VB3-03491

RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB3-03491 VB3-03492/VB3-03493/VB3-03494 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Appeal considered / heard at In Chambers Appel instruit à Date of decision April 7, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) Alexandra Mann Conseil(s) du (de la/des) the subject of the appeal Barrister and Solicitor personne(s) en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) XXXX XXXX XXXX Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du minister REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX, his spouse, XXXX XXXX XXXX and their two sons, XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX, (collectively referred to as the "appellants"), appeal the November 28, 2013 decision of the Refugee Protection Division (the "RPD") rejecting their claims for refugee protection. The claims were heard by the RPD on November 4, 2013, with a written decision rendered on November 14, 2013. The RPD found that the appellants were neither Convention refugees pursuant to section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA" or the "Act")1 nor persons in need of protection pursuant to subsection 97(1) of that Act. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(c) of IRPA, the Refugee Appeal Division (the "RAD") sets aside the determination of the RPD that the appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection and orders that the matter be referred to the RPD for redetermination by a differently constituted panel. The RAD also finds that it is unable to make a decision under subsections 111(1)(a) or (b) of the Act inasmuch as it cannot do so without hearing evidence that was presented to the RPD. BACKGROUND [3] Appellants' counsel at the RAD is different from their counsel before the RPD. The Minister has not intervened before either the RPD or the RAD. [4] No transcript of the proceedings before the RPD is included in the Appellants' Record (AR).2 A compact disc (CD) of the RPD proceedings is included at the back of the RPD Record (RPDR).3 While no extracts of testimony are set out in the AR, there are time-code references made in the AR as to where specific proceedings and/or testimony before the RPD might be found on the CD. [5] The appellants' wish to introduce evidence to the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Act but do not request a hearing before the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(6). While this evidence will be briefly discussed in the following, given the ultimate determination on the appeal, it will not be necessary to consider the question in any great detail as to whether the evidence will be accepted under subsection 110(4). Basis of Claim [6] The appellants consist of a husband ("XXXX", age 43) and wife ("XXXX", age 38) and their two sons ("XXXX" age 19, and "XXXX", age 16). They left Colombia on XXXX XXXX, 2013, arriving in Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013 at which time they made claim for refugee protection. [7] The appellants were lifelong residents of Bogotá, the capital of Colombia. The husband worked in XXXX while his wife was a XXXX XXXX. The two boys were students. [8] The primary basis of the family's claim arises from certain incidents when members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) attempted to recruit XXXX and XXXX. [9] The initial incident occurred in XXXX 2012, when XXXX was approached by three members of FARC after he had left a Colombia Army facility where he went to attempt to join the country's military. The FARC members threatened him and told him that he would have to join their organization, that further information would be sent to him and that his role would be to manage one of the organization's ammunition storehouses. XXXX was hit in the face and his cell phone taken from him. [10] In XXXX 2013, two members of FARC confronted XXXX and XXXX at the family's home. These members stated they were looking for XXXX. XXXX told them she did not know where he was. The FARC members then looked at XXXX and said that he too must join FARC. XXXX was told that FARC members would return in 15 days and, if the two boys were not turned over to FARC, the whole family would be killed. The appellants went to the police the next day but were told that no action could be taken against the assailants as there was no physical proof of what had occurred. [11] In response to these events the appellants relocated to another area of the large city of Bogotá to stay with relatives and placed the boys in a new school. XXXX was contacted by FARC in June 2013 and told that "time was running out", that the family was "making fun" of FARC and if the demands to turn over the boys to the group were not met, the family's home would be bombed. In the following two months the appellants continued to move from one relatives' home to another in Bogotá while they made arrangements to flee the country. [12] The appellants allege that they have a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of imputed political opinion at the hands of FARC if they are returned to Colombia and that they also face a risk to their lives or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture in that country from that same source. The appellants further submit that they would face this persecution, risk or danger everywhere in Colombia and that adequate state protection would not be available to them there. RPD Decision [13] The RPD made certain findings relating to the credibility of the evidence, including the testimony of the appellants' that are of particular importance in the context of this appeal and which will be discussed more fully in the Analysis portion of this decision. [14] While finding that the appellants' testimony was provided in a straightforward manner, reasonably consistent with the contents of the Basis of Claim (BOC) form narratives, and could "be reasonably relied upon for the purposes" of analyzing the claims, the RPD also found that the appellants had speculated on the motivations and capabilities of FARC. [15] In the end, the RPD concluded that the claims must fail inasmuch as there was a viable Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) for the family in the city of Cartagena, Colombia. GROUNDS OF APPEAL [16] The appellants raise the following grounds of appeal4: a) The Panel's finding that the appellants have a viable IFA in Cartagena was unreasonable because: i) The Panel's finding that the FARC had not taken steps to locate the appellants was directly contradicted by the evidence; and, ii) The Panel's determination that the FARC would not pursue the appellants outside of Bogotá was made in a capricious manner without regard to the evidence. b) The new evidence shows that: i) The FARC is continuing to pursue the appellants in Colombia; and ii) The Panel's finding that the FARC has no influence in Cartagena is factually incorrect. REMEDY SOUGHT [17] The appellants seek an order that the RAD set aside the determination of the RPD and substitute it with a determination that the appellants are Convention refugees and/or persons in need of protection. Alternatively, the appellants seek an order that the RAD set aside the RPD determination and that the matter be referred to the RPD for redetermination by a differently constituted panel.5 STANDARD OF REVIEW [18] Aside from stating that the RPD's finding that the appellants have a viable IFA in Cartagena was unreasonable, the appellants make no submissions as to the appropriate standard of review the RAD should employ when assessing the RPD determination. [19] As is set out in the following, I find that the finding of a viable IFA is one that involves issues of mixed fact and law and should, therefore, be assessed on the standard of reasonableness. [20] When considering standards of review with regard to the judicial review of administrative tribunal determinations, the Supreme Court of Canada (the "SCC") in Dunsmuir6 held that a standard of review analysis need not be conducted in every instance. Instead, where the standard of review applicable to a specific issue before a review court is settled by past jurisprudence, a reviewing court may adopt that standard of review. It is when that search proves fruitless that a reviewing court must undertake a consideration of factors comprising the standard of review analysis. [21] The RAD is a new appellant administrative tribunal about which, to the best of my knowledge, the Federal Court has yet to comment on the question of what standard of review the RAD should apply under various circumstances that might come before it. [22] However, some RAD decisions which, inter alia, set out detailed analysis establishing standards of review to be applied by the RAD, have now been made publicly available. [23] The RAD has previously determined that appeals based on issues of fact or mixed fact and law are to be assessed on a reasonableness standard.7 I agree with those conclusions. [24] In assessing reasonability, the SCC in Dunsmuir8 noted in paragraph 47 of its decision: In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. [25] The SCC has made it clear that on judicial review a court should not lightly interfere with a decision, even when the decision may not have been the one which the reviewing court would have reached on its own. As the SCC noted further in its subsequent decision in Khosa:9 There may be more than one reasonable outcome. However, as long as the process and the outcome fit comfortably with the principles of justification, transparency and intelligibility, it is not open to a reviewing court to substitute its own view of a preferable outcome. [26] Courts have found that the determination of an IFA is a question of mixed fact and law and that the assessment of such determinations on judicial review should be on the standard of reasonability. I find that there is no substantial reason why the RAD should not come to similar conclusions in this claim. [27] As was set out in a brief synopsis of the law concerning IFA by Justice Heneghan in Fatoyinbo:10 [4] The determination of a viable IFA is a question of mixed law and fact, reviewable on the standard of reasonableness; see the decision in Agudelo v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 465 at para 17 and Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, [2009] 1 SCR 339. [5] The test for a viable IFA was set out in Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706 (FCA) at 710-711. It is a two-pronged test, as follows: first, the Board must be satisfied that there is no serious possibility of a claimant being persecuted in the IFA and second, it must be objectively reasonable to expect a claimant to seek safety in a different part of the country before seeking protection in Canada. [6] In order to show that an IFA is unreasonable, the Applicant must provide evidence to show that conditions in the proposed IFA would jeopardize her life and safety in travelling or relocating to that IFA; see Thirunavukkarasu v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 FC 589 (FCA) at 596-598. [28] Justice de Montigny commented as follows in Garcia Guevara11 with respect to the onus on the claimant when a potential IFA is identified: [20] On the other hand, I am of the view that the panel could consider the possibility of an Internal Flight Alternative for the applicant in Mexico City. It is settled law that the onus is on refugee claimants to establish that they cannot find refuge in their country of origin. For the purposes of this analysis, it is important to apply the two-stage test developed by the Court of Appeal in Rasaratnam v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 FC 706. The applicant therefore had the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that she faced persecution everywhere in Mexico and that it was objectively unreasonable for her to avail herself of an internal flight alternative. [29] Taking the above authorities into account, the RPD must consider both prongs of the IFA test and then come to a reasonable conclusion about the viability of an IFA after considering the facts established in the evidence. In turn, the RAD must consider whether the RPD's conclusion with respect to an IFA for the appellants was reasonable. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [30] In this case, the focus of the appeal is on the RPD's credibility assessment and on the first prong of the IFA test. In particular, what is a reasonable answer to questions such as; first, to what extent, if any, would FARC be motivated to seek out the appellants throughout the country generally and; second, the capabilities of that organization to carry out such a search specifically in Cartagena? [31] I take from the SCC decision in Dunsmuir that the first task in the review of a decision-making process is whether or not the decision itself is intelligible. It must be capable of being understood in terms of its content and logic. Is it clear enough so that the reader can understand the point being made by the decision maker? [32] It is not necessary that a decision be flawless in all respects but, at a minimum, when it comes to material elements upon which the entire decision rests, one should not be left guessing as to what was meant. The courts have found that the adequacy of reasons is, in and of itself, not enough to quash a decision. However, I conclude that the RPD reasons in this instance do not satisfy the test set out by the SCC in the Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union12 case which reads: [16]...In other words, if the reasons allow the reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it to determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes, the Dunsmuir criteria are met. [33] With respect, I find that the RPD determination in this case is lacking in such clarity about determinative matters precluding me from concluding that its determination was reasonable. [34] With regard to the RPD's overall assessment of credibility, and under that heading, the Member stated the following: The claimants testified in a straightforward manner and the testimony was reasonably consistent with the previous statements found in the Basis of Claim (BOC) form. I do find that the claimants did speculate on the motivations and the capabilities of their agent of harm, and although this cannot be heavily weighted, I do find that their testimony can be reasonably relied upon for the purposes of this analysis. [35] In its ultimate assessment, the RPD found that FARC would not be motivated to seek out the appellants throughout Colombia and that, in any event, regarding Cartagena, country condition documents indicate that "the FARC is not known as having influence in the city" and concludes, based on that particular evidence, that, "the FARC having no influence in Cartagena further limits the risk the claimants would face if they were to relocate to Cartagena".13 [36] Dealing first with the overall credibility finding of the RPD, I find that the Member's statement can be interpreted in different ways. The first sentence is not confusing in that the Member finds that the appellants' testimony was "straightforward" and consistent with the story told in the BOC narratives. However, the Member then finds that the appellants, "did speculate on the motivations and capabilities" of FARC and goes on to comment, "and although this cannot be heavily weighted, I do find that the testimony can be reasonably relied upon for the purposes of this analysis". [37] To which part of the Member's statement does the word "this" refer? Is she suggesting that no significant weight be given to her finding that the appellants were speculating about FARC's motivations and capabilities or does it relate to her following comment that she found that the appellants' testimony could be reasonably relied upon for the purposes of her analysis? Clarity is further compromised by the use of the word "although". [38] Given the Member's ultimate conclusions, I could surmise that, taken in its entirety, the statement was intended to mean that the Member generally accepted what she was told with respect to factual events related to her by the appellants, but bears in mind that they may have either overstated, or guessed at, both FARC's fundamental interest in pursuing people like them, as well as with regard to its organizational ability to locate them in the proposed IFA. [39] The problem with this formulation is what the RPD reasons reveal in its following paragraphs. [40] If one assumes that as a general proposition the Member accepted that the facts related to her were credible, how is one to explain the portion of the reasons headed "Objective Basis-Contradictions"?14 [41] In this section, the RPD accepts that FARC uses forcible recruitment. The Member notes "that over 60 percent of their ranks are for children under the age of 15". (It is to be noted that XXXX was recruited just after he had turned 18 and XXXX was 15 when FARC confronted he and his mother at the family home.) The Member also found that the FARC method of recruiting children generally was either by way of enticement or as a replacement for extortion demands against their families. Importantly, given the uncertainty of the Member's credibility assessment, the Member states that the method of recruitment related by the appellants with XXXX being confronted outside the place where he was applying to join the Colombian army "does not fit the pattern of forcible recruitment as indicated in the objective evidence". [42] Moreover, the Member then states, "Further, the claimants relied on speculation and conjecture for motivation of the FARC enforcing their sons into the FARC's ranks." I am simply uncertain as to what that sentence means. Did FARC do what the appellants said they did, or is it unlikely that had happened? The Member closes the point with the words, "I find that although it could be possible that the FARC are targeting similar persons, but considering the objective evidence does undermine the claimant's profile for having been targeted or continuing to be targeted for such activities of the FARC". Again, the meaning of this sentence is not at all clear or transparent to me. [43] When I attempt to reconcile these statements with what apparently was a positive assessment of credibility, I am left wondering; does the Member accept or not accept that it is probable that it was indeed FARC who recruited XXXX and XXXX as the appellants had alleged. On the one hand, the Member states that the appellants are generally credible but, on the other, appears to find that it is unlikely that FARC would have been involved in the very events stated by the appellants to have happened. This confusion about the Member's credibility assessment is yet again compounded by her comments about the task the appellants testified that FARC wanted XXXX to perform. [44] The testimony was that XXXX was told by FARC that he would be given some geographic coordinates of the location of a FARC ammunition storehouse which XXXX was to help safeguard. The Member found this to be "puzzling" and rhetorically asked, why would an organization like FARC force someone to join their ranks (at that, someone who had just tried to join the Colombian army) and, as an initial assignment inform him of the specific location of one of their munitions' sites and trust him to protect it? The Member found it "improbable" that FARC would give such a responsibility to a new recruit, let alone a person who had been forced to join them. This is an entirely legitimate question to ask in my assessment, but not in the context of having apparently found that the actual story told by the appellants was credible. [45] At this stage of the reasons I found it difficult to understand what it was that the Member did accept as credible as opposed to what she did not. [46] This issue is important because the RPD ultimately doubted that FARC would have such an interest in the appellants that they would pursue them throughout the country which could lead them to Cartagena. The assessment of that interest goes to the strength of the motivation to find the family. If the family was only of passing interest and not considered important by FARC, one might conclude that little or no effort would be undertaken to find them. Accordingly, one must consider what had happened in the past as a predictor of what FARC potentially might do in the future. [47] In this regard, the appellants submit that the RPD was in error with respect to certain facts. The appellants note15 that the Member stated the following with in response to the appellants' allegation that FARC would track the family down anywhere in Colombia: [18] The evidence before this panel is that the FARC, although its operations and power is severely curtailed by the states actions against it to date, can and do seek and find those it considers valuable targets.16 There is evidence to support that any person can be tracked through an information system.17 However, the evidence does not show that every target of the FARC is pursued. The evidence before me is that the targets that the FARC chooses to expend its resources upon are those that actively challenge the FARC, including those looking to take band lands expropriated by the FARC, human rights defenders and police and judiciary.18 The claimants, as previously established, have been targeted by the FARC for recruitment. (...) The evidence before me is that the father was contacted on his cell phone. Something I would expect considering they had stolen the son's cell phone. A cell phone, is not a location, nor was there any further evidence of the FARC locating the claimants within Bogota. [The next sentence reads: "No further threats have been directed at other family members nor have they approached their last known residence."] (...) I find that the claimants do not represent a serious enough threat against the FARC and its objectives and as they do not, I find that the [sic] would not continue to pursue and threaten the claimants if they were to relocate within in Colombia, in p articular Cartagena. (Appellants emphasis and bold type) [48] The appellants further submit that the RPD's finding that "the FARC had not made any efforts to locate the appellants within Bogotá was directly contradicted by the accepted testimony that the FARC and threatened XXXX and XXXX at their house, which prompted the family to immediately locate to XXXX Bogotá". 19 As well, this event, where two FARC members went to the family home with guns asking for XXXX by name and then threatening to take XXXX, happened two months after the first approach to XXXX. I also note that the cell phone call to the father, XXXX, threatening to blow up the family's residence occurred in XXXX 2013, about six months after the initial approach. [49] I find that, in this latter submission, when the appellants state that the RPD had found that the FARC had not made any efforts to locate the appellants within Bogotá, the appellants ignore the Member's use of the phrase "further efforts". In other words, by using the word "further", it might be concluded that the Member did allow that there was, perhaps, more than one contact in Bogotá. Nonetheless, this simply highlights once again the uncertainty which the reasons present me with respect to which part of the appellants' story about what had happened to the family did the RPD find credible. [50] It is important to consider that the Member did conclude, based on country condition documents, that if FARC considers a target to be "valuable", the group does have the ability to seek and find such persons. This is so even though FARC's operations and power have been "severely curtailed" by Colombia's actions against it. In light of this conclusion it is essential that I understand what factual context has been found to be credible by the Member in order to assess the reasonability of RPD's conclusion that FARC does not consider the appellants to be sufficiently "valuable" such that the FARC's capabilities to seek out and find them would be brought into play. [51] I note as well that, with regard to the proposed IFA, Cartagena, the RPD found that, "According to the evidence before me, the FARC is not shown as having influence in this city".20 The evidence cited by the Member (Item 1.2 of the National Document Package-Colombia (NDP), May 3, 2013), consists of a map upon which certain areas have been "greyed" indicating "Areas of Influence". What is not apparent from either this document or the RPD reasons is whether or not a lack of influence [a phrase not defined in the country document] should lead to a conclusion that, even if one is considered a "valuable target", one would still be safe in Cartagena. Item 14.6 dated April 2013 from the NDP referred to by the RPD states that, "even though [FARC] and paramilitary groups are not present everywhere in the country, they have the ability to track down their victims throughout Colombia and the probably that they would do so is 'high'". This evidence indicates to me that it is ever more important to understand what the RPD had concluded, on a balance of probabilities, had happened to the appellants in order to assess whether they were valuable and would be successfully pursued even in a city like Cartagena, a place where the group's influence is apparently not strong. [52] It is because of all of these uncertainties in the reasons regarding a critical aspect of the first prong of a viable IFA that I find that the RPD's determination in this regard is not reasonable and the determination must be set aside. REMEDY [53] Section 111 of the Act states: * 111(1) After considering the appeal, the Refugee Appeal Division shall make one of the following decisions: (a) confirm the determination of the Refugee Protection Division; (b) set aside the determination and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made; or (c) refer the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination, giving the directions to the Refugee Protection Division that it considers appropriate. (2) The Refugee Appeal Division may make the referral described in paragraph (1)(c) only if it is of the opinion that (a) the decision of the Refugee Protection Division is wrong in law, in fact or in mixed law and fact; and (b) it cannot make a decision under paragraph 111(1)(a) or (b) without hearing evidence that was presented to the Refugee Protection Division. (RAD emphasis) [54] Having concluded that the RPD determination must be set aside; would it be appropriate for the RAD in this case to substitute the RPD determination with one that finds that the appellants are, in fact, Convention refugees or persons in need of protection? I find that I am unable to do so for the following reasons. I have found that the RPD determination is deficient in that the credibility findings of the RPD are unclear and, therefore, unreasonable. Accordingly, the underlying factual context of the claim remains unsettled. In order to make a final determination under subsection 111(1)(b), I find that it would be necessary for the RAD to conduct what essentially would be a de novo rehearing of the claim. I further find that the documents sought to be presented to the RAD under subsection 110(4) (the "new evidence"), even if accepted by the RAD, would not ameliorate the need for a de novo hearing. [55] The new documents consist of four reports/articles together with one map all directed toward establishing that FARC is active in Cartagena.21 The reports are dated April 20, 2002, July 7, 2010, April 28, 2011 and March 4, 2012. The fifth document consists of the affidavit of XXXX22 relating advice from his father that, on XXXX XXXX, 2013, two members of FARC had approached XXXX's father and mother outside their residence in Bogotá looking for the appellants and threatening the appellants and XXXX's parents' lives. [56] If accepted by RAD, the Cartagena documents could serve to establish that FARC can, in fact, operate in Cartagena so as to locate the appellants, thus undercutting the RPD's conclusion that the organization has no "influence" there. Also, if accepted, the affidavit could demonstrate that, at least as recently as late XXXX 2013 (after the RPD's rejection of the claim), FARC was still interested in pursuing the appellants, thus enhancing the allegation that the family is a sufficiently "valuable" target to motivate FARC to try to find them anywhere in Colombia, including Cartagena. [57] In my assessment, these documents, if accepted by RAD, could be useful in advancing the evidence on certain elements of the claim but they do not address the wider problematic situation arising from the deficiencies of the RPD findings regarding the credibility of the overall narrative. I cannot conclude that those wider deficiencies could be rectified in any way other than to effectively rehear the entire claim. Of necessity, that would entail RAD, in the words of subsection 111(2)(c), "hearing evidence that was presented to the Refugee Protection Division". [58] I take from this subsection that, having set aside the determination of the RPD, the RAD can substitute its own determination under subsection 111(1)(b), but only if that would not require hearing evidence already presented to the RPD. [59] Given this finding, I need not make a final ruling on the application to present new evidence to the RAD. Moreover, inasmuch as the matter is being returned to the RPD for a redetermination, this new evidence could be presented at that time. CONCLUSION [60] The RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection and refers the matter to the RPD for redetermination by a differently constituted panel. The appeal is accepted. (signed) "Philip MacAulay" April 7, 2014 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C., 2001, c. 27. 2 Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) Exhibit 2, Appellants' Record, (AR). 3 RAD Exhibit 3, Refugee Protection Division Record (RPDR). 4 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, pp. 40-41, para. 13. 5 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, p. 48, para. 36. 6 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9. 7 For example see X (Re), 2013 CanLII 82622 at para. 29 (IRB); X (Re), 2013 CanLII 67015 at para. 29 IRB): X (Re), 2013 CanLII 76397 at para. 18 (IRB); X (Re), 2013 CanLII 76473 at para. 28 (IRB); X (Re), 2013 CanLII 76390 at para. 27 (IRB). Decisions on CanLII are publicly available at <http://canlii.org>. 8 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9. 9 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, at para.59. As well, see Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC 61 and Halifax (Regional Municipality) v Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission), 2012 SCC 10. 10 Fatoyinbo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 629. 11 Garcia Guevara v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 195. 12 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board) 2011 SCC 62; and see Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Grdan 2014 FC 187 and Glowacki v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2014 FC 292. 13 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp. 9-10, para. 20. 14 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp. 6-7, para. 12-13. 15 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, pp.38-39. 16 RPD Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Colombia, (May 3, 2013), item 7.4, pg 1-3. 17 RPD Exhibit 6, pg 24. 18 Exhibit 3, NDP for Colombia, item 14.6. 19 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, pp. 41, para. 14. 20 RAD Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp.9-10. 21 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, p. 40, para.11 and pp. 16-34. 22 RAD Exhibit 2, AR, pp.11-15. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB3-03491 VB3-03492/VB3-03493/VB3-03494 RAD.25.02 (April 9, 2013)