TB6-12225

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-12225 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision October 19, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Manjit Walia Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX(the Appellant), a citizen of the Philippines, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and either find her to be a Convention refugee or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she fears harm in the Philippines at the hands of her ex-husband. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on February 2, 2016. By a decision of February 18, 2016, the RPD rejected the claim. The panel found significant credibility weaknesses in the Appellant's claim and also concluded that she had not rebutted the presumption of adequate state protection. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its credibility analysis and in failing to apply the Gender Guidelines. She asks the RAD to accept a new document in support of her appeal. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [6] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim or that was not reasonably available, or that she could not reasonably have been expected1 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [7] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in her Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.2 Application of Section 110(4) [8] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.3 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in her circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of her claim If she could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [9] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.4 [10] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD - either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [11] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for the Appellant to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.5 [12] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.6 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [13] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [14] In Singh,7 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza8 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of section 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on the nearly identical wording of section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.9 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of section 110(4).10 [15] Where evidence meets the test in section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [16] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.11 RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [17] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in section110 (6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.12 [18] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence that passes the test in section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. [19] Although the Appellant's Memorandum appears to refer to only one piece of new evidence,13 she has filed two new documents: (a) An affidavit of the Appellant, dated April 5, 2016;14 and (b) An excerpt from the blotter book of the XXXX City Police Station, dated March 12, 2016.15 [20] Most of the evidence in document (a) is a repetition of that provided to the RPD, and therefore did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. However, paragraph 6 of the affidavit alleges that the Appellant's mother has received threats that she did not reveal to the Appellant; the RAD will consider this along with document (b), which is purportedly a police report filed by the Appellant's mother with respect to those threats. [21] Document (b) is dated in March of 2016, after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. However, the evidence in that document is not new; the Appellant seeks to rely upon the document to show that the agent of persecution "threatened her and me repeatedly in the past.... She disclosed it to me after my decision and she also filed a police report in Philippines."16 [22] The document does not corroborate the Appellant's claim of repeated past threats; rather, it refers to one specific incident in XXXX of 2015, before the Appellant filed her refugee claim. This evidence does not post-date the rejection of the Appellant's refugee application. [23] As the threat posed by her ex-husband is at the heart of the Appellant's refugee claim, and as she was represented by counsel, the Appellant could reasonably have been expected to provide evidence of the XXXX 2015 threat to the RPD. [24] Was this evidence reasonably available to the Appellant to present to the RPD? She claims that her mother did not tell her about this and other threats "because she did not want me to live in fear. She disclosed it to me after my decision...." [25] The RAD has difficulty with this explanation. First, the Appellant testified to the RPD that her mother did receive threats via telephone, so it is difficult to understand the Appellant's assertion that her mother was hiding information about threats.17 Second, the Appellant claims that she was living in fear for years, staying away from the Philippines except when she had a vacation and then spending that vacation with her mother, while in disguise. Third, at the time of the alleged threat, the Appellant was living in Canada and near the end of her work permit; it would make no sense for her mother to withhold information about a threat faced upon her return. Fourth, the Appellant has not provided an affidavit, statement, or letter from her mother explaining why she did not provide this information earlier. As a result, there is also no explanation for why the mother reported the threats to the police a year after she received them. [26] The RAD finds that the Appellant's "new" evidence with respect to threats received by her mother is not new. The Appellant has not explained why this information could not have been provided to the RPD. The RAD finds that the proposed new evidence does not meet the requirements of section 110(4). [27] In the alternative, even if the RAD would have found this evidence to meet the statutory test, it would reject it as lacking credibility. As discussed above, there is no statement from the Appellant's mother about why this information was not revealed to the Appellant, though, somewhat oddly, the mother told the police why she did not reveal the information to the Appellant. The police report refers to one incident, while the Appellant's affidavit refers to repeated threats. The claim that her mother did not tell her about the threats because she did not want her to live in fear simply makes no sense, as the Appellant knew of an earlier threat received by her mother, was already living in fear outside of the Philippines, returning only to live in disguise with her mother. When the Appellant was in Canada, and facing a loss of status, her mother would have had urgent reason to tell her of the threats, in order to discourage her from returning to the Philippines. [28] The RAD cannot help but note that this evidence appears to be a direct response to findings of the RPD. The RPD observed that the Appellant did not provide affidavits from "your mother or any of your family members... to say that you have been threatened."18 The RPD also noted that the threats were not reported to the police. Very shortly after receiving the decision, the Appellant learned that her mother had been threatened, and her mother went to the police to file a report a year after the alleged threat. The RAD finds this sequence of events very difficult to believe. [29] Even if the Appellant's proposed new evidence met the test in section 110(4), the RAD would not admit it, as it is lacking in credibility. Even if the document is an actual report made to the police, long after the alleged incident, its contents are simply not credible or trustworthy. [30] For these reasons, the Appellant's proposed new evidence is not admissible in this appeal. THE ROLE OF THE RAD [31] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [32] The Appellant submits that the RAD must not adopt a judicial review standard, but must conduct an independent assessment of the evidence; the RAD may show some deference to factual findings of the RPD. [33] It is settled law that the RAD is not to review decisions of the RPD in the manner of a judicial review.19 [34] The RAD is a creature of statute and so is the appeal before it; its role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.20 Such an appeal (i) is directed at the decision of the RPD, (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision, and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD.21 [35] According to the Federal Court of Appeal, the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. It is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.22 [36] With respect to findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness.23 When applying that standard, the RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the RAD to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the RPD; if not, the RAD will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.24 [37] There are, however, cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because such findings require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence heard by the RPD.25 The Federal Court of Appeal, in discussing the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD's decision, has declined to provide the scope and degree of deference to be shown by the RAD: The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is thus no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case.26 [38] While it is clear that some level of deference is warranted, it is less obvious how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo: [T]here also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed.27 [39] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony. As such, credibility findings arising from that oral testimony are deserving of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, as are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [40] Not every finding relating to credibility warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where the determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.28 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.29 [41] How much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? In Huruglica, the Federal Court held that the RAD can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error".30 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Court. [42] Although the Court did not explain what level of deference is established by recognizing and respecting a conclusion of the RPD, it has repeatedly upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD.31 In the RAD's view, this suggests that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [43] In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome.32 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, the RAD finds this framework helpful in considering its own approach to deference. [44] Even where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of a comprehensible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and understand how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [45] Further, the outcome of that process must be a result that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. For this reason, it is particularly important that the RAD engage in its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to determine whether the RPD's finding is supported by that evidence. [46] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [47] However, the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a comprehensible reasoning process whose premises are rooted in such advantages. If either the process or the outcome does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error. [48] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. The RPD's Findings [49] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred by finding that she lacks credibility. Credibility Findings [50] The Appellant's Memorandum includes the heading "Credibility Based on Plausible Determinations."33 The heading is followed by excerpts from case law, but it is not entirely clear why the Appellant has cited such jurisprudence. The only submission under this heading states that: the Appellant's [sic]) was depressed due to threat and did not answer some questions properly. Adverse credibility must be made with proper reference and consideration and with explanation. The Board did not provide any proper and clear explanation for the adverse credibility. I submit that Board decision is unreasonable.34 [51] The RAD Rules require the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions about errors allegedly made by the RPD, including the location of such errors.35 In Huruglica, the Federal Court of Appeal held that it is the task of the RAD to carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, "as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred."36 Here the Appellant has not identified any such error. [52] The RAD has nevertheless reviewed the RPD's credibility findings. The RPD found that the Appellant claimed she was in danger for 15 years, but that the alleged agent of persecution showed little interest in her. It observed that the Appellant went to the authorities to complain of her husband's bigamy, but did not report death threats to the police. The RAD has reviewed the audio recording of the Appellant's testimony, and notes that the RPD repeatedly asked the Appellant to explain why she reported bigamy but not death threats. Her answers were hesitating and nonsensical: she claimed that she had already reported the bigamy, so it was not necessary to report the death threats, because if he killed her, he would already have a criminal record due to the bigamy complaint.37 [53] The RPD noted that the Appellant returned to the Philippines as many as nine times, seriously undermining her claim to have feared for her life. It also found that her actions in Canada were indicative of a lack of subjective fear: she delayed in making a refugee claim, even after she was out of status and at risk of being returned to the Philippines. The Appellant claimed that her ex-husband threatened her recently via Facebook but she deleted the message. The RPD also considered the Appellant's 2015 complaint to the police to be brief and lacking in detail, and the RAD agrees.38 [54] The Appellant has not pointed to any specific errors in the RPD's credibility findings. The RAD has nevertheless reviewed those findings, and the evidence on which they are based, and finds no error. [55] Although the Appellant blames her inability to answer questions properly on depression. She has provided no medical evidence to show that she is depressed, and nothing to indicate that her medical condition in any way impairs her ability to testify. [56] The RPD did not err by finding that the Appellant had not established with credible evidence that she was threatened or faces any threats. Even if the RAD would show no deference to the RPD's findings, the RAD would reach the same conclusion. The Appellant is generally lacking in credibility and has not established the core elements of her refugee claim. Gender Guidelines [57] The RPD referred in its decision to the application of the Gender Guidelines.39 The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its definition of "domestic" when it found that her fear is not of domestic violence. In her submission, "the Board determination is unreasonable because it failed to consider Gender Guidelines."40 [58] The RAD agrees that the RPD may have applied a too-narrow definition when it wrote, This is not a domestic violence case. It would be a non-domestic violence case, because he is not your husband anymore and has not been your husband for 15 years. Any threat against you could not be considered domestic violence. It can only be considered non-domestic violence and any statistics that we have relating to domestic violence would not apply in this circumstance.41 [59] The Appellant alleges, though not credibly, that she has been threatened for many years by her violent ex-husband, because of circumstances which originated in the dissolution of their marriage. In the RAD's view, this is a threat of violence arising out of a domestic relationship, and properly characterized as a form of domestic violence. [60] However, the context of the RPD's definition must also be considered. The RPD discussed the definition of domestic violence when it considered objective evidence about that issue. In the RAD's view, there was no need for the RPD to consider such evidence. It had already concluded that the Appellant's allegations were not credible. As such, whether those allegations were best characterized as relating to domestic violence or "non-domestic violence" really does not matter. [61] The Gender Guidelines exist to ensure that gender-related claims are heard with sensitivity.42 The fact that the RPD's reasons apply an inappropriately-narrow definition of "domestic" does not illustrate a lack of sensitivity. The Appellant has not alleged that the RPD member lacked sensitivity in the conduct of the hearing. The RAD has listened to the audio recording and finds that the RPD member conducted the hearing in a calm, respectful, and professional manner. [62] The Appellant has not established that the RPD failed to apply the Gender Guidelines; the RAD's review of the record finds that this was not the case. State protection [63] The RPD found that the Appellant had not rebutted the presumption of adequate state protection in the Philippines. This was an alternative finding; the RPD had already found that the Appellant's story was lacking in credibility. The RAD has found no error with those credibility findings. It is not necessary, then, to review the RPD's state protection findings, as the Appellant has not established any risk against which she requires state protection. CONCLUSION [64] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld October 19, 2016 Date 1 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 2 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, section 3(3)(g)(iii). 3 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, October 29, 2014, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 4 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 5 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 54 6 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 7 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 8 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 9 Ibid., Raza, paras. 13-15. 10 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 11 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 12 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 48. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 39, Memorandum, para. 10. 14 Ibid., p. 20. 15 Ibid., p. 33. 16 Ibid., p. 20, para. 6. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 0:29:00, where the Appellant told the RPD that her ex-husband threatened her mother and other relatives, and called her mother's house. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Reasons, page 2, lines 14-18. 19 See, for example, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, para. 33. 20 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015, 2015 FC 321, para. 14; M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 21 Dhillon, paras. 14-18. 22 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103. 23 Ibid. 24 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9; [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 25 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 70. 26 Ibid., para. 74. 27 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina, Yani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233, para. 11. 28 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; see also M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 72. 29 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, 2014 FC 78, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.). 30 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799, para. 55. 31 See Yin, Sarom v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2845-14), Noël, December 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1209, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Gaelle Leonelle Nguedo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7280-13), Locke, September 10, 2014, 2014 FC 859, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, Allalou, Abedelkrim v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7217-13), Shore, December 17, 2014, 2014 FC 1084, and Sajad, Zeeshan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-926-14), Shore, November 21, 2014, 2014 FC 1107; also Bui, Van Son v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1654-14), Shore, November 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1145. 32Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 33 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 39, Memorandum, para. 11. 34 Ibid., para. 13. 35 RAD Rules, Rule 3(3)(g). 36 Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Audio Recording, 0:25:00-0:27:00. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 154. 39 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Reasons, p. 1, lines 18-22. 40 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 41, paras. 14-16. 41 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Reasons, p. 6, lines 30-35. 42 Munoz, Olga Cadenas v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1218-06), Shore, October 26, 2006, 2006 FC 1273, paras. 29-35. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-12225