TB6-04669

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-04669 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision August 26, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Luis F. Agostinho Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Nicholas Omere Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), who claims to be a citizen of Mali which is a constitutional democracy, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and to substitute its own determination that he is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, or to refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination by a differently constituted panel. DETERMINATION [2] Based on the new evidence filed by the Appellant, the RAD finds that he has established his identity. The RAD therefore sets aside the decision of the RPD and, pursuant to Section 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), refers the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he is at risk of persecution in Ghana because of his sexual orientation. The Appellant further alleged before the RPD that he fears, his father, the family of his same sex lover and the community at large due to his sexual orientation. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on March 01, 2016. By a Notice of Decision dated March 14, 2016, the RPD rejected the claim. It is noted that the Appellant had difficulty in providing details about his identity. In light of these concerns and the lack of documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations, the RPD found that the Appellant had not established his identity, and it did not find him to be credible. Analysis The Role of the RAD [5] While the IRPA sets out grounds for an appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [6] The Appellant's counsel makes submissions on the appropriate standard of review which is to be used by the RAD.1 [7] It is settled law that the RAD is not to review decisions of the RPD in the manner of a judicial review.2 [8] The RAD is a statute of a different kind as is the appeal before it; its role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.3 Such an appeal: (i) is directed at the decision of the RPD; (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision; and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD.4 [9] The Federal Court of Appeal in its decision clearly states, that the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred in its decision. The RAD is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.5 [10] When the RAD is dealing with the findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness.6 When applying that standard, the RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the RAD to choose whether it agrees with the determination of the RPD; if not, then RAD will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.7 [11] However, there are cases where the RPD enjoys an expressive advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, as such findings require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence heard by the RPD.8 The Federal Court of Appeal, in deliberating the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD's decision, has declined to provide the scope and degree of deference to be shown by the RAD: The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case.9 It is obvious from the reading of the Federal Court of Appeal decision that some level of deference is warranted, it is less evident how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo: [T]here also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed.10 [12] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony from those individuals. Therefore, credibility findings which arise from that oral testimony are appropriate of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, so are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [13] The RAD notes that not every finding relating to credibility however, warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where the determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.11 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - here the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.12 [14] The question becomes how much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? In Huruglica, the Federal Court held that the RAD can: recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a 'palpable and overriding error'.13 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Federal Court. [15] It is unfortunate that the Federal Court did not explain what level of deference is established by recognizing and respecting a conclusion of the RPD, it has repeatedly upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD.14 This leads the RAD to believe, this proposes that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [16] In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome. 15 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, the RAD finds this framework helpful in considering its own approach to deference. [17] Where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of an intelligible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and comprehend how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [18] Additionally, the outcome of that process must be a product that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. It is for this reason, that it is principally important that the RAD employ its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to conclude whether the RPD's outcome is supported by that evidence. [19] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [20] But the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a intelligible reasoning process whose premises are embedded in such advantages. If either the process or the conclusion does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error. [21] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [22] Section 110(4) of IRPA provides that the Appellants may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claims or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected16 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [23] It is for the Appellants to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellants.17 Application of Section 110(4) [24] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.18 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claims. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of Section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellants could reasonably have been expected, in their circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of their claims. If they could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [25] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claims, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims, the evidence does not meet the test in Section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.19 [26] As the RAD understands it, Section 110(4) provides the Appellants with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD-either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellants could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [27] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for Appellants to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.20 [28] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.21 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [29] Where a document meets the test in Section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While Section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [30] In Singh22, the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason why the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza23 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of IRPA Section 110(4), it is based on the nearly-identical wording of Section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.24 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of Section 110(4).25 [31] Where evidence meets the test in Section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in Section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [32] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.26 The RAD's Rule (3) (3) (g) (iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to Section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [33] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into Section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in Section110 (6) of IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.27 [34] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in Section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. The Appellant's proposed new evidence submitted pursuant to section 110 (4), IRPA 1) Carte D'Identité Consulaire issued XXXX XXXX, 2016;28 and 2) Letter from Ambassade du Mali au Canada dated XXXX XXXX, 2016;29 and 3) Affidavit of XXXX XXXX sworn XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016;30 and [35] As stated above, the RAD will assess the above proposed evidence in accordance to section 110 (4). The Appellant have provided an affidavit to explain how the proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110 (4).31 [36] The RAD finds that the Appellant did not meet the requirements of RAD Rule 3(3)(g) which states: (g) a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding (i) the errors that are the grounds of the appeal, (ii) where the errors are located in the written reasons for the Refugee Protection Division's decision that the appellant is appealing or in the transcript or in any audio or other electronic recording of the Refugee Protection Division hearing, [37] The RAD could dismiss the appeal at this stage; however, the Appellant's counsel has filed an appeal on behalf of the Appellant and, in fairness, the RAD will conduct a review of the record. [38] The RAD has assessed the Appellants' affidavit as to how the proposed evidence meets the criteria of section 110 (4). The RAD notes that the Appellant provides weak explanation why some of these documents were not available prior to the hearing, or what steps he had taken to obtain these documents prior to the hearing. The Appellant has vaguely complied with RAD Rule 3; Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3) (g) (iii). (g) a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding (i) the errors that are the grounds of the appeal, ii) where the errors are located in the written reasons for the Refugee Protection Division's decision that the appellant is appealing or in the transcript or in any audio or other electronic recording of the Refugee Protection Division hearing, (iii) how any documentary evidence referred to in paragraph (e) meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Act and how that evidence relates to the appellant, [39] The Appellant has not fully complied with the above Rule 3; he has provided some weak explanations why he is now submitting the proposed evidence. The RAD finds the Appellant had had sufficient time before the RPD hearing to gather the some of the documents that he is now asking the RAD to accept as new evidence. As Federal Court noted in one of its recent decisions, "An appeal to the RAD should not be tantamount to another full-blown hearing."32 [40] In this case, the RAD looked at the literal provisions of subsection 110(4) of the Act in assessing the new evidence, asking itself two questions with respect to the new evidence; namely, (1) did the evidence arise after the rejection of the claim and was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection; and (2) was the evidence such that the Appellants could not reasonably have expected in the circumstances to have presented it at the time of rejection? [41] In regards to document (1) Carte D'Identité Consulaire issued XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016 which the Appellant provides no explanation of what documents he used to acquire the document. In fairness the Appellant does provide in his affidavit what procedure he followed to acquire the document. However, he now possess a document which has been issued by the Mali Embassy in Ottawa, as such RAD finds this document to be admissible under 110 (4). [42] In regards to document (2), Letter from Ambassade du Mali au Canada dated XXXX XXXX, 2016 which clearly states that he is a national of Mali. Again, there is no explanation in his affidavit of how he acquired said document or what steps had he taken prior to this hearing to obtain this document or other similar. However, he now possess a document which has been issued by the Mali Embassy in Ottawa, as such RAD finds this document to be admissible under 110 (4). [43] In regards to document (3), Affidavit of XXXX XXXX sworn XXXX XXXX, 2016, The document is dated after the hearing, in that it arose after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim and Appellant provided a reasonable explanation why this particular information was not available before or why it was not presented at the time of the hearing, as such RAD finds this document to be admissible under 110 (4). [44] The RAD after assessing the evidence in regards to the above questions, finds that the evidence does meet the requirements of subsection 110 (4). In answer to question (1), the Appellant in his own words states: states throughout his affidavit, that he is now submitting these documents as a result of the RPD impugning his credibility. But, again there is no explanation why he did not submit these documents or attempt to get these documents prior to his hearing. However, as soon as he received a negative decision, he was able to get these documents which he now attempts to have the RAD accept as evidence. [45] In RAD's opinion this clearly indicates that some of these documents were available to the Appellant prior to their RPD hearing, however, he chose not to get them until he received the RPD decision rejecting his claim due to identity concerns. He is now attempting to submit these documents to negate the RPD findings. [46] In regards to question (2) the Appellant was represented by counsel before the RPD, who is very conversant with claims and what requirements are necessary before the RPD. The Appellant could reasonably have been expected to know that identity and credibility would be issues, given the references to the issue in the Act, the Rules, and the BoC form. [47] The Basis of Claim (BoC) form advises that the refugee claimant is "responsible for obtaining and providing to the IRB any documents that may support your claim."33 Application to Submit Documents Not Previously Provided [48] On July 14, 2016 the RAD is in receipt of an Application from the Appellant pursuant to Rules 37 and 29. [49] The Appellant has submitted the following documents with his application: 1. Colour photocopy of passport bio page issued XXXX XXXX, 2016;34 and 2. Affidavit of XXXX XXXX sworn XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016;35 [50] The RAD has considered these documents, pursuant to the factors in Rule 29(4). Section 29(4) of the RAD Rules states that: [51] In deciding whether to allow an application, the Division must consider any relevant factors, including: (a) the document's relevance and probative value; (b) any new evidence the document brings to the appeal; and (c) whether the person who is the subject of the appeal, with reasonable effort, could have provided the document or written submissions with the appellant's record, respondent's record or reply record. [52] With regard to the passport, dated XXXX XXXX, 2016, the RAD finds that the Appellant has not provided a reasonable explanation of why he could not, with reasonable effort, have provided this document with the Appellant's Record, or prior to his hearing. However, the document does provide information that had the RPD been in possession of this information, the outcome may have been different in its decision regarding identity. As such, the RAD accepts this document as it meets the requirements of section 110 (4). [53] Accordingly, the Appellant's application to submit this document is accepted under the provisions of Rule 29(4) (c). [54] With regards to the affidavit of XXXX XXXX, the RAD notes that the affiant mentions that he is in a relationship with the Appellant, but does not give an explanation or information regarding the identity of the Appellant. The RAD finds that the document above if presented to the RPD at the time of the hearing, would not have changed its outcome, nor does present new evidence that the RAD can rely upon in regards to the Appellant's identity. As such the RAD finds this document does not meet the requirements of section 110 (4). [55] Accordingly, the Appellant's application to submit this document must fail under the provisions of Rule 29(4) (c). [56] Accordingly, the Appellant's application to submit one of the documents must fail under the provisions of Rule 29(4). Since the one document does not pass the tests set out in 29(4), the RAD finds there is no need to go on to consider the factors in 110 (4) IRPA. The Appellant's Application to Submit Documents Not Previously Provided is denied in part. Application for an Oral Hearing [57] The Appellant requests an oral hearing pursuant to Section 110(6) of the IRPA. [58] Section 110(3) of IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD's record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. The person who is the subject of the appeal may, pursuant to Section 110(4), present "only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection." [59] According to Section 110(6), upon which the Appellant relies, the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, that is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. In this appeal, where there is no evidence from or in response to the Minister, the documentary evidence referred to in Section 110(3) must be understood in relation to Section 110(4). [60] When read together, Sections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new (Section 110(4)) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [61] The RAD has accepted some of the Appellant's new proposed evidence; the RAD has ordered an oral hearing to establish what documents the Appellant used to obtain said documents from the Mali Embassy in Ottawa. [62] Numerous attempts were made to convene a hearing, however due to numerous attempts to secure an interpreter for the Appellant being unsuccessful; the RAD requested a conference with the Appellant's counsel to resolve the acquisition of the new evidence issue. [63] The conference between the RAD and the Appellant's counsel took place on Monday August15, 2016. Present were Counsel Nicholas Omere, the Appellant and counsel's interpreter Ali Saminga. The interpreter was brought by counsel to keep the Appellant apprised of what was being discussed. Counsel for the Appellant made submissions that the Appellant using his birth certificate and no other documents along with personal interview with the Mali government officials at the Mali embassy was issued the three documents. The Carte D'Identité Consulaire issued XXXX XXXX, 2016, Letter from Ambassade du Mali au Canada dated XXXX XXXX, 2016 and his passport issued XXXX XXXX XXXX 2016. [64] After assessing the information provided by the Appellant's counsel, although the RAD is skeptical that a person with just a birth certificate could get the Mali government to issue those three pieces of identity documents, finds on a balance of probabilities that the Mali government did issue the Carte D'Identité Consulaire, the Certificat de Nationalité, and a passport. The RPD's Findings [65] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in rejecting that he had not established his identity. The RAD disagrees; the RPD made its decision without the benefit of the identity documents that the Appellant has now submitted to the RAD. It is clear that had the RPD panel been in possession of the documents which were submitted to the RAD, it would have arrived at a different outcome in the issue of identity of the Appellant. [66] For reasons set out above, the RAD finds that the Appellant's new evidence does establish his identity. As such, it is not necessary for the RAD to consider the RPD's findings in respect to the Appellant's identity documents. The RAD, having considered the evidence in the RPD record as well as the evidence heard in the conference, finds that the Appellant has established his personal and national identity. SUMMARY AND DETERMINATION [67] The new evidence only establishes his identity and does not deal with the merits of the claim. For these reasons, the RAD will not substitute its own determination pursuant to section 11(2), as the RAD must refer it back to the RPD if the decision is wrong in law, in fact or in mixed law and fact, AND the RAD cannot make a decision under section 111(1) (a) or (b) without hearing evidence that was presented at the RPD. CONCLUSION [68] Pursuant to Section 111(1) (c) of the IRPA, the Refugee Appeal Division refers the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. [69] Therefore, this appeal is allowed. (signed) "Luis F. Agostinho" Luis F. Agostinho August 26, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 17-18, paras 7-8. 2 See, for example, Akuffo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1063, para. 33. 3 Dhillon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 321, para. 14; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 4 Dhillon, paras. 14-18. 5 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103. 6 Ibid. 7 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 8 Huruglica, FCA, para. 70. 9 Huruglica, FCA, para. 74. 10 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233 at para. 11. 11 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; see also Huruglica, FCA, para. 72. 12 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.) 13 Huruglica, Federal Court, para. 55. 14 See Yin, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Akuffo, Allalou, and Sajad; also Bui. 15 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 16 In the French version of IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 17 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 18 See Olowolaiyemo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 19 Deri v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96 - 2016-03-29, para. 63. 20 Singh, FCA, para. 54. 21 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R., para. 16. 22 Singh, FCA, para. 64. 23 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R. 24 Ibid, Raza, paras. 13-15. 25 Singh, FCA, para. 64. 26 Singh, FCA, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 27 Singh, FCA, para. 48. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 9, colour photocopy of Carte D'Identité Consulaire. 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 10, Letter (Certificat de Nationalité) from Ambassade du Mali au Canada dated XXXX XXX, 2016. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 11-12, Affidavit of XXXXX XXXX sworn XXXX XX, 2016 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 9-12. 32 Zhong, Zhihui et al v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3438-15), Boswell, March 23, 2016; 2016 FC 346. 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp 7-19, Appellant's Basis of Claim form. 34 Application dated July 12, 2016 ( pages not numbered), Received by IRB July 14, 2016. 35Application dated July 12, 2016 ( pages not numbered), Received by IRB July 14, 2016, Affidavit of XXX XXX sworn XXX XX 2016. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-04669