appellant is not represented by counsel. His arguments can be summarized as follows: - As his mother tongue is not Arabic, he did not understand the questions that were asked and had difficulty expressing himself. - The appellant submits that the (terrorist) Armed Islamic Group is still present and active in Kabylia, particularly in remote villages located near forests. - Finally, he argues that there is a typographical error in the sworn statements filed as P-5. They were dated February 2014, not February 2013. THE RAD'S ROLE AND FUNCTIONS [26] As an appeal before the RAD is a statutory remedy, an examination of its home statute and the criteria developed by the case law in the context of an appeal tribunal and administrative law is in order. [27] The statutory provisions establish precisely the allowable grounds for appeal,4 as well as the RAD's "remedial powers." Parliament has enabled the RAD to confirm the determination of the RPD, to set aside the determination and substitute the determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, or to refer the matter to the RPD for re-determination, giving the directions to the RPD that it considers appropriate.5 [28] An appeal before the RAD is not in the nature of a judicial review,6 nor is it the opportunity for a [translation] "new proceeding." By conducting its own assessment of the evidence in order to form an opinion, the RAD generally proceeds without a hearing, on the basis of the appeal record.7 [29] The wording of subsection 111(2) of the IRPA suggests that Parliament favours the finality of decisions before the RAD. It stipulates that the RAD may make the referral described in paragraph 1(c) only if it is of the opinion that (a) that the decision of the RPD is wrong in law, in fact or in mixed law and fact; and (b) it cannot make a decision under paragraph 111(1)(a) or (b) without hearing evidence that was presented to the RPD.8 [30] The Federal Court, which has been called upon to determine the appropriate type of review that the RAD must carry out with respect to RPD decisions, is faced with different lines of case law. [31] In two decisions rendered the same day,9 Justice Shore, finding the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Parizeau v. Barreau du Québec10 persuasive and instructive with respect to the standard of intervention which must be applied by an administrative appeal tribunal, states that: [27] ... the RAD must be able to correct any error of law in a decision of the RPD or any palpable or overriding error in the findings of fact or the application of the law to these facts.... [28] ... [As] a specialized (if not overspecialized) tribunal ... the RAD's primary responsibility is to ensure the integrity and consistency of proceedings before the RPD and to reduce needless duplication of proceedings (including before the Federal Court). When analyzing a decision of the RPD, the RAD must not merely determine whether it was made in a reasonable manner, but, rather, analyze whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error (Housen, above). [32] Justice Shore adds that "palpable and overriding error" is often used interchangeably with the "clearly wrong" or "unreasonable" decision test. According to Justice Shore, "Even though there are similarities, these standards are different." [33] Later, in Spasoja,11 Justice Roy, in examining the indicators of Parliament's intent when the RAD was created, points out that the appeal before the RAD is meant to be generous. He adds that "this does not mean that it will be an opportunity for a new trial or a reconsideration of the matter in its entirety," stating that the error must be "palpable and overriding error to succeed on appeal."12 Justice Leblanc expresses a similar point of view. [34] Justice Roy is of the opinion that "it will be on the basis of the record of proceedings before the RPD that the appeal will be heard based on the questions identified and raised, subject to the documentary evidence (subsection 110(3)) or evidence that is consistent with subsection 110(4)." [35] However, a significantly different response is proposed by Justice Phelan in Huruglica.13 According to Justice Phelan, "the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal." [36] It must "review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision."14 [37] In considering the deference that the RAD owes to the RPD's findings, Justice Phelan states that it may be justified to show deference to the RPD's decision in a circumstance where a witness's credibility is critical or determinative. Nevertheless, when it comes to interpreting the documentary evidence on country conditions, Justice Phelan states that "there is no reason for the RAD to defer to the RPD on this type of assessment." [38] The Federal Court has acknowledged the RAD's "expertise" in refugee matters. According to the Federal Court, broad powers are conferred by the IRPA "thus allowing the RAD to dispose of the merits of appeals."15 Decisions rendered to date indicate that "[t]he idea that the RAD may substitute an original decision by a determination that should have been rendered without first assessing the evidence is completely inconsistent with the purpose of the IRPA."16 [39] Taking into consideration the above-mentioned decisions and the Court's reasons in subsequent decisions,17 the RAD will assess the evidence as a whole to determine whether the decision is well founded with respect to the evidence before the RPD and the content of the RAD record. [40] When reviewing the evidence, the RAD may show a measure of deference when the credibility of a refugee protection claimant is at the heart of the decision or when the RPD is in an advantageous position compared to the RAD. Nevertheless, if findings of fact or of mixed law and fact are erroneous, or if they are not supported by the evidence, the RAD must intervene by one of the means set out in subsections 111(1) and 111(2) of the IRPA. [41] As for errors of law, Justice Shore states that "the RAD must be able to correct any error of law."18 MERITS OF THE APPEAL [42] The RPD concluded that credibility was the determinative issue. Issues of credibility are questions of fact, for which the RPD is in a better position than the RAD since it has the advantage of seeing and hearing refugee protection claimants and witnesses.19 The RAD, which generally proceeds on the basis of the record of proceedings, will have this advantage only in limited cases. It will not benefit from this opportunity in this case. [43] The RPD noted three elements of the appellant's testimony that led it to find that he was not credible. I will discuss the examination of these three elements, starting with the inconsistency that appears in the sworn statement. [44] The RPD drew a negative inference concerning the appellant's credibility because this statement, dated February 2, 2013, attests to the fact that he lived at his sister's home until July 2013. Of course, this is an inconsistency. However, for the following reasons, I am of the opinion that the RPD made an error vitiating its decision when it concluded that this element undermines the refugee protection claimant's credibility. [45] First, the refugee protection claimant is not responsible for this error. The RAD is of the opinion that it is obvious on the face of it that this is a typographical error. This sworn statement,20 signed by three individuals, is dated February 2, 2013. However, it is important to point out that the appellant was in Algeria on that date. Furthermore, an examination of this document reveals that, in the case of two of the three individuals who signed it, the identity documents submitted to authenticate their signatures were issued in May 2013 and September 2013. This leads me to conclude that the sworn statement was likely not issued in February 2013. I am also of the opinion that this weighs in favour of the appellant, who states in his memorandum that it is a typographical error. I am of the opinion that such errors made in good faith should not be held against him in order to find that he lacks credibility. [46] As an example of typographical errors made in good faith, the RAD notes that the notice of intervention filed by the Minister's representative mentions that the appellant allegedly lived at his sister's home until July 2014. However, the appellant arrived in Canada in July 2013. This is an error made in good faith. The same type of error was again made on page 3 of the notice of intervention with respect to the date on which the appellant claimed refugee protection. It is indicated that the appellant arrived in Canada on July 8, 2014, and that he claimed refugee protection in December 2014. It is obvious on the face of it that this is a typing error. The appellant arrived in Canada in July 2013 and claimed refugee protection in December 2013, and the hearing was held in May 2014. [47] To make a finding regarding a lack of credibility, it is necessary that the inconsistencies identified be serious and reasonably related to the refugee protection claimant's credibility.21 The RAD is of the opinion that the RPD committed a reviewable error by holding this type of error against the appellant. Existence of the agent of persecution (terrorists or the GIA) [48] I will now examine another of the RPD's conclusions, according to which the appellant lacks credibility because the documentary evidence does not mention the GIA as an active terrorist group in 2013 in Algeria. [49] I share the opinion that, because of the advantage that the RPD enjoys, a measure of deference is owed to its findings of fact. However, this advantage enjoyed by the RPD is not carte blanche, as its findings must be based on the relevant evidence as a whole and must not be made in an unreasonable or perverse manner. Also, a refugee protection claimant's statements must not be taken in isolation without considering the overall evidence. [50] The evidence referred to by the RPD indicates that the GIA was "virtually dismantled" in January 2005 after the Algerian army killed the leader of the group. Nevertheless, the documentary evidence reports extensively about the fact that terrorists continue to be active in Kabylia and that the army is trying by various means to stop their activities.22 Tab 1.4 of the National Documentation Package reads as follows: Despite the repression of radical Islamist movements since 1992 and the promulgation of a National Reconciliation law in 1999 aimed at encouraging the repentance of jihadi fighters, Algeria is still subject to regular terrorist attacks. Another document states the following: .... Despite Algeria's counterterrorism efforts, AQIM continued to execute suicide attacks, attacks using improvised explosive devices (IED's) and ambushes in areas outside Algiers. In total, Algeria's National Gendarmerie reported at least 175 terrorist act in 2012. The majority of these attacks occurred in the northern Kabylie region.23 [51] Regarding the identity of the agent of persecution, the following is an excerpt from the appellant's statements when he was questioned during the hearing:24 Member: Who do you think these people are? Appellant: In Algeria we call them terrorist. But lately, in the previous years ....it's a party called Armed Islamic Group. Member: Did you say GIA as well? Appellant: Yes, Groupe Islamique Armée. Member: So, you think people after you are GIA. Is that correct? Appellant: In Algeria, I am a normal Citizen. These people are terrorists. You have to be with them. If they need you, you have to work with them. Otherwise they would create you problems, kill you or force you to work with them. [52] It appears to me from this exchange that the appellant fears terrorists. In the past, these terrorists were members of the GIA. [53] Certain passages of the documentary evidence and an understanding of the evolution of terrorist movements in North Africa indicates that, when the GIA was virtually dismantled in 2005, some of its members joined other groups, in particular the Groupe salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC) [salafist group for preaching and combat], which later became the al Qaeda in North Africa group. On this subject, the documentary evidence states the following: ... The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) engaged in an escalating cycle of brutality that included terrorist attacks in France and massacres of civilians. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which split from the GIA, initially differentiated itself by disavowing attacks on civilians and focusing instead on the Algerian military.25 ... Despite prolonged attempts to crush it or to convince its members to lay down their arms in exchange for a generous amnesty, the Algerian government has not been able to contain the radical expression of Islamism represented by the various trends of Salafism. The government has succeeded in destroying the more openly political manifestation of Salafism, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS, or al-Jabha al-Islamiyya lil-Inqadh), but it has not solved the issue of the political reintegration of its former leaders and followers. It has reduced the violent jihadi manifestation to just a fraction of what it was during the 1990s, but this jihadi movement is now again present in the emergence of the al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Thus the challenge of Salafism has not been eliminated. Though political and jihadi manifestations of the movement may have decreased in importance, a third type of Salafism, called Da'wa Salafism (da'wa: proselytizing, from al-da'wa, i.e., the call)-which concentrates on Islamizing its followers and isolating them from the political process rather than directly challenging the state-has grown greatly in importance.... ... As of 2008, the Algerian state still has not won its battle against radical Islamism and the country is still being subjected to regular terrorist attacks. ... Thus, there are now three types of Salafi movements in Algeria. The first is political Salafism (Salafiyya Harakiyya [dynamic]). The second is Jihadi Salafism (Salafiyya Jihadiyya), which advocates jihad. And the third is Da'wa Salafism (ad-Da'wa al-Salafiyya, also named Salafiyya 'Ilmiyya [scientific]), which is de- voted to Islamic scholarship, or Wahhabiyya, in reference to its Saudi influences. ... Jihadi Salafism, conversely, is unambiguous. It openly rejects the state and seeks to overthrow it by violent means. It was mainly represented in the 1990s by the Armed Islamic groups (known as the GIA, from the acronym of its French name, Groupes Islamiques Arme´s) and their successor, the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (known as the GSPC, from its French name, Groupe Salafi pour la Predication et le Combat). In 2006 what remained of the GSPC formed AQIM, bestowing on Algerian Salafism a veneer of internationalism.26 [54] Given this documentary evidence, it appears to me that the RPD did not assess the appellant's statements in context, as he stated that in Algeria, the people who approached him are known as terrorists or GIA members. That is how he knows them. [55] Furthermore, whether or not they were GIA members in 2013 during the incidents alleged by the appellant does not seem to me to be a critical element in this case, as terrorists are still active in the region. The situation could have been different if the documentary evidence had not mentioned any terrorist activity in the region. [56] For these reasons, it appears to me that the RPD's conclusion is perverse and capricious. Incident at the coffee shop [57] The last element noted by the RPD as a factor that undermines the appellant's credibility is the appellant's statement during the hearing that, while he was in Canada, his brother informed him that terrorists had visited the coffee shop where he was working and asked for one XXXX XXXX. However, in his BOC Form, referring to a similar incident, the appellant states that it occurred in March 2013. When questioned during the hearing in order to establish whether a similar incident had occurred while he was in Algeria, the appellant first stated that, when he was in Algeria, he did not work in a coffee shop. He stated that he was a farmer in a region where few people visited. [58] The member then confronted the appellant with the information in his BOC Form. The following is an excerpt from the exchange between the member and the appellant:27 Member: Another thing I'm trying to understand is that in your BOC form at page 2 of 10, you described an incident in march in 2013, were you say your brother told you that 2 unknown men came to the coffee shop asking for XXXX XXXX, this fake name you had given. I ask you whether there been an incident involving a coffee shop and men asking your brother when you're still in Algeria, you said no. That it happened while you were in Canada. But in March 2013 you were not in Canada. Do you understand why I'm confused? Appellant: Yes, the first question in March 2013, I was in Algeria, and them they came a second time, when I got my visa. [59] It appears to me from this exchange that the appellant is referring to a second visit. Moreover, at question 2(a) of his BOC Form, the appellant states the following: "I have been informed that, on August 29 2013, 2 individuals went looking for me again and were still seeking a man by the name XXXX XXXX." (emphasis added by the RAD). [60] Given this information in question 2(b) and the appellant's testimony, it appears to me that the RPD should have clarified this point further. Furthermore, the following are the appellant's replies on this subject during questioning by his counsel: Counsel: When you were in Canada, your brother has called you and informs you that the terrorist group that you refer as GIA was looking for you? Appellant: Yes Counsel: What did he explain to you during the phone call with him? Appellant: They told me that they came looking for that name. Because I gave this false name and they told me that they are constantly looking for this person who goes by that name. Counsel: Did the terrorist group enter the coffee shop looking for you prior to you coming to Canada? Appellant: Yes. Counsel: Did, they also enter the coffee shop looking for you after you return to Canada? Appellant: Yes. Member: I am sorry counsel you said return to Canada. Do you mean after arrival to Canada? Counsel: Sorry arrival to Canada? Appellant: Yes. [61] In my opinion, the reply is unambiguous. They were looking for the appellant on two occasions: a first time was when he was in Algeria, and a second time when he was in Canada. [62] Given the importance of this element in the RPD's decision, the RPD should have been more explicit regarding the weight that it attached to the appellant's answer. In such circumstances, omitting to do so constitutes a reviewable error. [63] To find that there is a lack of credibility owing to contradictions or inconsistencies, those contradictions or inconsistencies must be real and significant. [64] After reviewing the evidence as a whole and listening to the recording of the hearing, I am of the opinion that the appellant's refugee protection claim must be re-determined by a differently constituted panel, given the errors made in assessing the appellant's credibility. [65] The RAD is of the opinion that it cannot substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made; after finishing with its questions, the RPD declared that the IFA and state protection were no longer issues. Counsel therefore did not ask any questions or make any submissions in this regard. CONCLUSION [66] For the foregoing reasons, having considered all the evidence on the record, the RAD sets aside the RPD's determination. As it cannot substitute a determination without holding a hearing, the RAD refers the matter back to the RPD for re-determination of the refugee protection claim by a differently constituted panel. Aside from credibility, which will need to be reassessed, the RAD is of the opinion that the IFA and state protection are key issues in this refugee protection claim. [67] The appeal is allowed. Maria De Andrade Me Maria De Andrade January 29, 2015 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494. 2 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FCA 385. 3 Vahid Ghannadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 879. Iyamuremye v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494. 4 Subsection 110(1) of the IRPA: Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), a person or the Minister may appeal, in accordance with the rules of the Board, on a question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact, to the Refugee Appeal Division against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division to allow or reject the person's claim for refugee protection. 5 Subsection 111(1) of the IRPA. 6 Eng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711; Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702; Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 7 RPD record, the parties' memorandums or any [translation] "new admissible evidence." 8 Subsection 111(2) of the IRPA. 9 Supra, footnote 6, Eng and Alvarez. 10 Parizeau v. Barreau du Québec, 2011 QCCA 1498, [2011] RJQ 1506. 11 Spasoja v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 913. 12 Lamia Aloulou v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1236. 13 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 14 Idem. 15 Eng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711. 16 Idem. 17 Alyafi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952; Kurtzmalaj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1072; Akuffo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1063; Lamia Aloulou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1236. 18 Supra, footnote 9. 19 Augebor v. Canada (M.E.I.), (1993) 160 N.R. 315 (F.C.A.); P.L. v. Benchetrit, 2010 QCCA 1505. 20 RPD record, page 91, Exhibit P-5 before the RPD. 21 Rajaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 135 N.R. 300 (F.C.A.); Owusu-Ansah v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989), 98 N.R. 312 (F.C.A.). 22 Algeria 2012 Human Rights Report, RPD record, pages 129 and 130; Articles taken from the Internet reporting on the situation in Kabylia from 2011 to 2013, RPD record, pages 175 to 192; Algeria 2013 Human Rights Report, RPD record, pages 199 to 200; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview, RPD record, pages 232 to 234. 23 Country Reports: Middle East and North Africa Overview, RPD record, page 233. 24 CD of the hearing, 45:51 and onwards. 25 RPD record, pages 117 and 118, National Documentation Package on Algeria, March 14, 2014, Tab 1.4; Congressional Research Service, Algeria: Current Issues; Alexis Arieff, Analyst in African Affairs, November 18, 2013. 26 Idem, page 116, footnote 11, Amel Boubekeur, Salafism and Radical Politics in Postconflict Algeria, Carnegie Endowment for Internation Peace, 2008. 27 CD of the hearing, 30:55 to 35:20. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB4-02487 16 RAD.25.02 (2014.09.11) Disponible en français