TB7-07977

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-07977 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision November 1, 2017 Date de la décision Panel Robert Bebbington Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Max Berger Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Pakistan, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has not submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD and substitute its own determination that he is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD and dismisses the appeal. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that his problems began in 2015 when he became financial secretary for his local XXXX XXXX, which he states in his Basis of Claim (BOC) Form is a "religious study hall."1 He alleges that after taking this position, he began receiving calls from unknown callers threatening him about his work for the XXXX XXXX. These calls were followed by a letter from the Taliban indicating that he would be killed. [4] The Appellant stopped working for the XXXX XXXX as a result of these threats. However, he alleges that approximately one month later, Sipah Sahaba gangsters, which he describes as a fundamentalist Sunni group in his BOC form, broke into his house on May 24, 2015 and beat him and his family members. The Appellant decided to travel to Canada for a few months to visit his brother-in-law, hoping that the fanatics would forget about him. After arriving in Canada, the Appellant learned that the religious fanatics went to his home on July 3, 2015 asking about him and saying they would cut his neck. [5] The Appellant's hearing for refugee protection was held on November 13, 2015, January 8, 2016, March 2, 2016 and September 15, 2016. In a decision on January 9, 2017, the RPD rejected the Appellant's claim finding that the Appellant was not credible. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in drawing its credibility findings and in its treatment of the documentary evidence. ROLE OF THE RAD [6] The RAD finds that the Federal Court of Appeal's (FCA) decision in Huruglica,2 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal, such as the RAD, to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. [7] The RAD concludes from its statutory analysis that, with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law), the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD's decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. [8] The standard of intervention to be applied by the RAD in considering decisions has been further clarified with the decision of a three-member panel.3 The RAD notes that the decision of a three-member panel is binding on a single-member panel such as in the present case.4 [9] In accordance with that three-member panel the following standard of review will be applied: a. The RAD will normally apply a standard of correctness to all findings of the RPD. b. Where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in making a particular finding, the RAD may assess that finding using a standard of reasonableness, modified to apply to the RAD context. c. Where the RAD finds that deference is warranted, it is obligated to explain how the RPD enjoyed a meaningful advantage with respect to the finding in question. d. Where the RAD shows deference to a finding, it will nevertheless consider both the process and the outcome. The finding must be the result of a comprehensible reasoning process - the RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and understand how the RPD's conclusion was reached. In considering the outcome, the RAD must assess whether the finding is based on the evidence in the record; in order to do so, the RAD must undertake an independent assessment of that evidence, which may include re-weighing the evidence as necessary. e. The RAD will consider the refugee determination on a standard of correctness, even where it has deferred to some or all of the findings upon which that determination is based. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL Issues [10] The Appellant alleges that the RPD erred in its findings in respect to: * The assessment of the documentary evidence in respect to the risk facing the Appellant in Pakistan. * The Appellant's identity as a high profile individual in Pakistan. * Basis of Claim (BOC) form omissions. * Police Reports * The medical document * The analysis of the supporting documents Risk of Harm in Pakistan [11] The RPD found that the Appellant's testimony in respect to the duties of his position as financial secretary of XXXX XXXX were not such that they would cause him to be viewed as a high profile individual in his community and hence bring him to the attention of the Sipah-e-Sahaba (SSP). The RPD further found that the Appellant may face discrimination in Pakistan based on his religious identity, but that it does not rise to the level of persecution. The Appellant submits that the RPD did not properly consider the documentary evidence in establishing this risk. The RAD has reviewed the documentary evidence on the record as well as the audio recording of the hearing and is not persuaded by this argument. [12] The RAD notes that the RPD has considered if the Appellant will face risk in his home area due to his religious profile. The objective evidence in the record establishes that over ninety-five per cent of Pakistan's population are Muslim; the Shia Muslim population is estimated to be between five and twenty per cent. The Shia population is spread throughout Pakistan, but there are no provinces where Shias constitute a majority. Shias in Pakistan are often employed in Government and hold high offices. Notable examples include former Presidents and Prime Ministers. Shias are well represented in Parliament, the police, judiciary and other institutions. Shias are represented on Pakistan's Council of Islamic Ideology, the Constitutional body that provides advice to the Government of Pakistan on issues of Islamic jurisprudence and practice. Shias also have representation in the Shariat Courts.5 [13] The documentary evidence further indicates that Shias are the target of violent attacks by Sunni Fundamentalist groups throughout the country.6 [14] The RAD acknowledges that the Shia population faces the potential of recurrent discrimination in Pakistan: According to the Jinnah Institute representative, it is an "everyday occurrence" for Shia to receive threats and/or face harassment in these cities. He said: Based on anecdotal evidence, Shia have been receiving threats in a variety of forms--texts, phone calls, letters. Threats against Shia are common, growing and quite frequent in both Lahore and Multan." The AHRC representative corroborated that it is "very common" for Shia in Lahore and Multan to receive threats and to be subject to verbal abuse.7 [footnotes omitted] [15] The RAD has considered the "UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Members of Religious Minorities from Pakistan."8 The RAD notes that the document states, "Given the wide geographic reach of some armed militant groups, a viable IFA/IRA will generally not be available to individuals at risk of being targeted by such groups;" therefore, while an Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) will generally not be available, it is not saying it is impossible. The document, in specific reference to Shia Muslims, states: "In light of the foregoing, UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] considers that members of the Shia community, particularly those in areas where Taliban-affiliated groups are active, such as the northwest of Pakistan and in urban centres, may, depending on the individual circumstances of the case, be in need of international refugee protection on account of their religion and/or (imputed) political opinion.9 [emphasis added] [footnotes omitted] [16] The RAD has reviewed the country condition documents, especially those addressed by the Appellant in respect of the treatment of Shia Muslims in Pakistan, and finds the evidence is mixed. [17] The United Kingdom Home Office report from October 2014, "Country Information and Guidance. Pakistan: Background Information, Including Actors of Protection, and Internal Relocation" notes: The Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) provided an assessment, published November 2013, with regard to internal relocation in Pakistan, stating: '...In particular, many large urban centres are home to mixed ethnic and religious communities and offer greater opportunities for employment, access to services and a greater degree of state protection than other areas...'10 [footnotes omitted] [18] The RAD notes that the Appellant resides in Lahore, a large urban city of mixed ethnic and religious communities. [19] The RAD notes that the United Kingdom Home Office report titled "Country Information and Guidance. Pakistan: Shia Muslims" is a more specific authoritative source and more recent than the UNHCR document. It is unambiguous with respect to the conditions for Shia Muslims in Pakistan. The report acknowledges that attacks against Shias are frequent in Pakistan: There are a significant number of Shia communities across Pakistan. Shia mosques and places of worship are located in most major cities and towns. In most cases there are options for Shia Muslims to relocate to other areas in Pakistan. [...] '...Across the country, Sunni and Shia communities are generally integrated and live side-by-side in their daily lives. Significant numbers of Shias can be found in Peshawar, Kohat, Hangu and Dera Ismail Khan in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; Kurram and Orakzai Agencies in FATA; in and around Quetta and the Makran coastline in Balochistan; areas of southern and central Punjab; and throughout Sindh. Many urban centres in Pakistan, including Karachi, Lahore, Rawalpindi, Islamabad, Peshawar, Multan, Jhang and Sargodha, are home to large Shia communities. DFAT has observed that some Shias live in enclaves in major cities.' [...] In 2013, the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) recorded more Shia deaths in Pakistan than since their records began in 2001. The SATP listed 81 incidents in which 504 people died, and 965 were injured. Types of violence included sectarian clashes, militant attacks and targeted assassinations. The SATP recorded attacks against Shias resulting in death or injury from 2001 to the present in its database of Shias killed in Pakistan since 2001, last updated 1 February 2015.11 [footnotes omitted] [20] The report explicitly addresses a number of alternatives and issues facing Shia Muslims in Pakistan:12 2.3 Are Shia Muslims able to seek effective protection? 2.3.1 There is a general willingness by Pakistani authorities to protect Shias. During Moharram, law enforcement authorities are known to provide security for participants. Armed forces have provided security for Shia pilgrims travelling to and from Iran 2.3.2 Whilst a lack of resources limits security forces ability to protect the Shia community at all times, decision makers must bear in mind that no state can provide complete protection for all of its citizens all of the time. [...] 2.4 Are Shia Muslims able to internally relocate within Pakistan? 2.4.1 There are a significant number of Shia communities across Pakistan. Shia mosques and places of worship are located in most major cities and towns. In most cases there are options for Shia Muslims to relocate to other areas in Pakistan. 2.4.2 Decision makers must determine whether the person could relocate internally to a place where they would not face a real risk of serious harm and where they can reasonably be expected to stay. This assessment will need to be based on the facts of the individual case. 3. Policy Summary * Shia Muslims may be subject to attacks by anti-Shia and militant groups. This varies from region to region. There are many towns across Pakistan with no intercommunal sectarian tensions. * Those in fear of ill-treatment by extremists will in general be able to seek effective protection from the authorities, or internally relocate within Pakistan. [...] 4.1.7 According to sources, attacks against Shia Muslims occur in all regions across Pakistan but are particularly prominent in Quetta, Balochistan. Other areas with notable levels of violence include Karachi, Gilgit Baltistan, and some cities in Pakistan's north west tribal areas. Shia pilgrimage routes between Pakistan and Iran, travelling through Balochistan, were subject to attack. In January 2014, Dawn reported that, following a suicide bomb attack against Hazara Shia pilgrims travelling to Iran, security forces escorted the pilgrims' coaches on their return journey. When the road between Quetta and the Iranian border was closed due to the attack, the Pakistan Air Force airlifted 215 pilgrims back to Quetta. [footnotes omitted] [emphasis added] [21] The RAD notes, in its review of the evidence in the record, that most of the attacks described are not the result of day to day interaction with ordinary citizens, but are predominately the actions of extremists targeting large gatherings of Shias. [22] The RAD reviewed an Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) Response to Information Request (RIR) titled "How Shia Muslims differ from Sunnis; treatment of Shias, particularly in Lahore and Multan; government response to violence against Shia Muslims (2010-December 2013)." The RAD finds that this is a document that allows it to assess issues specific to the residence area of the Appellant. The document states: Several sources indicate that there has been an increase in violent attacks against Shia by militant groups. Attacks against Shia reportedly occur in all regions of Pakistan. Several sources indicate that Shia are particularly targeted in Balochistan province, particularly in the city of Quetta... Sources also report high levels of violence against Shia in: • the city of Karachi; • the regions of Gilgit Balistan; • Hangu • Parachinar • Dera Ismail Khan. [...] According to the editorial team of the South Asia Studies Project of MEMRI, the situation for Shia Muslims in Lahore and Multan is "extremely serious." The same source stated that there have been "numerous killings" of Shia in these cities and that "[l]ike elsewhere in Pakistan, Shia Muslims are being systematically targeted and shot dead by Sunni militants who do not consider them as Muslims."13 [23] The same document carries on to provide a contrary viewpoint from the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP): The representative of the HRCP, while corroborating that there have been targeted killings against Shia in Lahore and Multan, expressed the opinion that the problem is not "severe" for Shia in these cities. Similarly, the PhD candidate described Lahore and Multan as "relatively more educated cities" and said that they do not have the same level of "sectarian violence or hatred" as other "remote" areas of Pakistan. He expressed the opinion that while there may be "sectarian tensions" in Lahore and Multan, that sectarian violence and extremism is not part of the beliefs of mainstream society in these cities.14 [24] The RAD notes that the Appellant has addressed this document in its submissions and states that the document provides evidence that Shias face severe risks throughout Pakistan, noting: "the situation for Shia Muslims in Lahore and Multan is "extremely serious"... there have been "numerous killings" of Shia in these cities." The RAD finds that the Appellant has not considered the full content of the document and has engaged in a selective assessment of the evidence. [25] The RAD further notes that the documentary evidence carries on to state: Media sources report that there was sectarian violence in Multan following attacks that occurred on 15 November in the city of Rawalpindi that killed at least nine people. The army was reportedly sent to Multan to quell sectarian clashes. Some sources report that twelve people were injured in the clashes resulting from protests in Multan, but the sources did not specify whether the victims were Shia or Sunni. According to the Pakistani newspaper Dawn, at least 25 people were injured in Multan during the "riots," including 7 people with bullet injuries and 3 policemen. According to the AHRC representative, there have been some attacks against Shia in Multan, including an attack on an Imam Bargah, which is a sacred place for Shia. An article by Shiite News, a news portal reporting on Shia news around the world, indicates that the Imam Bargah in Multan was attacked on 16 November 2013 by armed "terrorists" of the outlawed Sipah-e-Sahaba, who hit the gate of the building with batons and sticks. The article did not report whether there were any deaths or injuries.15 [26] The RAD finds that the information regarding the level of threat faced by Shia Muslims in Pakistan in the RIR is contradictory; the editorial team of the South Asia Studies Project of MEMRI (Middle East Media Research Institute) describes the situation as "extremely serious," while the representative of the HRCP expressed the opinion that the problem is "not severe" in Multan. The RAD has considered that the MEMRI builds its reporting via "media reports" which tend to dramatize the news, while the HRCP is a human rights non-profit group with workers on the ground in Multan. The RAD additionally notes that the article provides a number of specific references to incidents of violence in Lahore, but it finds that many of these incidents involve attacks on non-specific Shia groups (such as in a procession or at a mosque), as well as community leaders and people in prominent positions which it subsequently provides examples of. The RAD notes that it has assessed the Appellant's profile elsewhere in these Reasons and notes that the Appellant does not fit the profile of the individuals described in the document. [27] The RAD finds that when it assesses the information in the RIR, in conjunction with that provided in the UNHCR document, the UK Home Office documents and the information in the Human Rights Watch document16 cumulatively against the number of deaths and or attacks that have occurred in Pakistan, the Appellant will face no more than the mere possibility of persecution in Pakistan due to being a Shia Muslim and practicing his faith. The Appellant's Profile [28] The RAD notes that the documentary evidence describes Shia individuals who are at risk. Those at risk include: ...community leaders and people in prominent positions. Examples of Shia professionals targeted include: • doctors and lawyers • judges, teachers, journalists • bankers, clerics, company CEOs, police officers17 [29] The RAD further notes that the documentary evidence carries on to provide specific examples of Shias who have experienced violence in Lahore.18 The RAD finds that few of the individuals display a profile similar to the Appellant. [30] The RAD has reviewed the record as well as the audio recording of the hearing. The RAD notes that the Appellant has alleged that he has a long history of volunteer work associated with his XXXX XXXX. He confirmed that during his time as a volunteer and congregant he had experienced no problems. The RAD further notes that he has confirmed in his testimony that his role as the financial secretary involves collecting dues and donations from members, addressing maintenance issues and assisting people who come from other cities to visit the XXXX XXXX. The RAD finds these duties are routine and they are confined to working with the members of his religious congregation. The RAD finds that the Appellant's profile as the financial secretary is not one that would cause him to be highly visible in his community beyond the immediate confines of the XXXX XXXX. The RAD finds his profile is not aligned with those described in the documentary evidence. [31] The RAD finds that when it assesses the information in the RIR, in conjunction with that provided in the UNHCR and UK Home Office documents, cumulatively against the number of deaths and/or attacks that have occurred in Lahore, the Appellant will face no more than the mere possibility of persecution in Lahore due to him being a Shia Muslim and practicing his faith. The RAD supports the finding of the RPD that the Appellant's profile as Financial Secretary of his XXXX XXXX would not cause him to be a person of interest to the SSP and the Appellant's argument must fail. The Narrative [32] The RPD found that the Appellant provided information in his testimony on a number of issues that were omitted from, or were inconsistent with, his BOC narrative and that this detracted from the credibility of his allegations of harm. The Appellant submits that these issues are not central to the core of his claim and that the Appellant was simply elaborating on statements he made in his BOC narrative. The RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. Whether the "Religious Fanatics" Were Aware of the Appellant's Whereabouts [33] The Appellant in response to RPD questions about the visit of the religious fanatics to his home after he fled to Canada testified, "They didn't know I had left that place and they came asking for me." The RPD noted that he stated in his BOC narrative that the religious fanatics claimed, "we know that XXXX ran away like a dog" when his wife told them that he had left the country. The RPD explained that this was inconsistent with his testimony. The RAD notes that the Appellant testified that he was simply telling the panel what his wife told him, that she told the religious fanatics that he left the country. The RPD addressed further inconsistencies in his statements and found that his testimony lacked credibility. The RAD finds after its assessment, that throughout the Appellant's subsequent testimony, during questioning by both the RPD and his counsel, the Appellant's testimony evolved significantly in an attempt to address the question put to him. The RAD finds that the Appellant often avoided providing a direct response to questions put to him. The RPD continually refocused the Appellant in an effort to provide him with an opportunity to address the question. In the end of this exchange he modified his testimony stating, "They (the SSP) might have known that I left the country." The RAD agrees with the RPD and finds that the Appellant's testimony was evasive and evolved in an attempt to offset his previous inconsistency. The RAD finds that this is simply not credible. The Police [34] The RPD found that the Appellant omitted information from his BOC document regarding the reason the police would not help him. He testified that it was because one of their officers had been murdered by the SSP. The RPD further found that his allegations concerning the lack of assistance from the police were not credible. The Appellant submits that his omission of this information is not material. The RAD finds, in its review of the record, that perhaps the RPD has mischaracterized its finding as a BOC omission, whereas it should be treated as an inconsistency. Nonetheless, the RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. [35] The RAD has reviewed the record as well as the audio recording of the hearing. The RAD notes that the Appellant's BOC narrative simply implies that when he approached the police no action was taken. The BOC further describes a second contact with a higher level police officer who recommended the Appellant discontinue his work with the XXXX XXXX. The Appellant stated that he complied with the recommendation. The RAD notes that during his testimony the Appellant was asked to explain why the police could not help him. He replied that the police told him that one of their own officers was murdered by Sipah Sahaba and there was nothing they could do for him. He was asked why this information was not contained in his BOC narrative and he stated that he was under stress when he completed the BOC and it would make the document too long. [36] The RAD notes that the Appellant confirmed in his testimony that he sought help from the police on several occasions. He further testified that he went to the police station and they listened to his complaint. He noted in his testimony that the police stated they would gather information and suspicious people and call and ask him to identify them. The RAD finds the Appellant's own testimony is inconsistent with the allegations in his BOC narrative where he indicates the police would not help him. The RAD further notes that during the RPD's questions regarding his actions taken to secure a police report, the Appellant stated that he did not go back to the police station to inquire about police action in his situation or to pursue a police report. He testified, "I was leaving Pakistan and thought I did not want to waste time on these matters." The RAD notes that these incidents took place over a relatively short time period (approximately one month), beginning in late April 2015 and the second incident in late May 2015. [37] The RAD finds that the Appellant's testimony undermines his statements that the police were not interested in assisting him. The RAD notes that it would be unrealistic to expect in any society that all violent acts reported to the police result in immediate prosecutions or convictions, especially in a one month period. The RAD acknowledges the documentary evidence19 that states that it is difficult for Shias to access assistance from the police. In this circumstance, the Appellant's testimony indicates the police took information and were willing to investigate however, the Appellant himself did not follow up. The Federal Court has held that a claimant's decision to flee before police have had the opportunity to properly respond to and investigate a transgression does not amount to a lack of state protection.20 The Court found that police had to make choices relating to priorities, strategies and community relations and that those choices may affect their response. In the case at hand, there is no information to suggest the police would not have made genuine and earnest efforts to investigate the claimant's allegations and apprehend the perpetrator had he pursued his complaint diligently. The claimant's choice to leave Pakistan may have resulted in the investigation being delayed or stymied, given that he, as the alleged victim, was the key witness. [38] The RAD agrees with the RPD and finds that the Appellant's testimony in respect of why the police would not assist him is not credible and that this was provided in an attempt to embellish his claim for refugee protection. In respect to whether this information is material and relevant to his claim, the RAD finds that if the Appellant's testimony that the police would not help him because one of their officers were murdered by the SSP was credible, it is central to his allegations of harm and should be included in the BOC. The RAD finds the Appellant's argument fails. [39] The RAD finds that the Appellant's testimony in this issue is inconsistent with the statements in his BOC narrative. The RAD further finds that the multiple testimonial inconsistencies in respect to approaching the police for protection, seriously undermines the Appellant's ability to act as a credible witness in his quest for refugee protection. Identity of Perpetrators [40] The Appellant testified that the men who went to his home on July 3, 2015 were not identified and most probably belonged to Sipah Sahaba. The RPD noted that this contradicted his allegation at lines 25-27 of his BOC narrative, which indicates that he received a death threat from the Taliban in April 2015. The Appellant was asked to explain his inconsistent evidence about the various organizations who were against him. He testified that both of these organizations work together and are interlinked. He was subsequently asked to explain why he did not mention in his BOC that he believed these organizations were interlinked. He further testified that he was guessing because, "even the government cannot do that kind of thing, join them together, how could he." The RAD finds that the Appellant, in his testimony, has attempted to deflect the question put to him in an effort to avoid explaining his inconsistent statements. [41] The RAD finds that the Appellant's BOC narrative describes an evolution from telephone threats from "unknown numbers," to a telephone threat from the "Taliban" in April 2015, followed by an assault on himself and his family members by "SSP hooligans" in May 2015. The RAD finds that the Appellant's explanation does not address the question put to him, nor does it explain how all these differing individuals came to target him. [42] The Appellant's testimony further evolved to offer another explanation for the initial discrepancy. He stated that because the caller of the first threatening phone call was identified, and because a subsequent caller identified himself as the Taliban, he assumed the calls were connected. The RAD finds the Appellant's subsequent testimony makes little sense. The RAD agrees with the RPD's findings in this regard. Furthermore, the RAD finds after reviewing the record and the audio recording of the hearing, that the Appellant's statements are based in speculation and designed to embellish his risk of harm in Pakistan. Perpetrators Chant Sipah Sahaba Slogan [43] The RPD found that the Appellant's testimony that he knew his May 24, 2015 attackers were members of SSP because they chanted slogans specific to their organization should have been included in his BOC narrative. The RPD further found that the omission of this information from the BOC narrative detracted from the credibility of the allegations of the attack. The Appellant submits that this information is not relevant or central to the core of his claim. The RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. [44] The RAD notes, as previously discussed, that the Appellant's BOC narrative was lacking in detail in respect to which groups were seeking to harm him. The RAD further notes that the Appellant does not contest the credibility aspect of the finding in this issue. The Appellant was asked by the RPD to explain why this information was not contained in his BOC narrative. He testified, "I did not add any details to the BOC because it would have become a big book." The RAD notes that the Appellant offered a similar explanation on other occasions when he was confronted about BOC narrative omissions. The RAD acknowledges the Appellant's argument; as stated in Basseghi in respect to Personal Information Form (PIF) omissions (the PIF being the precursor to the BOC document): It is not incorrect to say that answers given in a PIF should be brief but it is incorrect to say that the answers should not be complete with all of the relevant facts. It is not enough for [a claimant] to say that what he said in oral testimony was an elaboration. All relevant and important facts should be included in one's PIF. The oral evidence should go on to explain the information contained in the PIF.21 The Appellant submits his omission is not material and that his testimony is simply an elaboration of information contained in the BOC. [45] The RAD finds that the Appellant's testimony contains material evidence that allegedly identifies the attackers as members of Sipah Sahaba. The RAD finds, as did the RPD, that his failure to mention this identifying information in the BOC narrative undermines the Appellant's allegation that Sipah Sahaba was responsible for beating him in May 2015. The RAD supports the finding of the RPD and the Appellant's argument must fail. [46] In summary, the RAD in reviewing all of the evidence in this issue finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the allegations that he was threatened and attacked by "unknown individuals," the Taliban and the SSP in Pakistan are not credible. The RAD further finds that the issues addressed are central core components of the Appellant's claim. The RAD agrees with the RPD and the Appellant's argument must fail. Police Reports [47] The RPD noted that the Appellant did not provide any police reports associated with his alleged contact with the police in Pakistan. The Appellant subsequently provided a letter from a lawyer in Pakistan22 that stated the police did not have any record of the incident which occurred on May 24, 2015. The RPD assigned the letter little evidentiary weight because of a number of credibility concerns with the letter. The RPD further found that the Appellant did not provide sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence that the police took his complaint, but refused to register an FIR. The Appellant submits that the letter from the lawyer corroborates his allegations that the police were not interested in recording his complaint. The RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. [48] The RAD has previously discussed the credibility concerns surrounding the Appellant's interactions with the police. The RAD notes that the Appellant, during the second sitting of his hearing, was asked by the RPD to explain why he described attending the police station on two occasions but had no police reports. He testified that police reports are only taken if you are going to court, that is why he had no reports. He added that the police did not entertain his complaint and they did not take any action. The RPD noted for the Appellant that his testimony was contradictory and asked him to explain the inconsistency. He replied stating, "There is no contradiction, it is just their normal way of evading such questions in these cases." The RAD finds the Appellant's explanations were designed to deflect the RPD inquiry and they did not address the inconsistency nor the questions put to him. The RAD finds the Appellant's response was evasive. [49] As was noted elsewhere in these reasons, the Appellant's testimony subsequently evolved by further stating that he was in a rush to depart from Pakistan and he did not concern himself with wasting time on these matters (such as following up with the police or obtaining reports). [50] The RAD finds that the Appellant's testimony in respect to his interactions with the police lacks credibility. The RAD further finds that this testimony was offered in an attempt to excuse his failure to support his allegations with credible documentation. The RAD additionally finds that, based on the Appellant's initial testimony where he attempted to deflect the RPD inquiry about police reports, noting that he did not intend to go to court, followed by his own admission of abandoning his police complaint, it is unlikely that documentation of his police visit exists. [51] In respect to the letter from a lawyer submitted by the Appellant, following the suggestion of his counsel that he attempt to obtain an original police report, the RAD finds on its review of the letter that it does little to offset the credibility concerns surrounding the Appellant's interaction with the police. The RAD finds, as did the RPD, that the letter from the lawyer is associated with a number of credibility concerns surrounding its content and it is deserving of little evidentiary weight. The RAD supports the finding of the RPD in this issue and the Appellant's argument fails. [52] The RAD finds after a full review of all of the evidence in this issue, that on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant has not contacted the police in Pakistan in respect to any confrontations during the period from April 2015 to May 2015. The Medical Report [53] The RPD found that the Appellant's testimony in respect of the treatment for the injuries he received, and his failure to initially provide a report of his treatment due to the alleged beating by SSP gangsters on May 24, 2015, was evasive. The Appellant later provided a report23 and the RPD noted discrepancies in the evidence about his alleged medical treatment. The RPD further found that this undermined his allegation that he received medical treatment or that the underlying reason for his treatment, notably that he was beaten by SSP gangsters, actually took place. The Appellant submits that the RPD was microscopic in its assessment, noting that the RPD statements about whether the author was a doctor is inconsequential. The Appellant further argues that the RPD questioned the authenticity of the document without sending the document for verification. The RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. [54] The RAD has reviewed the record as well as the audio recording of the hearing. The RAD notes the following information from the record: 1. The Appellant was asked by the RPD about his medical treatment and why he had no medical reports. His testimony was that if he went to a government hospital (for a medical legal report) he would have had to change his travel plans to Canada. Instead, he went to a private clinic. The RAD finds the testimony was evasive and it did not address the question put to him. The RAD further notes that the Appellant's explanation makes little sense. He alleges he was attacked on May 24, 2015, but he did not leave for Canada for over two weeks. This does not explain why he was unable to obtain a medical report. 2. The RAD notes that the Appellant in his BOC narrative, in reference to the May 24, 2015 attack, states that the Appellant and his family members were beaten and many household items were destroyed, implying that this was a serious incident. The RAD notes that the Appellant's testimony in respect to his medical issues continued to evolve until he stated that he sought first aid from a local clinic because his injuries were superficial and minor in nature. He added that because of the minor nature he did not keep a report of the injuries. 3. When further questioned by the RPD, the Appellant continued to avoid addressing why he did not take action prior to the hearing to obtain a medical report. He testified that it takes a lot of time, noting that if one needs a medical report they have to be there physically. The Appellant avoided responding directly to the question and concluded his statements by noting that the incidents were not very serious and he did not obtain a medical report. 4. The Appellant subsequently submitted a letter from the Nawaz Pathological Laboratory which indicates "[i]t is certified" that the claimant "came to me at midnight on 24.05.2015 with superficial injuries on the body ... I provided him First Aid and applied bandage." This letter is signed by M. Nawaz Natt who identifies himself as a senior lab technologist, and as an "EX.JCO(AMC)" which the claimant said stood for junior commission officer in the army medical corp. 5. The RAD notes that the RPD found a number of structural inconsistencies with the letter from the pathologist, who the Appellant described as a neighbour and retired army medical corps junior officer. The RPD found: * The letter he provided does not indicate that the business being operated was a private medical practice; * The Appellant did not provide a reasonable explanation why he would go to a pathological laboratory for his injuries; * The panel noted that the writer of the letter does not indicate he is a doctor, nor sign his name as doctor; the Appellant testified that pathologist meant doctor; and, * The seal on the document was blurred and illegible. [55] The RPD found that the Appellant failed to provide an original medical report for the treatment he allegedly received on May 24, 2015. It noted that the letter he submitted is merely a summary of treatment received on an earlier date. The RPD further found that the medical letter did not disclose what records, if any, the letter is based on. The RPD assigned little weight to the medical letter for these reasons. The RAD also finds that the Appellant's evolving testimony about the attack, his injuries and the initial lack of a medical report is not credible. It undermines the seriousness of the alleged attack and the injuries he received, and leads the RAD to find that the attack did not take place as alleged. [56] The RAD further finds that the letter from the pathologist does not provide persuasive documentation to support the author's medical background and qualifications to compose a medical report concerning the Appellant's injuries or his suitability to diagnose and treat the Appellant's injuries. [57] The RAD notes that where there is sufficient evidence to cast doubt on a document's authenticity, whether because of an irregularity on its face or the questionable circumstances in which it was obtained or provided, a document may be assigned little (or no) weight, without expert verification or where such verification is inconclusive.24 The RAD finds, as did the RPD, that following its review of all of the evidence in this issue, there is sufficient evidence in the record to assign the medical letter little evidentiary weight as evidence of injuries received by the Appellant or as support that he and his family were attacked by SSP members on May 24, 2015. The RAD agrees with the finding of the RPD and the Appellant's argument must fail. The Supporting Documents [58] The RPD reviewed a series of affidavits25 from various individuals submitted as support for the Appellant's refugee claim. The RPD found that each of the documents contained aspects that detracted from their credibility, leading the RPD to assign them little evidentiary weight. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in dismissing the documents because they did not provide the Appellant an opportunity to address the fact that the documents did not have legible identification. The Appellant further argues that the RPD has based many of its findings in respect to the supporting documents on flawed credibility findings in its decision. The RAD is not persuaded by the argument of the Appellant. [59] The RAD notes that while it would have been preferable for the RPD to have identified its concerns about the legibility of the identification accompanying the affidavits so that the Appellant could have had the opportunity to tender more legible copies of the identification, it was not the only basis on which the RPD based its decision to give the documents little weight. The RAD notes that it has reviewed all of the evidence before it and it has supported the credibility findings of the RPD. The RAD has reviewed the supporting documents submitted to the RPD. The RAD notes that the RPD reviewed each document individually and provided reasons for rejecting or assigning little evidentiary weight to each document. The RAD notes the following findings from its review of the documents: * The affidavits did not identify how the affiant became aware of the information they were attesting to. Many of the statements appeared to be grounded in information received from the Appellant. * The affidavit from the Appellant's wife stated that he began receiving "threats" from Sipah Sahaba after he became financial secretary. The RAD finds this statement is not supported by the information in the Appellant's BOC narrative where he states that (after he became Financial Secretary) he "started receiving threatening calls from unknown numbers."26 * The Affidavit from the Appellant's brother-in-law identifies that he was accepted as a refugee in Canada. The RAD notes he does not provide the reasons for his acceptance nor does he explain how his circumstance is relevant to the Appellant's. [60] The RAD further notes that the Appellant had the opportunity to tender legible identity documents as new evidence in this appeal, however there was no effort to do so. Regardless, the RAD finds that in the context of the totality of its findings, there was sufficient cause for the RPD to give the affidavits little weight without considering the legibility of the identity documents. [61] The RAD finds that the RPD conducted a thorough review of each of the supporting documents. As well, it related many of its findings with these documents to credibility concerns addressed in other aspects of the hearing. The RAD agrees with the finding of the RPD in respect to the Appellant's supporting documents and the Appellant's argument must fail. In Summary [62] The RAD finds that the Appellant was lacking in credibility concerning the core aspects of his claim, such as his interaction with the police and his allegations of harm from fundamentalist groups in Pakistan. The RAD finds that the Appellant's evidence was undermined by inconsistencies and discrepancies with respect to material facts and that his supporting evidence raised credibility issues. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, after it has considered all of the evidence, that the Appellant was not targeted by fundamentalist extremists in Pakistan. [63] The RAD agrees with the RPD and finds that, in light of the cumulative adverse credibility findings, the Appellant is not credible and that overall his allegations lack veracity. When considering the facts and evidence of this case in totality, the RAD finds that there is not a serious possibility of persecution for the Appellant, nor would he be subjected personally, on a balance of probabilities, to a risk to life, a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, should he return to Pakistan. Accordingly, the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. CONCLUSION [64] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD and dismisses the appeal. (signed) "Robert Bebbington" Robert Bebbington November 1, 2017 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 40, line 8. 2 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 3 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 33034 (CA IRB). 4 Section 171(c), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), (S.C. 2001. C. 27) 5 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 8, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Pakistan (29 April 2016), Item 1.6, United Kingdom. Home Office (16 July 2014). 6 Ibid, Item 1.8, HCR/EG/PAK/12/02, United Nations. High Commissioner for Refugees (14 May 2012). 7 Ibid, Item 12.5, PAK104713.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (9 January 2014), at p. 11, section 2.1.2. 8 Ibid, Item 1.8, HCR/EG/PAK/12/02, United Nations. High Commissioner for Refugees (14 May 2012). 9 Ibid, at p. 40, section 6. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 8, NDP for Pakistan (April 29, 2016), Item 1.12, United Kingdom. Home Office (6 October 2014), at p.8, section 2.4.2. 11 Ibid, Item 1.16, United Kingdom. Home Office (February 2015), at p. 5, section 2.4.1; p. 7, section 3.1.2; p. 8, section 4.1.2. 12 Ibid, at p. 5 and pp. 9-10. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 8, NDP for Pakistan (April 29, 2016), Item 12.5, PAK104713.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (9 January 2014), at p. 4, section 2 and p. 7, section 2.1.1. 14 Ibid, at p. 8, section 2.1.1. 15 Ibid, at p. 10, section 2.1.1. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 8 NDP for Pakistan (April 29, 2016), Item 2.4, Human Rights Watch (January 2016). 17 Ibid, Item 12.5, PAK104713.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (9 January 2014), at p. 8, section 2.1.1. 18 Ibid, Item 12.5, PAK104713.E, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (9 January 2014). 19 Ibid. 20 Montemayor Romero, Santiago Cosme v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-1146-08), Dawson, August 28, 2008; 2008 FC 977; Hussain, Majeed v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2345-02), O'Reilly, April 8, 2003. 21 Basseghi, Kourosh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2227-94), Teitelbaum, December 6, 1994. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 140. 23 Ibid, at p. 139. 24 Adar, Mohamoud Omar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no IMM-3623-96), Cullen, May 26, 1997; Uddin, Nizam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-895-01), Gibson, April 26, 2002; Mohanarajan, Sriahilandtharanathan v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5482-00), Simpson, November 6, 2000. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 113, 114, 115-118, 119-122, 123-126, 127-130. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 40-41, lines 23-24. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-07977