TB5-11062

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-11062 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX (A.K.A. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision January 5, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Robert S. Garner Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Jerome F. Olorunpomi Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) is a citizen of Jamaica. She appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the negative determination and substitute a positive determination; namely, to accept the Appellant's claim for protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the RAD refer the matter to the RPD for re-determination, giving directions to the RPD to accept the Appellant's claim. The Appellant submitted new evidence but did not request an oral hearing. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD and dismisses the appeal. Memorandum of Appeal [3] The Appellant submits the following issue on appeal, "Did the panel come to a negative credibility finding based on an erroneous assessment of the evidence before her?"1 Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [4] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant "...may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected2 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection." [5] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.3 [6] While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness", these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, or is immaterial to the issues to be considered by the RAD, it would make little sense to admit such document, even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [7] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to evidence that passes the test in section 110(4). (a) The RAD will consider whether the proposed new evidence is credible and trustworthy. (b) The RAD will assess the relevance of the evidence - whether it is capable, together with the other evidence in the record (including other admissible new evidence) of proving or disproving a fact at issue in either the refugee claim or the appeal.4 [8] The RAD will determine whether the evidence is material, in the sense that it would be capable of justifying, with or without the benefit of an oral hearing, as the case may be, a disposition under section 111 of the IRPA [9] The Appellant submitted a report,5 dated XXXX XXXX, 2015, of a licensed private investigator working in conjunction with police that are investigating the death of the Appellant's uncle XXXX, and threats of death and harm to the Appellant and her cousin, XXXX. The Appellant submits that the private investigator is working with the Jamaican police. The date of the report is after the refugee hearing of July 29, 2015, and the date of decision, September 25, 2015. Although it would be reasonable that this private investigator would produce a report prior to the date of decision, September 25, 2015, the RAD will consider the report. [10] The Appellant's submission that the private investigator is working with the police, is not substantiated by the private investigator's letter. The last paragraph of this letter indicates that he spoke to the police investigator and discovered that the police were unable to protect the girls. Furthermore, in the second paragraph of the letter, he makes no mention of who allegedly called him in to assist in the investigation. [11] The letter, allegedly from the private investigator, is not notarized; neither is the identity, role, or occupation of the author of the letter substantiated. It would be credible in such a circumstance, to have this information in such a report. In addition, the report, allegedly from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, appears to be written on regular paper, without an appropriate business heading and information that would reasonably be expected from an accredited investigation firm. [12] Given the above reasoning, the RAD does not accept the report from the alleged private investigator as probative and, as a result, it is not accepted as new evidence. [13] The Appellant submitted banking statements6 from an alleged joint account with the Appellant's name as well as her uncle's name, XXXX XXXX, a XXXX citizen. The submitted documents, according to the Appellant, have transactions related to the business of the Appellant's uncle XXXX in Jamaica, and name the Appellant as the operator of the business account. [14] In reviewing the documentation, the RAD notes that the transactions are recorded from XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013 until XXXX XXXX, 2014, information inconsistent with the "Transaction Date Range: From XXXX XXXX XXXX/2012 until XXXX XXXX XXXX/2014". The information presented only covers a portion of the transaction range. The printed version of the name of the account from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, is XXXX XXXX. The only mention of the Appellant is a handwritten notation of the Appellant's name under the section "NAME". There is a notation that says, "made joint XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX12". There is a similar notation made at the top of page 70, between the name of her uncle, XXXX XXXX, and his address of XXXX XXXX XXXX. It is not credible that the bank statement would not have the printed the names of the account holders. It is also not credible that this account, allegedly produced some time after XXXX XXXX, 2014, would not have current information printed on the statement. On page 75 of this bank statement is a list of the holders of the account and the account numbers. The Appellant's name does not appear. The date of this account precedes the date of the hearing, July 29, 2015, and the date of decision, September 25, 2015. As a result, this alleged document was reasonably available prior to the refugee hearing, and could reasonably have been presented at that time, or before the rejection on September 25, 2015. According to section 110(4), this new evidence will not be accepted. [15] Even if the document had been admitted, the RAD would have found it not credible and not relevant to the ultimate determination of the claim. The reasoning is noted above. [16] The Appellant submitted business documents and pictures7 of the property of her uncle, XXXX XXXX; a property alleged to be managed by the Appellant and her deceased uncle XXXX. The date of the inspection of the premises was XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014. The pictures of the alleged property are undated, and there is no indication of the address or any other defining information regarding the property shown in the pictures. In that this document and pictures could reasonably have been expected to be available for the refugee hearing, the RAD does not accept these documents and pictures as new evidence according to IRPA section 110(4). Background [17] The Appellant alleges the following. [18] The Appellant's uncle, XXXX XXXX, a citizen of XXXX, built a house on family land in Jamaica and started a business XXXX XXXX. The Appellant, her uncle, XXXX XXXX, and her cousin, XXXX XXXX, were given responsibility for XXXX affairs in Jamaica, which created animosity between family members and they received threats on a number of occasions. On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, the Appellant's uncle XXXX asked her if she was going to be coming home from university that weekend and indicated that the Appellant's aunt XXXX wanted to know. The Appellant told him she would be home; however, some assignments prevented her from following through with her plans and she did not go home as intended. [19] On XXXX XXXX, 2014, the Appellant's uncle XXXX was murdered while her aunt XXXX, XXXX husband XXXX, and their children were spared and placed in a separate room. The Appellant began to suspect that the question posed by her aunt about whether she would be home for the weekend was not innocent, and had she gone home as she initially intended, she would have been murdered also. [20] XXXX daughter also told XXXX that she could identify one of the assailants, but she had been told by her mother and father (XXXX and XXXX) not to do so when asked by police. The Appellant's uncle XXXX came to the funeral and the family was put under police watch, yet they continued to receive threats from unknown sources. The Appellant believes that XXXX and XXXX were involved in the murder of her uncle XXXX; however, they have not been charged due to lack of evidence. [21] The Appellant came to Canada, using a valid Canadian visa, because she was fearful for her life. She arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2014, hoping that after a few months things would be over and she could return home for school. However, on May 15, 2015, she was informed by her mother and by a close friend that things were still not safe; the murder investigation was ongoing and she was still in danger. Hence, she made a claim for refugee protection in approximately May 2015. [22] The Appellant's refugee hearing was held on July 29, 2015, and in a decision of September 25, 2015, the RPD found, after having considered the totality of the evidence, that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 96 and subsection 97(1) of the IRPA. ROLE OF THE RAD [23] The RAD finds that the recent Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,8 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal, such as the RAD, to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. The Appellant concurs. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error". [24] Accordingly, the RAD conducts its own independent assessment and determines whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Deference will be afforded to the credibility findings of the RPD or to other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. Merits of the Memorandum of Appeal Section 96 of the IRPA [25] The RPD, using Federal Court decisions,9 found that the Appellant was a victim of a personal vendetta, and this did not establish a link between fear of persecution and one of the Convention grounds in the definition of a Convention refugee. The RPD considered the Appellant's counsel's submissions at the refugee hearing, that she should be considered a member of a particular social group as a young girl facing gender violence, but the RPD did not concur. [26] The Appellant made no submission on this issue in the Memorandum of Appeal. Reliance on Trivial Errors [27] The RPD noted in its decision several incidents that occurred over the years. Specifically, an incident in 2006 where XXXX and her father argued and her father was chopped with a machete. Also an incident in 2006, where XXXX began making unwanted advances towards her. The RPD made no findings on this issue. [28] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by relying on trivial errors and thereby came to a negative determination of the Appellant's claim. The Appellant cites two examples: her failure to be able to give evidence of events in 2004 when XXXX made unwanted advances, and the assault on her father in 2006. The Appellant submits these areas are too trivial and not too fundamental to defeat the claim, taking into consideration the Appellant's age and when she was sexually assaulted in 2004, and the machete assault on her father when she was a minor child, 11 years old. [29] In reviewing the RPD's decision, the RAD finds that the RPD found that these allegations did not support the Appellant's contention that she should be considered a member of a particular social group, as a girl facing gender violence. The RAD concurs. There is no documentation to support the Appellant's allegations of this occurrence. In addition, in reviewing her testimony and BOC narrative, the basis of her claim is fear of persecution and death from her relatives, not gender related persecution. The RAD finds that the Appellant's claim under section 96 of the IRPA fails. Application of Section 97(1) of the IRPA [30] The Appellant outlined the purpose statement for section 97(1). She submitted "...that the Appellant's claim is covered by the provision of section 97(1) of IRPA being a provision of the Act that is forward-looking."10 She also stated that: Assuming without conceding to the fact that the Appellant did not and/or has not suffer [sic] persecution in Jamaica in the past, however there is exists the likelihood of future persecutions against her in Jamaica as contained in both her documentary and oral evidence the panel has a duty to consider her claim under section 97(1) of IRPA. [31] The Appellant further submitted:11 ...that the Appellant has demonstrated unequivocally that she has both subjective and objective fear of persecution that makes her claim to deserve consideration under section 97(1) of IRPA. The Appellant's fears as contained in her documentary evidence and oral testimony before the panel are: (a) In XXXX of 2014 threats of death were made to the Appellant and her uncles XXXX and XXXX XXXX, and her cousin XXXX by her aunt's husband XXXX; (b) On XXXX XXXX, 2014 her aunt XXXX enquired if she was coming home for the weekend (XXXX had never enquired on this before); (c) On XXXX XXXX, 2014 at approximately 6 am her uncle XXXX XXXX was savagely murdered in the house he shared with the Appellant, and her aunt's family; (d) Based on credible evidence, it is suspected that her aunt XXXX and her husband XXXX are involved in the savaged killing of her XXXX XXXX; (e) Credible death threats were made directly to the Appellant by telephone calls; (f) Credible threats were made and rumoured throughout the community that individuals were planning to shoot up (not a shoot-out) the funeral of XXXX XXXX sparking the police to deploy upwards of XXXX uniformed and non-uniformed officers to the event; (g) The police requested the family to not have a 'wake' or a after funeral 'reception' because of credible death threats to the family; (h) The police requested the family to have a l0am start for the funeral (not a normal time for funeral in Jamaica) and for the family to leave the area (the district) by 3pm the day of the funeral; (i) The police assisted the hotel security in providing temporary security for the claimant, her uncle XXXX and her cousin XXXX for XXXX additional days until the claimant and her uncle XXXX departed the island; (j) At the time of making a claim for protection in Canada unknown individuals continue to search for the Appellant and her cousin XXXX; (k) The Appellant has demonstrated that she has sought the protection of the state to little or no avail; (l) The Appellant has demonstrated that she is not safe anywhere in her country of origin; (m) The fear the Appellant is experiencing causes her to obtain XXXX sessions of counselling; (n) The Appellant continues to experience great fear if she were to return to her country of origin; (o) It is well documented that despite the good intentions and that Jamaica has a democratic system of governance it is not equipped to fully protect its citizens. [32] The Appellant submits that the documentary evidence of XXXX XXXX,12 an inspector of police in Jamaica that is close to the investigation, gives credence to the reason why the Appellant's claim ought to succeed under section 97(1) of the IRPA. [33] The RAD finds that the above information is a summary of the Appellant's narrative and testimony at the hearing. The Appellant does not provide any submissions regarding the negative credibility issues in the RPD's decision. The above submissions regarding the Appellant's suitability for refugee status under section 97(1) of the IRPA, are based on the information received and testimony given being found credible. The RPD, in its decision outlined below, found many issues where the Appellant was not credible. Given these findings outlined by the RPD, and the findings of the RAD on each of these issues, the description of events as outlined by the Appellant, above, are found not to be credible. [34] The submissions above, with the exception of paragraph 17(c),13are not supported by credible documentation or credible testimony. The letter from the Jamaican police inspector will be dealt with below in this decision. [35] As stated above, the Appellant made no submissions regarding the following issues of credibility outlined by the RPD in its decision. Threats [36] The Appellant testified that there were a number of thefts on the property where she resided with her uncle XXXX, her aunt XXXX, and her aunt's husband XXXX. Because she was assisting in the operation of the business, the Appellant asked XXXX and XXXX about the missing items, as she assumed that they were taking and selling the items. She testified that she received threats, and was told that if she talks too much and if she did not learn to shut her mouth, they would shut it for her. [37] This information was not in the Appellant's narrative. When questioned by the RPD regarding the omission she testified that she did not write this because she thought she should write about what led her to come to Canada, the murder of her uncle XXXX. She stated that she did not think she should write about what happened in 2012, prior to his death. The RPD pointed out to the Appellant that her reports of articles being stolen from his business created the alleged increase in animosity between her and XXXX and XXXX, which in turn led to the death threats against her. She testified that she did not think she had to write it down as she was summarizing what occurred. [38] The RPD did not accept this explanation and found that it would have been reasonable for her to describe, in her narrative, the full extent of why she was being threatened. The narrative only mentions that her uncle XXXX started a business on family land, and that her uncle XXXX and her cousin, XXXX, were responsible for his affairs which led to animosity in the family, and that they were threatened on numerous occasions. The narrative did not specify why or how they were threatened or from whom the threats came. The RPD drew a negative inference, reasoning that these details should reasonably have been recorded in her narrative. The RPD stated that the Appellant is a university student, and found it not reasonable that she provided a summary lacking in such significant details. The RPD stated that this was one of the issues, along with others, that led the RPD to conclude that the Appellant is not credible. [39] In reviewing the testimony of the Appellant, the RAD finds that the omission of such significant details in her narrative is not credible, and draws a negative inference. The narrative only stated that she, XXXX XXXX, and XXXX were responsible for managing her uncle's affairs in Jamaica, and had been threatened on numerous occasions. The Appellant's testimony was much more expansive, and included details that reasonably should have been included in her narrative. The Appellant testified that she received threats of harm and potential death because she challenged XXXX and XXXX regarding the thefts. The RPD finds that this allegation is significant, and should have been included in her narrative. Threat in XXXX 2014 [40] The Appellant testified that things became "very serious" in XXXX 2014 when XXXX and XXXX began stealing things in large quantities and she reported this to her uncle. She also testified they were breaking into her uncle XXXX room and taking valuables, and she reported this to her uncle XXXX. Her uncle XXXX confronted XXXX and XXXX about this issue and threatened to kick them out if they did not change their behavior. The Appellant testified that XXXX allegedly threatened that before he left the property, there were "...two people he would have to kill [XXXX and XXXX] and the Appellant and her cousin [XXXX] would be next." The Appellant testified that she heard about the threat that XXXX had issued from her uncle in XXXX 2014. [41] When the RPD questioned the Appellant about why this information was not in her narrative, she testified that she had written that she received threats and reported them to the police. The RPD noted that she had recorded in her narrative that she "...was threatened on numerous occasions...."14 The RPD noted that there was no context regarding the threats, when they were received, and why. [42] The RPD rejected her explanation that she did not know that you have to write what the threats were. The RPD stated that it would be reasonable to record what happened in XXXX 2014, given that XXXX explicitly threatened to kill her. The RPD noted that previous threats were somewhat ambiguous, but on this occasion XXXX made it clear that he would kill her. The RPD drew a negative inference from this omission in her narrative and found that this detracted further from her credibility. [43] The RPD reasoned that in XXXX 2014, when her uncle XXXX was killed and the Appellant suspected that XXXX and XXXX were behind the murder, the Appellant, believing that she was in danger, would have recorded this in her BOC narrative. The RPD continued to reason that the threats to their lives after XXXX murder was what led the Appellant to believe she was now in danger. The threat would be taken far more seriously because she now had knowledge of what they were capable of, and XXXX had demonstrated they had the wherewithal to arrange XXXX murder. [44] The RAD finds the RPD's reasoning sound. It is not credible that the Appellant, suspecting that XXXX and XXXX caused her uncle XXXX murder, would not include this very specific information in her BOC narrative. Shoot out at the Funeral [45] The Appellant stated that during the 20 days surrounding her uncle XXXX funeral, she received threatening phone calls, one of which was allegedly from the assailants who killed her uncle. The assailants had told the police that they were going to "shoot up the funeral". When asked by the RPD why this was not included in her narrative, the Appellant testified that when she was writing she was so emotional she may not have written everything. The RPD did not accept this explanation, reasoning that if the police had communicated this message to the Appellant and her family, this information should appear in her narrative, given it is one of the reasons why she felt she was personally at risk. The RPD drew a negative inference from this omission. [46] The RAD, after listening to the recording, concurs with the RPD's decision on this issue. The Appellant gave an explanation of how the family was informed by the police of significant information that was not included in her BOC narrative. Given that the Appellant states that this is one of the reasons that she left Jamaica and came to Canada, it would be expected that this significant piece of information would be included. No documentation was submitted to support this allegation. The Appellant testified that no formal report was filed. The RAD draws a negative inference from this omission in Appellant's BOC narrative. After her uncle XXXX murder, it would be credible that the Appellant would file a formal complaint with the police and include this in her BOC narrative. [47] The RAD finds, given the omissions of significant information in the Appellant's BOC narrative - information testified to at the refugee hearing - that the Appellant has not been a credible witness about the details of her alleged experiences in Jamaica. Supporting Documents [48] The Appellant testified that she is one of the beneficiaries of her uncle XXXX land and chicken business. She testified that she had been given this information verbally, and had no documentation to prove this allegation. The Appellant testified that she did not think she would need such information. No documentation was provided at the hearing to show ownership of the land where the business exists; documentation that should easily have been available given that her uncle XXXX, the owner of the property and the business, is present in Canada, and was present at the hearing to provide support for the Appellant. The RPD found that given the business and property were the cause of the animosity between the family and XXXX and XXXX, such documentation, central to her allegations, would have been provided as required by Rule 11 of the RPD's Rules. The RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's failure to provide these documents. [49] As stated above, the Appellant made no submissions on this RPD finding. [50] The RAD, in listening to the recording, finds that the Appellant's testimony regarding being one of the beneficiaries of her uncle XXXX land and business was not substantiated in the documentation. Given that this was one of the alleged points of contention between the family and XXXX and XXXX, it would be reasonable to expect such documentation to be produced. No additional documentation regarding the Appellant's status as a beneficiary of her uncle XXXX land and business was provided with the Memorandum of Appeal. [51] A letter from the Appellant's uncle XXXX was submitted in documentation.15 This letter was allegedly notarized by XXXX XXXX, a notary, according to the Appellant's submissions. The letter contains no information about the alleged notary, nor does it contain the seal which normally accompanies such documentation. On the surface of this letter, the RAD finds that it has no probative value. However, the letter does indicate that XXXX stated that the Appellant was one of the unofficial beneficiaries of his estate, and this created tension within the family. The author of this letter was present at the hearing, but did not avail himself as a witness so that the RPD could question him as to the veracity of a number of statements made in the letter. It would be reasonable and credible, given the number of allegations made by the Appellant's uncle XXXX, that he would support his niece by testifying as to the veracity of his statements, as well as the issues of ownership and banking authorization alleged by the Appellant. Because of the lack of appropriate notarization on XXXX letter,16 the RAD gives the letter no probative value. [52] The RPD found that because the Appellant had no credibility, little weight was given to the statements17 from family members and friends supporting her account of events. The RPD also found that the letter from her uncle XXXX provided significant details that the Appellant did not provide in her own narrative, and it was not a sworn statement or affidavit. The RPD noted that the signature by a second person, XXXX XXXX, gives no information about his identity, what he does, or in what capacity he is sending this document. [53] The RPD found that the letter18 by Inspector XXXX XXXX of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX was not an official police report, and was written in an ambiguous manner. Therefore, the RPD gave the documents little weight in establishing the Appellant's allegations. [54] The RPD reasoned and found that the letter noted above states that "...before the incident, the lives of XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX were threatened as the result of a bitter family dispute. It is believed that the demise of XXXX XXXX was carried out by persons who made these threats." The RPD noted that the inspector concludes the letter by writing that the safety of the Appellant and others has been severely compromised, and it cannot guarantee that they will remain safe due to the ongoing family feud. The RPD found that this implied that the family members are responsible for XXXX death, when the investigation is still ongoing. The RPD also reasoned that it was odd that the inspector was motivated to write such a letter, which does not speak well of the capacity of the XXXX. [55] The Appellant submitted that the panel committed a fundamental error when it failed to place weight on the documentary evidence before it, and therefore the impugned decision must be set aside. The Appellant notes that the RPD placed little weight on a duly notarized document of her uncle XXXX, tendered in evidence. The Appellant supported this submission by quoting case law.19 [56] The Appellant further submitted that the process taken by the RPD in arriving at a negative credibility finding, with respect to the Appellant's claim, is erroneous. She stated that all evidence must be considered and assessed, not just selected portions of the evidence. She further noted that ambiguous statements that do not amount to an outright rejection of the Appellant's evidence, but only "cast a nebulous cloud over its reliability", are not sufficient to discount the evidence. The Appellant submitted case law to support the submission.20 [57] The RAD finds that the RPD considered the evidence given in documentation at the refugee hearing. The RAD is cognizant that the Federal Court has stated that negative credibility findings cannot be used to discount documentation. The RAD, above in this decision, dealt with the letter from XXXX, and gave it no probative value because of the lack of appropriate notarization, and because the author of the letter was in the hearing room and did not testify on behalf of the Appellant. The letters from the Appellant's mother21 and friend22 were allegedly signed by the Justice of the Peace. The RAD gives these letters no probative value in that the identity of the authors was not documented, and that the alleged signature of the Justice of the Peace was, similarly, not documented as to identity, occupation, and an appropriate seal. [58] The RAD has found that the Appellant was not a credible witness regarding the allegations of her claim. She also has not provided any probative documentation to support her allegations. Disposition [59] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Robert S. Garner" Robert S. Garner January 5, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Appeal, p. 93. 2 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected"; see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para. 51. 3 Rule 3(3)(g)(iii), Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 4 See Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, at para. 13; also David Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 3d ed. (Irwin Law, 2002) at 24: "Evidence is relevant where it has some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would appear to be in the absence of that evidence." 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 67-68. 6 Ibid., pp. 70-75. 7 Ibid., pp. 77-89. 8 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799. 9 Leon, Johnny Edgar Orellana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3520-94), Jerome, September 19, 1995; Calero, Fernando Alejandro (Alejandeo) v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3396-93), Wetston, August 8, 1994; Vargas, Maria Cecilla Giraldo v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1301-92), Wetston, May 25, 1994; Marincas, Dan v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5737-93), Tremblay-Lamer, August 23, 1994; De Arce v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 74 (F.C.T.D.); Xheko, Aida Siri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4281-97), Gibson, August 28, 1998; Rivera, Omar Martin Farro v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-572-98), Tremblay-Lamer, February 22, 1999; Bacchus, Amit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4679-03), Mosley, June 8, 2004, 2004 FC 821. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Appeal, p. 96. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Appeal, pp. 96-97. 12 Exhibit, RPD-1, RPD's Record, Letter from XXXX XXXX (Inspector of Police), p. 140. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum of Appeal, p. 96, para. 17, item (c). 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, BOC, p. 23. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 39-41; Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 141-143. 16 Ibid. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 42-45; Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 144-147. 18 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 38; Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 140. 19 Owusu-Ansah (1989), 8 Imm. L.R. (2nd) 106 at 113 (F.C.A.), Mahoney J.A.;Toro [1989] 1F.C. 652 (C.A.). 20 Owusu, Kweku v. M.E.I. (F.C.A. no. A-1146-87), Heald, Hugessen, Desjardins, January 31, 1989; Hilo v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1991), 15 Imm. L.R. (2d) 199 (F.C.A.). 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 42-43. 22 Ibid., pp. 44-45. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-11062