TB7-18290

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-18290 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision July 17, 2018 Date de la décision Panel L. Gamble Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Kristina Cooke Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The AppellantXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant has submitted new evidence in support of this appeal, but she does not request an oral hearing before the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). The Appellant asks the RAD to find her to be a Convention refugee or person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant asks the RAD to refer the matter back to a different member of the RPD for a redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleges that she is a XXXX XXXXyear-old Somali woman of Madibhan ethnicity who fears return to Somalia due to the risk she faces at the hands of Al Shabaab following an incident whereby a member of Al Shabaab demanded to marry her, and when the Appellant and her father refused, her father was killed by Al Shabaab. She states that after the death of her father, she and her immediate family fled to Kenya by bus, and the Appellant herself flew to Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX with a view to seeking refugee protection. The Appellant's mother and brother remain in Kenya.1 [4] The Appellant's claim for refugee protection was heard on July 21, 2017. By a decision dated August 2, 2017, the RPD rejected the claim. The determinative issues before the RPD were identity and credibility. The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness and therefore did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, her identity or that she faces a serious possibility of persecution in Somalia on a Convention ground; or, on a balance of probabilities, that she would personally be subjected to a danger of torture, or face a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, if she were to return to Somalia. 2 [5] On appeal to the RAD, the Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its analysis of her identity and credibility.3 [6] The RAD is not persuaded that the RPD erred. The RPD correctly found numerous and significant credibility issues with respect to the Appellant's evidence, such that she was not a credible witness, and accordingly, she lost the presumption of truthfulness as set out in Maldonado.4 While the failure to mention why the RPD dismissed the witness's evidence may have been an error, it is not fatal to this decision as I have analyzed the witness's testimony herein, and conclude that the witness's testimony as to the identity of the Appellant is not sufficiently weighty to overcome the material credibility problems with the Appellant's testimony. As such, I find that her identity has not been credibly established, and confirm the decision of the RPD for the same reasons. ANALYSIS Role of the RAD [7] For questions of fact, mixed fact and law, and law, the RAD applies the standard of correctness, as per Huruglica.5 In assessing issues involving credibility of oral testimony, the RAD applies the RAD modified standard of reasonableness where the RAD determines the RPD had a meaningful advantage in assessing oral testimony.6 Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [8] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of the claim, or that was not reasonably available, or that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented at the time of the rejection. This section establishes a disjunctive test. It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in the Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the present appeal. If the factors in subsection 110(4) are not met, the RAD does not have discretion to admit the evidence. [9] If the submitted new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), the RAD will consider the criteria as set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Singh.7 The Federal Court of Appeal held that, in addition to the clear language of the statute, the implicit conditions for the admissibility of new evidence include: credibility, relevance and newness. [10] The Appellant has tendered one document as proposed new evidence in support of the present appeal, consisting of a news article about a bombing in Mogadishu by Al Shabaab dated October 16, 2017. RAD Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) directs the Appellant to include in her Memorandum an explanation of how the documentary evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA; however, no submissions were made in respect of this. Absent any argument, which is required of the Appellant in accordance with the Rules,8 I am not inclined to admit this article as new evidence. Nonetheless, as part of my independent assessment, I have reviewed the article and find that the contents of the article reflect the activities of Al Shabaab in Mogadishu, e.g. sporadic attacks, which remain much the same as already set out in the National Documentation Package (NDP) which was before the RPD. Therefore, I also reject the proposed new evidence as it fails to present evidence which is new. [11] I would also note that in the Appellant's statement, she makes mention of an appointment to see a psychologist which post-dates the rejection of her refugee claim.9 However, no documents have been submitted in relation to a consultation between the Appellant and any psychologist, and, again, no submissions were made in respect of any new evidence relating to same. Therefore, no new evidence will be admitted in this appeal. [12] As the Appellant has not requested a hearing before the RAD, and as there has been no new evidence accepted in this appeal, there will be no oral hearing in accordance with subsections 110(3), (4) and (6) of the IRPA. Merits of the Appeal Did the RPD err in its assessment of the Appellant's identity and credibility? [13] The RPD found that the Appellant had lost the presumption of truthfulness with respect to her testimony regarding her identity due to numerous material credibility concerns as set out in the Decision. Given the RPD's finding that the Appellant had lost the presumption of truthfulness, the RPD then turned to the identity witness and the three supporting documents provided by the Appellant to establish her identity, and found that absent credible testimony from the Appellant with respect to her identity, her remaining evidence was insufficiently weighty to overcome the material credibility concerns and to establish her identity, on a balance of probabilities. [14] In the present appeal, the Appellant makes several arguments about the RPD's identity and credibility findings. Each will be addressed in turn. However, even where I have found that the RPD has erred by not setting out reasons for finding the witness's evidence unpersuasive, I find the error not determinative, as the RAD is able to address the error from the evidence on record, and I find that the arguments made by the Appellant are thus not dispositive of the appeal. [15] First, the Appellant contends that the RPD erred by citing no source for the fact that Somali passports have been issued "since at least 2015" in Mogadishu where the Appellant claims to have lived,10 a fact cited by the RPD in the context of faulting the Appellant for not providing documents to establish her identity. The Appellant contends that her testimony that she could not provide a passport because Somalia does not issue them is therefore not inaccurate and that the RPD erred in faulting her for not providing a reasonable explanation for not having provided any primary identity documents.11 The Appellant refers to Item 3.9 of the NDP to support her testimony, which cites US sources stating that there is no "recognized competent civil authority [in Somalia] to issue civil documents."12 However, my review of the record indicates that a more recent item in the NDP affirms that "the Somali government has been issuing biometric passports since December 2013" and clarifies that the USA and other foreign governments do not recognize Somali passports as valid travel documents due to widespread fraud.13 Although Somali passports may not be valid for visa-issuance purposes, it is clear that they are issued in Somalia, specifically in Mogadishu, since 2013 - even earlier than the RPD noted - and may still provide evidence of one's identity in the RPD context. Given that the Appellant has produced no primary identity documents to support her personal identity or Somali citizenship, I agree with the RPD's finding that it was incumbent upon her, according to the Rules, to then provide testimony about what efforts she has made to obtain identity documents, including with respect to a Somali passport as the RPD inquired about; and it was therefore open to the RPD to reject her explanation that she did not seek to obtain one as Somalia does not issue passports, in light of objective documentation which states that the government in Mogadishu has been issuing passports for the last five years. Therefore, I do not agree with the Appellant that the RPD erred in this respect. [16] Secondly, the Appellant argues that the RPD erred by not considering the Appellant's secondary documents purporting to establish her identity, namely: the affidavit from her mother,14 a letter from Dejinta Beesha Somali Multi-Service Centre in Canada,15 and a letter from the Midaynta Community Services in Canada.16 However, a review of the Decision makes clear that, in fact, each of these secondary documents was considered by the RPD, but they were cumulatively found to be insufficient to establish her personal and national identity, on a balance of probabilities, when weighed against the significant credibility concerns with respect to her testimony. [17] Upon my own review, I also give little weight to the Dejinta Beesha and Midaynta Community Services letters insofar as they purport to establish the Appellant's identity. First, these letters are from Canadian community organizations, which have no independent knowledge of who the Appellant is/was before she came to Canada and therefore premise their conclusions as to the Appellant's personal identity and citizenship on information emanating solely from the Appellant herself, who, as noted in the RPD Decision and for reasons contained herein, has lost the presumption of truthfulness including with respect to her personal and national identity assertion. Moreover, at best, these community organization letters would only serve to speak to the Appellant's Somali background - not her personal identity, or in fact, her citizenship, as people of Somali ethnicity or descent live all around the world, and therefore factors like speaking the Somali language do not establish one's Somali citizenship. [18] In addition, I note in particular that the Dejinta Beesha letter concludes from a written questionnaire and oral interview session with the Appellant that the organization "confirms" the Appellant is who she says she is, with a date of birth of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, a citizen of Somalia and that she belongs to the "minority Yibir clan."17 There are several concerns with respect to this conclusion, notably: an oral history of Somalia and completion of a questionnaire cannot establish her personal identity and date of birth, and the Dejinta Beesha conclusions give rise to more inconsistencies with the Appellant's own evidence, which is that her birthdate is XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (not 1977) and that the Appellant specifically amended her Basis of Claim (BOC) from the original statement that she was part of the Yibir clan to assert that she is part of the Madibhan clan.18 Thus, I can give no weight to the Dejinta Beesha letter to establish the Appellant's identity given the inconsistencies between its conclusions as to her identity and the Appellant's own identity assertions. [19] The remaining letter, from Midaynta Community Services, indicates that the Appellant identified herself to them as a member of the Madhiban clan and Kulber sub-clan, which is consistent with her Amended BOC but different from how she reportedly identified at the Dejinta Beesha interview and in her original BOC. I find that I cannot give either letter sufficient weight to establish the Appellant's identity absent credible and reliable testimony from the Appellant herself. [20] With respect to the Affidavit from the Appellant's mother in Kenya, the RPD gave the Affidavit little weight due to inconsistencies between the Affidavit and the Appellant's testimony on whether the family "flew" to Kenya from Somalia or took a bus, and whether the family sought political asylum in Kenya or not.19 The Appellant argues that the use of the word "flew" in the mother's Affidavit is not inconsistent with the Appellant's testimony that they took a bus to Kenya, as the mother could be using the term "flew" to indicate that they "fled."20 It is possible that this could be so; however, even if I were to accept this as a purported linguistic error instead of an inconsistency in the Appellant's evidence, I still cannot find that the affidavit from the Appellant's mother is sufficiently weighty as to overcome the lack of credible testimony emanating from the Appellant herself, such that I cannot find that, on the strength of the Affidavit alone, she has established her identity, on a balance of probabilities. [21] The last aspect of the Appellant's attempt to establish her identity is the testimony of her identity witness, the elder sister of one of the Appellant's friends in Somalia who was also a neighbour of the Appellant in Somalia. The RPD found the evidence provided by the Appellant and her witness was "inconsistent, lacking in detail, and/or not persuasive," such that the witness's testimony was not sufficiently weighty to establish the Appellant's identity, on a balance of probabilities, absent credible testimony from the Appellant herself.21 The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to address how the witness's testimony was not persuasive and that this is a fatal error in the decision.22 While I agree that the RPD ought to have provided reasons as to why it was unpersuaded by the witness's testimony, I have reviewed the testimony of both the Appellant and her witness and ultimately agree with the RPD's conclusion that the witness's testimony was unpersuasive to establish the Appellant's identity, on a balance of probabilities, for the reasons that follow. [22] The witness's testimony was general in nature and lacking in detail, as her testimony essentially amounted to simply asserting that the Appellant was known to her as a friend of her younger sister and someone she knew from being neighbours in Somalia. The witness testified that she last saw the Appellant in Somalia when the Appellant was a child in 2007 when the Appellant was about ten years old (according to the birthdate provided on her BOC) and that the witness recognized the Appellant during a chance encounter at a No Frills grocery store in Canada ten years later, when the Appellant was approximately 20 years old, because the Appellant "has the same face." The witness did not know the Appellant well, as they were not friends due to the difference in age (the witness being about ten years older than the Appellant) and the fact that they attended different Qur'anic schools; the witness was also unable to give any detail about the Appellant personally, such as about her house or personal activities. Therefore, the testimony was of limited value to be compared against testimony from the Appellant in respect of the same questions for verification. While I did not note any major inconsistencies between the testimony of the witness and Appellant, I do find that the vague and general nature of the witness's testimony limited the value of her testimony, such that I cannot give it sufficient weight so as to prove the Appellant's identity, on a balance of probabilities - even when considered in conjunction with the limited weight afforded to the Affidavit of the Appellant's mother. The credibility concerns which arose with respect to the Appellant's assertions are material (as set out below), and the recognition ten years later of the witness's sister's friend from Somalia, whom she last knew as a child, without more, is simply insufficient to overcome these concerns and to establish the Appellant's identity on a balance of probabilities. [23] With respect to the reasons the Appellant was found by the RPD to have lost the presumption of truthfulness, I note that the credibility concerns and inconsistencies in her evidence were numerous, material and remained unsatisfactorily explained by the Appellant when presented to her for comment by the RPD. In my view, the inconsistencies in the Appellant's evidence regarding her personal identity and the events which led her to flee Somalia and seek protection in Canada are so fundamental as to rebut the presumption of truthfulness with respect to her testimony; so, I will deal with those issues first before returning to the issues of the Appellant's use of fraudulent documents to enter Canada and her delay in claiming, as identified by the RPD. [24] The RPD found that, according to the Appellant's BOC and Amended BOC, she identified as a Sunni Muslim and part of the Sufi sect known as Qadiro.23 At the hearing, she again identified as a Sunni Muslim, but she stated that she was part of the Shia sect, an allegation which does not appear in her BOC or other documents. She testified about characteristics of those who practice the Shia sect of Sunni Islam, including graveside rituals of prayer and the slaughter of animals; however, the Appellant's BOC lists these same rituals as those of the Sufi sect.24 In testimony, she made no mention of being part of the Sufi sect, as set out in her BOC, and continued to allege she was part of the Shia sect which is entirely omitted from her BOC. When asked by the RPD to explain this inconsistency, the Appellant indicated she was Sunni-Shia Muslim, and when further asked to explain how she could be both Sunni and Shia, the Appellant simply responded, "I don't know." She did not provide an explanation for the multiple references to Sufism in her BOC which were omitted from her testimony. [25] The Appellant argues that the RPD's comment that her explanations were unreasonable, particularly as she alleges she had studied at Qur'anic school for ten years constitutes "impropriety" in the decision.25 However, given that a distinct basis for the Appellant's refugee claim was her alleged practice of Sufi Islam,26 I find it unreasonable that she would fail to mention adherence to Sufism in testimony and also fail to mention identifying as a "Sunni Muslim, of the Shia sect" or indeed making any comment of her adherence to Shia Islam on her BOC. This constitutes a material and significant inconsistency and omission, which undermines the very basis of the Appellant's refugee claim and erodes her testimony about her identity, including specifically her religious identity. I agree with the RPD that this materially undermines the Appellant's credibility, and I can find no error on the part of the RPD. [26] In addition, the RPD noted that the Appellant identified as part of the Yibir minority clan in her interview with the Dejinta Beesha organization and in her original BOC;27 whereas, she submitted an Amended BOC to the RPD indicating that her clan membership was Madibhan and not Yibir.28 I note that the Appellant identified as part of the Madibhan minority clan in her subsequent interview with the Midaynta Community Services organization and that her alleged Madibhan clanship forms one of the bases for her claim.29 The Appellant makes no argument on this finding made by the RPD, but it is worth noting that, although a mistake may be acceptable when corrected or revised in an Amended BOC, given that her minority clan membership constitutes a basis for her refugee claim, I find it unreasonable that the Appellant would name her clan as Yibir in her original BOC and self-identify at the Dejinta Beesha interview as Yibir, before amending her BOC to reflect Madibhan clan affiliation instead of Yibir, and later identify as Madibhan at the interview with Midaynta Community Services. I find that this is a material inconsistency which undermines the Appellant's credibility in respect of both her identity claim and her basis of claim. [27] The RPD also noted significant contradictions in the Appellant's evidence regarding key elements of the precipitating event which caused her to flee Somalia for Kenya with her mother and brother in early 2017.30 According to her narrative, the Appellant alleges that a member of Al Shabaab approached her while she was working at her family's tea shop and demanded to marry her on December 15, 2016. The next day, the man attended the family's home with two other men from Al Shabaab and told the Appellant's father that he wanted the Appellant to marry him. Her father refused, and on December 21, 2016, the man attacked her father's store and killed the Appellant's father. [28] However, in testimony, the Appellant stated that the Al Shabaab man came to her and demanded to marry her on December 13, 2016; she also said that the "same day", he went and made the demand of her father to marry the Appellant, before changing her testimony to indicate he returned "two days later" to make the demand of her father. Lastly, in testimony, the Appellant recounted that the man had attended her father's workplace to make the demand; whereas, the Narrative is clear that the man came to the family home. When asked to clarify, the Appellant continued to be very unsure about the dates, chronology, and location of the key events which she alleges resulted in the death of her father and led her to flee Somalia. By way of explanation, the Appellant only responded that she "got mixed up" about the dates of these events and that her testimony was correct and not her Narrative: that the Al Shabaab men attended her father's store and not her home, as set out in her Narrative. She offered no further explanation for these contradictions, which the RPD found was unreasonable given the importance of these events and the fact that they allegedly occurred in the recent past which would favour consistency on the part of the Appellant.31 I agree. [29] The Appellant argues that her confusion regarding the dates, chronology and location of these two key visits by Al Shabaab are immaterial to her claim, and instead the focus ought to be on the fact that Al Shabaab approached the Appellant and subsequently killed her father. She also argues that the difference of two days regarding the chronology of events and the location of where her father was initially approached are minor inconsistencies, which do not undermine her credibility.32 However, I cannot find that these three inconsistencies, which remain unexplained by the Appellant but for her statement that she simply got "mixed up," are minor or immaterial. The Appellant's story is a simple one: it is important, as it is the precipitating event which caused her to flee Somalia and seek protection abroad, and as noted by the RPD, it occurred very recently. While the difference of two days' time may seem minor when phrased as such, it is significant when one considers whether the first and second interactions between the Appellant and her father with the man from Al Shabaab occurred on the same day (per testimony), the next day (per BOC), or two days later (per testimony). The Appellant does not allege that she had ever been approached by Al Shabaab in the past. Given the significance of these events on the Appellant's life and the recent occurrence of these events, I would expect her to recall with relative consistency the chronology of events as well as the locations of where these events occurred, or were said to have occurred when she was told about them. I agree with the RPD that these inconsistencies remained unsatisfactorily explained by the Appellant and materially undermine her credibility with respect to the basis of claim in addition to her overall credibility. [30] The RPD faulted the Appellant for failing to make her refugee claim in Canada at the first available opportunity at the airport despite her stated intention to make a refugee claim in Canada and instead entering Canada with what she now claims was a fraudulent Canadian passport, thereby depriving immigration authorities of the opportunity to verify her documents, route, or other aspects of her story. The RPD noted that Canadian jurisprudence affirms that a failure to claim asylum at the first available opportunity and the use of false or fraudulent documents can be indicative of a lack of subjective fear of harm on the part of the refugee claimant and can undermine the claimant's credibility.33 In the present case, the RPD found these actions on the part of the Appellant undermined her credibility and her claim to have a subjective fear of return to Somalia. [31] The Appellant argues that she is a young woman, XXXXyears old, entering Canada alone. She states that she did not claim upon arrival because she was "...in a foreign country and entirely unfamiliar with her surroundings and the refugee system and needed time to acquaint herself with same."34 The Appellant claims to have entered Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, thereafter making her claim inland, which was referred to the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) on May 29, 2017,35 which the Appellant points out is not an egregious delay.36 While the Appellant's remaining arguments on this issue are hyperbolic to the point of lacking merit, indicating that the RPD's reasoning would require the Appellant to remain in Somalia and inform herself of Canada's refugee system before fleeing the country, I would agree with the base argument that the one-month delay in claiming is not egregious. However, as the RPD's decision did not rest solely on the issues of delay and entry into Canada on false or fraudulent documents, I cannot find that the RPD erred. These were but two of the numerous concerns which caused the RPD to doubt the Appellant's credibility, which taken in conjunction with those materially relating to her story (as outlined above) undermine her credibility to such an extent that the RPD found she had lost the presumption of truthfulness on which her identity claim largely rests. I agree. Therefore, the Appellant's arguments on the weight of the negative inferences made by the RPD with respect to her actions in coming to Canada and delaying in making her claim are not determinative. [32] In my own independent assessment of the present appeal, I find that the material credibility concerns which remained insufficiently explained by the Appellant and pertain to the very bases of her refugee claim - namely: her religious identity, her ethnic/minority clan identity, her allegations about being targeted for marriage by Al Shabaab - are sufficient to rebut the presumption of truthfulness with respect to all of the Appellant's testimony, including that of her personal and national identity. The details of her entry into Canada and delay in making her claim are but two more credibility concerns which are less significant but still provide a valid supporting basis for concluding that the Appellant was not a credible witness. I have afforded little weight to the two letters from the Canadian Somali community aid organizations with respect to establishing the Appellant's identity for the reasons outlined above. Absent credible and reliable evidence from the Appellant herself, I cannot find that the basic affidavit of the Appellant's mother and the limited, general testimony of the identity witness are sufficiently weighty as to establish the Appellant's identity, on a balance of probabilities. Therefore, the determinative issue is that the Appellant has not established her identity, on a balance of probabilities. Other Arguments Not Determinative [33] The Appellant has also argued that the RPD erred in failing to apply the Gender Guidelines37 when considering her case. As the Appellant admits, the RPD turned its mind to the application of the Gender Guidelines in deciding this case, as is clear in its reasons.38 However, the Appellant presently argues that the RPD's mention of the Guidelines was perfunctory and that the RPD was not sensitive to the social and cultural differences in assessing the Appellant's claim, resulting in "...ethno-centric, Western-based standards of what he expected to be proper testimony and action from the Appellant."39 The Appellant lists various international human rights instruments by title and asserts that these agreements would have been "helpful" in assessing her claim, but makes no submissions on how or why she believes these instruments should have been considered, how the RPD did not effectively apply the Guidelines in assessing her claim, or any examples of what she believes were ethno-centric or Western-based standards imposed upon her. Therefore, I find these submissions deficient under Rules 3(3)(g)(i) and (ii), which require the Appellant to set out the error alleged and where it was located in the decision. Nonetheless, upon my own review and assessment of the record, I can find nothing to substantiate this argument and I see no evidence that the Gender Guidelines were not effectively applied - indeed, the RPD appeared to be alive to the sensitivities that the Appellant might require throughout the hearing as evidenced by, inter alia, his manner of questioning and offering of breaks where needed - and, as such, I can find no such error. Therefore, this argument is not determinative. [34] While the RPD made comment on the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Somalia and therefore doubted the "additional evidence provided" by the Appellant,40 and the Appellant made arguments that the RPD erred in doubting the authenticity of supporting documents from Somalia,41 I cannot find that any such documents were submitted in support of the Appellant's identity or otherwise before the RPD. I have considered the Appellant's testimony, that of her witness, the BOC and BOC Amendments, the Dejinta Beesha and Midaynta Community Services letters, and the affidavit from the Appellant's mother in Kenya, as well as the country condition documents from the NDP. Given that the Appellant does not specify in her argument which documents she believes to have been erroneously impugned by the RPD, I cannot find merit in this argument. As such, the Appellant's argument is not determinative. [35] Additionally, the Appellant argues that the RPD erred by failing to conduct a full and proper assessment of her claim "under s.96 or s.97" of the IRPA, and despite citing ample Canadian jurisprudence, she does not set out with specificity the error she believes the RPD committed, other than to assert generally that the RPD failed to analyze "significant and credible country condition documentary evidence, personal documentary evidence, an affidavit, and witness testimony that the Appellant faces serious risk upon her return" to Somalia.42 As discussed above, each of these evidentiary items were considered by the RPD with clear and intelligible reasons as to why each item together and cumulatively failed to establish the Appellant's identity, on a balance of probabilities, except for the reasons for giving little weight to the witness's testimony, which I have considered in detail herein. It is trite law that identity is a threshold issue in all refugee claims, and where, as here, the Appellant has not established her identity with credible and reliable evidence, there is no need to go on to assess the merits of her claim separately from the credibility concerns which negatively impacted the presumption of truthfulness which would have otherwise been afforded to her. Therefore, I cannot find that the RPD erred, and this argument is likewise not determinative. CONCLUSION [36] The RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, that there was insufficient persuasive evidence to establish the Appellant's identity, particularly given the credibility concerns outlined in the Decision with respect to her claim. On the basis of the findings noted above and after my own assessment of all the evidence, including the Appellant's oral evidence at the RPD hearing and that of her identity witness, I agree with the finding of the RPD that the Appellant has not established her identity, on a balance of probabilities. As identity is a threshold issue, I therefore find that the Appellant has failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA, and for the same reasons, I find that the Appellant is not a person in need of protection under section 97 of the IRPA. [37] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, I confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention Refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "L. Gamble" L. Gamble July 17, 2018 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 23, Basis of Claim (BOC) Form, Question 5. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD Decision, p. 5, para. 6. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 80, para. 2. 4 Maldonado, Pedro Enrique Juarez v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-450-79), Heald, Ryan, MacKay, November 19, 1979; Reported: Maldonado v. M.E.I., [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.); 31 N.R. 34 (F.C.A.). 5 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no.A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 6 Ibid., Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, at paras. 69-74. Also see X (Re), 2017 CanLII 33034 (CA IRB). 7 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96. 8 Rule 3(3)(g), Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 18, para. 10. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD Decision, pp. 6-7, para. 13. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 84, para. 18. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 84, para. 18, citing National Documentation Package (NDP) for Somalia (May 31, 2017), item 3.9, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Response to Information Request (RIR) SOM105755.E, 6 March 2017. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Somalia (31 May 2017), item 3.11, IRB, RIR SOM105248.E, 17 March 2016, p. 2, section 2. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 45. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 40. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 46. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 40. 18 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 41-43, Amended BOC, Question 1(e). 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Decision, p. 14, para. 41. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 91-92, para. 35. 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Decision, p. 15, para. 42. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 94, para. 39. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 29-30, paras. 5-9. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 29-30, paras. 5-9. 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 91, para. 34. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 32, para. 20. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 19. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Decision, p. 7, para. 15 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 29, paras. 2-4. 30 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD Decision, pp. 12-13, paras. 33-37. 31 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD Decision, p. 13, para. 36. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 91, para. 33. 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD Decision, p. 6, para. 12. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 88, para. 25. 35 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD Decision, p. 9, para. 23. 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 88, para. 25. 37 Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson, pursuant to Subsection 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 25, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD's Decision, p. 4, para. 2. 39 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 92-94, paras. 36-38. 40 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, RPD Decision, pp. 15-16, paras. 46-47. 41 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 97, para. 46. 42 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 99-102, paras. 48-51. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-18290